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ABSTRACT 
In developing countries, malaria treatment is often inadequate, notably in retail shops where 
the majority of people seek care. Shopkeepers are the last link in a chain of wholesalers who 
have an influence on treatment availability, price and quality. Evidence on competition in retail 
and wholesale markets is scarce, partly due to the methodological challenges of studying 
healthcare markets in poor countries. The thesis investigates how market structure, provider 
conduct, customer demand and regulation affect malaria treatment outcomes in Cambodia. In 
addition the thesis contributes to the development of methods for studying private drug 
markets. 
Cross-sectional surveys and semi-structured interviews of representative samples of 
antimalarial retailers and wholesalers were conducted to collect data on provider practices 
and perceptions. The contribution of different empirical methods for identifying and sampling 
wholesalers and measuring sales volumes was also assessed. 
Private commercial providers supplied the majority of antimalarial drugs, reflecting the relative 
proximity, long opening hours, reliable drug stock and friendliness of private retailers. Retail 
and wholesale competition increased accessibility to malaria treatment but did not lead to 
optimal supply of affordable quality treatment. Several market failures were evident: intense 
product differentiation, high concentration, and imperfect consumer information on treatment 
quality. These provided opportunities for higher mark-ups, although not in all market 
segments. With high market heterogeneity, higher retail mark-ups did not necessarily translate 
into higher consumer prices, highlighting the influence of distribution chain structure and 
wholesaler's price setting decisions. Government failures were also frequent, with poor public 
sector treatment accessibility and ineffective regulation'. 
Recommendations include widening distribution networks for artemisinin combination 
therapy and rapid diagnostic tests; improving product stock reliability; decreasing wholesale 
and retail product prices; intensifying providers' training; diffusing information to consumers 
on what constitutes appropriate management of malaria fever; and strengthening regulation 
and the potential to extend its supportive role. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, 225 million cases of malaria were reported worldwide, resulting in 781 000 deaths. 
About 85% of these deaths were children under 5 years of age, with the majority occurring in 
Africa. Malaria control is the 6th Millennium Development Goal (MDG6), which aims for a 
decline of malaria incidence by 2015 (UN Millennium Project, 2005). Unless effective 
preventive and treatment methods reach high levels of coverage, it is unlikely that countries at 
the highest risk of malaria will achieve MDG6 within the given timeset, which will also have 
important implications for reaching MDG4 to reduce child mortality. Furthermore, malaria 
places a considerable burden on the social and economic development of malaria-endemic 
countries that also tend to have lower economic growth rates (Sachs and Malaney, 2002). 
Malaria is caused by a parasite called Plasmodium, which is transmitted to humans via the 
bites of infected female mosquitoes. Different types of Plasmodium species exist, with 
Plasmodium /alciparum (P.!) and Plasmodium vivax (P.v) being the most common parasite 
types and P./the cause of most malaria infections and death (WHO, 2010c). 
One of the cornerstones of malaria control is parasitological confirmation of all suspected 
malaria cases by either microscopy or rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) and treatment of confirmed 
P.f cases with artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT). By 2009, most countries with P./ 
had switched to ACT as their first line medicine, with the choice of combination drugs based on 
their efficacy in specific countries. The therapeutic life of ACT is however threatened by the 
spread of multi-drug resistance (MDR) that has emerged in Western Cambodia. This is of great 
concern to the international community because prolonged parasite clearance may spread to 
other parts of Asia and Africa, as has been the case in the past for older antimalarial drugs 
(Roper et aI., 2004, Verdrager, 1986, Noedl, 2005, Dondorp et aI., 2009). The loss of ACT to 
resistance would be catastrophic for malaria control strategies as no other treatment with the 
same efficacy and tolerability is currently available (WHO, 2010a). Containing resistance to 
areas where it exists is therefore urgent. 
Factors believed to encourage MDR development and spread include inadequate drug 
prescribing, poor consumer adherence to duration or dose of treatment and poor quality drug 
(WHO, 2010a). In addition, the consumption of artemisinin monotherapies (AMT) is argued to 
have fuelled the emergence of MDR (Maude et aI., 2010). A key issue for containment 
strategies is therefore improving access to prompt and appropriate management of malaria 
17 
fevers through increase of ACT availability and decrease of ACT price in relation to other 
antimalarials; withdrawal of artemisinin monotherapies, substandard and fake drugs; targeting 
ACT to those actually in need of the therapy (i.e. parasitological confirmation of malaria cases 
prior treatment) (Whitty et aI., 2008b, Whitty et aI., 2008a) and better adherence to treatment 
regimens. These issues are relevant to both the public and private commercial sectors as the 
latter plays an important role in the provision of malaria treatment. 
Private commercial providers can be pharmacies, drug shops, grocery stores, market stalls or 
itinerant hawkers that are often preferred to public health facilities as they tend to operate 
closer to homes and offer a more reliable source of drugs. However the quality of care they 
provide is often poor, with retailers often lacking relevant qualifications and adequate 
knowledge of drugs and dosages. MDR containment strategies for improving access to prompt 
and appropriate management of fevers are therefore particularly relevant in the private 
commercial sector. The private sector is not limited to providers that serve consumers directly. 
Retailers are the last link in a chain of wholesalers and their business practices are likely to be 
influenced by what happens at higher levels of the distribution chain. There is a need therefore 
to understand private retailers and wholesalers' stocking and pricing decisions, as they are 
likely to have a profound impact on the availability, price and use of different antimalarial 
medicines and diagnostics. There is however a lack of evidence on the structure and 
functioning of the supply-side of the market for malaria treatment, partly reflecting the 
challenges of studying private commercial providers. Retail and wholesale providers are 
commercial businesses and their operations are likely to be affected by both the competitive 
and regulatory environment in which they operate and by customer demand. Theories and 
concepts from the field of economics are therefore likely to provide useful insights for such 
study. 
The main aim of this thesis is to analyse the market for malaria treatment in Cambodia, 
including the retail market and its distribution chain, with a focus on the private commercial 
sector, and to draw public health recommendations for improved access to effective malaria 
treatment and MDR containment. A further aim is to conduct a comparative analysis of 
different empirical methods for studying markets for pharmaceutical drugs in general in 
developing countries. The thesis has five specific objectives: 
• To describe the structure of retail markets for malaria treatment and assess product 
differentiation and non-price competition 
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• To describe the structure of the private commercial sector distribution chain for 
antimalarial drugs and assess product differentiation and non-price competition 
• To assess the intensity of price competition in retail markets and in the private 
commercial sector distribution chain 
• To compare different empirical methods for identifying and sampling private 
commercial providers for antimalarial drugs, and measuring their sales volumes 
• To analyse the implications of the interplay between market structure and provider 
conduct in the context of consumer demand and government intervention on the 
availability, quality and price of malaria treatment and draw recommendations for 
public policy and future research. 
The thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, the institutional context in which the study is 
taking place is described including Cambodia's socio-economic situation, malaria situation, 
health care system, pharmaceutical drug sector regulations and malaria control interventions. 
In Chapter 3, three different literatures relevant to this thesis are reviewed: first, the literature 
on standard models of markets and competition because it provides several concepts of 
potential relevance to the study of the supply-side of the market for malaria treatment, 
including, for example, product and geographical definitions of the market, market 
concentration, vertical integration and restrictions, product differentiation, imperfect 
consumer information and regulatory failures; second, the literature on the range of data 
collection and data analysis methods that have been used for studying retail and wholesale 
markets for pharmaceutical products in low and middle income countries in order to inform 
the design of this study; and third, the available empirical evidence on private commercial 
sector distribution chains for antimalarial drugs in the developing world in order to identify the 
key knowledge gaps at the time of our study. Chapter 4 presents the aims and objectives of 
the thesis, the study design and methods for data collection and data analysis. Results on 
market structure and non-price competition in retail markets are presented in Chapter 5 and in 
the private commercial sector distribution chain in Chapter 6, followed by results on price 
competition in retail markets an"d at different levels of the distribution chain in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 8 gives the results of the comparative analysis of different methods for studying retail 
and wholesale markets in developing countries. The thesis ends by assessing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the research before discussing the results and drawing recommendations for 
public policy and future research in Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 2 CAMBODIA COUNTRY BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the country setting in which the PhO research took place. It gives an 
overview of Cambodia's socio-economic situation, malaria burden, health system, 
pharmaceutical drug regulations and malaria control interventions. 
2.2 Country socio-economic situation 
Cambodia is located in South-East Asia and borders Thailand, Vietnam and Laos. It has a 
population of 13.4 million inhabitants, predominantly rural and a quarter of whom are 
considered migrant (NIS, 2008). Cambodia has the lowest literacy rate in the South EastAsian 
region, with one quarter of the rural population and one tenth of the urban population being 
illiterate (NIS, 2008). The gross domestic product (GOP) per capita is US$ 739 and 40% of 
Cambodians live on less than US$ 1.25 per day (CIA, 2009, World Bank, 2010). 
The agriculture, forestry and fishing sector accounts for 72% of the employed population but, 
still being narrowly focused on paddy productions, accounts for only 32% of GOP. By contrast, 
the wholesale and retail trade sector, which accounts for only 8% of the employed population 
contributes nearly 39% of GOP (NIS, 2008). Most of the labour force is self-employed, working 
in small private commercial enterprises, indicating the importance of 'the informal or 
unorganized sector' (NIS, 2008). 
The importance of the private commercial sector is relatively recent. From 1975 to 1979, the 
Khmer Rouge regime implemented a form of agrarian socialism, characterized by the abolition 
of money and private property, and after the fall of the regime, a socialist economic model 
". 
was implemented. In 1993, the UN-supervised first elections marked the start of progress 
towards recovery, and from 1998, after a second round of elections, economic and political 
stability returned. Several reforms were then implemented, including market liberalisation, 
complete dollarization of the economy and administrative decentralisation (Grundy et aI., 
2009). In 2009, there were 24' provinces (23+Phnom Penh), which included a total of 167 
districts, 1621 communes and 14,119 villages (NIS, 2008). 
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2.3 Malaria burden 
Malaria transmission in Cambodia is seasonal and takes place during the monsoon season from 
May to November. Anopheles dirus and Anopheles minimus are the main malaria vectors1 as 
they breed in thick forests, which cover 62% of the country landmass (CNM, 2009a). Forested 
areas are thinly populated and around 85% of the population actually lives in areas without 
malaria transmission risk (CNM, 2009a). Based on official statistics there has been a downward 
trend in malaria morbidity in the last decade, with 83,777 outpatient and 4,045 inpatient cases 
reported in 2009 (CNM, 2009a). The official Health Information System reports that malaria 
accounts for 0.6% of outpatient cases and 3.5% of inpatient cases (MOH, 2009). 
As opposed to most African malaria endemic countries, the malaria burden in Cambodia falls 
predominantly on male adults who account for 51% of all confirmed malaria cases. Female 
adults, children aged 5 to 14 years old and those aged less than 5 years account each for 
around 16% of all confirmed malaria cases (CNM, 2009b). The 1.8 million of inhabitants at risk 
of malaria are however very heterogeneous populations, that can be broadly categorised in 
four categories (CNM, 2009b), including: 
• Forest fringe inhabitants (around half of the population at risk). Rice growing 
communities living in or close to forested areas. Adult males who make overnight visits 
to the forest to hunt and collect construction wood and other products are the 
primary population risk group. Malaria infected men who return from the forest can 
infect anopheles mosquitoes breeding outside the forest leading to local transmission, 
putting all age group at risks. 
• Cross-borders and temporary migrant workers (around 400,000 people, although the 
actual size of this group is ,hard to estimate (CNM, 2009a)). Mostly adult males with 
little or no immunity to malaria, working in the forest for extended periods (e.g. 
construction workers, agricultural farm workers, sandal wood collectors and soldiers) 
(CNM, 2009a). Timely health facility attendance is low as many delay treatment until 
they return home (CNM, 2009a, URC-MCC, 2009). 
1 Anopheles aconitus and Anopholes moculotes are considered secondary vectors, although their role in 
malaria transmission has been reported to increase following changing in biting habits (CNM, Annual 
Report 2009) 
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• Ethnic minority groups (around 200,000 people). Traditional forest inhabitants living 
mainly in the northeast of the country. All age groups are exposed seasonally to 
intense transmission. Children and pregnant women bear the highest risk. Remoteness 
of these provinces and differences in language, culture and beliefs are the main 
challenges in reaching these populations with effective malaria control interventions. 
• New forest settlers (around 100,000 people). New settlements are continuously 
established by populations with generally low immunity to malaria infections. 
Malaria transmission is the highest in the North and North-East of Cambodia where 
Plasmodium falciparum (P.f) predominates and remains drug-sensitive. By contrast, in the 
West, P.f malaria transmission is generally lower and Plasmodium vivax (P.v) predominates in 
some parts (Shunmay Yeung, personal communication) (Figure 2-1). 
Figure 2-1: Incidence of cases treated for confirmed malaria per 1000 inhabitants in 2009 
LAO P.D.R 
VIETNAM 
o 7Q " 
Source: CNM, personal communication 
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The Western area is also known as the epicentre for multi-drug resistance (MDR) (Noedl, 2005, 
Dondorp et aL, 2009), with MDR defined as reduced in vivo or in vitro parasite responses or 
detected using measures of parasite clearance. Cambodia can therefore be roughly divided 
into two parts: one where MDR is confirmed or suspected (North/North-East) and one without 
MDR (West/South-West). 
2.4 Cambodia's health system 
During the Khmer Rouge regime, Cambodia lost the majority of its public health infrastructure 
and human resources (Chandler, 2000, Dubois et aL, 2004). After the fall of the regime, 
significant reforms were implemented in order to rebuild the public health system (Grundy et 
aL,2009). 
A Health Coverage Plan was designed to improve primary health care coverage, by allocating 
resources and decentralising responsibilities to provincial health departments (PHDs) and 
creating operational districts (ODs). PHDs oversee and support the functioning of their ODs, 
each of which consists of one referral hospital, several health centres and posts and/or village-
based volunteers where no health centres/posts exist. Hospitals provide a comprehensive 
package of health services to a population of 100 000 to 200 000 inhabitants whilst health 
centres provide a minimum package of primary health care services to around 10,000 people. 
By 2009, there was a total of 77 referral hospitals, 992 health centres (of which, 828 newly 
built between 1995 and 2007) and 107 health posts, supplemented by 6140 village-based 
health workers (CNM, 2009a). 
At the time of our study, Cambodia's health care financing was dominated by households' out-
of pocket spending in public health facilities or in the private sector (village-based services 
offered by volunteers being generally free of charge for users). Health financing schemes 
existed, including health equity funds2 and community-based health insurance3, but generally 
on a small scale and ad-hoc basis (e.g. around 247,000 people benefited from health equity 
funds and 45,000 from community-based health insurance (MOH, 2008)). Overall, total health 
expenditure was estimated to amount to US$ 37 per capita of which US$ 25 (68%) was out of 
2 A social-transfer mechanism or third-party payer scheme designed to provide targeted income 
transfers to the p09r to pay for health care services in the public sector through facilities contracted by 
the equity fund. 
3 A micro-assurance scheme managed independently by community _members, whereby the term 
community may be defined as members of a professional group, residents of a particular location, etc. 
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pocket, with the remainder covered by donor organisations (22%) and the Ministry of Health 
(MOH) (10%) (MOH, 2008). 
Improvements in coverage of basic health services have been reported but mostly in areas 
covered by village-based services (Schwartz and Shushan, 2004). Access to public health 
facilities was limited and inequitable (Grundy et aL, 2009, Sigdeli and Annear, 2009). For 
instance, it was estimated that around 670 health centres needed to be built for complete 
coverage of populations, with the further implication that around 6640 health centre staff 
members would need to be recruited (MOH, 2008). Limited geographical accessibility and poor 
drug stock reliability, as commonly experienced in public health sectors in other low income 
settings (Kangwana et aI., 2009, Zurovac et aL, 2008, Zurovac et aL, 2007), combined in 
Cambodia with a lack of trust in government health workers, were reported as the most 
important factors affecting treatment seeking decisions (Ozawa and Walker, 2011, Van 
Damme et aI., 2004), with most health care visits taking place in the private commercial sector, 
notably at drug retailers (Meesen et al 2011). 
2.5 Regulation of the pharmaceutical drug sector 
The private commercial pharmaceutical sector is regulated by the 2007 Pharmaceutical Law, 
which is formed by the 1996 Pharmaceutical Law and the series of law amendments that took 
place until November 2007. Another set of important legal texts are gathered in the Drug Law 
Profile, which includes all Preah Reach Krom (Royal decree), Anukrit (Prime Minister's sub-
decree), Praka (Ministerial decision), joint Praka (Interministerial decision), Sarachor 
("circulaire") and announcements. Other documents include the Good Pharmacy Practice 
2005-2010 that contains standards and guidelines for pharmacy practices, the Pharmaceutical 
Sector Strategy plan 2005-2010 and guidelines on the management and supply of drugs for 
sexually transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. 
The regulation of the private commercial pharmaceutical sector is overseen and implemented 
by the Department of Drug & Food (DDF) of the MOH, in collaboration with the Phnom Penh 
municipality health department and PHDs to which some tasks have been delegated, including 
licensing and inspections of retail and wholesale drug outlets (except that of wholesale drug 
outlets that import pharmaceutical drugs, which remain under the direct regulation of the 
DDF). 
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There are three categories of drug outlet license: 
• pharmacy license for businesses managed by a pharmacist (including drug importers) 
• depot A license for businesses managed by an assistant pharmacist 
• depot B license for businesses managed by retired health staff, with a minimum 
qualification at nurse or midwife level 
Pharmacies can engage in both wholesale and retail activities and can serve depots, private 
and public facilities, and end-users. Pharmacies are authorised to purchase supplies from 
pharmaceutical drug manufacturers and import companies only. Depots can engage in retail 
activities only and purchase only from pharmacies and import companies. There are also 
additional regulations about the size and signage of pharmacy and depot outlets. 
Drug outlet licenses are valid for 2 years, with the exception of pharmacy licenses delivered to 
civil servants with a pharmacist qualification that are valid for 1 year. There was no legally 
fixed license fee at the time of this study. Instead, licensing authorities were advised to charge 
a small fee to cover the costs of undertaking this task and the overall functioning of their office 
(DDF, personal communication). 
The number of registered pharmacy outlet in each commune is capped at 1 outlet for 2,000 
inhabitants so once this ratio is reached no new licenses should be issued. New depot 'A' 
licenses should only be issued if there is less than 1 pharmacy per 2,000 inhabitants in a given 
commune. No new depot 'B' licenses have been issued since 2005 though those issued before 
2005 can be renewed. 
Pharmacy and depot license holders are authorised to change the location of their outlet 
within the same commune after 6 months of operation. They are also authorised to pass on 
their license to a different person with the relevant qualifications (again after 6 months of 
operation). These changes need to be notified to and agreed by the relevant municipal or 
provincial health department. License holders are authorised to open one outlet only, implying 
that pharmacy and depot (horizontal and vertical) chains are not authorized. Registered 
outlets are authorised to sell registered pharmaceutical drugs, hygienic and cosmetic products 
with preventive and curative properties, and dental, laboratory and medical equipment. The 
sale of other consumer goods, such as household products and food is forbidden. Inspections 
I 
of drug outlets are conducted before licenses are issued and theoretically once a month at 
each outlet by the municipal or PHD authorities (DDF, personal com.munication). 
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Pharmaceutical drugs must be registered at the DDF. The process generally takes between 4-5 
months, including 3 months for drug quality control activities and 1 to 2 months for processing 
the registration. Drugs procured by the MOH including antimalarials, tuberculosis and 
HIV/AIDS medicines can be registered through a fast track registration process, which takes 2-3 
weeks. Drugs are registered for 5 years, unless the World Health Organization (WHO) 
recommends that the drug should be banned for public health reasons, in which case the MOH 
registration is annulled and the import, distribution and sales of the drug are banned (DDF, 
personal communication). Registered pharmaceutical drugs are classified as prescription-drug 
or over-the-counter medicines. 
Before registered drugs can be distributed, importers or local manufacturers should place a 
sticker on each drug pack stating the drug registration number and their company name. 
Distribution and sale of packs containing more than 100 tablets or bottles above 300 millilitres 
to pharmacies, depots and private facilities are forbidden. Distribution is regulated at 
municipal and PHD level though in some provinces drug companies· might have to obtain 
additional authorisation from OD authorities before conducting any distribution activities 
within the OD. Finally, drug prices and mark-ups are not regulated. 
It is estimated that a total of 519 outlets are managed by registered pharmacists (pharmacy 
outlets), 126 by registered assistant pharmacists (depots A) and 568 by registered nurses or 
midwives (depots B) (DDF, personal communication). In addition, aside from these outlets, 
there are other medicine sellers that operate illegally (DDF, personal communication). These 
include unlicensed pharmacies and drug shops that sell medicines, cosmetics and household 
goods; private clinics (sometime referred as cabinet or clinical pharmacies) that sell medicines 
and also provide outpatient and/or inpatient clinical services; mobile providers who travel to 
patients' home to provide clinical services, and at times who offer outpatient and/or inpatient 
care at fixed outlets; and, grocery and villc;lge shops that sell medicines alongside food, soft 
drinks and other consumer goods (PSI, 2007, ACTwatch Group, 2009b). These providers who 
operate without .relevant licenses are estimated to account for 70-80% of all private 
commercial outlets in Cambodia (MOH, 2003, Tawfik, 2006). 
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2.6 Malaria Control 
Since 2000, the national treatment guidelines state that malaria cases should be confirmed 
through blood tests, either using microscopy or rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) (CNM, 2000). 
Confirmed uncomplicated adult P.f cases should be treated with the artemisinin-based 
combination therapy (ACT) artesunate and mefloquine (ASMQ) for 3 days a'nd P.V cases with 
chloroquine also for 3 days (CNM, 2000). For mixed infections, ASMQ should be used (CNM, 
2000). Severe adult cases are managed using quinine and tetracycline for 7 days (CNM, 2000). 
However, there is evidence that these treatment guidelines are often not followed, notably in 
the private commercial sector where the majority seek care (Meesen et aL, 2011, DHS 2005, 
CMS 2007). Malaria infection is often diagnosed presumptively on the basis of clinical 
symptoms rather than by blood tests and is often poorly treated with inadequate antimalarial 
regimens, including artemisinin monotherapies (AMT) or cocktail medicines composed of 
inappropriate or unnecessary drugs (Yeung et aI., 2008, CDUS, 2002). Particularly, the use of 
AMT is argued to have fuelled the emergence of MDR and contributed to its spread (Maude et 
aI., 2010). Evidence also shows that substandard and fake antimalarial drugs4 are available in 
Cambodia and in the Mekong region more generally, with in the latter 33% to 53% of 
artesunateS samples estimated to be counterfeits or containing either no or sub-therapeutic 
quantities of the active ingredient (Newton et aL, 2008, Lon et aL, 2006, MOH, 2004b, MOH, 
2001). Specifically, in Cambodia in 1999, 71% of 133 private drug outlets sold either fake or 
substandard artesunate and 60% fake or substandard mefloquine6 (Rozendaal, 2001). The 
same year, 25% of 26 samples of artesunate tablets collected in shops operating in Phnom 
Penh and Siem Reap towns contained no active ingredients (Newton et aI., 2001), with little 
change in 2004 (Dondorp et aL, 2004). In 2006, of 451 antimalarial drug samples collected at 
171 private drug outlets operating in four provinces with suspected or confirmed MDR, 27% 
were substandard "products or counterfeits (Lon et aI., 2006). Worryingly, the literature 
highlights an increased difficulty for investigators to visually differentiate counterfeits from 
4 The World Health Organization (WHO) defines substandard medicines as "pharmaceutical products 
that do not meet I their quality standards and specifications" (45th WHO expert committee on 
specifications for pharmaceutical preparations, 2010) 
sAn artemisinin-based monotherapy (AMT) 
6 A non-artemisinin-based monotherapy (nAMT) 
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genuine products with 80% of fake products collected in Cambodia being almost 
indistinguishable from the genuine product (Oondorp et aL, 2004, Lon et aL, 2006). 
To address these challenges and in the context of the importance of the private commercial 
sector, there have been five main interventions for improving the quality of malaria treatment 
obtained in Cambodia. 
First, a national ban on the sale and distribution of oral AMTs was announced in 2008, 
combined with a public campaign, including television spots and leaflets distributed in private 
drug outlets. Second, a public campaign was implemented about the availability and risks of 
counterfeit medicines at private commercial shops in 20097• 
Third, in areas at high risk of malaria (i.e. villages within 2 kms of the forest), free malaria 
diagnostics using ROT and treatment with co-blistered ASMQ in public health facilities and, in 
particularly remote villages, from trained village malaria workers (two volunteers per village 
referred to as VMWs) (Yeung et aL, 2008). 
Fourth, in areas where MOR is confirmed, the ACT dihydroartemisinin+piperaquine (OHA+PP) 
replaces ASMQ for treating uncomplicated P.f and mixed infections. 
Fifth, in the private commercial sector, a nationwide social marketing programme of ROT and 
co-blistered ASMQ implemented by the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Population 
Services International (PSI Cambodia) in collaboration with the National Malaria Control 
Programme (commonly known in Cambodia as CNM (National Malaria Centre)), and with the 
financial support of the Global Fund. The social marketing programme was initiated in 1999 by 
the European Commission Cambodia Malaria Control Project in partnership with the CNM and 
the WHO, and handed over to PSI Cambodia jn 2003. 
At the time of the .~tudy, PSI Cambodia provided one-day group training sessions to all their 
private commercial drug customers (regardless of their license status) for ACT and ROT and 
operated a "medical detailing" programme, in which clinically or pharmacy trained sales 
representatives visited shopkeepers at their place of work in order to provide advice and 
7 Including the ttPharmacide" public service announcement, a collaboration between the United States 
Agency for International Development, the United States Pharmacopeial Convention and Cambodia's 
government authorities. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BoyPJiDzosM 
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support (PSI Cambodia, personal communication). PSI Cambodia also conducted behaviour 
change communications, including mass media advertising through television and radio spots, 
distribution of point-of-sale materials such as posters and job aids, and community educational 
activities through mobile video units (PSI Cambodia, personal communication). 
The co-blistered ACT ASMQ was procured from an overseas manufacturer in age-specific packs 
under the name of Malarine and the P.f specific RDT under the name Malacheck8 • The 
products were stocked at PSI Cambodia's warehouse in Phnom Penh and stocks for around 
two months were distributed to three regional depots from where PSI Cambodia's sales 
representatives got their monthly supplies (PSI Cambodia, personal communication). 
ACT and RDT were distributed to any private commercial outlet type, although with a focus on 
pharmacies, clinical pharmacies, drug shops and mobile providers (PSI, 2007), at a subsidized 
prices. At the time of our study, PSI Cambodia sold one pack of Malarine adult at a price of US$ 
0.42 and a box of 10 RDT units at US$ 0.50 (equivalent to US$ 0.05 per test), regardless of 
whether providers were retailers or wholesalers (PSI Cambodia, personal communication). PSI 
Cambodia recommended private shopkeepers to sell the adult pack of Malarine at US$ 0.61, 
with the recommended retail price (RRP) being printed on packs, and one RDT test unit at US$ 
0.24 (RRP not printed on packs nor on test units). 
Despite this mUlti-pronged approach to malaria control, prompt access to effective malaria 
treatment was, at the time of the PhD research, limited as shown by the findings of a 
household survey conducted in 2009 by the ACTwatch Study Group in a representative sample 
of malaria-endemic areas in Cambodia. 
Whilst almost all (96%) of the 1617 respondents reported seeking care for malaria fever in the 
2 weeks preceding the survey, 46% reported treating at home, 42% at private commercial 
outlets, 7% at government-owned outlets, including public health facility (6%) and VMWs (1%) 
and 1% at other outlets9 (ACTwatch Group, 2009a). Overall, 12% of respondents visited a 
mobile provider, 11% a pharmacy/clinical pharmacy, 10% a drug shop and 9% a grocery or 
8 In 2010, the socially:marketed RDT was changed to a test that diagnoses P.!, P.v and mixed infections. 
The RDT was still marketed under the name Malacheck. 
9 Information on outlet type included under the "other" category was not available from the ACTwatch 
Household Survey report. 
29 
village shop (ACTwatch Group, 2009a). Less than half of respondents10 said they had received a 
diagnostic test, with 27% receiving a RDT and 14% microscopy (ACTwatch Group, 2009a). Of 
those who reported testing positive to malaria (around 87% of those who had received a test), 
47% said they received an antimalarial drug and 35% an ACT whilst cocktail therapies 
containing no antimalarial were received by 53% of respondents. The percentage of those 
testing positive who received ACT promptlyll was 21% (ACTwatch Group, 2009a). 
Furthermore, of those who reported testing negative to malaria, 11% said they received an 
antimalarial drug and 7% an ACT. Finally, of those who did not receive a test or were unsure of 
the test results, 11% reported receiving an antimalarial and 5% an ACT (ACTwatch Group, 
2009a). 
The same year, the ACTwatch Study Group also conducted a census of all public and private 
outlets with the potential of selling antimalarial drugs in the household survey's study areas. 
Antimalarial drugs were found to be available from a wide range of outlets, including 
government-owned outlets (Le. public referral hospitals, health centres and posts and VMWs), 
pharmacies and clinical pharmacies, drug shops, mobile providers, grocery stores and village 
shops. Antimalarial availability amongst censused outlets was variable across outlet types, with 
around two-thirds of all government-owned outlets, half of all pharmacies/clinical 
pharmacies, one third of all mobile providers and less than one tenth of all grocery and village 
shops censused stocking any antimalarial drug (ACTwatch Group, 2009b). 
ACT availability amongst outlets stocking antimalarial drugs was also variable across retail 
outlet types and overall low, notably in the private commercial sector, with ACT availability 
ranging between 19 to 50% (Table 2-1). ACT availability was found to be significantly higher at 
pharmacies/clinical pharmacies and drug shops than at other private commercial outlet types 
(ACTwatch Group, 2009b). Stock-outs of the first line ACT ASMQ were also common with 
around 40% of outlets that stocked ASMQ at, any point in time during the 3 months preceding 
the survey reporting disruption in stock (ACTwatch Group, 2009b). 
Other antimalarials stocked included non-artemisinin monotherapies (nAMT) and AMT. The 
nAMT chloroquine, the first line treatment for P. v, was available at 20% of government-owned 
outlets and at between 23% and 33% of private commercial outlets stocking antimalarials at 
10 Of 1,551 responde~ts for whom the information was available. ACTWATCH GROUP 2009a. Household 
Survey Report, Kingdom o/Cambodia. 
11 the same day or next day of fever onset 
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the time of the survey (Table 2-1) (ACTwatch Group, 200gb). Finally, AMT in tablet form, which 
were banned at the time of the study, was found in 18% of pharmacies/clinical pharmacies, 
26% of drug shops, 13% of mobile providers, 25% of grocery stores and 21% of village shops 
(ACTwatch Group, 200gb) (Table 2-1). 
Table 2-1: ACT availability 
As percentage of outlets with antimalarial drugs in stock at the time of interview 
(n=number of outlets) 
Government Pharmacies! Drug Mobile Grocery 
Antimalarial outlets1 clinical shops providers stores 
drug category (n=369) pharmacies (n=86) (n=122) (n=79) 
(n=85) 
ACT ASMQ 90.9% 50.2% 45.6% 29.1% 28.3% 
nAMT 56.4% 27.8% 31.1% 43.5% 52.2% 
Chloroquine 20.0% 24.2% 26.5% 23.2% 33.5% 
AMT 55.2% 28.9% 32.8% 26.8% 29.8% 
AMTtablet 2.3% 17.6% 26.5% 12.9% 25.3% 
1 Included public referral hospitals, health centres and posts and Village Malana Workers. 
Village 
shops 
(n=127) 
19.0% 
63.6% 
29.7% 
25.4% 
21.3% 
ACT is artemisinin-combination therapy; ASMQ is artesunate and mefloquine; nAMT is non artemisinin 
monotherapy; AMT is artemisinin monotherapy. 
Source: adapted from ACTWATCH GROUP 2009. Outlet Survey Report, Kingdom of Cambodia 
Blood testing services, either microscopy or RDT, at outlets stocking antimalarial drugs were 
available at both government outlets and private shops, with RDT availability being generally 
higher than microscopy services (Table 2-2). Availability of blood testing services was however 
lower than that of antimalarial drugs (Table 2-2). In the private sector, RDT availability was 
significantly higher at pharmacy/clinical pharmacy, drug shops and mobile providers than at 
grocery and village shops (ACTwatch Group, 200gb). 
Table 2-2: RDT and microscopy availability 
As percentage of outlets stocking antimalarial drugs on the day of interview or in preceding 3 months 
(n=number of outlets reporting stocking an antimalarial in last 3 months) 
Government Pharmacies! Drug Mobile Grocery Village 
Blood test olltlets1 clinical shops providers stores shops 
type (n=376) pharmacies (n=103) (n=202) (n=91) (n=151) 
(n=96) 
ROT 75.3% 57.9% 38.5% 41.5% 33.6% 8.6% 
Microscopy 16.7% 37.9% 32.3% 45.2% 3.6% 3.7% 
RDT IS rapid diagnostic test for mal ana. 
Source: adapted from ACTWATCH GROUP 2009. Outlet Survey Report, Kingdom of Cambodia 
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In terms of the cost of malaria treatment at private commercial outlets, one adult equivalent 
treatment dose (AETO) of ASMQ was sold at a median price 2 to 3 times higher than the RRP 
for Malarine (US$ 0.61): pharmacies/clinical pharmacies and drug shops reported selling one 
AETO at US$ 1.18, mobile providers at US$ 1.88, grocery stores at US$ 1.61 and village shops at 
US$ 1.64 (ACTwatch Group, 2009b) (Table 2-3). For comparative purposes, ASMQ was 
between 3.5 to 5 times more expensive than chloroquine (Table 2-3). The median price of AMT 
in all dosage forms was between 2 to 3 times higher than that of ASMQ. When monotherapies 
in injectable form only were considered, the median price of AMT and nAMT was respectively 
12 to 17 times and 4 to 12 times higher than that of ASMQ in tablet form. By contrast, 
antimalarials were reported to be available free of charge at government outlets (ACTwatch 
Group,2009b). 
As for blood testing services, the median price of ROT at private commercial outlets was lower 
than that of microscopy, with prices ranging between US$ 0.35 and US$ 0.47 for the former 
and US$ 0.71 and US$ 0.94 for the latter across outlet types (author's own calculations) (Table 
2-3). In the public sector, ROT were reported to be available free of charge whilst the median 
price of microscopy testing was US$ 0.35 (author's own calculations, data not shown) 
Table 2-3: Retail median prices of antimalarial drugs and blood tests 
Median retail prices of one adult equivalent treatment dose or test unit (US$) (n=numberofobservations) 
Pharmacies Drug Mobile Grocery Village 
/Clinical shops providers stores shops 
pharmacies 
Antimalarial drug category (dosage form) 
ACT ASMQ (all were tablets) 1.18(59) 1. 18(!>4} 1.88(51) 1.61(Lb} 1.65(.14) 
nAMT (all forms) 0.23(LL} 0.23(lb} 1.98(LlS} 0.46(U} 1. 13(l7) 
nAMT chloroquine (all were tablets) 0.23(20) 0.23(lL} 0.46(1l) 0.46(~} 0.35(~) 
nAMT (injectables only) - 14.83(j} 9.89(12) 5.93(j} 17.30(.l) 
AMT (all formsl ) 3.61(.14) 3.16(31) 3.77'.lb} 3.61(L~} 4.52'.11) 
AMT (tablets only) 2.64(14} 3.62'.1U} 3.77'21) 3.62'L!>} 4.52'32) 
AMT (injectables only) 15.10(19) 19.80(~} 22.60(2U) 22.60(4} 28.25(!» 
Blood test type 
ROT 0.35P~} 0.4i4U} O.4ib .l} 0.33(L!>} O.47'.lU) 
Microscopy 0.71(37) 0.71(27) 0.94(~1) 0.71(5) 0.71(b) 
.. ACT IS artemlsmm combmatlon therapy; ROT is rapid diagnostic test for malana. ASMQ IS the ACT artesunate and 
mefloquine; nAMT is non artemisinin monotherapy; AMT is artemisinin monotherapy; "_" drug category not 
stocked; lincludes one observation for AMT in suppository sold in a drug shop at a median price of US$ 15.1 
(author's own calculaticns). Source: adapted from ACTWATCH GROUP 2009. Outlet Survey Report, Kingdom of 
Cambodia and author's own calculations for ROT and AMT and nAMT in injectable form and AMT in all forms. 
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On the basis of this evidence, the cost of appropriate treatment of confirmed P.f malaria - RDT 
followed by ASMQ - in the private commercial sector in 2009 ranged between US$ 1.53 and 
US$ 2.35 across the different private commercial outlet types. 
2.7 Summary 
At the time of our study, RDT and ACT availability was low in Cambodia's malaria endemic 
areas, and where available, the cost of appropriate treatment for P.f malaria was relatively 
high. The aim of the thesis is to describe the supply of antimalarial drugs from an economic 
lens and investigate how it affects the availability, price and quality of malaria treatment. 
The next chapter will review three literatures that are relevant to this aim, including the 
Industrial Organization (10) field of economic theory, the range of methods that have been 
used for collecting data on pharmaceutical drug markets in low and middle income countries 
and finally the empirical evidence available on the structure and functioning of the supply-side 
of markets for antimalarial drugs in developing countries. 
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CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEWS 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, three different literatures relevant to the thesis are reviewed. The first draws 
on the Industrial Organization (10) field of economic theory, which provides many concepts of 
potential relevance to the study of the market for malaria treatment in Cambodia, including 
market product and geographical definition, market concentration, contestability, product 
differentiation, price competition, etc. The second literature reviews and discusses the range 
of methods that have been used for collecting data on pharmaceutical drug markets in low and 
middle income countries in order to inform the design of our study on the supply of malaria 
treatment in Cambodia. Finally, the third and last literature review covers the empirical 
evidence available on the structure and functioning of the supply-side of markets for 
antimalarial drugs in developing countries, with a focus on private commercial sector 
distribution chains for antimalarial drugs in low and middle income countries. 
The range of methods for studying pharmaceutical drug markets and the evidence available on 
private commercial sector distribution chains for antimalarial drugs have been reviewed using 
systematic search and review methods described in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 respectively. 
The review of the 10 literature relied on a more informal approach, which consisted of reading 
recommended texts and references within this field of economic theory. 
3.2 A review of the economic theory literature on markets and competition 
Economic theory and the 10 literature provide benchmark models against which markets can 
be studied. A market can be defined as the set of sellers and buyers whose interactions 
.. 
determine the price, quantity and quality of a good or service (Dranove and White, 1998), or 
the group of sellers and buyers of a set of products who are in sufficiently close contact for 
.' 
their transactions to affect the terms on which the others buy or sell (Tirole, 1988). 
Under the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, the structure of a market 
determines the way firms behave in that market, which in turn affects market performance 
(Scherer and Ross, 1390). Performance is generally assessed in terms of the price and quality 
of the product or service in the market, with lower consumer prices and higher quality being 
associated with higher market performance. 
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Later refinements of the SCP paradigm recognized however that the SCP sequence was far 
from being linear and that the direction of causation between structure and conduct was two-
way (Tirole, 1988) with attempts from firms to shape market structure in order to increase 
their profitability. 
This section starts by reviewing the standard model structures and their implications in terms 
of market performance (Section 3.2.1). Structural factors that affect the functioning of markets 
are then described (Section 3.2.2), followed by the strategies used by providers to shape 
market structure (Section 3.2.3). 
3.2.1 Standard models of markets and competition 
Four models of market and competition are traditionally used, namely perfect competition, 
monopoly, oligopoly and monopolistic competition. The models are all based on the 
assumption that each firm is interested in maximising profit by supplying a quantity of 
products at the level at which marginal cost (i.e. the cost of supplying one extra unit) equals 
marginal revenue (i.e. the change in total revenue from selling one extra unit). 
The key difference between these models lies in the extent to which firms can influence the 
price at which they are paid, which is referred to as market power. Market power depends on 
the extent to which consumers can substitute to other suppliers of the same product (supply-
side substitution under homogenous product) or to other products (demand-Side substitution 
under differentiated products). Market concentration is generally used as a measure of market 
power, with more concentrated markets, that is few large firms with relatively large market 
shares, being associated with higher consumer prices and profits and, as a result, lower market 
performance (Demsetz, 1973). 
In the model of perfect competition, many firms operate, each selling a small quantity of the 
," 
same product relative to the total quantity sold on the market. Consumers have perfect 
information about the product and firms are said to be price-takers as they have no influence 
over the price at which they can sell their product: if a firm decides to sell at a price higher 
than the market price, consumers will switch to other providers and the firm will lose all its 
consumers whilst if a firm decreases its price, it will make a loss. Under perfect competition, 
firms face a horizontal demand curve that is perfectly price elastic and each maximises profit 
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by supplying a level of output at which price equals marginal cost implying zero economic 
profit12. Under this equilibrium, the optimal level of market performance or efficiency is 
achieved. 
At the other extreme, the monopoly model describes a market in which a single firm supplies a 
product with no close substitutes. The monopolist can therefore influence the price at which 
he is paid without losing his consumers (he faces a downward sloping demand curve). Other 
things being equal, the monopoly price will be higher than under perfect competition, creating 
economic profits for the monopoly whilst the quantity supplied will be lower, yielding to 
reduced market performance as some consumers will not buy the products at the monopoly 
price whilst others will pay a price higher than they would have under perfect competition. 
In-between perfect competition and monopoly, there are different models of imperfect 
competition. The basic oligopoly competition model describes a market with few firms 
competing on how much quantity to supply or on price, either under static or strategic 
competition. 
• Under static competition, firms make their decision about their action variables 
simultaneously given their expectations about other firms' decisions while recognising 
that other firms are going through the same process. They may decide to cooperate 
and act as a monopolist in order to raise price and increase profit. However, given that 
each firm has an incentive to deviate or cheat (e.g. by decreasing price to gain market 
share) collusion is not sustainable. Under the assumption of a homogenous product, 
the basic Cournot model describes a market in which two firms compete on quantity 
whilst in the Bertrand model firms compete on price13 
12 The market price equals the minimum average cost of the least efficient firm such that firms with 
lower average costs earn a rent, sometimes referred to as Ricardian profits. Economic profits occur 
where the market price is higher than average cost and profits can be made on each unit supplied. 
13 For illustration purposes, the basic Cournot model describes 2 firms competing simultaneously over 
quantity, each maximising profit given the output of its rival: if firm 1 expects firm 2 output to be zero, 
firm 1 will act as a monopoly and maximise profit at marginal revenue equals marginal cost; as firm 2 
output increases, the profit maximising output for firm 1 will decrease; then if firm 2 supplies such a 
large quantity that price equals marginal cost then firm 1 will shut down. Conversely, if firm 1 were to 
produce nothing then firm 2 output will determine the market price and as firm 1 increases its output, 
price decreases to attract customers to buy the additional supplies. 
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o In the Cournot model, as the number of firms increases, each firm's market 
share decreases and so does their market power (the elasticity of demand 
increases as consumers can switch to other suppliers) and profits14 • An 
extreme scenario considers the number of firms increasing to infinity with 
output supplied at the level where marginal cost equals marginal revenue and 
price (or average cost) driving profit to zero. 
Whilst a higher number of firms is associated with higher competition and 
market efficiency (from the perfect competition perspective), in the presence 
of economies of scale (i.e. a situation where average total cost falls as the 
quantity supplied increases) each firm would supply a smaller quantity at a 
higher average cost. This implies a loss in market efficiency, although from a 
consumer perspective welfare increases following a price decrease. A higher 
number of firms may therefore not lead to improved market performance 
from a societal perspective. 
o As for the basic Bertrand model, it describes few firms supplying a 
homogenous product with no capacity constraints (firms can expand their 
supplies without production constraints). Each firm has the incentive to 
undercut other firms by decreasing its price and regardless of the number of 
firms price will equal marginal cost, implying zero profit. 
• Under strategic competition, firms operate in more than one time period and the 
implications of repeated interactions are considered. 
o The Stackelberg model is similar to Cournot with firms competing on 
quantities, but the timing of supply decision differs: firms choose quantities 
sequentially with a IIleader" moving first as it chooses quantity whilst its 
competitor or IIfollower" observes the leader's decision before choosing its 
own quantity. In the Dominant Firm theory or Price Leadership model, the 
14 Increasing the numbe~~ of firms has the following effects: the output of each firm decreases because 
their residual demand and marginal revenue decreases, total output increases because the decrease in 
output by the existing firm as they accommodate entry is less than the output of the entrant, price falls 
because total output increases and the profits of each firm decrease because,of lower price and lower 
output per firm. 
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leader acts on price rather than on quantity. As under Cournot, Price 
Leadership and Stackelberg predict price and profits in-between those under 
perfect competition and monopoly. 
o Finally, the kinked demand curve model predicts rigid prices if firms believe 
that their rivals will match price cuts but will not react to price increases: 
beyond a certain quantity supplied the marginal revenue lost from cutting back 
supply (to match the price increase) is much greater than the extra revenue 
gained from increasing supply (to cut prices). The implications in terms of 
market efficiency are unclear. 
The model of monopolistic competition is described as an oligopoly market where there are 
enough firms that their actions have no effect on the actions of their competitors and in which 
products are differentiated, providing firms with some market power (Chamberlin, 1933). Price 
will therefore be above marginal cost as consumers may not find close enough substitutes to 
switch to (Chamberlin, 1933). 
Market power may also be exercised on the part of the buyer. A monopsony model describes a 
market with a single buyer who influences the market price by purchasing a lower quantity 
than in a competitive setting therefore leading the market price to decrease and his profit to 
increase. In health care, concerns about monopsony power have been highlighted in relation 
to the exercise of market power by insurers who purchase health care services from hospitals 
or physicians, and by hospitals purchasing nursing labour (Gaynor and Vogt, 2000). 
The next section describes some key structural sources of market power and is followed by the 
strategies used by providers to exercise, maintain and increase market power. 
3.2.2 Sources of market power 
3.2.2.1 Entry and exit barriers 
As one would expect profits to attract entry of new firms, it is initially unclear why firms 
continue to make profits. Different elements of market structure have been suggested to 
prevent entry and therefore the erosion of profit and market power: economies of scale, sunk 
expenditures, product differentiation and absolute cost advantages (Bain, 1956). It is also 
possible for entry barriers to be created by government or by providers aiming to limit 
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competition. The former are presented in this section after the structural barriers whilst the 
latter are described in the section on strategies for increasing market power (Section 3.2.3). 
Economies of scale. Economies of scale occur when the average total cost of supply falls as the 
quantity supplied increases. Firms that enjoy economies of scale have an incentive to maintain 
or expand supplies. This may deter new firms to enter the market if they think that they 
cannot gain the minimum market share required to become profitable. 
Sunk costs are expenditures or investments that cannot be recovered after market entry and 
that provide a signal to potential entrants about the need to operate at a large scale to make a 
profit (Gilbert, 1989). Many sunk expenditures are fixed costs that create scale economies. 
Absolute cost advantages occur where potential entrants have higher average costs than the 
established firms at any scale of operation. For example, an established firm may own a patent 
on a particular technology or be able to access capital on more favourable terms than entrants 
(Church and Ware, 2000). 
Product differentiation can prevent entry if consumers have preferences for the products of 
established firms. Entrants may be required to convince consumers to switch to their products 
by charging lower prices, advertising more and/or providing higher quality - strategies that 
reduce the profitability of entry. Some customers may also be better off continuing to 
purchase the same product at a higher price than switching to another if there are costs 
associated with switching from one provider or brand to another, with costs being economic or 
related to personal taste (Gilbert, 1989). 
Other entry barriers can be created by government intervention. For example, government 
may grant exclusive rights to a firm to supply a product or service in order to minimise costs 
(Noll, 1989). In health care, government intervention aims to signal quality and promote 
minimum quality levels. Regulations can cover market entry (e.g. physician licenses, import 
permits, outlet regulation), product registration and pricing (e.g. pharmaceutical drug price 
regulation, insurance premium regUlation). The time required to complete government 
paperwork may also create additional entry barriers and restrict the number of alternatives 
available to consumers and therefore competition (Stiglitz and Walsh, 2002). 
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Despite the appearance that entry barriers are structural factors that undermine competition, 
their presence may not be synonymous with market inefficiency. For example, there may be a 
limited number of firms in a market because of the presence of economies of scale. In 
addition, market concentration may be a sign of market power but not necessarily a sign of 
economic profits because the threat of entry may lead firms to charge less to discourage 
potential entrants (Baumol et aI., 1982). 
Fina"y, although more rarely researched, there may also be exit barriers, such as, for example, 
sunk expenditures, which may lead firms to stay in the market even if it means operating at a 
loss. 
3.2.2.2 Informational issues on product characteristics 
A shortage of information on the characteristics of a product or service on the part of 
consumers is an important source of market power. For some products, consumers have 
sufficient knowledge or can easily discern the true quality of a product before purchase. Such 
products are called search goods. Providers have therefore no opportunities to lie about the 
quality of their product, although they may attempt to manipulate it (see Section 3.2.3.2). 
With other groups of products, consumers do not have complete information and their quality 
can only be determined after purchase by use or experience (Nelson, 1970). These products 
are called experience goods. 
For some products, the experience of consumers can be passed across to other consumers (or 
other markets) through word of mouth for example. Such products are referred to as 
reputation goods. 
For other products called credence goods for which quality can never be observed or the 
technical attributes are not well understood, consumers will tend to rely on the advice 
provided by a more informed agent, which may lead to potential agency problems where the 
decision to purchase the product is influenced by the seller himself (see Section 3.2.3.6). 
The structural characteristics of markets described above are important sources of market 
power. Providers may als~ attempt to shape these structural characteristics to maintain or 
gain market power. These attempts are the subject of the next section. 
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3.2.3 Strategies for increasing market power 
3.2.3.1 Price discrimination 
Firms with market power have the opportunity to increase their profitability by selling the 
same product at different prices to different customers. Three types of price discrimination 
can be distinguished. 
The first type is "first-degree" or perfect price discrimination under which a seller sells each 
unit of a product at the maximum price that anyone is willing to pay for that unit of the 
product. This strategy is sometimes referred to as "take-it-or-Ieave-it" offer to each customer 
(Varian, 1989). 
The second type of price discrimination is "second-degree" price discrimination under which a 
seller varies the price of a product for different units sold but not for different customers (e.g. 
quantity discounts). 
The third type is "third-degree" price discrimination under which a seller varies the price from 
customer to customer but not for different units of the product sold (e.g. airline business and 
economy tickets). 
For price discrimination to be maintained, customers charged a lower price must be prevented 
from reselling the product to those offered a higher price (arbitrage). Another prerequisite for 
price discrimination is to find a means to categorise customers according to their willingness to 
pay. A provider may be able to separate customers on the basis of easily observable 
characteristics, including for example age, income or geographical location. When the provider 
cannot easily observe which characteristics distinguish customers with different price 
elasticities, he may be able to segment the market by structuring its pricing in a way that 
consumers "self select" into appropriate categories according to their valuation of the product 
offered (e.g. charging a lower price for airline tickets including a Saturday overnight stay in a 
city) (Varian, 1989). 
The most common form of price discrimination is third degree (Varian, 1989). In heath care 
markets, it has been reported through providers charging lower fees to different patients. 
Although it has often been interpreted as an act of charity (Folland et al.,.2004), it is also 
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considered to be a common strategy used for increasing profits by charging more to those with 
greater ability to pay (Kessel, 1958). 
3.2.3.2 Product differentiation 
Product differentiation exists whenever consumers do not view products as perfect 
substitutes. It arises as a consequence of differences in physical attributes of a product or in 
the quality of a service offered, or for reasons related to the reputation of a provider or 
preferences or perception of consumers for a particular product. Product differentiation allows 
providers to raise their price without losing all their customers. 
Product differentiation can be horizontal when it reflects different consumer tastes and one 
product is not superior to another (concept of product variety), or vertical when some product 
characteristics are more desirable than others and all consumers agree over the ordering of 
the characteristics (concept of product quality) (Gaynor, 2006). 
Hotelling (1929) described a model in which products are differentiated on a single attribute 
that is the location of the outlet at which they are sold (Hotelling, 1929). Consumers are 
uniformly distributed on a main street. Prices are fixed and each consumer assesses the total 
cost of buying from each outlet, considering the product price and transport cost to travel 
between their location and each outlet. Consumers purchase from the outlet whose location is 
the closest to theirs. The boundary of the market for each provider is defined by the location 
of the customer to whom the total cost to buy from the next provider on the street is the 
same. If a provider raises its price, consumers on and close to the market boundaries will shift 
to the neighbouring provider. Hotelling showed that under duopoly providers would locate 
close to each other in the centre of the street, leading to minimum product differentiation. 
The geographical clustering of stores may however be the result of search cost and imperfect 
information (Lancaster, 1990). Providers may have an incentive to locate in close proximity to 
create positive externalities by decreasing search costs for customers or choose to locate 
where the demand is in order to increase the volumes they sell, even though this will increase 
price competition. 
For search goods for which quality is easily observed by consumers, there are no opportunities 
for providers to deceive consumers about the quality of their product. Consumer will be 
relatively quality sensitive but price insensitive, creating incentives for providers to compete 
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on quality. Increasing quality levels may lead to increasing prices through higher costs of 
higher quality. Quality competition may also lead to excess quality being offered on attributes 
that are more easily observable (e.g. patient amenities) and too little quality on less 
observable elements. Providers may also attempt to discriminate customers on quality by 
offering products or services with different quality levels to different consumers (analogous to 
price discrimination). 
For goods for which the quality cannot be ascertained until after the purchase, consumers may 
be relatively price sensitive but quality insensitive (e.g. they know they cannot observe the 
true quality of a product, therefore quality plays a more limited role in their decision function 
than if quality was easily observable) (Dranove and Satterthwaite, 1992). The quality offered 
will be too low as providers will have little incentive to provide high quality services, and a 
market for "lemons" may emerge: consumers will be willing to purchase products at an 
average price, leading sellers of high quality products to exit the market, with quality and price 
decreasing until a potential collapse of the market (Akerlof, 1970). The problem of "Iemons" 
creates an incentive for providers of high quality products to communicate the level of quality 
they offer to potential consumers. 
Different strategies can be used to attract customers. The first is to build a reputation of 
providing quality to make repeat sales and potentially attract new customers through word of 
mouth. Second, investment in advertising can be used to communicate information about 
quality or simply signal quality, regardless of the information content (Nelson, 1974). Product 
warranties can also be used to signal quality, as well as a quality discrimination strategy (e.g. 
reduced warranty provision for lower quality products). 
3.2.3.3 Entry deterrence and accommodation 
Deterrence strategies are used to prevent entry of new competitors or drive established 
competitors outside the marKet. To prevent entry, firms may make large plant investments to 
Signal to potential entrants that it will be profitable" for them to respond aggressively post 
entry by increasing the amount they supply. Established firms may also decide to sacrifice 
current profits by limiting pricing as an indication to potential entrants that entry will not be 
profitable. 
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Accommodating strategies are used when entry cannot be deterred by incumbents or if it is 
more costly for firms to use deterrence strategies than to let new firms enter the market. In 
this situation, accommodating may involve disadvantaging competitors, for example by 
overbuying a scarce input in order to increase their rivals' costs (Church and Ware, 2000). 
3.2.3.4 Horizontal mergers and collusion 
Horizontal mergers between 2 firms increase the market power of the merged firms and 
facilitate price increases. In addition, mergers facilitate collusion by increasing market 
concentration. 
Collusion can be defined as a cooperative arrangement between firm to coordinate their 
actions in terms of the quantity they supply and price they charge. Collusion is facilitated in 
markets for homogenous goods with high levels of concentration and entry barriers and where 
sellers can easily monitor each other's behaviours. Firms have an incentive to cheat so for 
collusion to be sustainable means of monitoring the behaviour of collusive firms are required 
as well as sanction methods for those deviating. Tacit collusion occurs when firms are able to 
coordinate their activities by simply observing and anticipating their rivals' behaviour. In this 
context, tacit collusion can also be referred to as oligopolistic coordination. 
3.2.3.5 Vertical integration and vertical restraints 
Economic theory is also relevant to the vertical dimension of markets, in terms of structure 
and relationships between firms operating at successive stages of a chain of production or 
distribution. Vertical integration may be treated as an aspect of market structure or provider 
conduct. Firms are faced with a 'make or buy' decision which depends on the relative costs of 
making transactions through the firm or through the market (Coase, 1937) and integration 
may be the result of the existence of transaction economies (Williamson, 1979). Alternatively 
contractual arrangements may be used to reduce the costs of transactions within the market, 
although these arrangements may create additional challenges (e.g. loss of flexibility to adapt 
to a change in technology). 
Vertical integration can be employed by a supplier to maximize his profit by mitigating the 
double marginalization phenomenon, through which each firm at two successive levels of the 
chain adds its own mark-up (Spengler, 1950) leading to a quantity of prqducts sold by a 
supplier lower than that achieved through a vertically integrated structure (because of higher 
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prices resulting from mark-ups added at each level of the chain). In this model, the retailer is 
seen as the economic agent of the supplier (Tirole, 1988) because the latter will maximise his 
profit only if he can control the retailer's pricing decisions. Integration of the retailer into the 
supplier is considered as a socially optimal model compared to the non-integrated structure as 
the supplier maximizes profit by supplying larger quantities at lower prices. 
Another benchmark model considers a monopolist supplier who sells a product to a perfectly 
competitive market in which firms use a variable proportion of the monopolist's product and 
also purchase another product from perfectly competitive suppliers. The model predicts that 
downstream firms will shift away from the monopoly product (because of its price) to the 
competitively supplied product, resulting in inefficiencies in the downstream market (too little 
of the monopoly product) and creating an incentive for the monopolist supplier to integrate 
with the downstream firms (to avoid substitution towards other products and capture profits). 
The implications in terms of market efficiency are unclear: by integrating, inefficiencies in the 
-
downstream market are eliminated (i.e. efficient level of monopoly product is used) and the 
monopoly maximizes profits. However, the monopoly may decide to increase the consumer 
price. Market performance will therefore depend on the gain in efficiency in the downstream 
market and the level of the retail price after integration (Perry, 1989). 
Incentives to integrate also exist on the buyer's side. Market foreclosure may occur when a 
firm integrates with an upstream firm in order to control the supplies of inputs and exclude a 
(horizontal) rival from the supplies (or increase the input price) (Church and Ware, 2000). A 
monopsony buying a product from perfectly competitive suppliers may also choose to 
integrate with one of the upstream firms following an increase in the price of the product at 
which suppliers purchase the product, in order to access supplies at lower cost (i.e. avoid 
double marginalization). 
Other vertical strategies may be used to increase market power, including advertising and 
restraints. Advertising may be used to force sellers to stock the advertised product or they will 
suffer a loss of customers to competitors who carry the product. Large advertisement 
campaigns may also influence sellers to stock the well-known brand given that advertised 
products may have higher shelf turnover than others, yielding to higher profit per unit of shelf 
space with a given price-cost'mark-ups (Vickers and Waterson, 1991). Furthermore, carrying 
advertised products may attract customers who may also buy other higher-margin items 
(Vickers and Waterson, 1991). 
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Vertical restraints are strategies generally used by manufacturers or wholesalers to restrict the 
flexibility of retailers' decisions in terms of price, customers and location. In addition, retailers 
are expected to provide a point of sale service (e.g. advertising, trained sales teams) (Church 
and Ware, 2000) that upstream firms may want to influence in order to increase their sales 
and profits. Various types of restraints exist, including resale price maintenance, territorial 
restriction, exclusive dealing, tying or bundling and quantity fixing contracts. 
• Resale-price maintenance (RPM) contracts specify at which price the retailer can resell 
the product. Alternative contracts of this type are price floor and price ceiling 
contracts. "Softer" (non-contractual) restraints can also be used such as for example 
recommended retail prices (RRP). 
• Exclusive territorial restrictions aim to limit intra-brand competition by assigning a 
market to a single retailer therefore creating a retail monopoly (Church and Ware, 
2000) (e.g. McDonalds franchise operating under an agreement defining an area within 
which no other franchise will open). 
• Exclusive dealing aims to limit inter-brand competition by forbidding retailers to 
handle brands that compete directly with the products of the supplier (Church and 
Ware, 2000). 
• Tying is a restriction placed by upstream firms on customers that 2 products are 
bought from the same provider - these products may be complements (e.g. printers 
and toners) but not necessarily. 
• Quantity fixing contracts stipulate the amoun~ to be purchased by the retailer. 
Through these different ar~angements, suppliers may effectively control the actions of 
retailers. The welfare implications of vertical restraints are however complex. They are said to 
be efficient for the vertical structure, but may fail to account for consumers' interests (Tirole, 
1988) and call for government intervention. In addition their effect on retailers' actions may be 
limited and/or perverse, notably in the context of imperfect and/or asymmetric information 
and/or risk aversion from the' side of the retailers (e.g. in terms of demand or cost of handling 
the product). Retailers may decide to sell at a price higher than the RPM or RRP or may provide 
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lower quality at a given RPM/RRP if for example the RPM/RRP is set too low to provide an 
incentive for retailers to bind to the agreement. 
3.2.3.6 Agency and supplier induced demand 
Under perfect competition, information is assumed to be perfect with all consumers and 
sellers having complete information about the products available. Information is assumed to 
be symmetric with consumers being as informed as sellers. 
Information is however generally not perfect nor symmetric, notably in the health sector 
where providers may be uncertain or uninformed about the outcomes of treatment whilst 
patients are often poorly informed about their own condition, treatment availability, expected 
outcomes and prices charged by other providers. 
In situations where information is asymmetric, a principal-agent relationship may arise where 
the consumer recognizes he does not possess all the information necessary to decide on the 
most appropriate treatment, and delegates his decision to a relatively more informed agent, 
generally a health care provider. Whilst a perfect agent would choose as the patient himself if 
the patient possessed the same information as the provider does, the agent may try to 
influence demand for their own self interest, a situation referred to as supplier induced 
demand (SID) (Folland et aI., 2004). SID may be mitigated by various mechanisms including 
licensing, ethical constraints, and the establishment of long-term relationship between 
patients and providers (Folland et aI., 2004). 
3.2.3.7 Regulatory capture 
Regulation is government intervention to control .or change market structure, provider 
conduct and ultimately market performance. The effect of regulation will depend on the 
structure of the market, conduct of providers and capacity of authorities to enforce regulatory 
policies. The impact of government intervention on the intended objectives may be limited in 
markets where providers have the potential to influence government policy, primarily through 
lobbying activities. In the health sector, for example, qualified health care professional 
organisations may try to influence regulatory authorities to tighten entry requirements in 
order to reinforce market power. Regulation may be inefficient if policies are captured by 
interest groups for the purpose of acquiring monopoly rent or redistributing wealth in ways 
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that create inefficiencies or if authorities have limited capacities for enforcing regulatory 
policies. 
This section has reviewed the key models of markets and competition offered by the 10 
literature, and has shown the complexity of the interplay between market structure, provider 
conduct and government and of the implications of this interplay for market performance. 
The 10 literature suggests a range of measurement methods for studying economic markets. 
These methods alongside those used in studies of retail and wholesale sectors for 
pharmaceutical drugs in developing countries are the subject of the next section. 
3.3 A review of empirical methods for studying markets 
In this section, the methods that have been used for studying health care markets are 
reviewed, with a focus on those used in empirical studies of markets for pharmaceuti_cal drugs 
in low and middle income countries. By methods, we refer to the range of approaches used 
for collecting data on key aspects of market structure and provider conduct and for analyzing 
these data. The literature on markets for hospital services has not been formerly searched 
because these markets differ in important ways from markets for pharmaceutical drugs 
(Scherer, 2000, Gaynor and Vogt, 2000). However, the analytical methods they used are likely 
to be of some relevance to the analysis of competition in markets for pharmaceutical drugs. 
Therefore these methods are reviewed, drawing mainly on two relatively recent reviews on 
that subject (Gaynor, 2006, Moriya et aI., 2010). The methods used to search and review the 
literature are described in Appendix 1. 
The section starts by reviewing methods for identifying and sampling private commercial 
providers of antimalarial and pharmaceutical drugs in general in developing countries (Sections 
3.3.1 and 3.3.2). It then turns to a review of methods used for identifying the range of products 
sold (Section 3.3.3) and measuring sales volumes and values (Section 3.3.4). The section 
continues by reviewing methods used in studies of market competition, including those for 
defining the market, measuring market concentration, assessing market contestability and 
analysing providers' conduct, with a focus on their price setting behaviour (Sections 3.3.5 to 
3.3.9). 
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3.3.1 Identifying providers 
3.3.1.1 Existing lists of providers 
Lists of registered outlets available from National Health Authorities have been used to 
estimate the number of wholesale and retail providers operating in different settings. During a 
training intervention that aimed to improve the quality of malaria treatment in the Kenyan 
retail sector, mobile vendors and wholesale shopkeepers registered to operate in the district 
were identified using official records (Tavrow et aL, 2003). In a study of malaria treatment in 
the Tanzanian private sector, the number of registered manufacturers, wholesalers and drug 
stores was calculated using official listings available from the National Pharmacy Board 
(Battersby et aL, 2003). In another study that looked at the antimalarial retail market in 6 
regions of Tanzania, the number of outlets registered to wholesale medicines was identified 
using a list available from the Tanzanian Food and Drug Authorities (TFDA) (Clinton Health 
Access Initiative (CHAI), personal communication 2007). Another study obtained from the 
TFDA the list of pharmacies authorised to handle prescription only medicines in Dar es Salaam 
(Kachur et aI., 2006). More recently, a study conducted in Uganda used the list of registered 
drug wholesalers and pharmacies operating within the capital city, Kampala, and the Entebbe 
municipality (Nakyanzi J et aL, 2009). 
Official lists provide an easy way of estimating the number of providers. This approach has 
however several limitations. The first limitation is that only the number of registered providers 
can be calculated. Other providers who are not captured in official lists might exist, including 
those awaiting official registration and informal providers operating without authorisation. The 
second limitation is that official lists might simply be outdated and omit registered providers. 
An alternative has therefore been to use other lists available from private sources. In a study 
of the Kenyan retail market for malaria treatment conducted in 4 districts, the number of retail 
providers was estimated from a list of retail outlets purchased from a commercial market 
research agency that had undertaken a national retail outlet census a few years before the 
study (Amin and Snow, 2005). In their study of access to malaria treatment in the Tanzanian 
districts of Ulanga and Kilombero conducted in 2004, Hetzel and colleagues used a list of all 
retail sources for antimalaria! drugs developed during an earlier study of the retail market for 
malaria treatment in the same districts (Hetzel, 2007). More recently, a similar approach was 
used by a study on the provision of antimalarial drugs in private outlets operating in districts 
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alongside the Cambodian-Thai border. The study sampled all retailers operating in the study 
districts that had been identified to stock antimalarial drugs during an earlier outlet census 
(URC-MCC, 2009). During the study, however, over 40% of outlets could not be found and 
were IIconveniently" replaced by other outlets found to stock antimalarials at the time of the 
study (URC-MCC, 2009). 
Using other lists offers the opportunity to identify informal providers not captured by official 
lists. For instance, in the Kenyan study the list purchased from the commercial market research 
agency provided data on shops stocking antimalarial drugs that were not legally registered as 
drug outlets and therefore not included in official lists (Amin and Snow, 2005). The use of 
other lists has however some limitations: such lists may not systematically be available across 
settings, or if available they may be outdated, and there may also be a financial charge for such 
data if they are held by commercial organisations. 
Overall, despite the above mentioned limitations, lists of outlets, either from official or other 
sources are a useful frame to start measuring the number of providers operating in a given 
area and they can be used in combination with other approaches. 
3.3.1.2 Interviews with key informants 
A range of studies have conducted key informant interviews to estimate the number of 
providers who operated at different levels of the distribution chain. Face to face interviews 
with various stakeholders including policy makers, manufacturers, importers and pharmacists 
were carried out in Zambia in a study that explored public, private and mission distribution 
chains for essential medicines (MMV, 2007). In another study conducted in five sub-Saharan 
countries, local antimalarial drug manufacturers and importers were identified in collaboration 
with national public health and pharmaceutical "authorities (Kindermans et aI., 2007) 
Interviews with Ministry of Health officials, coordinators of National Malaria Control 
Programmes and informants 'in professional pharmaceutical organisations were carried out to 
identify the number of providers at each stage of the distribution chain for antimalarial drugs 
in Senegal, Cambodia and Zambia (Shretta and Guimier, 2003). 
One advantage of interviewing central-level informants is that insights into the structure of 
distribution chains can also be collected (MMV, 2007, Russo, 2007). The relative importance of 
suppliers within and across levels can also be investigated. For example, the Medicines 
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Transparency Alliance (MeTA) found that whilst respondents reported that the number of 
importers could range between 50 and 60, interviewees all agreed that 6 importers handled 
almost 80% of the volume of essential medicines in the country (MeTA 2007). One limitation is 
however that those outlets at lower levels of the chain are likely to be more numerous and it 
might be difficult to obtain accurate estimates about their number from central-level 
informants. 
As a result a preferred approach has been to interview local key informants, including people 
living and working in the study area, community and village leaders and local administrative 
councils. In a study of the retail market for malaria treatment in the Tanzanian rural districts of 
Rufiji, Ulanga and Kilombero field researchers who worked and lived in the communities were 
asked to list all the outlets that might be selling drugs categorised by outlet type (Goodman et 
aI., 2004). In the absence of field staff in the district of Morogoro, the same study asked local 
village leaders to identify all potential drug sources (Goodman et aL, 2004). In the Hung Yen 
-
Province, Vietnam all private commercial providers were identified by interviewing community 
leaders and a sample of households (Tuan et aL, 2005). In Uganda, the Ministry of Health 
interviewed village leaders and other informants to update existing lists of health facilities, 
pharmacies and drug shops in 3 geographic areas where interventions to improve access to 
subsidised Artemisinin Combination Therapy (ACT) were to be piloted (MMV, 2007). 
The weakness of interviewing key informants is that they may not know the accurate number 
of outlets stocking antimalarials nor which shops stock antimalarials. In the Tanzanian study, 
out of the 834 retail outlets that had been initially identified by local informants, 20 had closed 
including 14 on a permanent basis and 90 did not actually stock drugs (Goodman et aL, 2004). 
Visiting outlets provides therefore a relatively more accurate estimation of the number of 
providers. This approach is reviewed in the next section. 
3.3.1.3 Providers' census 
A census consists of visiting all outlets operating in a given area in order to record their 
identifiers (e.g. name, address, GPS coordinates) and the range of products they stock. This 
method was implemented in 3 rural sub-districts of Northern Bangladesh (Ahmed and Hossain, 
2007) and 3 districts of the E3stern Region of Uganda (MMV, 2007). In the Tanzanian study of 
the retail sector for malaria treatment, a census of all potential outlets stocking antimalarial 
drugs was conducted using the preliminary lists of outlets drawn by field researchers and 
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village leaders (Goodman et aI., 2004). In another study on malaria treatment conducted in 
Tanzania, a census was used to identify every Part II drug shop and every government and non-
governmental organisation (NGO) owned facility situated within a 10 km radius of a Part II drug 
shop (CHAI, 2007). 
Overall, a census appears to be the most reliable approach for measuring the number of 
providers in a given area. In her study of the retail market for malaria treatment, Goodman 
assessed the completeness of her approach by comparing the census data with treatment 
sources identified during a household survey conducted in the same areas over the same 
period. She found that less than 7% of shops mentioned by householders could not be 
matched with those listed in the census and that in some cases this discrepancy may have 
reflected the use of different names for a given shop (Goodman, 2004). Goodman concluded 
that nearly all retail outlets that sold pharmaceutical drugs and that were used by the 
population at the time of the census had been captured (Goodman, 2004). 
Through a census, both formal and informal providers operating at the time of the census can 
be captured. Furthermore, a census offers the opportunity to collect data on the range of 
products stocked and for each product its price and volume sold over a given period. However, 
it may be difficult to conduct a census for identifying providers operating at higher levels of the 
chain, such as wholesalers for instance, because wholesale outlets may not be sign posted and 
would therefore be more difficult to identify. 
Another important disadvantage is that a census requires more resources - time, human, 
financial - than the previous two approaches (Le. lists and key informant interviews). As a 
result censuses are rarely carried out at regional or national level where wholesalers may 
operate. 
3.3.1.4 Sales receipts 
To identify retailers, retail sales receipts of all registered wholesalers were collected during a 
study that evaluated the impact of a vendor-to-vendor training programme implemented in 
the rural district of Bungoma, Kenya (Tavrow et aI., 2003). This method has however been 
rarely used, notably because of the relatively low availability of sales records at private 
commercial outlets operating in developing countries especially in remote towns and villages. 
S2 
3.3.1.5 Household survey 
In 12 villages of West Bengal State, India, private drug retailers were identified by visiting all 
the households with under-five children, asking mothers if any child had been sick in the past 
two weeks and if so, which providers they first visited to treat the child (Chakraborty et aI., 
2000, Chakraborty and Frick, 2002). The main advantage of a household survey is that informal 
and mobile providers who might not be captured in lists or during an outlet census can be 
identified. However, it can be difficult to identify outlets precisely from household's 
information and the survey will only capture providers visited by sampled households over a 
given time period. 
3.3.1.6 Bottom-up approach: interviews with retailers and wholesalers 
To identify wholesalers, interviews with their customers have been conducted. In the study of 
the retail market for malaria treatment in rural Tanzania, antimalarial wholesalers were 
identified by asking drug and general shopkeepers to name their 2 top suppliers for 
antimalarial drugs (Goodman, 2004). Then, the 5 most frequently mentioned wholesale 
sources for each drug and general outlet category were visited and asked about their top 2 
supply sources for antimalarial drugs. This process was repeated until local manufacturers or 
importers were identified (Goodman, 2004). An alternative approach is to focus on each 
retailer's main supply source for all drugs as has been done in Zambia (MMV, 2007) and 
Nigeria (Adikwu, 1996). Another approach recommended by the WHO/HAl consists of asking 
at least one retailer in each of the studied area about his main supply source for each of the 
medicine surveyed, and the process is repeated at each stage of the chain until the top of the 
chain is reached (WHO and HAl, 2008). 
In summary, a "bottom-up approach" offers the opportunity to identify formal and informal 
providers. This method however does not provide estimates of the total number of 
wholesalers operating at each level of the distribution chain. 
An overview of the range of methods that have been reviewed for identifying providers at 
different levels of the distribution chain for antimalarial and pharmaceutical drugs in general is 
given in Table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1: Summary of approaches used for identifying different provider types 
Methods Distribution level 
Manufacturers Wholesalers Retailers 
Lists of outlets 
Dfficiallists .; .; .; 
Other lists 
.; 
Interviews 
Central informants .; .; .; 
Local informants .; 
Providers .; .; 
Outlet census .; 
Household survey 
.; 
It is difficult to conclude on the relative completeness of each method in absence of a gold 
standard approach. The choice of method or combination of methods to be used will be driven 
by the types of outlets to identify and the resources available to do so. An outlet census seems 
to be the most reliable approach to identify providers although it can be a huge task especially 
if it is undertaken in large areas. The census approach has been used to identify retailers but 
never wholesalers so its relevance at higher levels of the chain is unknown. To date the 
"bottom-up" method which consists in interviewing providers about their supply sources has 
been the most common approach for identifying wholesalers. But key challenges emerge with 
respect to whether all providers have been identified (e.g. retailers might have a lot of 
different suppliers for different products) and how a representative sample can be drawn 
under this uncertainty. 
Research studies are generally conducted on a sample rather than on the whole population. 
Three sampling procedures have been used in studies of markets for antimalarial and 
pharmaceutical drugs in general, namely convenience, random and stratified sampling 
methods. These methods are described below. 
3.3.2 Sampling providers' 
3.3.2.1 Convenience sampling method 
During the evaluation of the vendor-to-vendor training programme in Kenya, retailers, who 
had been identified from wholesalers' sales receipts, were conveniently sampled based on 
logistical considerations with those located in remote areas purposively excluded from the 
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evaluation (Tavrow et aI., 2003). This approach limits the extent to which findings can be 
generalised to the whole study district. 
3.3.2.2 Random sampling method 
The simple random sampling method has been used to draw samples of outlets identified from 
existing lists of providers. In the study that explored the practices of patent medicines sellers in 
Nigeria, a sample of outlets was randomly drawn from the list of retailers registered to handle 
prescription-only drugs in the study area (Adikwu, 1996). Similarly, registered pharmacies 
operating in 3 municipalities of Dar es Salaam were randomly sampled from the official list of 
pharmacies available from the TFDA (Kachur et aI., 2006). One limitation shared by these 2 
methods is that outlets might not be homogeneous, varying for example by outlet type and 
geographic location, and simple random sampling may fail to ensure that each group is 
adequately represented. To address this issue, some studies drew stratified samples. 
3.3.2.3 Stratified sampling method 
Stratification involves the creation of relatively homogenous sub groups or strata, from which 
samples are taken either randomly or purposively. A method developed by WHO/HAl was to 
stratify outlets by geographic area and draw a sample using a combination of randomisation 
and purposively driven techniques. They select the main urban centre and 5 other 
geographical areas that can be reached within one day's drive from the urban centre. In each 
area, the main public hospital is purposively selected and 4 public facilities are randomly 
chosen from the official list of government outlets ;then, in each area the closest private outlet 
to each public facility is selected (WHO and HAl, 2008). 
This sampling approach has been adapted in a couple of studies. For example, in Maputo City, 
Mozambique, a sample of private pharmacies was stratified by outlets located in the suburbs 
and those in the town centre (Russo and McPake, 2010). An advantage of the WHO/HAl 
approach is feasibility but it is limited in its focus on registered outlets. The sample is at best 
informative for pharmacies in the surveyed area but not for all the retail sources that might 
also stock medicines in the selected geographic areas. Another adaptation of the WHO/HAl 
approach by the Medicines"for Malaria Venture partially solved this issue, by identifying all 
private registered and unregistered sources of antimalarial drugs found within 3 hour's-drive 
from each public health facility using lists of outlets and key informants. ~hen, 5 outlets are 
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randomly sampled (MMV, 2007). However, the representativity of the sample remains 
questionable. 
Other methods of stratification have included by village (Hetzel, 2007) or area of operation 
(wealthy versus poor) (Russo and McPake, 2010); by type of drugs handled (generics or 
brands) (Russo and McPake, 2010); and by level of the distribution chain (manufacturers, 
wholesalers and retailers) (Yadav, 2007). One study conducted in Uganda drew random 
samples of private wholesalers and retail pharmacies using official lists and stratified the total 
sample proportionally by the share that wholesalers and retailers each represented to the 
total number of registered private outlets (Nakyanzi J et aI., 2009). In another study, a 
stratified sample of wholesalers serving retailers was drawn directly by selecting the 5 most 
frequently mentioned supply sources by retail shopkeepers for each category of general and 
drug outlet (Goodman, 2004). 
Another challenge in studying the provision of pharmaceutical products and antimalarials in 
general in developing countries is to identify the range of drugs dispensed in a particular area. 
The next sub-section reviews the range of methods used in the literature. 
3.3.3 Identifying the range of products 
The review identified two sets of approaches for exploring the range of products available in a 
particular area. The first set includes approaches that explore availability from a supply-side 
perspective, including product lists, outlet surveys and the mystery shopper's technique. The 
second set covers household surveys and exit interviews, which investigate product availability 
from the demand-side. 
3.3.3.1 Product lists 
Official lists have been used to count the number of products with marketing authorisations in 
a given country. In a study that explored the supply and use of antimalarial drugs in Tanzania, 
the list of registered medicines available from the Pharmacy Board was used to identify the 
number, types and formulations of imported antimalarials (Battersby et aI., 2003). In another 
study on malaria treatment conducted in the Kenyan retail sector, the official list of registered 
antimalarials was obtained from the Pharmacy and Poisons Board of the Ministry of Health 
and was supplemented by information on newly registered antimalarials ?vailable from the 
Board's minutes and Gazette notices (Amin and Snow, 2005). 
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The main limitation of this approach lies in the quality of the information contained in the list 
and whether registration status reflects availability on the ground. For instance, the Kenyan 
study found that out of the 218 oral antimalarial products that were found to be in circulation 
in Kenya in 2002, 83 products were not included in the official list (Amin and Snow, 2005). In 
addition, it reported that many of the drugs listed were due for re-registration, creating 
uncertainty around their status and availability in the market (Amin and Snow, 2005). A 
preferred approach has therefore been to assess the availability of medicines by visiting 
outlets. 
3.3.3.2 Outlet surveys 
A range of studies has surveyed outlets to assess medicines availability. 
In a study that explored the supply of medicines by informal outlets in the Division of Ntem, 
Cameroon, a medical anthropologist collected information on the types, formulations and pack 
sizes of all medicines on display in each outlet. If none were displayed, the shopkeeper was 
asked whether medicines were sold in the premises (van der Geest, 1987, Van der Geest and 
Hardon, 1988). The main limitation of this approach relates to the time needed to record 
detailed information about each medicine. Implementation of this approach in all outlets or 
large samples of outlets selling drugs is likely to become unmanageable. 
An alternative is to focus the data collection on selected products. The WHO/HAl methodology 
consists of selecting a maximum of 50 medicines, including 14 global and 16 regional essential 
medicines selected on the basis of the global burden of disease, and 20 supplementary 
essential medicines identified at country level. One pack size and one strength are surveyed for 
each medicine type, which can include innovator brand, generic, locally produced and 
imported drugs. Advantages of this approach include its feasibility and the potential for 
comparison across countries. 
A third approach is to assess availability of medicines commonly used to treat a specific 
condition. For instance, several rounds of outlet surveys have been conducted during the 
IMPACT programme to provide evidence to help improve malaria control in 4 districts of rural 
Tanzania over a 5 year period. Data on the formulation and packaging of all antimalarials and 
painkillers stocked by drug and general outlets were collected at different points in time 
allowing stocking patterns to be investigated over time and compared across outlet types 
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(Goodman, 2004). By contrast, a later survey focused on the availability of the first-line 
antimalarial drug only from both drug and general shops in the study area (Hetzel, 2007). 
Availability of antimalarials and painkillers was also investigated at wholesale level by following 
up the sources of supply for drug and general retail outlets (Goodman, 2004). 
The most important limitations of exploring the range of all or selected medicines on display in 
shops is that the information collected does not tell us about the use of medicines and their 
relative importance (Conteh and Hanson, 2003). In addition, there is a potential for 
shopkeepers to withhold information as prescription-only medicines may not be openly 
displayed. The mystery shopper technique can address this limitation. 
3.3.3.3 Mystery shoppers 
The mystery shopper technique consists in the unobtrusive observation of shop attendants by 
researchers who pose as clients seeking care from a provider who is unaware of their identity 
(Conteh and Hanson, 2003). This strategy has been used in Tanzania during a pilot study during 
which ACT was sold at subsidized prices. In the 210 Part II drug shops that were visited, 
shoppers posed either as clients with malaria symptoms or as care takers of a 9-month old 
child sick at home. When shoppers were not directly offered an ACT, they specifically asked for 
one referring to a radio ad they had recently heard (CHAI, 2007). They bought whatever 
product was available and after leaving the outlet recorded the details of their visit (CHAI, 
2007). 
In addition to these supply side approaches, two methods for exploring product availability 
from the demand-side were identified and are described below. 
3.3.3.4 Household surveys 
Many household surveys collect data on drugs used for fever/malaria treatment. For example, 
in a study of the management of paediatric fever in 4 districts of Kenya, a sample of 
households was surveyed and in each home a child under five years of age was randomly 
selected. The main caretaker was then asked whether the child had had a fever in the 
preceding 14 days, and if th~.Y had, the duration of illness, if care had been sought and the type 
of care sought. When modern medicines had been obtained, the caretaker was asked to 
identify the medicines from a photo-illustrated chart of common branded antimalarials and 
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painkillers available in the retail sector (Amin et aI., 2003). Health cards and prescriptions were 
also examined (Amin et aI., 2003). 
The main limitation of the household survey approach as a means to explore product 
availability lies in respondents' ability to recall their past actions, which may also be influenced 
by social desirability biases. For instance, caretakers might not accurately report the treatment 
obtained and the name of the providers they visited. 
3.3.3.5 Exit Interviews 
Interviews can also be conducted outside each outlet surveyed where clients who exit the 
shop are asked about their purchases by a researcher. In the ACT subsidy pilot conducted in 
Tanzania, a data collector was stationed outside each Part" drug shop for one day and asked 
customers who had purchased an antimalarial the brand name of the purchased medicine, the 
price paid, the reasons for purchasing this product and a set of demographic characteristics 
(CHAI, 2007). 
This approach has the potential to unveil information about medicines stocked behind the 
counter but it can be time consuming as the interviewer has to wait outside the outlet. For 
example, during a study of illicit drug sellers in two markets located in the suburbs of Dakar, 10 
drug sellers were randomly selected and observed during 10 hours per day for 7 days, with a 
total of 144 seller-customer interactions recorded (Fassin, 1987). 
3.3.4 Measuring sales volumes and values 
This section reviews four methods identified for measuring sales volumes and values, namely 
the review of sales records, interviews with providers, exit interviews with customers and the 
retail audit technique. 
3.3.4.1 Review of sales records 
One approach to measuring sales volumes is to collect information from sales recorded by 
storekeepers. In a study conducted in Tanzania, researchers used sales records available in 
each store to estimate the volumes of antimalarial drugs sold over one month (CHAI, personal 
communication). 
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3.3.4.2 Interviews with providers 
Sales volumes can also be estimated during interviews with retailers who are asked to recall 
their sales volumes during the week preceding the interview (PSI, 2008b). 
3.3.4.3 Exit interviews 
Exit interviews with customers can be conducted outside public and private pharmacies to 
estimate the utilisation of medicines as done in a study conducted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
(Kloos et aI., 1986). 
3.3.4.4 Retail audits 
Another approach, developed by market research agencies, is to undertake a retail audit 
during which stock information is collected by field research teams who visit a panel of outlets 
at regular intervals. At each visit and in each outlet fieldworkers measure the stocks of an 
entire product category and ask about any volumes added and/or disposed during the visit 
interval. The volume of sales for each shop during the period is then estimated by subtracting 
the stock at the end of the period from the stock at the initial visit, corrected by any 
additions/disposals during the period. Periodic sales volumes can then be calculated by 
summing the sales volumes of each audit and scaling up accordingly to the period of interest. 
In the study of the retail market for malaria treatment in rural Tanzania, the retail audit 
technique was used to collect antimalarial sales data (Goodman, 2004). All public facilities and 
drug shops and a sample of general stores that stocked antimalarials were visited during two 
separate 2-week periods. 
More recently during the evaluation study of the impact of subsidised ACT in Tanzania, retail 
audits were conducted to assess the volume of antimalarials sold by each Part" drug shop. 
Data collectors visited all the shops in each of the 3 districts two times with a 4 week interval 
between visits (CHAI, 2007). Data on the stocks at the first visit, stocks at the second visit, 
volumes purchased and volumes disposed were then used to determine the volume of all 
antimalarials sold at each outlet in the past month. 
Research International, a market research company, used a panel of pharmacies, drug stores 
and clinics to survey each outlet on a monthly basis for a period of 3 months (MMV consensus 
~ 
methodology meeting, March 2007): fieldworkers visited outlets and asked retailers to see 
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their receipts for wholesale purchases, asked about products that were out of stock at the 
time of the visit and counted the stock available of each product surveyed. In Kenya, a panel of 
300 registered and unregistered outlets were surveyed (MMV consensus methodology 
meeting, March 2007). 
During our review, the literature did not indicate which approach may provide the most 
accurate estimates. However, common challenges were identified. The first is that 
shopkeepers may be reluctant to share their records. They may fear that their data could be 
disclosed to drug registration bodies, revenue authorities or competitive outlets. They may 
also simply object to being observed because it might interfere with their work (Conteh and 
Hanson, 2003). 
When shopkeepers are willing to disclose sales data, the second challenge lies in the 
completeness of the data that can be collected. Approaches tend to be better suited for 
-
estimating the sales of formal rather than informal outlets (Conteh and Hanson, 2003) and 
sales of registered rather than unregistered products. Shopkeepers are unlikely to display 
products that they are not authorised to handle and exit interviews may be the best approach 
to address this problem, although the presence of interviewers may still bias sales patterns. 
The third challenge is to obtain annual estimates by scaling up sales data that are available 
over shorter time periods. Information about the seasonality of sales patterns is therefore 
needed. Reviewing sales records can potentially address this challenge as if they exist they will 
cover a longer time period. Retail audits can also be an alternative if they can be carried out all 
year continuously. Otherwise, proxies are needed, such as, for example, outpatient records 
available from health information systems. 
The fourth challenge relates to the valuation of sales volumes. It can be relatively 
straightforward to collect sales values directly from shopkeepers' records. However, if other 
approaches are used, price data are required and need to be collected. In addition, a question 
concerns which price should be used for valuing sales volumes. Ideally, one could collect the 
retail price of each product during a retail audit and then use these data for valuing sales 
volumes. The biggest challenge however is in the valuation of highly subsidised or free 
products. In a study conducted in rural Tanzania, volumes of antimalarials dispensed from 
government facilities were valued assuming a zero mark-up using international reference 
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prices (IRPs) to which 30% were added to account for delivery costs (Goodman et aI., 2009, 
Goodman, 2004). 
The fifth and last challenge is to scale up sales volumes or values for outlets that were not 
sampled and for which no data are available in order to obtain estimates for the total market 
size. Mean sales volumes and values might be used but this may under or over estimate actual 
volumes/values and as a result market concentration measures. Whilst these common 
challenges have been identified, relatively little is known about the strengths and weaknesses 
of different methods implemented in the same context. This will be explored in Chapter 8 of 
this thesis. The review now turns to methods for studying economic markets. 
3.3.5 Defining economic markets 
As previously mentioned, market power is traditionally estimated using market concentration 
measures. These are based on market share data and therefore require the market to be 
defined appropriately. In the 10 literature, markets are defined along product and geographic 
lines. 
The product definition relates to the set of buyers, sellers and products sold in the market 
whilst the geographic definition is the area within which buyers and sellers interact and 
determine the product price. The range of methods used for defining the product dimension in 
the literature on markets for pharmaceutical drugs in developing countries is reviewed first, 
followed by the range of methods used for defining the geographical dimension. 
The study of medicines prices in urban Mozambique followed the WHO/HAl approach and set 
the product definition as public and private registered pharmacies dispensing a sample of 
essential medicines (Russo, 2007). In the study of the retail sector for malaria treatment in 
rural Tanzania, the provider market was defined as all outlet types found to be widely used to 
obtain fever or malaria treatment using household survey data collected on treatment seeking 
behaviour in the study areas. As a result, the product definition included all public and private 
facilities, drug shops and general stores stocking painkillers and/or antimalarial drugs, with 
these medicines representing the vast majority of drugs obtained for treating fever or malaria 
during the household survey (Goodman et aI., 2009, Goodman, 2004). Other provider types 
that were rarely used were excluded as potential competitors, including itinerant vendors, 
community health workers and traditional healers (Goodman et aI., 2009, Goodman, 2004). In 
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the ACT pilot study implemented in 3 rural districts of Tanzania, the product definition 
included Part II drug shops on the basis of evidence provided by Goodman and colleagues that 
these were the most commonly visited provider type for treating fever or malaria treatment in 
rural areas (CHAI, 2007). 
Overall, few studies we reviewed specifically aimed to define the product dimension of 
pharmaceutical markets. This partly reflected the challenges in assessing which products to 
consider as close substitutes and therefore part of the same market in the absence of data on 
between-product cross-elasticity. Furthermore, products part of the same market may not 
face the same degree of competition (Goodman, 2004). 
Three approaches have been used for defining the geographic dimension of pharmaceutical 
drug markets in developing countries: the fixed radius method, the use of administrative areas 
alone or combined with the shipment approach. 
The fixed-radius method was used in the ACT pilot implemented in Tanzania. The geographic 
dimension was set as all outlet types that potentially competed with Part II drug shops in the 
study districts, including other shops situated within a 1km radius of each Part" drug shop and 
government and NGO facilities located within 10kms of each drug shop and providing free ACT 
(CHAI, 2007). 
Administrative areas alone were used in the study of medicine prices in urban Mozambique. 
The geographic definition was set as the main urban centre based on household survey data 
that showed that consumers who lived in the Machava and Matola areas of the Maputo 
Province reported buying medicines in Maputo City (Russo 2007). 
The shipment method consists of identifying self-contained areas using data on the proportion 
of the population that se~k care in the market area but live outside it and data on the 
proportion of the population in the market area that use providers located outside it 
(Zwanziger et aI., 1994). This approach was used by Goodman and colleagues in their study of 
fever/malaria treatment in Tanzania in order to assess the appropriateness of different levels 
of administration areas. The most appropriate administrative area for most sub-markets was 
identified by minimising the proportion of customers who travelled outside the area to 
purchase the product and maximise the proportion who remained within the area. Shipment 
data were also used to take account of local specificities in care seeking behaviours and 
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adjustments were made to some sub-markets for which a different geographical definition was 
more appropriate {Goodman, 2004}. For example, in situations where a smaller administrative 
area was relatively self-contained, it was considered as a more appropriate geographic 
definition and used to set up boundaries for some of the sub-markets. 
All these approaches that have been used for defining the geographical dimension of markets 
have their weaknesses. Administrative area and fixed radius methods ignore consumers' actual 
treatment seeking behaviours. For example, during the Mozambican study, evidence showed 
that consumers crossed the Mozambican border to seek care from providers outside the 
country, although these providers had been excluded from the market definition. As for the 
shipment method, it uses utilisation data by patient origin that may not be readily available, 
and where available, cut-off points of proportions of the population that seek care inside and 
outside the area are generally arbitrary. In summary, the extent to which the geographic 
definition can be fine tuned to customers' preferences and location of providers is generally 
limited and it is unrealistic to define completely distinct markets in the context where 
providers' catchment areas often overlap and vary in size {Goodman, 2004}. 
To conclude, defining the market is challenging and all approaches tend to have limitations. 
Combining approaches seems to be the best method for defining markets. Once an 
appropriate market has been defined the intensity of competition in the market can be 
explored, starting with the measurement of market concentration. 
3.3.6 Measuring market concentration 
In the empirical literature, horizontal concentration has typically been measured by the n-firm 
concentration ratio {CR} or the Herfindahl-Hirschman- index {HHI}, although additional 
approaches have also been identified. 
The CR measures the proportion of market output accounted for by the n largest firms, with n 
. often set at 3, 5 or 10. Formally: 
Where Sj is the share of the ith firm in the market and n the number of firms considered to be 
the largest. 
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Concentration ratios are easy to calculate but they only consider the n largest firms in the 
industry and the choice of n is arbitrary. 
Another approach is therefore to calculate the HHI, which is the sum of squared firm market 
shares of all firms in the industry. 
Formally: 
N 
HHI = LSl 
i=l 
Where N is the total number of firms in the industry. 
The HHI can vary from 0 to 1, with fewer firms and larger variations of market shares 
increasing the index and indicating a greater degree of concentration and lower competitive 
intensity. 
CRs and HHls have been used to measure concentration at various levels of the distribution 
chain for pharmaceutical drugs in developing countries. At wholesale level, a study of the 
structure of the antimalarial market in Uganda assessed the level of concentration of the 
import wholesale market by calculating the n-firm concentration ratio and the HHI index using 
the value of all antimalarial drugs imported into the country by each importer (Yadav and 
Conesa, 2008). The level of concentration was assessed using a three tier cut-off, following US 
horizontal merger guidelines, which at the time of the Ugandan study considered markets with 
an HHI below 0.1 as unconcentrated, between 0.1 and 0.18 as moderately concentrated and 
above 0.18 as highly concentrated (Yadav and Conesa, 2008). 
In a study of medicine prices in Mozambique, the degree of concentration of the wholesale 
market for essential medicines was estimated by c~lculating the market shares of registered 
drug importers using pre-tax turnover data available from the National Directorate of Tax and 
Auditing (Russo 2007). The .HHI index was calculated and the cut-off value of 0.18 was used to 
assess the level of concentration in that market. One limitation of using pre-tax turnover data 
is that it provides the market share that each wholesaler holds in value terms in the overall 
drug markets rather than solely in the market under study. Therefore, through this approach, 
the HHI is calculated on the market defined as all wholesalers of any pharmaceutical drugs. It 
implies that all wholesalers were expected to compete with one another despite the fact that 
they were likely to operate in different markets as they sold drugs that were unlikely to have 
all been close substitutes. 
65 
At retail level, Goodman calculated the 3-firm CR and the HHI by sub-market and outlet owner 
using sales values data (Goodman, 2004). The measures were calculated by owner rather than 
by outlet because of evidence that the same owner managed more than one outlet. 
Additional methods have also been used. In the Tanzanian study, the number of providers per 
capita was estimated to assess concentration in the retail market for antimalarials. A similar 
approach was used for the wholesale market by calculating the number of retailers per supply 
source (Goodman, 2004). In another Tanzanian study, retail market concentration was 
measured using a competition index referring to the number of shops located within a 1km 
radius of each Part" drug shop. The index was defined to range from 0 (no other shops within 
the 1km radius) to 5+ (more than 5 other shops within the 1km radius) providing a proxy of the 
degree of competition (CHAI, 2008b, CHAI, 2007). 
In the absence of sufficient quantitative data, interviews have been conducted to explore the 
relative importance of suppliers within and across supply chain levels. In the Mozambican 
study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with policy makers, importers and 
pharmacists to collect information on the number of pharmacies located in central Maputo 
and in the suburbs, their product orientation (either generic or brand) and the relative 
volumes they were perceived to handle to assess the level of retail concentration (Russo and 
McPake, 2010, Russo, 2007). This approach is useful to get a feel of the structure of the market 
but is much less informative to assess market concentration and the extent to which market 
power is exercised. 
Concentration in vertical markets is also of interest when studying competition in distribution 
chains. However, there is no measurement technique akin to those used to assess horizontal 
concentration. In the absence of consensus about which approaches are best suited for 
studying vertical integration, some attempts have however been made in two studies of 
pharmaceutical drug mar~ets in developing country settings. In Mozambique, Russo 
interviewed key informants to collect information on importers and pharmacists' ownership 
status and the existence of long term agreements between manufacturers, importers and 
pharmacists (Russo, 2007, Russo and McPake, 2010), whilst Goodman investigated the degree 
of vertical integration during semi-structured interviews by collecting evidence on ownership 
links and long-term coordination such as long-term contractual arrangements (Goodman, 
2004). 
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In summary, several techniques are available for measuring market concentration, with the 
HHI and CR being the most commonly used. Taking into account solely those providers that are 
currently operating in the market however ignores potential competitors who may enter the 
market and fails to provide a comprehensive assessment of the intensity of market 
competition. The notion of contestability needs therefore to be explored. 
3.3.7 Assessing market contestability 
A third step in the study of markets is to look at competition that firms already in the market 
face from potential new providers. This is done by exploring barriers to market entry and exit. 
During our review, 3 methods were identified: use of regulatory documents, interviews with 
providers and calculation of providers' turnover. 
During his study of medicines prices in Mozambique, Russo investigated contestability by 
identifying the regulatory and economic barriers that providers face to enter the 
pharmaceutical drug market. Regulatory documents detailing the legal requirements to 
establish drug importing, wholesaling and retailing businesses were reviewed, covering for 
instance staff qualification requirements and drug pricing (Russo, 2007, Russo and McPake, 
2010). Interviews with key informants were also used. Registered importers and urban-based 
pharmacists were interviewed about the legal and economic requirements new providers were 
likely to face to enter their respective markets (Russo, 2007, Russo and McPake, 2010). 
Economic barriers included the initial investment required, the perceived profitability of 
entering the market and risks encountered (Russo, 2007, Russo and McPake, 2010). 
Finally, in her study of the retail market for malaria treatment in rural Tanzania, Goodman 
explored contestability by estimating the turnover of providers in her study areas using data 
collected during two rounds of retail censuses cond'ucted 1 year apart (Goodman, 2004). This 
technique was thereafter repeated annually for several years in a follow-up study (Alba et aI., 
2010b). 
In summary, there is a wide range of approaches available for exploring the structure of 
pharmaceutical drug markets. Combining methods may be the best strategy in order to 
triangulate the information collected and obtain more accurate estimates. However, the study 
of wholesale markets and distribution chains in general appears to be less common and the 
range of methods used in low income settings more limited. 
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3.3.8 Measuring price mark-ups 
Price mark-up is a key variable in the study of economic markets as it provides an indication of 
the extent to which providers influence the price at which they are paid. The range of 
empirical methods that have been used for measuring price mark-ups are described first, 
followed by methods for analyzing their determinants. 
3.3.8.1 Review of pharmaceutical regulations and key informant interviews 
Reviewing official central policies and conducting central level interviews are the simplest 
methods for collecting medicines mark-ups. In a study of the market for essential drugs in 4 
East African countries, researchers reviewed pharmaceutical drug policies to identify the 
maximum mark-up level authorized at each stage of the private commercial distribution chain 
(Myhr, 2000). In another study of the components of medicines prices in 10 countries, open-
ended questions were sent via email to government officials (Levison, 2002). 
These two methods are relatively convenient and inexpensive and they offer the opportunity 
to collect information on other components of medicine prices, including port and custom 
clearing tariffs and quality insurance check costs. 
There are however 3 key shortcomings. The first is that it is only a valid approach in countries 
where mark-ups are regulated. The second shortcoming is that the collected data are likely to 
be inaccurate in countries where regulation enforcement mechanisms are weak as is often the 
case in developing settings. The third and last shortcoming is that mark-ups for individual 
medicines or different provider types cannot be collected. 
3.3.8.2 Interviews with providers 
Interviews with providers are an alternative method, which consist of asking providers directly 
about their mark ups. The advantage of this method is that mark-ups at different levels of the 
distribution chain can be collected, although again there may be concerns about the accuracy 
of self-reported mark-ups. In the Tanzanian study of the retail market for malaria treatment, 5 
of the 6 surveyed drug wholesalers reported mark-ups ranging from 5% to 10% for both 
antimalarials and painkillers, reaching sometimes 15% for antimalarials. However, when mark-
ups were calculated using selling and purchasing prices they were very different and varied 
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across drugs, with no mark-up on locally produced aspirin and 24.5% on quinine 
(Chukwujekwu, 2007). 
3.3.8.3 Use of existing price data 
Price data may also be used for calculating price mark-ups. Total mark-up, or the difference 
between the price at which a consumer buys a drug in retail shops and the price at which 
manufacturers sell it, provides a measure of the additional costs that are added as a medicine 
travels from the top of the distribution chain down to the bottom. 
An alternative approach to calculating this difference is to calculate the Medicine Price Ratio 
(MPR) which is an expression of the price faced by customers in terms of its procurement 
costs. As the availability of procurement costs for particular drugs tends to be rare, IRPs have 
been used as a proxy for drug procurement prices to compare total mark-ups across medicines 
(Amin and Snow, 2005, Goodman, 2004, Russo and McPake, 2010), sectors (Levison, 2006, 
Ewen and Dey, 2005, WHO, 2007) and countries (Laing, 2006, Ewen and Dey, 2005, WHO, 
2007). However, an important limitation of using IRPs for calculating price mark-ups is that 
IRPs are not actual procurement costs and therefore may not provide a reliable measure of 
providers' price setting decisions. The next section describes the range of methods used for 
analysing pricing determinants in low income countries and briefly reviews those used in 
developed countries. 
3.3.9 Analysing price setting decisions 
This review identified a single study that analysed providers' price setting decisions for 
antimalarial drugs and painkillers in a developing country setting, using quantitative methods, 
including bivariate and multivariable analyses, combined with semi-structured interviews with 
retailers and wholesalers. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted to explore how providers set their prices and 
mark-ups, providing insights on some of the factors to consider during the quantitative analysis 
(Goodman, 2004). 
A bivariate analysis was then conducted to explore the association between the median price 
of a 2-year old child's treatment dose and a range of outlet and product c~aracteristics. Outlet 
characteristics were used to account for differences in perceived quality of service, overhead 
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costs and wholesale prices between drug and general outlets. They included whether the 
outlet was a drug shop or a general shop, the area in which the outlet was situated (Rufiji, 
Ulanga and Kilombero areas) and whether the outlet was situated in a market centre, rural 
village or farming area. Product characteristics were used as proxies for variations in the cost 
and perceived quality of drugs that retailers reported customers to associate with effective 
medicines. They included the antimalarial and painkiller type, whether the tablets were 
packaged or loose, whether the drug was the innovator brand, a branded or unbranded 
generic and its country of manufacture (Tanzania, Other Africa, Asia or Europe) (Goodman et 
aL, 2009, Goodman, 2004). This type of analysis provided information on which characteristics 
were associated with drug prices. However, drug and outlet characteristics were highly 
correlated, so it was therefore not possible to assess the relative importance or marginal effect 
of each of the different outlet and product characteristics on drug prices. 
An ordinary least square (OLS) log-linear regression model was developed. The median price of 
a 2-year old child's treatment dose was logged to reflect the skewed distribution of drug prices 
and it was regressed on several predictor variables, including the generic drug type, type of 
packaging, country of manufacture, brand status, DSS area, outlet type and location and 
market concentration as measured by the HHI calculated for antimalarial sales volumes and 
values at private outlets (Goodman et aL, 2009, Goodman, 2004). The analysis accounted for 
clustering of drug prices within outlets and the stratification of the outlet sample between 
Kilombero/Ulanga and Rufiji areas. As for other studies of price setting for pharmaceutical 
drugs in developing countries, they used semi-structured interviews with retailers and/or 
wholesalers (Chukwujekwu, 2007, Russo and McPake, 2010, RBM, 2007, MMV, 2007). Other 
studies conducted in low or middle income countries have also explored the influence of 
market structure on price and quality outcomes in markets for hospital services (Nakamba et 
aL, 2002, Bennett, 1996). 
In high or middle income, countries, econometric models have been used to investigate 
changes over time in market structure (mergers, entry, regulation) on price or quality 
outcomes in markets for pharmaceutical drugs and hospital services (Wang, 2006, Sorensen, 
2000, Danzon and Chao, 2000, Meiners et aL, 2011). Within this literature, few studies have 
also investigated the conduct of both providers and buyers, notably in the US insurance and 
hospital markets(Moriya et aL, 2010). These studies have faced challenges in measuring 
concentration on both sides of the market, and as a result nearly all, except one, measured 
concentration on one side of the market only whilst on the other side they used the share of a 
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particular buyer for a particular seller rather than the market share of the buyer in his market 
(Moriya et aI., 2010, Gaynor and Vogt, 2000). The single study that measured market 
concentration on both sides used the sum of the squared market shares of each firm in their 
market (Moriya et aI., 2010) 
In summary, a range of methods have been used for studying healthcare markets across 
different settings (Conteh and Hanson, 2003, Van der Geest and Hardon, 1988). However, few 
studies conducted in developing countries have analysed drug markets from an economic lens. 
In addition, there is limited evidence available on how methods for studying a particular aspect 
of the market compare. 
3.4 A review of the empirical literature on markets for malaria treatment 
In this section, the literature on retail markets is summarised briefly (Section 3.4.1), as it has 
been the subject of a previous review (Goodman et aI., 2007). Greater focus is placed on the 
literature on private commercial sector distribution chains for antimalarial and pharmaceutical 
drugs in general (Section 3.4.2). The private commercial sector distribution chain refers to all 
levels of the in-country distribution chain, in other words to the chain of wholesalers serving 
private commercial retailers. The focus is on suppliers who operate from the point where 
commodities leave the factory gate or port of entry down to those directly supplying retailers. 
The review presents literature from outside Cambodia given that recent data on Cambodia 
have been presented in Chapter 2. As will become evident, most of the evidence available on 
retail markets and private commercial sector distribution chains concerns countries with high 
malaria transmission, notably those in Africa, where children under five years of age bear most 
of the disease burden. By contrast In Cambodia, as described in Chapter 2, malaria 
transmission is lower, concentrated in forest areas a.nd affects mainly adult males. This implies 
that consumer demand and preferences may differ substantially between Cambodia and the 
countries for which most of· the evidence is available. This may have important implications in 
terms of, for example, the range of products stocked, relative importance of different provider 
types in terms of sales volumes, and providers' pricing behaviour. Furthermore, Cambodia was 
the first country to introduce ACT and RDT in 2000 and availability and market shares for these 
products can be expected to be higher than in other malaria endemic countries. Finally, the 
structure of the private commercial distribution chain in Cambodia is likely to have been 
influenced by the nationwide social marketing programme, although as the review will 
demonstrate there is too little evidence on the structure of the chain in Cambodia and other 
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countries to conduct comparative analysis. The literature presented is however still of 
relevance to the thesis as there are several features that the Cambodian market shares with 
those covered in this review, as will become apparent from later chapters. These include the 
importance and heterogeneity of the retail sector, concerns about retail sector quality of care, 
and the range of wholesale supply sources. Moreover understanding the differences between 
the Cambodian context and other malaria-endemic settings is important in assessment of the 
generalisability of the thesis findings, considered in Chapter 9. 
The methods used for the literature search are also detailed in Appendix 2. An earlier version 
of this review was published in 2010 and is available in Appendix 3. 
This section starts by reporting the key structural aspects of retail markets for malaria 
treatment before presenting in more detail the evidence available on the private commercial 
distribution chain for antimalarial drugs. The section ends by describing and discussing the 
available data on price mark-ups on antimalarial drugs as they flow down distribution-chains. 
3.4.1 Retail markets for malaria treatment 
This section reviews the available evidence on private commercial retailers' characteristics, 
range of antimalarial drugs stocked, sales volumes and interventions working with 
shopkeepers. 
In many low and middle income countries, retail shops play an important role in the provision 
of malaria treatment (Agyepong and Manderson, 1994, Foster, 1991, Foster, 1995, Geissler et 
aL, 2000, Hamel et aL, 2001, Krause and Sauerborn, 2000, McCombie, 1996, Molyneux et aL, 
1999, Ndyomugyenyi et aL, 1998, Njau et aL, 2006, Ruebush et aL, 1995, Salako et aL, 2001, 
Snow et aL, 1992, Rutebemberwa et aL, 2009). Fo'r example, the retail sector was the first 
source of care for around 45% of households seeking malaria treatment across four 
communities in Enugu State, Nigeria (Onwujekwe et aL, 2008). In three rural districts of 
Tanzania nearly 40% of all anti-malarial volumes were dispensed within the retail sector, 
mainly through drug shops (Goodman et aL, 2009). 
Private shops' popularity is commonly based on convenience as they tend to operate closer to 
homes (Adikwu, 1996, Adome et aL, 1996, van der Geest, 1987, Onwujekwe et aL, 2008), and 
availability and reliability of drug stocks compared to public health providers (Snow et aL, 
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1992, Adome et aL, 1996, Goodman, 2004, Molyneux et aL, 1999, Rutebemberwa et aL, 2009, 
van der Geest, 1987), sometimes at lower costs (Rutebemberwa et aL, 2009, Williams and 
Jones, 2004, Amin et aI., 2003, Brieger et aL, 2001). 
Private retailers' characteristics vary substantially across settings. They can be pharmacies, 
drug shops, grocery stores, market stalls or itinerant hawkers. In Nigeria, Uganda and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), drug stores were the most common type of outlet 
stocking antimalarials whilst in Benin it was market stalls and in Nigeria grocery stores 
(O'Connell et aL, in press). Mobile vendors are common in West Africa, but are rarely found in 
East and Southern Africa (Goodman et aI., 2007). 
Outlets staffed by trained pharmacists are rare in all countries (Adikwu, 1996, Tavrow et aI., 
2003), and concentrated in urban areas, whilst drug shops can be found in both urban and 
more densely populated rural areas. Finally, general shops that sell drugs alongside household 
goods are often the only medicine retailers in more remote rural villages. Pharmacies are 
generally authorized to stock both prescription-only drugs and over-the-counter (OTC) 
products, while other outlets can only sell OTC drugs, although in practice some illegally stock 
prescription-only medicines (Goodman et aL, 2007). 
The market for antimalarial drugs includes artemisinin combination therapy (ACT), the most 
effective medicine and the official first-line treatment of uncomplicated P.! in most developing 
countries; non-artemisinin therapies (nAMT), some of which were recommended before the 
ACT era (e.g. chloroquine, amodiaquine, sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine and quinine), and 
artemisinin monotherapies (AMT) (e.g. artesunate, dihydroartemisinin, artemether) 15. 
These three product types are available under different formulations including tablets, 
suppositories, suspensions, syrups and liquid injectables. Some are sold under their 
proprietary names, and ref~rred to as innovator brands when they are products patented by 
their originators, or branded generics in the case of generic versions of innovator products 
marketed under a different name. Others are sold as unbranded generics without a 
proprietary name. 
15 Some are still recommended for treating uncomplicated P.! in pregnant women for example and in 
severe P.f cases 
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Whilst antimalarial drug availability is relatively high in the private commercial retail sector, 
the range of antimalarials is generally lower in outlets which are more remote or have less 
qualified staff (CHAI, 2008b, CHAI, 2007, Amin and Snow, 2005, Goodman et aL, 2004, Tavrow 
et aL, 2003, van der Geest, 1987, MMV, 2007). 
In terms of the volumes of antimalarial drugs sold annually across different provider types, 
limited data show that in Tanzania, 233 606 equivalent adult antimalarial doses were 
dispensed per annum from all facilities and shops in 3 rural districts of Tanzania, equivalent to 
1.7 adult doses per capita. Drug shops sold a mean of 2,310 equivalent adult doses per annum 
whilst general stores sold a mean of 74 equivalent adult doses per annum (Goodman, 2004). 
Retail market concentration in volume terms was reported to be high, with the 3-firm CR 
ranging from 68 to 100%, and the HHI from 0.18 to 1 (mean of 0.45) (Goodman, 2004, 
Goodman et aL, 2009). 
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ACT has been rarely available outside facilities and pharmacies whilst older therapies remain 
relatively popular. For example, In Tanzania, despite the change of treatment policy to the ACT 
artesunate-Iumefantrine (AL) in 2004, the old therapy sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine still 
accounted for 51% of all antimalarial sales whilst AL represented 19% of total sales, of which 
68% was from public health facilities and 14% from faith based health facilities and 17% from 
drug shops (Alba et aL, 2010b). In 2009/2010, in Benin, Madagascar, Uganda and Zambia, 
nAMT was the most commonly sold antimalarial category whilst in the DRC and Nigeria it was 
oral AMT (O'Connell et aL, in press). In these countries, recommended first-line ACTs 
accounted for less than 25% of total antimalarial volumes sold across public and private 
sectors and for less than 6% of sales volumes in the private sector(O'Conneli et aL, in press) . 
Other concerns around the quality of care provided in private shops relate to retailers' lack of 
qualifications, poor knowledge of drugs and dosages (Marsh et aL, 1999, Nshakira et aL, 2002, 
Abuya et aI., 2007, Okoro ~nd Jones, 1995), and stocking of unregistered (Battersby et aL, 
2003, Goodman et aL, 2004) and sometimes substandard or counterfeit drugs (Basco, 2004, 
Geissler et aL, 2000, Kaur et aL, 2008, van der Geest, 1987, Dondorp et aL, 2004, Newton et 
aL, 2001, Rozendaal, 2001). 
Although care provided by pharmacies is far from perfect (Adu-Sarkodie et aI., 2000, Mayhew 
et aL, 2001), most of these concerns are directed to non-pharmacy outlets. Drug shop staff are 
rarely qualified pharmacists (Rajakaruna et aL, 2006), having at best a basic nursing 
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background (Goodman et aL, 2007, MMV, 2007) or sometimes just secondary education 
(Rajakaruna et aL, 2006). General retailers have even fewer qualifications and some are 
illiterate (Goodman, 2004, Adome et aL, 1996). 
A strong interest in working with retailers to improve the quality of care they provide has 
emerged in recent years. Reviews of interventions working with shopkeepers indicated that 
various activities and mix of activities have been implemented (Goodman et aL, 2007, Wafula 
and Goodman, 2010, Smith et aL, 2009, Smith, 2009, Shah et aI., 2011). 
The most commonly used intervention for improving providers' knowledge and practice has 
been training, including individual sessions, training of trainers and workshops. Many 
interventions however had more than one component such as training combined with the 
provision of printed materials (e.g. job aids and posters) to display in outlets, pre-packed 
medicines, outlet accreditation or franchising, and supervision. Intervention components have 
also targeted factors influencing providers' practices, including the provision of information to 
consumers through social marketing programmes16, mass media or public information 
campaigns, or the creation of an "enabling environment" by changing drug policies and 
regulations or the provision of credit facilities to retailers (Goodman et aI., 2007). 
The reviews pointed out to the limited evidence on which interventions work best. They found 
however that training led to improvements in shop attendants' knowledge and practice, 
although the sustainability of the latter, including drug dispensing and referral of severe cases 
was questionable. In addition, participatory approaches within education and supervision 
interventions were reported to be relatively successful when they involved trainees and key 
stakeholders (e.g. national drug regulatory authorities) in the design and content of the 
intervention and in the planning of actions for performance improvements (Goodman et aI., 
2007, Wafula and Goodman, 2010, Smith et aL, 2009, Smith, 2009, Shah et aI., 2011). Finally, 
the reviews found higher improvements achieved during multi-faceted interventions 
addressing providers' knowledge and practices, and the broader context within which retailers 
operate, including the degree of competition faced by providers, regulatory mechanisms, 
consumer demand and influence of what happens at higher levels of the distribution chain 
(Goodman et aI., 2007, Wafula and Goodman, 2010, Smith et aI., 2009). 
16 Social marketing involves the tools and concepts of commercial marketing,' including promotional 
activities, branding, pre-packaging and/or financial subsidy of public health commodities 
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More recently, ACT subsidy schemes have been introduced in several malaria-endemic 
countries. Evaluations of these pilot interventions found that a subsidy, combined with 
supporting interventions (as those described above), increased ACT availability and uptake 
(Kone et aL, 2007, Sabot et aL, 2009, Sabot et aL, 2008, Cohen et aL, 2010, Talisuna et aL, 
2009, Kangwana et aL, 2011). For example, a cluster randomised controlled trial of subsidized 
paediatric ACT packs provided to retail outlets, training of retail shopkeepers and community 
awareness activities was conducted in 3 districts of Kenya. The percentage of children 
receiving the subsidized ACT on the day of fever or the following day was 25.5% points greater 
in the intervention arm than in the control arm ( 95%ci 14.1%-35.9%, p< 0.001) (Kangwana et 
aL, 2011). However, there was some evidence that this kind of intervention benefited the 
more accessible and wealthier populations (Cohen et aL, 2010), perhaps in part because of the 
small implementation scale (e.g. municipal, district) or/and scope (e.g. pharmacies and/or drug 
shops only). 
A global subsidy mechanism, known as the Affordable Medicines Facility-malaria (AMFm) and 
managed by the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the Global Fund) has 
been introduced in Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda and Tanzania, and is to 
be introduced in Cambodia. Co-payments are made by the Global Fund directly to preselected 
ACT manufacturers on behalf of both public and private sector buyers in each country, with 
the aim to reduce ACT retail prices to a level similar to less effective antimalarials, increase 
demand for ACT and displace less effective medicines from the market. Additional funding is 
available to countries for introducing "supporting interventions" such as community 
awareness, provider training and regulatory strengthening. 
A rapid assessment of the preliminary effects of the AMFm, which was conducted in the capital 
city of Nigeria and Ghana found that, whilst ACT prices had decreased following the 
intervention, ACT was sold at a price higher than that of less effective therapies, and 
questioned the potential ~or ACT crowding out and ultimately the AMFm's capacity for 
increasing access to good quality malaria treatment (Tren and Hess, 2011). A more formal 
independent evaluation of the AMFm is conducted in the participating countries. 
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3.4.2 Distribution chains and wholesale markets for antimalarial drugs 
This section reviews the available evidence on distribution chains in developing countries, 
including the general structure of the chain for antimalarial and pharmaceutical drugs17 in 
general and, at each level, suppliers' numbers and characteristics, range of antimalarial drugs 
stocked, antimalarial sales volumes and interventions working with wholesalers. An overview 
of the reviewed studies is available from the published manuscript in Appendix 3. 
For the purpose of the review, a taxonomy of suppliers was developed. Suppliers who sell 
directly to retailers are termed terminal suppliers. They buy from upstream suppliers, referred 
to as primary suppliers if they are the point of entry into the distribution chain, or intermediate 
suppliers if they themselves obtain drugs from primary suppliers. 
Overall, the distribution chain has been relatively less researched than the retail sector. The 
available evidence focused mainly on supply sources for retailers, with more limited-evidence 
on higher levels of the distribution chains, notably intermediate ones. 
The private commercial sector distribution chain of pharmaceutical drugs had a pyramid 
shape, similar to that of other private distribution channels, with fewer suppliers at the top 
and more numerous suppliers at the bottom (Yadav and Conesa, 2008, 10M, 2004, Tavrow et 
aL, 2003, Battersby et aL, 2003, International Finance Corporation, 2008, RBM, 2007, Shretta 
and Guimier, 2003, CHAI, 2008b, Russo, 2007, Russo and McPake, 2010, Chukwujekwu, 2007, 
MMV, 2007, Tougher et aL, 2009, Palafox et aL, 2009). 
The chain serving more remote outlets and those with less qualified staff tended to have more 
numerous levels. There were two intermediate levels of general wholesalers in the chain 
serving general shops operating in three rural districts in Tanzania but no intermediate level in 
the chain serving drug shops located in the same districts (Chukwujekwu, 2007). In a rural 
district of Uganda, two intermediate levels of wholesalers supplied the chain down to general 
stores and market stalls whilst the chain serving drug shops had a single intermediate level of 
wholesalers (MMV, 2007). 
17 Antimalarials are expected to follow the same distribution route as other drugs and to represent an 
important share of all drugs distributed in malaria-endemic countries. 
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Data on the total number of suppliers operating at each level of the antimalarial distribution 
chain were generally lacking. When available, data mainly concerned registered suppliers of 
pharmaceutical products in general (Yadav, 2007, Battersby et aL, 2003, 10M, 2004, IFC, 2008, 
Russo, 2007, Tavrow et aL, 2003, MMV, 2007, Palafox et aL, 2009) and rarely provided 
information on the total number of suppliers handling antimalarials (Chukwujekwu, 2007, 
Yadav and Ongola, 2007, Yadav and Conesa, 2008, CHAI, 2008b, Bojang et aI., Tougher et aI., 
2009). For example, in Nigeria, 286 registered importers and 616 registered wholesalers 
supplied pharmaceutical drugs in general (Palafox et aL, 2009). In Benin, 3 private wholesalers 
imported antimalarials (Tougher et aL, 2009) whilst in Burkina Faso and Uganda 4 and 15 did 
so respectively (RBM, 2007). 
The type of businesses acting as terminal, intermediate and primary suppliers is described 
below, although as will become clear, there is considerable overlap between these categories 
in practice. 
At the terminal level, wholesalers were the most common suppliers, serving pharmacies, drug 
shops and general shops (Yadav, 2007, RBM, 2007, Amin and Snow, 2005, Buabeng et aL, 
2008, CHAI, 2008c, 10M, 2004, IFC, 2008, Russo, 2007, Tavrow et aL, 2003, Yadav and angola, 
2007, MMV, 2007). In some settings, different types of wholesalers tended to supply different 
types of retail outlets. In Tanzania and Kenya, wholesalers who supplied drugs alongside other 
commodities served general shops, whilst wholesalers specialized in handling drugs usually 
served pharmacies and drug shops (Chukwujekwu, 2007, Tagbo and Henrietta, 2007, Tavrow 
et aL, 2003). 
Retailers themselves frequently operated as terminal suppliers for outlets located in more 
remote areas (Foster, 1991), although with variation across countries and retailer types. 
Pharmacies frequently supplied rural drug shops and general stores (Yadav, 2007, MMV, 2007, 
Battersby et aL, 2003, 10M" 2004), sometimes in a relatively organized manner, such as in 
Nigeria where they sent sales teams (Adikwu, 1996). Drug shops were somewhat less common 
terminal suppliers, at times serving other drug shops in Uganda and Tanzania (CHAI, 2008b, 
MMV, 2007) and general stores in Uganda only (MMV, 2007). 
Importers were also terminal sources when they directly served pharmacies that they 
sometimes owned and also drug shops (Yadav, 2007, Buabeng et aL, 2008, Russo, 2007, MMV, 
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2007, Chukwujekwu, 2007), using sales teams, such as in Tanzania (Chukwujekwu, 2007) and 
Nigeria (Palafox et aL, 2009) 
Public agencies were terminal suppliers, either officially such as in Sri Lanka where the State 
Pharmaceutical Corporation supplied retail outlets (Rajakaruna et aL, 2006) or in Benin where 
the Centrale d' Achat des Medicaments Essentiels et des Consommables medicaux supplied 
generic antimalarials to private clinics and retail pharmacies (Tougher et aL, 2009), or 
unofficially in several countries where government health workers sold public sector drugs to 
retail shops (Adome et aL, 1996, van der Geest, 1987, 10M, 2004, Tougher et aL, 2009, Palafox 
et aI., 2009) 
Terminal suppliers' characteristics were rarely explored. When available, the evidence shows 
that wholesalers infrequently had any health-related qualifications, although drug specific 
wholesalers were reported to employ more qualified staff (mainly pharmacy and biochemistry 
graduates) and to have been in operation for longer than general wholesalers (Chukwujekwu, 
2007). 
Information on terminal suppliers' locations shows that overall, remotely located drug shops 
and general stores obtained their supplies more locally than more accessible retailers. In 
Zambia, 24% of outlets located in 3 border districts with DRC or Tanzania obtained their drugs 
from district suppliers and the same proportion chose to cross borders to buy from Tanzanian 
or Congolese suppliers (CHAI, 2008c). In Tanzania, drug shops generally obtained antimalarials 
from terminal level drug specific wholesalers or pharmacies located in the capital city, 
hundreds of kilometres away (Goodman et aI., 2004, Chukwujekwu, 2007, CHAI, 2008b), whilst 
those located more than 1,000 kilometres away from the capital city obtained their supplies 
from more nearby locations (CHAI, 2008b). In Uganda and Kenya, general shops usually 
obtained their supplies from local suppliers (Amin and Snow, 2005, MMV, 2007, Tavrow et aI., 
2003). In Kenya, the location of general shops' supply sources varied with outlet size, such that 
large shops where more than one person worked during opening hours obtained their supplies 
from terminal general wholesalers located inside or outside the district whilst smaller shops 
where one person worked during opening hours bought more frequently from general 
wholesalers located within the district (Amin and Snow, 2005). 
Mobile suppliers such as sales representatives of drug companies or general distributors 
served retailers in many settings, although their popularity and the types of outlets they 
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served varied. In Kenya, mobile vendors commonly supplied both drug and general shops 
(Amin and Snow, 2005, Marsh et aI., 2004, Tavrow et aL, 2003) whilst in Tanzania mobile 
vendors only served general shops, representing in some districts only 1% of supply sources 
(Goodman et aL, 2004), but in others being a more common source of supply (Battersby et aL, 
2003). In Nigeria, sales representatives of large national and international drug companies 
supplied all types of retail outlets (Adikwu, 1996). By contrast, in Uganda and Tanzania, local 
manufacturers' sales teams supplied the more accessible retailers with more qualified staff 
(Chukwujekwu, 2007, MMV, 2007). 
Finally, overseas manufacturers were only found at terminal level in Sri Lanka where 5% of 
retailers obtained drugs directly from drug companies in India (Rajakaruna et aL, 2006). 
At intermediate level, studies provided much less information on supply sources. In settings 
where intermediate level suppliers were identified (MMV, 2007, 10M, 2004, IFC, 2008), they 
were wholesalers who, as in the case of those operating at terminal level, either handled drugs 
alongside other commodities or specialised in drugs, hence supplying distinct distribution 
chains. Information on the location of intermediate suppliers was available only for Tanzania 
and Uganda, where they operated in the capital city (Chukwujekwu, 2007, MMV, 2007) and at 
regional (Chukwujekwu, 2007) or district level (MMV, 2007). In Tanzania, intermediate 
wholesalers were sometimes agents of upstream suppliers at regional level (Chukwujekwu, 
2007). Regional wholesalers also, at times, used mobile services providing door-to-door 
services to their customers (Chukwujekwu, 2007). In other settings, there was no information 
available at this level or no intermediate suppliers operating in the chain serving the studied 
areas (PSI, 2007, Amin and Snow, 2005, Adome et aL, 1996, Tavrow et aL, 2003). Finally, as at 
terminal level, information on suppliers' characteristics was provided by a single study 
reporting that in Tanzania general suppliers had started their business more recently than drug 
specific wholesalers and rarely employed staff with health related qualifications 
(Chukwujekwu, 2007). 
At the top of the chain or primary level, suppliers were importers who were sometimes agents 
of overseas pharmaceutical companies, at times contracted to act as their sole supplier for 
distributing their products locally (MMV, 2007, Chukwujekwu, 2007, Yadav, 2007, Palafox et 
, .. 
aL, 2009) or integrated with manufacturers (Russo, 2007, Palafox et aL, 2009). The literature 
provided little information on the nature of this agency relationship. In the case of exclusive 
distributorship agreements between overseas companies and local importers, the latter 
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frequently exchanged products with other importers for which one or the other was the sole 
supplier (Battersby et aI., 2003, Chukwujekwu, 2007, Yadav, 2007, MMV, 2007), creating 
horizontal transactions at the top of the chain. This situation was reported in Zambia where 
importers tended to have regular customers who would generally purchase the bulk of their 
supplies from few importers. As importers were generally the sole entry point for a particular 
drug, they would often exchange products between one another (Chukwujekwu, 2007, Yadav, 
2007) rather than send customers to buy from the relevant importer. As a result, no clear 
differentiation between wholesalers and importers existed in many settings, as these roles 
were product dependent (Yadav, 2007, MOH, 2004a). As at terminal and intermediate levels, 
suppliers' characteristics were provided only by the study conducted in Tanzania. None of the 
primary general suppliers employed staff with health related qualifications and had started 
their business more recently than drug specific suppliers (Chukwujekwu, 2007). 
Finally, illegal distribution channels were reported in several countries, whereby drugs were 
smuggled from one country to another (Buabeng et aI., 2008, Rozendaal, 2001, 10M, 2004, van 
der Geest, 1987, Tougher et aI., 2009, Palafox et aI., 2009). For example, in Nigeria, informal 
suppliers were reported to operate in large markets selling a wide range of consumer goods, 
with drugs originating from neighbouring countries (Palafox et aI., 2009). Drugs from Nigeria 
were commonly found on sale in Benin (Tougher et aI., 2009) or Cameroon or passing through 
Cameroon to reach Gabon or the Central African Republic (van der Geest, 1987). Medicines 
imported illegally from Togo were also sold in Benin by a wide range of informal providers, 
such as mobile drug sellers or sellers operating in or outside open-air markets (Tougher et aI., 
2009). Inter-sectoral leakages were also said to be common in Nigeria and Benin, with in the 
latter ACT designated for the public sector (Benin's or that of neighbouring countries) sold at 
informal outlets (Tougher et aI., 2009, Palafox et aI., 2009). Finally, in Senegal, smuggling took 
the form of sea or air shipments diverted from their initial destination or illegal imports of 
donations from European countries (10M, 2004). Whilst illegal channels were commonly 
reported, the literature off~red very limited information on their structure and actual size (van 
der Geest, 1987). 
As previously mentioned, sales volume data are key for assessing the relative importance of 
sellers within a market. Data on sales volumes across different chain levels were however 
-' 
relatively rare. For example, antimalarial sales volumes reported by 21 wholesalers operating 
across 6 regions of Tanzania ranged from 2,001 and 27,000 doses per month (CHAI, 2008a). In 
Benin, the total volume of antimalarial adult equivalent treatment doses (AETD) supplied 
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annually by the country's three registered private importers was estimated at 999,606 AETDs, 
equivalent to a total value of US$ 647,530 (Tougher et aI., 2009). Wholesale markets were 
reported to be relatively concentrated compared to retail markets, especially at the top of the 
chain where a few suppliers were found to be responsible for most of the volume sold (CHAI, 
2008c, Yadav and Ongola, 2007, Yadav and Conesa, 2008). However, only one study on the 
antimalarial import market in Uganda calculated market concentration measures. The study 
found that 5 importers accounted for nearly 72% of antimalarial sales with a HHI of just under 
0.14, indicating relatively "moderate" market concentration (Yadav and Conesa, 2008). 
Interest in working with wholesalers has been relatively limited, with two interventions 
implemented within the distribution chain, including one that involved training wholesalers 
and mobile vendors in Kenya and one sales representatives in Madagascar (Goodman et aI., 
2007). 
3.4.3 Price setting in private commercial sector distribution chains 
More attention has been paid to measuring antimalarial price mark-ups, especially on first-line 
treatments for uncomplicated malaria or the most common alternatives at the time of the 
studies. Evidence of mark-ups on antimalarial drugs at different levels of the chain is 
summarized in the published manuscript in Appendix 3. It should be noted that these figures 
are gross mark-ups, including both provider overhead costs and profit margins. 
Primary mark-ups refer to the percentage margins that primary suppliers (entry point to the 
distribution chain) add on top of their purchase prices when they serve intermediate or 
terminal wholesalers. Terminal mark-ups relate to margins added by terminal wholesalers 
(retailers' direct supply sources) on top of the price at which they obtained the drug, either 
from primary or intermediate suppliers. 
Studies reported price mark-ups within the distribution chain serving pharmacies or/and drug 
shops, except one that also provided mark-ups within the chain supplying general stores. 
Overall, mark-ups varied across levels, ranging from 27% to 99% at primary level, 8% at 
intermediate and 2% to 67% at terminal level. In some settings, mark ups varied depending on 
the structure of the chain, with somewhat higher mark-ups at a given level observed in a 
distribution chain made of fewer levels. For example, in Tanzania, when supplying regional 
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wholesalers, importers added between 27% and 43%, whilst when directly supplying retailers 
they added between 50% and 67% (Goodman et aL, 2007). 
In the retail market, price mark-ups on antimalarial drugs have been relatively more 
researched. They were sometimes very high and varied greatly across outlet type and location, 
and antimalarial type and packaging. There were four main findings: 
• Mark-ups ranged between 3% and 566% in pharmacies, 29% and 669% in drug shops 
and 100% and 233% in general shops. 
• Mark-ups were somewhat higher in rural outlets compared to urban ones. In Zambia, 
for example, the median ACT mark-up in Lundazi, a rural district was 54% whilst in 
Kabwe urban district the median was 29%; in Choma, a peri urban district, the median 
ACT mark-up was, however, much higher than in rural Lundazi reaching 300% (CHAI, 
2008c). 
• Generics tended to have higher percentage mark-ups, a situation that may not have 
translated into higher absolute margins given that generics are generally purchased at 
lower prices than branded products. 
• Mark-ups varied across packaging types, with a mark-up of 669% on one loose tablet 
of amodiaquine compared to 270% on a blistered tablet in Tanzania (Goodman, 2004). 
Again, assuming that loose tablet prices are lower than packed tablet prices, this may 
not have automatically translated into higher absolute margins. 
In some settings where ACT subsidy schemes have already been implemented, prices were 
within the range expected by the managers of the schemes. In Senegal, private pharmacies 
purchased the subsidized first-line ACT from public sector medical stores and added on 
average 35% to the price of an adult dose, which tr,anslated into a retail price only 4% higher 
than the RRP (Kone et aL, 2007, Sabot et aL, 2008). In three districts of Kenya, 95.3% of 
caregivers in the intervention arm who had bought the subsidized ACT reported they paid the 
recommended retail price of US$ 0.25, whilst other caregivers said they paid less or more 
(Kangwana et aL, 2011). In two districts of Tanzania, the subsidy scheme was piloted in drug 
shops and in one of these two districts it was combined with a RRP printed on ACT packs. The 
subsidy effectively decreased the price of ACT below the price paid by consumers in the 
control area and below the price of older antimalarials, leading to a large increase in the 
proportion of antimalarial consumers purchasing ACT in the two intervention areas (from 1% 
to 44.2% one year later) (Sabot et aL, 2009). Surprisingly, ACT prices we~e higher in the district 
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with the RRP than in the district without, suggesting caution in future use of this approach for 
controlling ACT retail prices (Sabot et aI., 2008). Overall, relatively little is known about the 
factors that influence pricing decisions. Only one study used statistical methods to analyse 
price determinants, examining prices in drug and general retail shops selling antimalarials and 
painkillers in rural Tanzania (see Section 3.3.9). The study found that higher retail prices were 
associated with branded and packed products, being sold in general shops (which might have 
reflected higher prices charged by their terminal supply sources) and higher market 
concentration (Goodman, 2004, Goodman et aI., 2009). 
The rest of the literature provided findings from semi-structured interviews. Retail and 
wholesale mark-ups were reported to be influenced by fixed price or mark-up regulation or, in 
the absence of regulation, market competition and consumer demand. Wholesale pricing 
decisions were also said to be influenced by product characteristics, business practices and 
costs (Chukwujekwu, 2007, RBM, 2007, MMV, 2007). In Uganda, mark-ups were reported to be 
lower for antimalarials with shorter shelf life (MMV, 2007). In Tanzania, drug wholesalers 
reported giving discounts to customers who bought drugs in relatively large quantities 
(Chukwujekwu, 2007), and general wholesalers to customers who purchased drugs alongside 
other commodities (Chukwujekwu, 2007). One wholesaler also reported adding 6-7% to cover 
his expenses and 3-4% for profit (Chukwujekwu, 2007). 
The available evidence on the private commercial sector distribution chain for antimalarial 
drugs provides some useful descriptive information. However, there is a lack of nationally 
representative data, and of analysis of retailers and wholesalers' behaviour notably in terms of 
price setting. This is an important gap as retailers are likely to remain an important source of 
malaria treatment and price is likely to be a major obstacle to improve access to quality 
malaria treatment. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed three literatures relevant to this thesis: the standard models of 
markets and competition and the 10 field; the methods used for collecting and analysing data 
on retail and wholesale markets in developing countries; and the empirical evidence on 
markets for malaria treatment in low and middle income countries. The thesis now turns to 
the study design and methods used in the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 4 STUDY DESIGN & METHODS 
4.1 Introduction 
This Chapter first presents the study design, including the thesis' aims and objectives, 
analytical framework and scope of research (Section 4.2). Then, an overview of data sources is 
given (Section 4.3), followed by a description of the institutional setting and intellectual 
ownership of the thesis (Section 4.4). Finally, aspects of ethical clearance and informed 
consent are described (Section 4.5) before the methods for data collection and analysis are 
presented (Section 4.6). 
4.2 Study design 
4.2.1 Aims and objectives 
The main aim of this thesis is to analyse the market for malaria treatment in Cambodia, 
including the retail market and its distribution chain, with a focus on the private commercial 
sector, and to draw recommendations for public health policy and future research for 
improved availability of appropriate and affordable malaria treatment. A further aim is to 
conduct a comparative analysis of different measurement methods for studying retail and 
wholesale markets for pharmaceutical drugs in developing countries. 
The specific objectives are: 
1} To describe the structure of retail markets for malaria treatment and analyse product 
differentiation and non-price competition 
2} To describe the structure of the private 'commercial sector distribution chain for 
antimalarial drugs and analyse product differentiation and non-price competition 
3} To analyse the intensity of price competition in retail and wholesale markets 
4} To analyse different empirical methods for identifying and sampling wholesalers and 
measuring retail and wholesale sales volumes 
5} To discuss the implications of the interplay between market structure, provider 
conduct, consumer demand and regulation on the availability, price and quality of 
malaria treatment and draw recommendations for public health policy and future 
research. 
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4.2.2 Analytical framework 
The analytical framework used throughout the thesis is built on concepts from the Industrial 
Organization (IO) literature and standard models of markets and competition (Chapter 2). The 
primary reason for choosing this field of the economic literature is that it has already proven to 
be particularly helpful for studying hospital markets in industrialised countries (Gaynor, 2006) 
and its relevance in low and middle income settings has also been demonstrated in studies of 
hospital and pharmaceutical markets (Goodman, 2004, Bennett, 1996, Nakamba et aI., 2002). 
As described in Chapter 2, the 10 literature provides useful analytical concepts, notably 
through the structure-conduct-performance paradigm (SCP), which holds that the structure of 
the market determines the way firms behave which in turn affect market performance 
(Scherer and Ross, 1990). In this early perspective more concentrated markets - few large firms 
with relatively large market shares - were associated with less price competition, higher price 
mark-ups and higher consumer prices (Demsetz, 1973). Later refinements of the paradigm 
recognised that the SCP sequence was far from being linear and that the direction of causation 
between structure and conduct was two-way (Tirole, 1988). 
For instance, providers might attempt to shape the structural aspects of markets by colluding 
with one another on price or quantity produced or through marketing strategies to attract 
consumers. Collusion is facilitated by high concentration but it may also be found in less 
concentrated markets, if providers are well organised through physicians' organisations for 
example. Strategies that aim to change the nature of the product - e.g. deliberate product 
differentiation - will have key influences on competition in markets where consumers are 
sensitive to quality attributes. Where consumers can never observe quality or poorly 
understand the scientific or technical aspects of the product, the decision to purchase might 
be influenced by the providers themselves and distort competition. Other strategies that may 
affect competition can or.iginate in the distribution chain where suppliers may impose 
restrictions on their customers that may ultimately affect retail availability and price. 
Competition is also not only shaped by current levels of concentration but also by potential 
new entrants. Where a market has high levels of contestability, firms may have very little 
market power and influence on the price at which they are paid, even if there are currently 
few firms in the market. Government might choose to intervene by directing policies towards 
market structure and conduct, or consumer demand in an attempt to improve the functioning 
of the market. Government intervention can take various forms including the provision of 
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products and services, its regulation including provider certifications, business licensing, 
product registration, quality controls, price and/or mark-ups regulation, taxes or the provision 
of information to consumers through communications and education campaigns. 
The analytical framework used throughout the thesis is presented in Figure 4-1. It draws on 
previous work from Conteh and Hanson further developed by Goodman (Goodman, 2004, 
Conteh and Hanson, 2003). Given the focus of the thesis, market outcomes are expressed in 
public health terms, namely the availability, price and quality of malaria treatment. 
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Figure 4-1: Analytical framework 
Context 
country socio-economic situation, health system, malaria control programme 
Market structure Provider conduct Consumer demand 
• Range & characteristics of • Pricing and price competition • Disease prevalence 
sellers 
.--. 
• Product differentiation and • Preferences & beliefs 
• Range of products available non-price competition .--. • Income 
• Horizontal concentration • Horizontal collusion • Information on product 
• Barriers to market entry & exit • Entry deterrence and characteristics 
• Distribution chain structure & accommodation 
Vertical integration • Vertical restraints 
• Regulatory system • Response to regulation 
1 
Malaria treatment 
• Availability 
• Price 
• Quality 
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4.2.3 Scope of research and data sources 
The aims of this thesis are to analyse the market for malaria treatment, including the retail 
market and its distribution chain, with a focus on the private commercial sector, and to 
compare different methods for studying private commercial sector distribution chains. 
The term retail market includes all outlets that provide antimalarial drugs to patients, either at 
a cost or free of charge, including both health facilities such as hospitals and clinics and shops. 
The private commercial retail sector includes all private for-profit outlet types at which 
antimalarial drugs are sold to patients, and the public retail sector includes all outlets owned 
by or working for the Government or for non-governmental not-for-profit organisations (NGO). 
The term private commercial sector distribution chain includes wholesale suppliers who 
operate from the point where commodities leave the factory gate or port of entry down to 
those directly supplying retailers. In this thesis, it refers to the chain of private or public 
suppliers who serve private commercial outlets, and to private commercial suppliers who 
serve public retail outlets, such that any transactions between public and private commercial 
sectors are noted. Public suppliers who only supply public retail outlets are not included in the 
study. 
The focus is on the market for different antimalarial drugs and rapid diagnostic tests for 
malaria (RDT). Antimalarial drug categories include Artemisinin Combination Therapy (ACT), 
Artemisinin Monotherapy (AMT) and non-Artemisinin Monotherapy (nAMT), in different 
formulations (tablets, syrups, injectables etc), whether they are used for inpatient or 
outpatient care. It excludes complementary products, such as drips, water for injections and 
syringes because of the problems in distinguishing those used for malaria treatment from 
those with other purposes. 
Table 4-1 gives an overview of the data sources that were used for achieving the objectives of 
the thesis. 
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Table 4-1: Data sources 
Sampling frame and sample size 
Thesis' Objectives 1,2,3 - Economic analysis of retail and wholesale markets for malaria treatment 
Outlet Survey (OS), June-July 2009 
Cross-sectional survey of retail outlets stocking antimalarial drugs at the Sampling frame: all private, public and NGO 
time of visit or in the preceding 3 months. Data on retailer's characteristics outlets operating in a representative sample 
and operations; top 2 supply sources for antimalarials in last 3 months; of 38 malaria-endemic sub-districts (health 
range of antimalarial drugs stocked and blood testi ng services offered, facilities' catchment areas) with the potential 
including microscopy and rapid diagnostic tests (RDT); for each antimalarial of selling antimalarial drugs. Sample size: all 
and RDT purchase and selling prices; for each antimalarial stocked recall of outlets stocking antimalarial drugs at the time 
volumes sold over previous week.; for microscopy services selling price only. of visit or in past 3 months: 792 retailers 
interviewed. 
Supply Chain Survey (SCS), August-November 2009 
Cross-sectional survey of suppliers operating in the chain that served Sampling frame: all supply sources mentioned 
retailers interviewed during OS. Data on wholesalers' characteristics and as top 2 suppliers for antimalarial drugs by 
operations; top 2 supply sources for antimalarials and RDT in last 3 months; retailers operating in a random sample of 20 
and for each antimalarial and rapid diagnostic test stocked purchase & sub-districts surveyed by the OS. Sample size: 
selling prices, recall of volumes sold over previous week and recall of last 95 wholesalers interviewed. 
purchase value. 
Semi-Structured Interviews (SSls), August-November 2009 
Semi-structured interviews with retailers and wholesalers surveyed during Sampling frame: all private commercial 
OS and SCS. Data collected for defining retail and wholesale markets and retailers and wholesalers interviewed during 
investigating retailers' and wholesalers' operations, in terms of product OS and SCS. Sample size: 33 interviews, 
differentiation strategies and pricing decisions. As part of thesis' Objective 4 including 11 with retailers and 22 with 
below, data on all supply sources for antimalarial drugs used by retailers wholesalers, stratified by outlet type, location 
and wholesalers in last 3 months, including for each supplier name and and characteristics. 
share of antimalarials purchased from each supplier. 
Thesis' Objective 4 - Comparative Analysis of empirical methods for studying retail and wholesale markets 
Sales Level Survey (SLS), August-November 2009 
Cross-sectional survey of retailers and wholesalers using the retail audit Sampling frame for the SLS survey: All private 
technique, which consisted of visiting each sampled outlet 2 times with a 2- commercial retailers and wholesalers who 
week time interval between each visit. At the first visit, data on antimalarial participated in OS and SCS. Sample size: 105 
and RDT quantities stocked of each product were collected. At the second providers interviewed, including 66 retailers 
visit, data on quantities stocked and quantities delivered between 1st and and 39 wholesalers. 
2nd visits, quantities thrown away/transferred to other shops or sent back to Sample frame for the SLS group discussions: All 
wholesalers or confiscated were collected for each product in stock, fieldworkers who participated in both SCS and 
including products in stock at either or both visits. Volumes sold of each SLS and all completed diaries. Sample size: 5 
product in-between 2 visits were calculated. group discussions conducted each with 8 data 
Semi-structured interviews with SCS and SLS fieldworkers in the form of collectors; 105 diaries. 
semi-formal group discussions to collect fieldworkers' experiences in 
collecting sales volumes data during SLS and SCS, combined with 
fieldworkers' written diaries of their visit to each outlet using large blank 
comment boxes on each SCS and SLS questionnaire. 
Snowball Census (SC), August-November 2009 
Census of all wholesalers operating in districts visited during the SCS. Sampling frame: 95 private commercial 
Wholesalers identified using the "snowball technique" by asking wholesalers interviewed during the SCS. 
wholesalers interviewed during the SCS about the name, location, contact Sample size: 63 snowball censuses completed. 
details, outlet type and stocking practice (antimalarial and/or RDT) of all 
other wholesale businesses operating within the district. "Snowballed N 
wholesalers were then visited and interviewed to verify information on 
name, location, outlet type and stocking practices, and asked if they could 
identify any more additional wholesalers in the district. 
Key Informant Interviews (Klls), August-November 2009 
Semi-structured interviews with government officials and organisations Sampling frame: all organisations and 
involved in the supply of antimalarials in Cambodia. Data collected on authorities involved in activities related to the 
antimalarial chain structure and number of private providers operating at supply of antimalarials in Cambodia. Sample 
each level. Official lists of registered drug outlets were also collected. size: 10 interviews completed. 
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4.3 Institutional setting and intellectual ownership 
The genesis of this thesis goes back to the development of the PhD research proposal 
submitted to the UK Medical Research Council in January 2007. Later developments of the 
thesis scope, study design, data collection tools and data analysis plans were undertaken 
within the framework of the ACTwatch project that was launched in March 2008 and which 
provided additional financial support and data sources for the PhD research. 
The ACTwatch project is a collaborative research study undertaken by the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) and Population Services International (PSI). Above 
mentioned as, SCS, SSls, Klls are 4 core components of the ACTwatch project. A fourth 
component is a household survey that collected data on treatment seeking behaviours. Each of 
these 5 study components were implemented in Cambodia and six African countries (Benin, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar18, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia). PSI was 
responsible for the design and implementation of the household survey and as and LSHTM for 
that of the SCS, SC, SSls and Klls. In Cambodia, these were supplemented by a comparative 
analysis of methods for studying retail and wholesale markets for antimalarial drugs, including 
the SLS and additional SSls and Klls designed and implemented by the author. Table 4-2 gives 
an overview of the author's (EP's) participation and responsibilities in the design, 
implementation and analysis of data sources. 
Table 4-2: Overview of the author's participation and responsibilities 
Data Source Participation and responsibilities 
Research design Data collection Data analysis 
OS (Objectives 1 &. 3) PSI PSI Ep1 
SCS (Objective 2) EP,BP,ST,KH,C~ EP EP3 ,BP,ST,KH,CG 
SSls (Objectives 1 &. 2) EP2,BP,ST,KH,CG EP EP 
SC (Objective 4) EP,BP,ST,KH,CG EP EP 
SLS (Objective 4) EP EP EP 
Klls (Objective 4) EP,BP,ST,KH,CG EP EP 
EP IS Edith PatoUiliard; BP is Benjamin Palafox; ST is Sarah Tougher; KH is Kara Hanson; CG is Catherine 
Goodman; PSI is Population Services International; l Data from the outlet survey presented in Chapter 3 
was analysed by PSI.2Additionai questions were added for the purpose of the PhD.3Analysis of 
concentration in wholesale markets conducted solely by the author. 
18 SCS not implemented in Madagascar. 
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The author was involved in the research design of all components, except the as, and solely 
responsible for the SLS design. In Cambodia the author conducte~ all data collection except 
the as, and was sole analyst for all results presented in the thesis except the SCS where she 
was the lead analyst in collaboration with other ACTwatch team members. 
4.4 Ethical clearance and informed consent 
The research received ethical approval from the ethics review committee of the LSHTM and 
the Cambodian National Ethics Committee for Health Research (Appendix 4). 
Before the start of all interviews, informed consent was obtained from each research 
participant in a language that she/he understood. Trained interviewers visited wholesalers and 
retailers and sought to speak with the person most knowledgeable about the antimalarial and 
RDT businesses. Before the start of all interviews, they informed respondents about the study 
by providing an information sheet stating their name, institutions involved, aims of the study, 
nature of questions to be asked and length of the interview. Interviewers emphasized that a 
respondent's participation was voluntary and could be stopped at anytime without any 
negative implications if a respondent wished to change his/her mind over the course of the 
interview. Interviewers also emphasized that a respondent could refuse to answer any specific 
question or pause the interview at anytime (e.g. for serving customers). They informed each 
respondent that there was no individual benefit in taking part in the study. All respondents 
were given the opportunity to ask questions at any time before, during and after the interview 
and received the contact details of the local research coordinator. Interviewers emphasized 
that individual information was confidential and that no information would be passed on to 
the regulatory authorities or any individual outside the research team. Interviewers then 
invited respondents to participate in the study and they asked for informed consent, witnessed 
by a member of the research team. During SSls, only written notes were taken, rather than 
tape recordings as many of the issues to be discussed in the interviews could be judged 
sensitive for commercial or regulatory reasons. Tape recording respondents' answers could 
have made respondents uncomfortable and introduced a bias in their answers or lead 
respondents to refuse discussing some of these issues. 
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4.5 Methods for data collection and data analysis 
In this section, we describe in detail the methods used for achieving Objectives 1, 2 and 3, for 
which results are presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. A detailed description of methods used for 
achieving Objective 4 (Le. the comparative analysis of measurement methods for studying 
retail and wholesale markets of pharmaceutical drugs in low income settings) is given at the 
beginning of Chapter 8 before presenting the results that pertain to this objective. Data 
collection tools are available in Appendix 4. 
4.5.1 Outlet survey 
4.5.1.1 Overview 
For the purpose of the OS, PSI divided Cambodia into 2 strata: one stratum covered areas with 
Suspected or Confirmed Multi-Drug Resistance (MRDSC stratum, roughly North/North-West 
provinces), and the other areas Free of MDR (MDRF stratum, roughly South/North East 
provinces) (PSI, 2008c). In each stratum, PSI randomly sampled 19 sub-districts using a 
probability proportional to size (PPS) approach through which more populated sub-districts 
had a higher chance of being selected (Figure 4-2). Sub-districts were defined as the 
catchment areas of public health centres with reported malaria cases in 2008, each covering a 
population of around 10,000 to 15,000 inhabitants. In each of the 38 sub-districts, PSI 
conducted a census of all government, NGO and private commercial outlets that had the 
potential to dispense antimalarials and invited outlets that stocked antimalarials at the time of 
the surveyor in the past 3 months to participate in the 0519• A total of 792 retailers were 
identified to stocked antimalarial drugs and all were successfully interviewed20, of which 644 
(81.3%) were private commercial outlets and 148 (18.7%) government outlets. There was no 
191n order to estimate antimaiarial availability and price across different outlet types, PSI supplemented 
the sample by a booster sample that included all government outlets operating in the operational 
district of the sampled sub-districts. The use of a booster sample is a procedure used by PSI across all 
ACTwatch outlet surveys to ensure adequate representation of relatively rare but important antimalarial 
provider types. Booster government and NGO outlets that stocked antimalarials were identified through 
a census in the relevant districts. Data pertaining to the booster sample were not used in this thesis 
because the focus is on private commercial outlets which were not surveyed in the booster areas. In this 
context, results pertaining to the retail market for malaria treatment that are presented in Chapter 5 
draw on a different sample than those presented in Chapter 3. 
20 There was no refusal to participate in the OS from retailers operating in the 38 sub-districts identified 
to stock antimalarial drugs. 
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outlet owned by NGO that dispensed antimalarial drugs in the survey~d areas at the time of 
the as. 
Figure 4-2: Map of 38 sub-districts sampled for the ACTwatch Outlet Survey 
MDR is multi drug resistance; MDRSC is MDR suspected or confirmed; MDRF is MDR free 
Source: PSI Cambodia, 2009. 
PSI was responsible for the development of the as data collection tools and their translation 
from English to Khmer; pilot of the tools; and, selection and training of fieldworkers. The as 
collected data on retailer's characteristics (number of staff, education, health-related 
qualifications, registration status, GPS co-ordinates), range of antimalarial drugs stocked and 
blood testing services offered, including microscopy and ROT; for each antimalarial and ROT 
purchase and selling prices; for each antimalarial stocked recall of volumes sold over previous 
week; and, for microscopy services selling price only. In addition, the as collected data on 
other areas of importance for the SCS, including e~ch retailer's two top supply sources for 
antimalarials (name, location, type of provider, whether they distribute, collect or both) and 
antimalarial wholesale purchase prices. 
Data from the as were double-entered into SPSS 16 and cleaned by PSI Cambodia before 
being sent to the author who transferred these data to STATA 11 for analysis. The dataset sent 
by PSI contained antimalarial sales volumes that had been calculated on the basis of an adult 
equivalent treatment dose (AETO). One AETO was defined as the number of milligrams (mg) of 
an antimalarial drug needed to treat a 60 kg adult (Appendix 5). The number of mg/kg used to 
. 
calculate one AETO was defined as what was, at the time of the study, recommended for a 
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particular drug combination in the treatment guidelines for uncomplicated malaria in areas of 
low drug resistance issued by the World Health Organization (WHO). Where WHO treatment 
guidelines did not exist, AETDs were based on the product manufacturer's treatment 
guidelines. In the case of ACT, as the treatment consists of 2 or more active antimalarial 
ingredients packaged together (either co-formulated or co-blistered), the strength of the 
artemisinin-based component was used as the principal ingredient for the AETD calculations. 
Information collected on both the medicine strength and unit size, as listed on the product 
packaging, was then used to calculate the proportion of AETDs contained in each unit. 
4.5.1.2 Data analysis 
To account for the differences in sampling probabilities across sub-districts selected using PPS 
and in strata of varying size, observations were weighted using stratum-specific weights 
calculated for each sub-district sampled. 
The weight for sub-district i within stratum j was given by: 
N. 
w .. = J 
Ij N 
nj x ij 
with N j the population in stratum j, N;j the population of sub-district; in stratum j and nj the 
number of sub-districts sampled21 in stratum j. 
Stratum-specific weights calculated for each sub-district sampled are available in Appendix 6. 
Weights were applied during data analysis using STATA 11 commands aweight or svyset 
depending on the calculations performed. Proportions were calculated using STATA 11 survey 
estimation command svy:tab and differences in proportions were tested for significance using 
the Pearson chi-squared statistic with the Rao and Scott correction to account for the survey 
design (Stata Inc., 2003). Median and inter-quartile range (IQR) were calculated using the 
STATA 11 commands tabstat and aweighi22• Differences in medians were investigated using 
the Hodges-Lehmann method, which consists of calculating the median value of the difference 
between 2 variables that are randomly selected within 2 independent populations (Newson, 
21 The number of sub-distdcts sampled in the stratum was included in the formula because the 
probability that a sub-district was selected from a given stratum depended on the number of sub-
districts selected from the stratum, with a greater probability that a given sub-district was selected the 
more sub-districts were sampled from the stratum. 
22 providing the same results as the STATA 11 commands.J)ctile combined with pweight 
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2002) (e.g. observations are randomly selected within the drug shop population and within the 
population of all other retailer types.). Median differences and 95% confidence intervals were 
calculated using STATA 11 cendif command (Newson, 2002) 
4.5.1.3 Measuring the size of the antimalarial drug market 
The size of the market for antimalarial drugs refers to the total volumes and values of 
antimalarial drugs dispensed annually in Cambodia. It was calculated as follows. There were 
1259 antimalarial drug observations and for 185 observations sales volume data were 
missing23 (e.g. respondents did not remember or refused to provide the information). To avoid 
underestimating the volumes of antimalarial drugs sold, missing data were imputed using an 
imputation model developed in STATA 11. We used the command mi impute to generate a set 
of plausible values that were used for "filling in" missing sales volume observations. The mean 
matching imputation method (STATA 11 command mi impute pmm), a partially parametric 
method for imputing observations of a continuous variable that does not follow a normal 
distribution was used (Schafer, 1999). This method combines a standard linear regression of 
sales volumes on a set of explanatory variables to obtain predictions, which are then used as a 
distance measure for selecting the observation with the smallest difference between the linear 
prediction for the missing value and that for the complete values (StataCorp., 2009). 
Sales volumes were estimated using the following explanatory variables: sub-district, stratum, 
area type24, antimalarial category2s, brand name, generic type, dosage form and manufacturer. 
These explanatory variables were selected under the assumption that they would explain most 
of the variation in sales volumes across outlet and antimalarial types. A similar approach was 
used in an earlier study that estimated antimalarial sales volumes at private shops in rural 
Tanzania (Alba et aL, 2010b). Given the relatively small number of missing sales volume 
observations (185 missing observations out of a total of 1259 observations (around 14.5%)), 
the imputation model was run 5 times in order to obtain 5 imputations per missing value, and 
each missing value was imputed with the average value of the 5 imputations. Increasing the 
number of imputations from 5 to 10 and to 50 had little effect on the average values as has 
been reported elsewhere (Schafer, 1999). 
23 Out of the 185 missing values, 89 (48%) were nAMT, 48 (26%) ACT and 48 (26%) AMT. Missing values 
were most frequent at village shops (28% of all missing values), followed by public health facilities 
(25%), and least frequent at pharmacies/clinical pharmacies (8%). 
24 Rural or urban area 
25 ACT, AMT, nAMT 
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For each outlet, we calculated the total volume sold for the week preceding the survey by 
summing all antimalarial sales volume observations. Then, for each sub-district, we calculated 
the total volume sold for the week preceding the survey by summing the total volume sold by 
all outlets operating in that sub-district. The total sales volume in sub-district i within stratum j 
was multiplied by its corresponding analytical weight and sales totals were summed under 
each stratum in order to obtain 2 stratum-specific total sales volume estimates. Given that the 
2 strata covered the whole population at risk of malaria in Cambodia, the total antimalarial 
sales volume for the week preceding the survey across all malaria endemic areas was 
calculated as the sum of the 2 stratum-specific antimalarial sales volume estimates. 
An annual sales volume estimate was calculated by scaling up the weekly total estimate to a 
whole year, accounting for monthly variations in malaria transmission risk by using data on the 
number of cases treated each month in the public sector (CNM, 2009a): the weekly sales 
volume estimate was scaled up pro-rata to a monthly estimate assuming constant weekly sales 
-
within each month, by using the ratio of the number of days during the month of data 
collection divided by the number of days in a week; scale-up factors were then calculated for 
each month of the year as the ratio of the number of cases treated each month in the public 
sector to that treated during the month of data collection (Appendix 7); the annual 
antimalarial volume dispensed was then obtained by calculating the sum of the 12 monthly 
sales volume estimates. It was not possible to calculate stratum-specific annual sales volume 
estimates in the absence of data on patterns of malaria transmission risk in MDR free and MDR 
suspected/confirmed areas respectively. 
Annual sales values were calculated following a similar approach. Sales values were estimated 
in each outlet by multiplying each antimalarial sales volume by its selling price in that outlet. 
For around 6% of all sales volume observations, prise data were missing and estimated using 
the median selling price of that antimalarial generic type and dosage form for the 
corresponding outlet's category (e.g. sales of artemether injection sold at a drug shop were 
valued using the median selling price of artemether in injection form for the drug shop outlet 
category). For around 0.5% of all sales volume observations, there was no corresponding 
median retail selling price because the antimalarials were rarely stocked in a given outlet 
category. In such cases, sales volumes were valued using the median price for the given 
antimalarial generic type in the most similar outlet category (e.g. sales values of mefloquine at 
pharmacies/clinical pharmacies were estimated using mefloquine price at drug shops). For 
antimalarial drugs sold at highly subsidized prices or provided free of c'harge, their value was 
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estimated using procurement costs inclusive of carriage and insurance costs for delivering the 
drugs to in-country warehouses, collected from the Ministry of Health and PSI (Appendix 8). 
Procurement costs were inflated by 15% to account for in-country storage and other 
distribution costs (Goodman, 2004). The ACT ASMQ provided free of charge at government 
outlets and at a subsidized price to private commercial outlets was valued using the same 
procurement cost across both sectors as they used the same procurement process. One could 
argue that a lower factor should be used to account for PSI's storage and distribution costs 
because one may expect an NGO institution to be more efficient than the MOH. However, in 
the absence of such evidence and in the context where the MOH may have benefited from 
economies of scale in distributing antimalarials with other products, procurement costs were 
inflated by the same factor for both sectors. 
4.5.1.4 Defining economic retail markets 
Economic markets can be defined on product and geographic dimensions (Section 3.3.5). In 
the thesis, a combination of different approaches was used and is described in detail in 
Chapter 5 in which results on the structure of retail markets are presented. 
4.5.1.5 Measuring retail market concentration 
Market concentration was measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) defined as 
the sum of the squared market shares of all the firms operating in the market (Section 3.3.6). 
The HHI was compared with US anti-trust guidelines, which indicated that a market with an 
HHI below 0.15 could be considered as unconcentrated, between 0.15 and 0.25 moderately 
concentrated and above 0.25 highly concentrated 26 (U.S. Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission, 2010). Whilst these thresholds are essentially based on the experience of 
US anti-trust agencies, they provide a useful guide for starting an analysis of market 
competition. In cases where it was not possible to calculate the HHI, concentration ratios were 
used (Section 3.3.6). 
Market concentration measures were calculated on antimalarial sales volumes and values 
including both public and private outlets. Public sector sales were included in the measure of 
concentration based on evidence from SSls that some private shopkeepers perceived 
government providers to compete in the provision of malaria treatment (see Section 5.2.4). 
26 These thresholds for interpreting the degree of concentration using the HHI' were released in August 
2010. Previous guidelines used lower thresholds (Section 3.3.6) 
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There was no indication of ownership of several private shops by the same provider within a 
given market so market share calculations were performed at the level of the outlet. 
Conversely, government providers operating in the same market were not assumed to 
compete with one another so the quantities/values of antimalarial drugs that they dispensed 
were treated as those of a single outlet and summed. 
4.5.1.6 Measuring retail market accessibility 
The geographical accessibility of retail markets is likely is to be associated with competition but 
it is not a result of competition. For example, fewer providers, and therefore less competition 
are expected in more remote areas. In addition, it is likely to be more costly to obtain drug 
supplies in more remote areas than in more accessible ones (e.g. transport costs). Therefore, 
the analysis of competition on retail availability, price and quality of malaria treatment needs 
to control for the geographical accessibility of retail markets. 
Accessibility was measured as the time required to travel in a 4-wheel drive vehicle from each 
market to the closest main commercial area. Main commercial areas were identified using 
2008 census data on the total number of commercial establishments in each province available 
from the Cambodia National Establishment Listing. The Cambodia National Establishment 
Listing defines an establishment in conformity with the International Standard Industrial 
Classifications of the United Nations as: 
'an enterprise or part of enterprise which is situated in a single location and in which 
only a single (non-ancillary) productive activity is carried out or in which principal 
productive activity accounts for most of the value added.' (NIS, 2009). 
Provinces where 5% or more of all establishments nationwide operated were considered to be 
main commercial areas. The 5% cut-off was based on discussions with informants working at 
the Ministry of Planning-and PSI Cambodia, supplemented by the author's own observations 
during fieldwork. A total of eight provinces each accounted for more than 5% of all 
establishments operating nationwide: Phnom Penh, Kampong Cham, Kandal, Takeo, Prey 
Veng, Siem Reap, Battambang and Kampong Thom. These provinces were therefore defined as 
main commercial areas. 
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The travel time from each market to the closest commercial area was estimated by calculating 
the average time required to travel from all the villages located in each market to the closest 
main road (i.e. the sum of minutes required to travel from each village to the main road 
divided by the number of villages), plus the estimated time to travel from the main road to the 
closest main commercial area, using the province's capital city as point of arrival (thereafter 
referred as closest commercial centre). This approach was based on the assumption that most 
commercial establishments within a province were located in each province's capital city. Data 
on villages covered in each market were collected from the Health Coverage Plan 2004/5, 
supplemented by Klls with PSI Cambodia's staff members (in order to check whether coverage 
had changed since the publication of the Health Coverage Plan). Data on travel time between 
each village to the main road were collected from the 2004 SElLA household survey, again 
supplemented by Klls with PSI Cambodia's staff members. Data on travel time from each main 
road to the closest commercial centre were estimated through KKls with PSI staff members 
and during fieldwork travels for conducting the SLS and SSls with retail shopkeepers. _ 
4.5.1.7 Assessing malaria transmission risk level in retail markets 
Malaria transmission risk is also an important characteristic that needs to be considered in the 
analysis of competition in retail markets for malaria treatment in Cambodia. Transmission risk 
is likely to be associated with retail competition but is not due to competition. For example, 
markets at higher malaria transmission risk may be more contestable than those at lower risk. 
In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 3, malaria control activities in Cambodia tend to be more 
intense in areas at higher transmission risk, for instance through the introduction of Village 
Malaria Workers (VMWs). 
Following the MOH's malaria transmission risk cate~orisation (Section 3.5.2), markets were 
classified at "high risk" of malaria transmission if they were located less than 250 meters from 
the forest, at "moderate risk" if located within 250 meters and less than 1 kilometre from the 
forest and at "low risk" -if located 1 kilometre or more from the forest. For markets that 
covered several villages with different risk levels, the number of people living in the different 
risk level categories was calculated using 2008 census data (NIS, 2008). Markets were finally 
assigned the level of risk that was most common in that area in terms of number of inhabitants 
exposed. 
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4.5.1.8 Calculating retail price mark-ups 
Summary estimates of retail selling prices per AETO for different antimalarial categories and 
different retail outlet types were analysed by PSI and have been reported elsewhere 
(ACTwatch Group, 2009b) (see Section 2.6 also). For this thesis, median purchase prices and 
price mark-ups and IQR for one antimalarial AETO were calculated. Retail percentage mark-ups 
were calculated for each AETO as the difference between selling price and purchase price, 
divided by purchase price, and retail absolute mark-ups as selling price minus purchase price. 
For the calculation of absolute price mark-ups, prices were converted using the average 
exchange rate during the as period (9 June to 8 July 2009) [4,248.24 Cambodian Riel to US$ 1] 
(www.oanda.com). Retail price mark-ups were analysed using a regression model based on the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method. The methods used for developing the model are 
described in detail in Chapter 7. 
4.5.2 Supply chain survey 
For the SCS, we randomly sampled 20 sub-districts (10 in each stratum) out of the 38 sub-
districts surveyed by PSI during the as (Appendix 9). This approach was used because of 
logistic and time constraints. The sampling procedure for wholesalers used the list of all 
antimalarial supply sources reported by retailers as their two top antimalarial suppliers 
(termed the terminal wholesalers) during the as administered by PSI. From these data, a list of 
all terminal wholesalers mentioned was created and all these terminal wholesalers were 
visited and invited to participate in the SCS. Wholesalers were eligible to participate if they 
had either an antimalarial or ROT in stock at the time of interview, or if they reported having 
stocked either antimalarials or ROTs in the three months prior to interview. Ouring the 
interview, eligible wholesalers were also asked about their top two supply sources for 
antimalarials (termed the intermediate-l wholesa'lers). From these data, a list of all 
intermediate-1 wholesalers mentioned was created. All these intermediate-1 wholesalers 
were visited and invited tp participate in the SCS, during which, as at previous levels, they were 
asked about their two top supply sources for antimalarials (termed the intermediate-2 
wholesalers). This process was repeated until the factory gate or port of entry was reached. 
Where horizontal trading was identified within the distribution chain, with for example 
terminal wholesalers purchasing antimalarial drugs from other wholesalers who had already 
been identified from the as as terminal wholesalers, the SCS was not administered again to 
this wholesaler, though the relationship was noted and accounted for in the analysis. However, 
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in the case where horizontal trading was identified at the retail outlet level (for example, a 
retailer identifies another retailer as the source of their antimalarials) the SCS was 
administered to the source of supply, even if they had already been surveyed during the as, 
because the questions asked in as and SCS were different. 
The SCS questionnaire was used for collecting data on each wholesale business' characteristics 
and operations and on the wholesalers' top two supply sources for antimalarials and RDTs. 
Inventory sheets were used for collecting data for each antimalarial/RDT stocked on brand 
name, generic name and strengths (for antimalarials), package type and size, recall of volumes 
sold over the week before the survey, recall of last purchase value and selling and purchase 
prices. 
The questionnaire, information sheet and consent form were piloted in Uganda in January 
2009. Tools were further developed by the author for the purpose of the thesis and revisions 
were made to account for the specificities of the Cambodian context (Appendix 4). All data 
collection survey tools were translated into Khmer by a trained native speaker and back 
translated into English to identify any translation errors. Tools were piloted by fieldworkers 
recruited and trained by the author. The SCS was implemented shortly after the as, from 
August to November 2009. 
4.5.2.1 Data analysis 
A challenge in the analysis of wholesalers is their classification into sub-groups, as in practice 
many are likely to operate at several levels of the distribution chain. Two approaches were 
therefore used for describing and analysing the distribution chain: 
• To describe the structure of the chain, wholesalers were classified into mutually-
exclusive categories (MECs) defined by the levels they supplied. For example, 
wholesalers supplying retailers only, wholesalers supplying retailers and terminal 
wholesalers only, and wholesalers supplying intermediate and terminal wholesalers 
only. 
• For analytical purposes, wholesalers were grouped into 2 broader and overlapping 
categories: one including wholesalers supplying retailers and one for wholesalers 
supplying wholesalers. Some wholesalers may therefore be included in both analytical 
categories. This second approach for classifying wholesalers addresses the issues of 
individual MECs including very few wholesalers. Furthermore, this approach reflects 
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the actual operations of wholesalers in the distribution chain. In this context, it was 
not possible to conduct statistical tests of difference in key indicators (e.g. price mark-
ups) between the wholesaler analytical categories. 
4.5.2.2 Calculating wholesale sales volumes 
As for retail sales volumes, wholesale volumes were calculated on the basis of AETOs. ROT 
wholesale sales volumes were calculated in terms of the number of ROT units sold. A total of 
230 antimalarials were surveyed, of which 9 (4%) had missing sales volumes27 that were 
imputed by conducting 5 imputations using STATA 11 mi impute pmm command on a set of 
provider and product characteristics, including generic name, antimalarial category28, brand, 
dosage form, outlet location (district), number of staff employed, whether wholesaler imports, 
provides credit, supplies retailers and finally MEC. For ROT, no imputation procedure was 
required as there was no missing data. 
In the context of overlapping distribution chain levels, it was not possible to calculate the total 
volume of antimalarials flowing down the chain without the risk of overestimation (Le. 
wholesalers often sell to each other, sales volume of a given pack could be counted several 
times). Three alternative summary measures of wholesale sales volumes were developed: 
• The median volume sold for the different antimalarial categories available in the 
distribution chain across all wholesalers 
• The median volume sold of the different antimalarial categories across those 
wholesalers who stocked at least one antimalarial within the particular category at the 
time of interview. 
• The proportion of wholesalers selling at least one antimalarial drug the week before 
the survey who reported a particular antimalarial drug as his top selling antimalarial 
based on sales volumes data collected for each antimalarial in stock at the time of the survey, 
as a proxy to the relative importance of different antimalarial drugs sold in the 
distribution chain. 
27 At outlets not stocking antimalarials on the day of interview, sales volumes were set to zero for all 
antimalarial categories. At wholesale outlets with no antimalarials of a specific category in stock at the 
time of the survey, sales volu"mes for the past week were assumed to be zero for that category. At 
wholesale outlets without information about the type of antimalarials stocked (because of refusals to 
participate in the study or to provide information on the type of antimalarials stocked or because of 
interrupted interviews), sales volumes were treated as missing and therefore imputed. 
28 ACT, AMT, nAMT 
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4.5.2.3 Calculating wholesale price mark-ups 
Because it is common for wholesalers to vary their prices with the volumes they sell, minimum, 
mid-point and maximum mark-ups were calculated using data on wholesale purchase price 
and maximum and minimum selling price charged for one unit. The wholesale maximum 
percentage mark-up was calculated as the difference between the highest wholesale selling 
price (that is the price of the minimum volume sold wholesale) and the wholesale purchase 
price, divided by the wholesale purchase price. The wholesale minimum mark-up was 
calculated as the difference between lowest wholesale selling price (that is the minimum price 
charged for wholesale sales) and wholesale purchase price, divided by wholesale purchase 
price. The wholesale percent mid mark-up was calculated as the difference between the 
average wholesale selling price (Le. mean between the maximum and minimum wholesale 
selling price) and wholesale purchase price. Wholesale absolute mark-ups were calculated for 
each product following the same approach as for percent mark-ups (Le. high-, low-, mid-
selling price minus purchase price). Prices were converted using the average exchange rate 
during the data collection period for wholesale purchase prices (21 August to 1 November 
2009) [4,239.76 Cambodian Riel to U5$ 1] (www.oanda.com). 
4.5.3 Semi-structured interviews 
The review of methods for studying private commercial markets for antimalarial and 
pharmaceutical drugs in developing countries (5ection 2.3) indicated that several studies have 
used 551s for identifying providers, defining economic markets, assessing market contestability, 
collecting price mark-ups and investigating price determinants. These studies demonstrated 
that qualitative data have the potential to enhance our understanding of the operation of 
markets that have been little researched. More generally, it has been argued that qualitative 
methods can improve the application and interpretation of economic theory in health systems 
research (Coast et aI., 2004). 
551s were conducted with retailers and wholesalers to better understand private commercial 
providers' behaviour, notably in terms of their stocking and pricing practices and to collect 
data on providers' perceptions and opinions on sensitive commercial and regulatory issues not 
amenable to quantitative research (Conteh and Hanson, 2003). Data on providers' accounts of 
their own behaviours were used to triangulate quantitative summary measures obtained from 
the analysis of 05 and 5C5 data and were used in their interpretation, n,otably for antimalarial 
and RDT availability and pricing, supplier choice and providers' responses to government 
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regulatory and non-regulatory interventions. In addition, qualitative data informed the 
generation of hypotheses to be tested for the analysis of retail price mark-up determinants 
(Chapter 7). 
Fluency in Khmer would have been ideal for conducting our SSls (Green and Thorogood, 2004). 
However, it was not possible for the author to reach such a level over the course of the 
research study. To address this issue, all SSls were conducted by the author with the assistance 
of a local interpreter with an excellent command of the English language. Simultaneous 
translation was used, with each question translated from English to Khmer and respondents' 
answers translated from Khmer to English. The same interpreter was used for all the SSls 
conducted over the course of the research. Prior to data collection, the translator was trained 
on the research aims, objectives and data collection tools. The interview guide was developed 
to cover topics on key aspects of market structure (type and provenance of customers, type 
and location of competitors, barriers to market entry and exit), provider conduct (delivery 
services, credit facilities, competitive strategies, vertical restraints, collusion, supplier choice, 
cost structures) and providers' perceptions and opinions of regulations. However, a flexible 
approach was kept during the interviews to provide the opportunity to collect data on issues 
that may not have been specified in the analytical framework described Section 4.2.2. In 
addition, providers were asked to reflect on the challenges and risks they faced in the 
provision of malaria treatment and were given the opportunity to share suggestions on how to 
improve their operations and also malaria control in Cambodia. As many of the issues that 
were discussed were sensitive for commercial or regulatory reasons, interviews were not tape 
recorded and only written notes were taken by both the candidate and the interpreter. After 
each interview, the author and her interpreter reflected on their own experience and 
impressions of the interview and issues were clarified where required. 
In order to capture the full range of providers, a sub-sample of 33 private commercial 
providers was interviewed, including 11 retailers and 22 wholesalers. The sample of retailers 
was purposively selected using as data: we selected primarily retailers that had been 
interviewed during the as and who had mentioned a supplier interviewed during the SCS (Le. 
the sampling frame included all retailers operating in the 20 sub-districts sampled for the SCS). 
We sampled at least one private commercial retailer within each retail outlet type identified 
during the as, including pharmacies/clinical pharmacies, drug shops, mobile providers, grocery 
stores and village shops. The sample was stratified across outlet type, resistance strata (i.e . 
. 
MDRF stratum or MDRSC stratum), accessibility levels (defined as the travel time from each 
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market to the closest commercial centre} and whether antimalarials, ACT and RDT were 
stocked (Table 4-3). As there were few retail outlets located in urban areas, we interviewed 2 
additional providers, including one in Phnom Penh City and one in Kampong Cham city. 
Table 4-3: Overview of the characteristics of retailers who participated in semi-structured 
interviews 
All Pharmacy/ Drug Mobile Grocery 
Clinical Stores Providers Stores 
Pharmacy 
Total sample 11 2 3 4 1 
Characteristics: 
Stratum: 
MDR-Free 7 1 2 2 1 
MDR-Suspected/Confirmed 3 0 1 2 0 
Non-endemic area 1 1 0 0 0 
Area type: 
Urban 2 1 1 0 0 
Rural 9 1 2 4 1 
Located in: 
Accessible market 4 1 1 1 0 
Moderately accessible market 2 1 1 0 0 
Remote market 5 0 1 3 1 
Stock antimalarial at time of OS 9 1 3 4 0 
Stock ACT 8 1 3 4 0 
Stock ROT 5 1 2 2 0 
Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey data, 38 sub-districts, June 2009 
As for sampling wholesalers, a question on whether wholesale respondents would be 
interested in participating in 551s was added at the end of the 5C5 questionnaire and a list of 
wholesalers who agreed to do so was created. The wholesale sample was stratified across 
chain levels, whether antimalarials, ACT and RDT were stocked, whether antimalarials were 
imported and whether the outlet reported selling antimalarials directly to patients (Table 4-4). 
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Village 
Shops 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Table 4-4: Overview of the characteristics of wholesalers who participated in semi-structured 
interviews 
All Mutually Exclusive Categories of Wholesalers (WS) Structured Survey 
Analytical Categories 
Supply Supply Supply Supply 
Retailers Retailers Terminal Intermediate 
& WS & Terminal 
Terminal WS 
WS 
Total sample 22 15 2 3 1 
Cha racteristics: 
Stock 
antimalarials at 18 13 2 2 0 
time ofSCS 
Stock ACT 17 12 2 2 0 
Stock ROT 16 11 2 2 0 
Sell to end 17 13 2 2 0 
consumers 
Import 3 0 0 1 1 
ACT is for artemisinin combination therapy; ROT is rapid diagnostic test for malana. 
Source: ACTwatch Supply Chain Survey data, August-November 2009. 
Supply Supply 
Intermediate Retailers 
& Terminal 
WS & Retail 
1 18 
1 18 
1 15 
1 14 
0 15 
1 1 
During data analysis, a deductive approach was used to test predefined hypotheses generated 
by the analytical framework. Key themes related to market structure, provider conduct, 
consumer demand, regulation and the broader policy context were used to develop an initial 
coding scheme. Interview notes were read and data coded under the relevant themes using 
NVIVO 8. A flexible approach to framework analysis was however adopted in order to identify 
additional themes and sub-themes. Data on the impact of the candidate on the research 
process or "Hawthorn effect" (Pope and Mays, 1995) were also coded to ensure reflexivity 
during the analysis of findings. The coding scheme developed during the analysis of the 
qualitative data is presented in Appendix 10. 
4.6 Summary 
The main aim of this thesis is to analyse the market for malaria treatment in Cambodia, 
including retail and wholesale markets, with a focus on the private commercial sector, and to 
draw recommendations for public health recommendations and future research. A further aim 
is to conduct a comparative analysis of different measurement methods for studying key 
aspects of markets of pharmaceutical drugs in general in developing countries. To address 
these aims, a mix-method approach was used to collect data through cross-sectional surveys 
and 551s of retailers and wholesalers, supplemented by a sales level survey, snowball census, 
and interviews with key informants including policy makers, people working in organisations 
involved in the provision of antimalarial drugs, and finally fieldworkers. Results are presented 
in the 4 following chapters, starting with an economic analysis of retail markets in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5 RETAIL MARKETS FOR MALARIA TREATMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts the analysis of competition in retail markets for malaria treatment. It 
presents the key structural aspects of the market, including the number and range of 
antimalarial drug providers, antimalarial drug sales volumes and values, market characteristics 
(accessibility, malaria transmission risk, and concentration), and entry and exit barriers. The 
chapter then assesses the extent of product differentiation and explores retailers' non-price 
strategies for differentiating their products and services from that of their competitors in order 
to attract custom. Price competition, which is the other key dimension of provider conduct will 
be analysed in Chapter 7. It may be seen more conventional from the perspective of economic 
theories to study price competition first. However, the analysis of product differentia~ion and 
non-price competition can provide insights on the structural factors that provide retailers with 
market power and retailers' strategies to maintain or gain market power and temper price 
competition. Furthermore, the study of retail price competition will draw not only on factors 
peculiar to retail markets but also on key aspects of the distribution chain, in terms of 
structure and suppliers' conduct, which will be presented in Chapter 6. In this Chapter, for the 
analysis of retail market structure and retailers' conduct, we use quantitative data from the 
ACTwatch Outlet Survey (OS) and qualitative data collected during Semi-Structured Interviews 
(SSls) with retailers. We also draw on data collected during SSls with wholesalers when the 
latter served consumers directly (many wholesalers also sold on a retail basis, see next 
chapter). 
5.2 Structure of retail markets 
5.2.1 Providers stocking antimalarial drugs 
As indicated in Chapter 4, in the 38 sub-districts surveyed during the OS, there were 792 retail 
outlets with antimalarials in stock on the day of the surveyor in the previous 3 months, of 
which 644 (81.3%) were private commercial outlets and 148 (18.7%) government owned 
outlets. At the time of the study, there was no retail outlet owned by not-for-profit non-
governmental organisations (NGO) that stocked antimalarial drugs in the surveyed areas. 
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There was 1 private provider for every 821 people at risk of malaria transmission and 1 public 
provider for every 3571 people. Important variations across the 2 strata were observed: in the 
surveyed areas free of multi-drug resistance (MDRF areas), there was 1 private provider for 
every 900 people at risk and as few as 1 public provider for every 5551 people; in the surveyed 
areas with MDR suspected or confirmed (MDRSC areas), there was 1 private provider for every 
753 people and 1 public provider for every 2621 people. 
Private commercial providers included mobile providers (25.5%), village shops (19.3%), drug 
shops (13.0%), pharmacies/clinical pharmacies (12.1%) and grocery stores (11.4%); 
government providers included village malaria workers (VMWs) (13.0%) and health facilities 
(5.7%). In both strata, mobile providers were the largest category of providers, accounting for 
34.0% of all antimalarial outlets in MDRF areas and 19.0% in the MDRSC areas (Table 5-1). 
Table 5-1: Retail providers stocking antimalarials in the 38 surveyed sub-districts 
Antimalarial provider types All Surveyed Surveyed Surveyed 
Sub-Districts Sub-Districts of Sub-Districts of MDR 
MDR Free Stratum Suspected/Confirmed 
Stratum 
Number % Number % Number % 
All Providers 792 100% 344 100% 448 100% 
Private Commercial Providers 644 81.3% 296 86.0% 348 77.7% 
Pharmacies/clinical pharmacies! 96 12.1% 26 7.6% 70 15.6% 
Drug shops 103 13.0% 35 10.2% 68 15.2% 
Mobile providers 202 25.5% 117 34.0% 85 19.0% 
Grocery stores 90 11.4% 37 10.7% 53 11.8% 
Village shops 153 19.3% 81 23.5% 72 16.1% 
Government providers 148 18.7% 48 14.0% 100 22.3%, 
Referral hospitals 3 0.4% 0 0.0% 3 0.7% 
Public health centres and posts 42 5.3% 24 7.0% 18 4.0% 
Village Malaria Workers 103 13.0% .. 24 7.0% 79 17.6% 
.. /I II comprised of around three-quarters small clinical pharmaCies ( cabinets) and one quarter of drug-only 
pharmacies. MDR is for multi-drug resistance. Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey in 38 sub-districts, June 2009. 
5.2.2 Antimalarial drug sales volumes and values 
Annual antimalarial sales volumes in malaria-endemic areas of Cambodia were estimated 
following the approach described in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.5.1.3). After calculating the total 
antimalarial volume sold at each outlet and the total volume sold by all outlets in each sub-
district during the week preceding the survey, the total sales volume in each sub-district was 
multiplied by its corresponding analytical weight and sales totals w~re summed under each 
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stratum in order to obtain 2 stratum-specific total sales volume estimates. During the week 
preceding the survey, 8292 adult equivalent treatment doses (AETDs) were estimated to have 
been dispensed in the MDRSC stratum and 4253 AETDs in the MDRF stratum. As the 2 strata 
covered the whole population at risk of malaria in Cambodia, the total antimalarial sales 
volume for the week preceding the survey across a" malaria endemic areas was calculated as 
the sum of the 2 stratum-specific antimalarial sales volume estimates. During the week 
preceding the as, a total of 12,545 AETDs were estimated to have been dispensed across a" 
malaria endemic areas (Table 5-2). 
The weekly total estimate was then scaled up to the whole month of data collection assuming 
constant weekly sales within that month. A total of 53,766 AETDs were estimated to have been 
dispensed in June 2009 (data not shown). A monthly total estimate for each of the other 
months of the year was calculated using scale-up factors calculated for each month as the ratio 
of the number of cases treated during that month in the public sector to that treated during 
the month of data collection (Appendix 7), in order to account for monthly variations in 
malaria transmission risk. The annual antimalarial volume dispensed in all malaria endemic 
areas was obtained by calculating the sum of the 12 monthly sales volume estimates. It was 
not possible to calculate stratum-specific annual sales volume estimates in the absence of data 
on patterns of malaria transmission risk in MDRF and MDRSC areas respectively. A total of 
500,225 AETDs were estimated to have been dispensed across all malaria endemic areas in 
2009 (Table 5-2). 
Sales values were calculated following a similar approach (Section 4.5.1.3). Sales values were 
estimated in each outlet by multiplying each antimalarial sales volume by its selling price in 
that outlet. Sales volume observations for which price data were missing (6%) were valued 
using the median selling price of the corresponding. antimalarial generic type and dosage form 
for the corresponding outlet's category (e.g. sales of artemether injection sold at a drug shop 
were valued using the median selling price of artemether in injection form for the drug shop 
outlet category). For sales volume observations with no corresponding median retail selling 
price (0.5%), sales volumes were valued using the median price for the given antimalarial 
generic type in the most similar outlet category. For instance, sales values of mefloquine sold 
in pharmacies were estimated using the median price at drug shops; for primaquine sold at 
pharmacies/clinical pharmacies only, no price data were available so the median price of 
mefloquine sold at drug shops was used. For antimalarial drugs sold at highly subsidized prices 
or provided free of charge, their value was estimated using actual procurement costs inclusive 
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of carriage and insurance costs for delivering the drugs to in-country warehouses (Appendix 8), 
inflated by 15% to account for in-country storage and other distribution costs (Goodman, 
2004). During the week preceding the survey, the value of AETDs dispensed was estimated at 
US$ 24,892 in the MDR Suspected/Confirmed stratum and US$ 16,649 in the MDR Free 
stratum, amounting to a total of US$ 41,541 across all malaria endemic areas (Table 5-2). 
Finally, the value of AETDs dispensed annually was estimated at US$ 1,074,612 (Table 5-2). 
Table 5-2: Estimated total antimalarial sales volumes and values in malaria-endemic areas 
Total sales volumes, Annual total Total sales Annual total 
during the week sales volumes valuest, sales values 
preceding the survey (AETO) during the (US$) 
(AETO) week 
preceding the 
survey (US$) 
All malaria endemic areas 12,545 500,225 US$ 41,541 US$ 1,074,612 
MDR Free areas 4,253 - US$ 16,649 -
MDR-Suspected/Confirmed 8,292 - US$ 24,892 -
-areas 
AETO is adult equivalent treatment dose; It_It when estimate could not be calculated 
5.2.3 Market shares of different antimalarial categories and provider types 
Figure 5-1 presents market shares in volume terms of different antimalarial categories across 
all malaria-endemic areas and in each of the two strata. Artemisinin Combination Therapy 
(ACT) made up 60% of all AETDs dispensed, and this was constant across strata. There were 
key differences between strata. First, the relatively higher market share of ACT other than co-
blistered artesunate and mefloquine (ASMQ) in the MDRSC stratum compared to the MDRF 
stratum reflected the switch to the ACT dihydroartemisinin and piperaquine in areas wi~h 
confirmed MDR. Second, the relatively higher market share of chloroquine in the MDRSC 
stratum than in the MDRF stratum may have reflected the higher prevalence of P.v in the 
former than in the latter. Third, artemisinin monotherapy (AMT), which were banned at the 
time of the study, accounted for a larger share of the antimalarial market in the MDRF stratum 
than in the MDRSC stratum (14% of all antimalarial sales volumes compared to 4%), although 
in absolute terms the volume dispensed in the latter was larger than in the former (595 AETDs 
vs. 331 AETDs) 
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Figure 5-1: Antimalarial market shares in volume terms 
As % of the total volume of AETDs dispensed during the week preceding the OS in all malaria endemic 
areas (N=12,545), MDR Suspected/Confirmed areas only (n=8,292) and MDR Free areas only (n=4,253) 
(Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey, 38 sub-districts, June 2009) 
ALL MALARIA ENDEMIC AREAS (N=12,545 AETDs) 
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AMT=artemisinin monotherapies; nAMT=non-a rtemisinin monotherapies; ASMQ=artesunate+mefloquine; 
CQ=chloroquine; AS=artesunate; AR=artemether; DHA=dihydroartemisinin; PP=piper.aquine; Art=artemisinin; 
Prim=primaquine; SP=sulphadoxine+pyrimethamine. 
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Figure 5-2 presents market shares in volume terms of each provider type across all malaria-
endemic areas and in each of the two strata. Three-quarters of antimalarial volumes were sold 
by private commercial providers whilst the rest were dispensed by government providers, and 
this was constant across the 2 strata. In the MORF stratum, mobile providers, the largest 
category of antimalarial outlets, accounted for 25% of all antimalarial sales volumes whilst 
village shops, which were the second largest category of outlets, accounted for only 12% of all 
antimalarials sold. In the MORSC stratum, pharmacies/clinical pharmacies accounted for 38% 
of all sales volumes whilst the more numerous mobile providers were responsible for only 8%. 
This situation may in part be due to some pharmacies engaging in wholesale trade. In this 
context, our approach could have overestimated total retail sales volumes. However, it is likely 
that only a few pharmacies sold antimalarials wholesale as the majority of outlets in this 
category were small clinical pharmacies (cabinets). 
Figure 5-3 presents market shares in volume terms of each provider type by antimalarial 
category and stratum. In the MORSC stratum, pharmacy/clinical pharmacies were responsible 
for the largest share of ACT and nAMT volumes dispensed whilst drug shops for the largest 
share of AMT volume dispensed. By contrast, in the MORF stratum, government providers 
were the largest supplier of ACT whilst mobile providers were responsible for the largest share 
of AMT and nAMT dispensed. 
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Figure 5-2: Provider market shares in volume terms 
As % of the total volume of AETDs dispensed during the week preceding the OS in all malaria endemic 
areas (N=12,545 AETDs), MDR Suspected/Confirmed areas only (n=8,292 AETDs) and MDR Free areas 
only (n=4,253 AETDs) (Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey, 38 sub-districts, June 2009) 
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Figure 5-3: Market shares in volume terms of each provider type by "antimalarial drug category 
As % of total volume of AETDs dispensed by each provider type for different antimalarial categories 
during the week preceding the OS in MDR Suspected/Confirmed areas only (n=8292) and MDR Free 
areas only (n=4253) (Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey, 38 sub-districts, June 2009 
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ACT is artemisinin combination therapy; ASMQ is the ACT artesunate and mefloquine; AMT is artemisinin 
monotherapy; nAMT is non-artemisinin monotherapy; MDR is multi-drug resistance. 
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Finally, Figure 5-4 presents market shares in value terms of each provider type. 
Private commercial providers were responsible for 70% of the market and government 
providers for 30%, and this was constant across strata. 
In the MORSC stratum, pharmacies/clinical pharmacies were responsible for the largest share 
of the market whilst in the MOR Free stratum it was mobile providers. VMWs and drug shops 
were the second most important provider type in the MORF stratum and MORSC stratum 
respectively. 
This section has demonstrated the important role played by the commercial private sector in 
the provision of antimalarial drugs compared to the public sector. It has also shown key 
variations in the relative importance of different provider types depending on the indicator 
used: in terms of outlet number, mobile providers were the most important antimalarial -
providers in both strata; in terms of antimalarial sales volumes and values, mobile providers 
were also the most important providers in the MORF stratum, whilst it was pharmacies/clinical 
pharmacies in the MORSC stratum. VMWs and drug shops were the second most important 
provider type in the MORF stratum and MORSC stratum respectively (Table 5-3). ACT 
dominated the retail market but other antimalarial drug categories were also dispensed. 
Table 5-3: Top two antimalarial retail outlet categories by stratum 
MDR Free areas MDR suspected/confirmed areas 
Number of Outlets Mobile providers Mobile providers 
Village shops Village Malaria Workers 
Antimalarial Sales Volumes Mobile providers Pharmacies/Clinical Pharmacies 
Village Malaria Workers Drug shops 
Antimalarial Sales Values Mobile providers Pharmacies/Clinical Pharmacies 
Village Malaria Workers Village Malaria Workers 
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Figure 5-4: Provider market shares in value terms 
As % of total sales value of AETDs dispensed during the week preceding the OS in all malaria endemic 
areas (US$ 41,541), MDR Suspected/Confirmed areas only (US$ 24,892}and MDR Free areas only (US$ 
16,650) (Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey, 38 sub-districts, June 2009) 
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Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey data. 38 sub-districts, June 2009 
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5.2.4 Defining the market 
An important and challenging step in the analysis of market structure is to define the market. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, markets can be defined as the set of sellers and buyers who are in 
sufficiently close contact for their transactions to affect the terms on which the others buy or 
sell (Tirole, 1988). They are traditionally defined along product and geographic lines. The 
product definition relates to the set of providers and products that are sold in the market 
whilst the geographic definition refers to the area within which buyers and sellers interact and 
determine the price of each product. 
5.2.4.1 Setting the product definition 
The product dimension is specified by the set of products and providers that are close 
substitutes from the consumer's perspective29• For defining the product dimension of a 
market, previous studies have used household survey data on treatment seeking behaviour 
(including types of outlets visited, products received and distance travelled) supplemented by 
qualitative data on the type of outlets providers perceived themselves to compete with 
(Section 2.3.5) At the time this study was conducted, household data were not available so the 
sources and products commonly used by consumers were identified during SSls with retailers 
who were asked to describe their selling practices for treating malaria. In the absence of data 
on distance travelled by care-takers/end users, retailers were asked about the provenance of 
their customers for malaria treatment, supplemented with data on the types and location of 
outlets that providers perceived themselves to face competition from in the provision of 
malaria treatment. The issue of whether or not to include antibiotics with antimalarial action 
in this study's product definition was however not clear. At the time of this study tetracycline, 
an antibiotic, was the recommended second line treatment for P.f infections in Cambodia, in 
combination with the antimalarial quinine. However, the inclusion of antibiotics with 
antimalarial action into the product definition for the market for malaria treatment raises 
complications because antibiotics are used for many other conditions. Furthermore, during the 
ACTwatch study, such products were excluded from the overall scope of the project. As a 
result, the product definition for this study was set as all antimalarial drugs in all dosage forms 
stocked at outlets surveyed by the as in the 38 sub-districts. 
29 By contrast, the analysis of substitutability in supply focuses on a provider being able to switch his supply for 
treating one condition to another at a limited or no cost. 
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As discussed in Chapter 4, retail outlets were identified for inclusion in the as if they stocked 
antimalarials or had done so in the preceding 3 months through a census of all outlets that 
may potentially sell antimalarials in each of the 38 sub-districts. All these outlets were included 
in the product definition for providers. Whilst the focus of this study is on private commercial 
retailers, government outlets were also included on the basis that they were perceived by 
private shopkeepers to compete in the provision of malaria treatment and therefore influence 
private shopkeepers in their strategies for attracting customers. 
"When people get malaria, they go first to the health centre" (Pharmacy/clinical pharmacy #1, 
accessible market, MDRF stratum) 
"Before the malaria business was good but now public health centres provide treatment. There 
are also vii/age malaria workers around" (Wholesaler supplying retailers #3, MDRSC stratum) 
Other providers of health care services and products included Kru Khmer (traditional healers). 
However, Kru Khmer have been reported to playa relatively small role in the provision of 
healthcare in Cambodia, as they accounted for only 1.5% of all health care visits (DHS 2005). At 
the time of this study, there was no reason to believe that they played a significant role in the 
provision of malaria treatment. This was backed up by data collected during SSls with retailers 
who did not report perceiving other types of outlets than those identified during the as to be 
their main competitors in the market for antimalarial drugs. 
5.2.4.2 Setting up the geographic definition 
In previous studies on pharmaceutical drug markets (Section 3.3.5), 3 approaches have been 
used for defining geographic markets: the fixed-radius method, the simple administrative 
boundary approach and the shipment approach. 
.. 
The fixed-radius approach defines a market as the area within a given radius around an outlet. 
This approach creates challenges at the boundaries of the whole study area as outlets that are 
outside the area have not been sampled whilst, by definition when using this approach, they 
are part of the marke~ under study and are expected to influence the operation of outlets in 
the study area. In this thesis, the whole study area was made up of 38 sub-districts implying 
that setting the geographic definition through the fixed-radius method would have created 
repeated challenges for defining markets at the boundaries of each sub-district (or group of 
clustered sub-districts). 
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The shipment approach uses household data on the distance travelled by care takers when 
seeking malaria treatment. However, as previously mentioned, such data were not available 
for use in this thesis. 
The administrative boundary approach was therefore used. To avoid oversimplifying the 
geographical definition and as a result over or under estimating competition, the 
appropriateness of 4 different administrative areas (district, sub-district, commune and village) 
was assessed using data collected during 551s with retailers on the provenance of their 
customers for malaria treatment and the location of outlets that they perceived as 
competitors. 
The sub-district, which formed the primary sampling unit for the OS, was the catchment area 
of public health facilities with reported malaria cases in 2008. The sub-district therefore 
appeared as an attractive candidate for setting the geographic definition of the market. The 
suitability of this definition was hard to assess during 551s because sub-districts formed 
operational areas defined by the MOH for planning activities rather than widely recognised 
administrative units. However, evidence from 551s with retailers indicated that the sub-district, 
which covered around 10,000 to 15,000 people, was a too broad definition for retail markets 
for malaria treatment. 
"My main competitions are approximately 10 minutes walk away, near the main road's 
roundabout and a bit farther away in the market". (Mobile provider #5, remote market, MDRF 
stratum) 
Using the sub-district would overestimate the market and therefore the intensity of 
competition. In this context, the sub-district, and consequently the district were considered 
inadequate. 
During 551s, most providers mentioned surrounding villages or/and their village as the areas 
within which competitors operated and/or customers came from. 
"Other drug shops in the vii/age and in the surrounding vii/ages compete with me" 
(Pharmacy/clinical pharmacy #1, accessible market, MDRF stratum) 
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The village was therefore considered to provide too narrow boundaries and the geographic 
definition was therefore set as the commune. The commune was considered to be the most 
relevant area, especially in the presence of mobile providers who were likely to travel outside 
their own village. The suitability of this approach was validated with researchers on fever 
treatment seeking behaviour in Cambodia and using evidence on utilisation data from a 
household survey conducted some years ago that found that the median time travelled when 
seeking treatment for malaria symptoms was 60 minutes (Shunmay Yeung, personal 
communication), indicating that consumers were likely to travel outside their own village when 
seeking malaria treatment. To illustrate, villages had a median population of 623 (368-998) 
people and communes a median of 3507 inhabitants (lOR 1764-6054). With an average density 
of 75 people per km2 (NIS, 2008), the average village surface would be around 8km2 and that 
of communes 46km2, which appears to be consistent with a 60 minute walk. 
On the basis of the product and geographic definitions developed above, 87 markets were 
defined, of which 40 were in the MDRF stratum and 47 in the MDRSC stratum. These markets 
each served a median population of 3507 inhabitants (data not shown), and this was relatively 
constant across strata (Table 5-4). 
In summary, in this section, the market for malaria treatment was defined. The product 
definition was set as all types of drugs developed for the treatment of malaria in all dosage 
forms whilst the product definition for providers was set as pharmacies/clinical pharmacies, 
drugs stores, mobile providers, grocery and village shops, and public sector referral hospitals, 
health centres/posts and VMWs because in several instances private shopkeepers perceived 
they faced competition from government providers. Finally, the geographical definition of the 
market was set as the commune after assessing the appropriateness of 4 different 
administrative boundaries (district, sub-district, commune, and village). The next 2 sections 
assess market accessibility and malaria transmission risk (Section 5.2.5), and market 
concentration (Section 5.2.6). 
5.2.5 Market accessibility and malaria transmission risk 
Market accessibility was measured by calculating the total travel time from each market to the 
main commercial centre (Section 4.5.1.6). The median travel time was 3.35 hours (lOR 1.6-5.4, 
min 0.5, max 10.5). Markets were grouped into 3 categories, with markets located less than 
2.5 hour-drive from the closest main commercial area categorised as "accessible", within 2.5 
and 4.5 hour-drive as "moderately accessible" and more than 4.5 hour-drive as "remote". 
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The suitability of this approach was backed-up during discussions with key informants working 
at Population Services International in Cambodia (PSI Cambodia) who were asked about what 
"remote" or "accessible" meant to them in terms of travel time using a 4-wheel vehicle. 
Following the MOH's malaria transmission risk categorisation, markets located less than 250 
meters from the forest were classified as "high risk" of malaria transmission risk, within 250 
meters and 1 kilometre from the forest as "medium risk" and more than 1 kilometre from the 
forest as "low risk" (Section 4.5.1.7). 
A significantly higher percentage of markets located in the MORF stratum was remote than in 
the MORSC stratum (66.0% vs. 18.4%, p=O.Ol), with the latter significantly more likely to be 
moderately accessible (57.5% vs. 0.06%, p<O.OOl) (Table 5-4). Whilst the proportion of markets 
at high or moderate risk of malaria transmission was not statistically different across strata, 
markets in the MORF stratum were more likely to be at low malaria transmission risk 
compared to the MORSC stratum (44.5% vs. 20.7% p=0.03) (Table 5-4). Finally, in both strata, 
the levels of malaria transmission risk were not significantly different across markets with 
different levels of accessibility (e.g. more remote markets were not found to have higher risk 
of malaria transmission) (Chi2, p=0.67) (data not shown). 
Table 5-4: Market characteristics by stratum 
MDR-Free M DR-Suspected/ 
Market characteristics Stratum Confirmed Stratum 
n=40 n=47 
Median number of inhabitants {IQR} 3624 3403 
(1877-6023) (1757-6547) 
Level of Accessibilitl 
-Accessible 33.4% 24.8% 
-Moderately accessible 0.07%* 57.5%* 
-Remote 66.0%* 18.4%* 
Level of Malaria Transmission Riskz 
-High risk 14.3% 29.5% 
-Moderate risk 41.1% 49.7% 
-Low risk 44.5%* 20.7%* 
Markets located less than 2.5 hours drive from the closest main commercial centre were defined as accessible, 
within 2.5 and 4.5 hours as moderately accessible and more than 4.5 hours drive as remote. 2Markets were classified 
as "high risk" of malaria transmission if they were located less than 250 meters from the forest, as "medium risk" if 
located within 250 meters and 1 kilometre from the forest and as "low risk" if located more than 1 kilometre from 
the forest. ·significant differences between MDR-Free and MDR-Suspected/Confirmed Stratum (chi-squared test 
with Rao and Scott correction, p<O.OS) 
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5.2.6 Retail market concentration 
Retail market concentration was analysed by retail provider first and then by manufacturer. 
5.2.6.1 Concentration by provider 
The number of providers was very variable across markets, ranging from 1 to 32, with a mean 
of 5 outlets per market. In 61% of the markets, both public and private providers stocked 
antimalarial drugs whilst in 30% of the markets only private shops did so (and this was similar 
across strata) and in the remaining 9% it was VMWs only (with three-quarter of these 
communes situated in the MDR Free stratum). Appendix 11 presents the HHI on antimalarial 
sales volumes and values for each market including both public and private sector volumes. 
Table 5-5 presents median and IQR for the HHI calculated using sales volumes and values for 
all markets and across strata. 
Table 5-5: Median HHI across all markets and by stratum 
Median HHI on Median HHI on 
antimalarial sales antimalarial sales values 
volumes (IQR) (lQR) 
All Marketsl 0.50 (0.34-0.74) 0.58 (0.32-0.72) 
Markets in MDR Free Stratum (n=31) 0.63 (0.37-1.00) 0.64 (0.36-1.00) 
Markets in MDR Suspected/Confirmed 0.49 (0.30-0.61) 0.50 (0.29-0.64) 
Stratum (n=42) 
1 HHI were calculated for 73 communes because In 14 communes total sales volumes were null so market shares 
could not be calculated. MDR is multi-drug resistance; lOR is inter-quartile range 
The median HHI, both in volume and value terms, was not statistically different between strata 
(median difference 0, 95% ci -0.02 to 0.03). In the MDRF stratum, there was no significant 
difference in the median HHI in volume and value terms (paired t-test p=0.69) whilst in the 
MDRSC stratum the HHI in volume term was significantly higher than the HHI in value terms, 
although by only 0.03 (p<O.OOOl). These results are in line with previous studies that found 
little differences in HHls calculated on different variables (Gaynor and Vogt, 2000). 
According to US anti-trust agencies, markets with an HHI below 0.15 can be considered as 
unconcentrated, between 0.15 and 0.25 moderately concentrated and above 0.25 highly 
concentrated (U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 2010). On the basis 
of these thresholds, markets for. antimalarial drugs would be considered as highly 
concentrated in both strata, with some markets in monopoly situations. However, out of the 
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markets with an HHI equal to 1, two thirds in the MDR Free stratum and one third in the MDR-
Suspected/Confirmed stratum were public sector monopolies. 
5.2.6.2 Concentration by manufacturer 
Competition between drug manufacturers was explored using information on antimalarial 
drug manufacturer collected during the as. 
ACT products audited originated from 7 manufacturers, with 3 manufacturers of co-blistered 
ASMQ accounting for 84% of the ACT market in volume terms and 91% in value terms. On the 
basis of us anti-trust agency guidelines, the ACT market would be considered as highly 
concentrated, with a HHI of 0.75 in volume terms and 0.79 in value terms. 
For the market for non-ACT, it was not possible to assess the degree of concentration using the 
HHI. In the market for AMT, there was no information about manufacturers for 38.5% of sales 
volumes (20.7% of sales values). Similarly, in the market for nAMT, no manufacturer 
information was available for 31.5% of sales volumes (86.5% of sales values). Absence of 
information about manufacturers may be due to products being imported from Thailand or 
other neighbouring countries for which data collectors were unable to read packaging, or 
products being stored loose as blisters or single ampoules so that no information on 
manufacturer was available. Overall, 15 different manufacturers were identified to supply AMT 
and 13 nAMT. The top 3 "identified" manufacturers of AMT were responsible for 43% of all 
sales and 70% of sales from identified manufacturers in volume terms (50% and 63% in value 
terms respectively); for nAMT, the top 3 "identified" manufacturers made up 62% of all sales 
and 91% of sales from identified manufacturers in volume terms (11% and 84% in value terms 
respectively). 
In summary, the analysis of concentration by providers indicated that markets could be highly 
.. 
concentrated, and sometimes in monopoly situations, notably in the MDR-Free stratum. 
However, two-thirds of these monopoly situations were pUblic-sector monopolies. The analysis 
of concentration by manufacturer indicated that the market for ACT could be considered as 
highly concentrated, reflecting the crowding out by social marketing of sales of other ACTs. As 
for the market of AMT and nAMT, information about manufacturers was lacking for a relatively 
large share of sales therefore impeding the calculation of concentration indices. The analysis of 
market structure is not limited to market concentration but also includes the extent to which 
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market entry and exit is possible. The next section explores the presence and nature of entry 
and exit barriers to the market for malaria treatment. 
5.2.7 Perceived barriers to entry and exit 
This section explores the factors that inhibit market entry and exit as perceived by retailers. 
Data on providers' perceptions were collected during SSls during which respondents were 
asked if they expected businesses like theirs to open in their area in the near future and the 
factors explaining this situation. As indicated previously, the analysis mainly relies on data 
from interviews with retailers, but data are also included from wholesaler interviews where it 
refers to their retail practices. Regulatory requirements, the lack of financial capital and the 
lack of experience of newcomers were perceived to be key obstacles to market entry. 
Regulation was the most commonly reported source of obstacles to retail market entry. A key 
aspect was the cap on the number of new drug outlet licenses that could be issued in each 
commune. At the time of this study, the number of pharmacy licenses was capped at 1 outlet 
for 2,000 inhabitants, so once this ratio was reached no new pharmacy licenses were to be 
issued, but if there was less than 1 pharmacy per 2,000 inhabitants in a given commune, depot 
A licenses could be issued to pharmacy assistants wishing to set up a new drug business within 
the commune (Section 2.5). 
"The provincial [Ministry ofl health office does not authorise new pharmacies to open in the 
area. Four pharmacies are enough according to the authorities. I don't know more about it." 
(Wholesaler supplying wholesalers #5, MDRSC stratum). 
Whilst it would have been of interest to know whether the 1:2000 ratio was respected in 
practice, it was not possible to assess this from the OS data as it collected license status data 
for drug outlets in general, without making a distinction between pharmacy and depot 
licenses. Official lists could have provided this information but they were incomplete or 
outdated, as will be seen in Chapter 8. It was therefore not possible to investigate whether the 
legislation was effectively implemented. However, as described below, in practice many 
providers had overcome this barrier by operating without the required license. 
The process of applying for a drug outlet license was reported as a second regulatory hurdle 
with retailers perceiving it to be complicated and expensive. The Department for Drug and 
Food (DDF) encouraged applicants to submit the relevant documentation as soon as possible 
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with new licenses to be issued on a IIfirst-come first served-basis", assuming the relevant 
documentation had been submitted (DDF, personal communication). At the time of this study, 
there was no official fixed license fee though the DDF suggested provincial offices charge a 
small fee. During 551s with providers, the fee reported to be paid to the MOH's Provincial 
Health Departments (PHDs) for obtaining a drug outlet license was around U5$ 20, although 
one provider reported that the fee could be as much as U5$ 120, such that the cost of 
obtaining a license led providers to operate without a license. 
Other requirements for opening a drug outlet were said to be hard to fulfil, notably in terms of 
the premises in which a drug business could be set up. This reflected Article 20 of Praka30 
no.14, which stated that a pharmacy outlet should be at least 20m2 and depots 16m2 with 
clear separation from the living space. 
"/ don't know any problem for opening a business, except to have a house. / know someone 
who wants to set up a drug business in this area. But there is no house free so he can not open 
a new shop" (Village shop #10, remote market, MDRF stratum) 
Buying a drug business from a licensee already operating in the market was said to be one way 
to enter the market, which was reportedly possible when licensees decided to retire. Retailers 
also reported renting licensees' names for setting up their own shop. At the time of this study, 
the legislation authorised such practice provided that IInew" entrants had the relevant 
qualifications. However, renting a license was reported to be near impossible because of the 
limited number of pharmacists in Cambodia and of those renting their names. In the situation 
where licensees' names or premises were rarely for sell or for rent, their cost, when they 
became available, was reported as an additional barrier to entry. 
"/ have not found an affordable pharmacist name to rent. Pharmacist names are expensive, 
around US$ 200 per month. / can only afford to pay $50"per month "(Mobile provider #4, 
remote market, MDRF stratum) 
However, there was also evidence that circumventing the above-mentioned regulatory entry 
barriers was common. 
30 Ministerial decision 
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"They are a lot of drug outlets that have opened here. This is a problem because they do not 
have enough knowledge about medicines and malaria. Some sell drugs only, some sell other 
products, and sometimes they cannot read nor write" (Pharmacy/clinical pharmacy #1, 
accessible market, MDRF stratum) 
During the OS, the majority of respondents indicated that they operated without a drug outlet 
license (Table 5-6). To be more specific, MOH licenses were significantly more frequently 
observed at pharmacies/clinical pharmacies and drug shops than at other retail outlet types 
(26.7% vs. 3.0%, p<O.OOOl and 11.9% vs. 4.8%, p=0.005 respectively). By contrast, they were 
less frequently observed at mobile provider outlets (1.5% vs. 8.0%, p=O.Ol) and never 
observed at village shops (p=0.04). 
Table 5-6: Retailers who reported operating without a MOH drug outlet license 
As % of providers for whom the information was available (N=637) 
Retail outlet category Percentage of private shops reported to 
n=sample size operate without a MOH drug outlet license 
(95%ci) 
Pharmacies/clinical pharmacies 55.3% 
n=95 (44.5,66.0) 
Drug shops 88.5% 
n=101 (82.0,95.1) 
Mobile providers 99.3% 
n=201 (98.0,100) 
Grocery stores 96.7% 
n=89 (93.5,100) 
Village shops 100% 
n=151 (100,100) 
Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey data, 38 sub-districts, June 2009. 
Setting up a pharmacy business was reported to require significant financial resources. 
"To open a big pharmacy, it costs between US$ 10,000 to US$ 20,000. I cannot open such a big 
shop" (Pharmacy/Clinical pharmacy #1, accessible market, MDRF stratum) 
In general pharmacy shopkeepers estimated that around U'S$ 25,000 was required for setting 
up a pharmacy business, whilst for other outlet types US$ 540 was reportedly sufficient 
although it could be 10 times more at US$ 5,000. Resources included renting a house and 
purchasing shop furniture such as shelves and a drug cabinet, fittings and an initial stock of 
drugs, with the latter accounting for the largest share of capital required (40-97% of all capital 
reportedly required). 
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All interviewees, except one, said that they did not borrow money either because the bank in 
their area did not lend money or because they foresaw not earning enough to repay back later. 
However, when prompted on the cost of borrowing money, none of the retailers reported 
knowing about the interest rates charged by financial establishments. The sole provider who 
reported borrowing money from a bank said that to finance his inventory he borrowed at a 
monthly interest rate of 3% for sums less than US$ 1,000 and 2.5% for sums above US$ 1000. 
The only other source of financial resources mentioned, although rarely, was family members 
who had provided the initial capital for setting up the business. 
Finally, the lack of experience in selling drugs or treating patients was perceived as a barrier to 
entry by retailers who reported that this was going way beyond having the relevant health 
qualifications to do so and related to practical experience of running such businesses. 
"No other businesses will open in the area [ ... J because it takes time to build experience and 
people are not confident for opening this type of business" (Mobile provider #5, remote 
market, MORse stratum) 
This was somewhat backed up by the outlet survey data which showed that median length in 
operation of antimalarial providers was 7 years (IQR 3-16). 
During SSls, private shopkeepers did not report any barriers to exiting the market for 
antimalarial drugs. One would expect that bankruptcy would be a cause for shop closure but it 
was never mentioned by shopkeepers who argued that shops never closed down because of 
the variety of products sold alongside antimalarial drugs. Two factors were mentioned as 
causes for shop closures: old age and recent developments in the regulatory environment. 
Whilst regulatory developments were perceived by some private shopkeepers as new 
requirements from the MOH, they frequently actually reflected strengthened enforcement of 
existing policies. 
"There is a new policy that says that shops selling drugs without being registered will be closed 
down" (Drug Shop # 3, moderately accessible market, MORse stratum) 
Several private shopkeepers mentioned that requirements had become stringent for outlets 
operating within Phsars (marketplaces) such that phsar-based outlets had recently been asked 
to obtain a license if they wished to continue operating. Some other respondents referred to a 
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controversial ongoing campaign from the regulatory authorities during which outlets providing 
clinical services were being closed down. 
"Kru Pets31 practices will be closed down. But there will also be reaction. Providers are 
discussing and are unhappyN (Drug Shop # 3, moderately accessible market, MDRSC stratum)" 
One mobile provider who also worked at the local health facility argued, however, that the 
authorities had limited capacity for closing unlicensed shops because the implementation of 
the intervention was delegated to the operational district and, it appeared, to government 
health workers themselves. As one clinical pharmacy interviewee, who was also the head of 
the local health centre said: 
"The provincial office wants to stop the operation of informal providers who operate without a 
license but the implementation is not up to speed. I was told to close shops by the local 
authorities but I cannot do anything myself to stop the operation of informal businesses. I could 
be murdered for doing this because the lines are blurred, you see, I also run a drug businessN 
(Pharmacy/Clinical Pharmacy #1, accessible market, MDRF stratum) 
However, shortly after the end of our study, the MOH engaged in a crack-down on unlicensed 
providers and a few months later, in March 2010, the Ministry of Health announced that 65% 
of unlicensed outlets had been closed (BMJ, 2010). During SSls, a few providers had also 
reported that the sales of drugs at private shops would soon be forbidden by their local 
authorities. 
This section has analysed the structure of the market for malaria treatment in Cambodia. The 
product dimension of the market was set to include private commercial retailers and 
government providers stocking antimalarial drugs in the 38 sub-districts: pharmacies/clinical 
pharmacies, drugs stores, mobile providers, grocery and .. village shops, and public sector 
referral hospitals, health centres/posts and VMWs. The geographical definition of the market 
was set as the commune on the basis of evidence on the provenance of antimalarial customers 
and location of retailers' competitors, and after assessing the appropriateness of 4 different 
administrative ,boundaries (district, sub-district, commune, and village). Markets could be 
31 Kru Pets refer to semi-qualified or qualified health care providers. Semi-qualified health care providers 
may be those who received training in. the camps after the Khmer Rouge regime. Qualified health care 
providers may include government health workers who have their own private practice or retired nurses 
or midwives. 
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considered as highly concentrated, with some in a monopoly situation, although some of these 
were public sector monopolies, notably in the MDRF stratum. Market concentration by 
manufacturer was high for ACT, reflecting the social marketing crowding-out of private sector 
sales whilst it was lower for nAMT and notably AMT. Entry barriers were reported to be high, 
although many outlets appeared to have overcome these obstacles. Market exit was generally 
perceived to be rare, except in areas where regulation was reported to have recently become 
more stringent. 
5.3 Provider conduct: product differentiation and non-price competition 
This section explores the key axes of product differentiation in the market for malaria 
treatment, describing the inherent product characteristics perceived to be the most valued by 
customers when choosing one product over another at a given price and the strategies used by 
providers to distinguish their products and services from that of other providers on the basis of 
other attributes than price. 
5.3.1 location choice 
Antimalarial retailers said that they chose to locate where they perceived the demand to be. 
They reported that consumers preferred outlets located in or around phsars, which were said 
to be conveniently located so that if they did not find the products or services of their choice in 
a given shop they could easily visit another shop nearby. 
"Phsar Tapang is an area with a lot of retail pharmacies [ .. 1 People go there because there are 
a lot of drug sellers and therefore a wider range of drugs a vaila ble II. (Pharmacy/clinical 
pharmacy # 9, accessible market, Phnom Penh) 
Being located in or around a phsar was also reported to create positive externalities between 
providers because it increased the overall demand for these providers. One retailer on the 
outskirts of a phsar indicated that she would close her shop shortly after midday because the 
phsar was only open in the morning and therefore she was not expecting customers to visit 
her shop in the afternoon. 
Transport costs were reported to be a key factor influencing consumers' choice of outlet, and 
outlets located along main roads and roundabouts were reported to attract custom because 
they were said to be easily accessible for the majority of consumers. One retailer said that 
customers choose providers on the grounds of both treatment price and transport costs. 
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"People have to pay 10,000 riel (US$ 2.50) to get to the health centre by taxi and come back. 
This is why people come to my shop because I am not more expensive" (Drug shop #6, remote 
market, MDRF stratum) 
Section 5.2 indicated that many people were likely to have to travel longer distances to reach 
public health facilities than private shops: in as many as one third of communes, private shops 
were the only providers of antimalarial drugs and overall private commercial outlets tended to 
be more accessible than government ones, notably in MDR free areas where there was 1 
private provider for every 900 people at risk and as few as 1 public provider for every 5551 
people. Furthermore, seeking care from government facilities implied other indirect costs 
including the opportunity cost of being away from work or that of providing food to family 
members or friends who would have accompanied patients for the duration of their stay. Only 
when free treatment was available locally, such as through VMWs, was it reported to attract 
custom. 
5.3.2 Outlet's opening hours 
Longer opening hours were reported to be an attribute highly valued by customers and shops 
were sometimes said to never close! 
"/ am open 24hours, 7 days a week because if / was not opened all the time, customers would 
go somewhere else". (Wholesaler supplying retailer #5, MORSe stratum) 
This may have reflected situations where the drug outlet was located at the provider's home, 
or where providers travelled to patients' homes, such as mobile providers. Opening hours 
were also mentioned as one reason why people preferred seeking care at private shops rather 
than at public facilities. One mobile provider said that for people sick at night there was no 
alternative source of care available locally other than him because the nearby health post did 
not provide care at night. 
5.3.3 Stock reliability and range of drugs available 
Stock-outs were reported to be another factor that led consumers to avoid public health 
facilities. Stock-outs were said to be frequent, especially at lower level facilities, such as health 
posts. During two interviews with health workers, the latter explained that their outlet 
received only 4 to 5 adult doses of ASMQ per month. Requesting additional treatment packs 
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from higher level facilities, either to the health centre or directly to the operational district, 
was reported to be possible, but supplies were said to arrive one or two days later or health 
post staff were required to travel relatively long distances, sometimes 60 to 70 kilometres, to 
pick-up antimalarials from the operational district office. 
Within the private sector, a wider range of drugs was also perceived to be an attribute that 
attracted custom, notably at outlets providing treatment services such as clinical pharmacies 
and mobile providers. 
"Kru pets compete with me because they have a wider range of drug types, such as 
suppositories" (Grocery shop #7, remote market, MDRF stratum) 
This was however not backed up by the outlet survey data which showed that only public 
health facilities stocked suppositories, with the exception of one drug shop. However, of 
private sector outlet types, mobile providers and clinical pharmacies stocked the largest share 
of injectable products (Table 5-7), reflecting the clinical services (e.g. injections, IV) offered by 
these providers. 
Table 5-7: Antimalarial dosage forms by outlet type 
As % of all antimalarial drugs stocked (N=1259), by dosage form and provider type 
Antimalarial drug dosage form 
Provider type Tablet Injectable Suppository Granule 
n=number of products n=1,096 n=90 n=72 n=1 
Pharmacy/clinical 15.5% 23.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
pharmacies 
Drug stores 13.8% 13.3% 1.4% 0.0% 
Grocery stores 9.6% 8.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
Village shops 14.1% 8.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
Mobile providers 14.4% 35.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
Government providers 32.6% 10.0% 98.6% 100.0% 
All 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 
Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey data, 38 sub-districts, June 2009. 
5.3.4 Perceived drug quality 
Customers' perceptions of drug quality were reported to influence providers' stocking 
decisions. Furthermore, nearly 35% of private providers reported brand reputation to be a 
factor influencing their stocking decisions for antimalarials. During 551s with private 
shopkeepers, the quality of a drug was reported to be signalled by its popularity amongst 
customers such that customers preferred drugs that they knew or had heard of notably on TV, 
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and which they knew were popular amongst other customers. Malarine was the most 
commonly mentioned "high quality" antimalarial drug, a situation that may have reflected the 
social marketing programme which focused on promoting the Malarine brand. By contrast, 
A+M, the public sector version of ASMQ, which was not the object of any promotion campaign 
was reported to be less popular amongst consumers, although there was some evidence of 
drug leakages from public providers to private shops. 
"Doctors write prescriptions for A+M4 so I stock it. But it is less famous than Malarine because 
there is no promotion" (Wholesaler supplying retailers #4 MDRF stratum) 
This was in tune with as data which showed that Malarine accounted for 38.1% of all 
antimalarial volumes and 90% of all ASMQ volumes sold by private providers whilst these 
percentages were 4.2% and 10% for the public sector A+M respectively. 
Customers were also said to prefer antimalarial drugs, and notably Malarine, for which there 
were no counterfeited versions known to be available on the market. This may have reflected 
the effect of a government-led campaign on counterfeit medicines launched on Cambodian 
television at the start of 2009 (Section 2.6). 
During the outlet survey, nearly two-thirds of private providers reported their decisions on 
stocking antimalarials to be influenced by government recommendations, although important 
variations across provider types could be noted: whilst around 48%, 43% and 33% of 
pharmacies/clinical pharmacies, drug stores and mobile providers reported government 
recommendations to influence their stocking decisions respectively, only around 18% of 
grocery stores and village shops did so. However, other antimalarial drugs than Malarine were 
regularly stocked by all types of retailers. Amongst nAMT, chloroquine sales represented the 
largest share of volumes sold, a situation that may have reflected cases treated for P. v 
infections. This was confirmed by a couple of providers who, during SSls, explained that 
Malarine could only be used when P.fwas confirmed by testing patient blood, which led them 
to stock chloroquine. Other factors may have however influenced providers' to stock other 
drugs than Malarine, with the most commonly mentioned reason relating to its undesirable 
side-effects, which were associated with mefloquine. 
"Malarine can only be used when the test clearly shows it is plasmodium, and it has side 
effects, so I also stock artesunate tablets" (Wholesaler supplying retailers #11, MDRF stratum) 
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This was supported by the as data, which showed that artesunate sales volumes accounted for 
6.3% of all antimalarial drug volumes sold and artemisinin monotherapies in general for 8.5%, 
although sales had been banned since November 2008. However, providers who knew about 
the ban reported trying to finish their stocks of artesunate. Others reported being out of stock, 
although unintentionally because artesunate was not available anymore from their supply 
sources. During one interview, a shopkeeper showed us the product list of a manufacturer of 
artesunate dated July 2009, indicating that artesunate was still available for sale. 
A few providers said that the country of manufacture influenced their stocking decision for 
antimalarials, with antimalarial drugs manufactured in European countries, China and Vietnam 
argued to be of higher quality than products produced in Cambodia. 
"Drug quality is poor in the country. Khmer manufacturer do not put the right amount of active 
ingredient in the drug. "(Wholesaler supplying retailers #2, MDRF stratum) 
This was in tune with the as data, which showed that less than 2% of antimalarial drugs had 
been manufactured in Cambodia and around 24% in Asia and 10% in Europe (Table 5-8). 
However, as indicated in Section 5.2, for many antimalarial drugs stocked in private shops 
there was no information on country of manufacture, indicating that the provenance of 
medicines might have had a relatively limited influence on providers' stocking decisions. 
Table 5-8: Country of manufacture of antimalarial drugs surveyed 
As % of all antimalarial drugs stocked surveyed (N=1259) 
Country of manufacture Percentage of antimalarials surveyed 
(%) 
Belgium 1.0% 
Cambodia 1.7% 
Canada 0.1% 
China 11.1% 
Denmark 0.3% 
Germany 0.2% 
India 2.0% 
Switzerland 6.3% 
Thailand 4.2% 
Vietnam 6.3% 
Unknown1 66.8% 
1 mo~tly mcludes ASMQ products distributed by PSI Cambodia before May 2009 and for 
which manufacturer information was not printed on packs. Other products were nAMT and AMT 
(see Section 5.2.6.2). 
Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey data, 38 sub-districts, June 2009. 
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5.3.5 Personal relationship, providers' expertise and reputation 
Customers were said to visit providers they had known of for a long time so that retailers who 
had been in operation for longer were perceived to have more expertise providing them with a 
competitive advantage. 
Interviewee: "Why do you think that some customers choose other businesses instead of yours? 
Respondent: "Because they started their business before I did, more than 7 years ago" (Drug 
shop # 3, moderately accessible, MDRSC stratum) 
"I started working just before the Khmer Rouge regime. I was treating the Khmer Rouge 
[soldiers] during the regime. I participated in surgeries, between 10 to 20 surgeries per day" 
(Wholesaler supplying wholesalers, MDRF stratum) 
As indicated previously, this was backed up by the OS that showed that retailers had been in 
operation for a median of 7 years (IQR 3-16). 
Outlets were run by a median of 2 (IQR 1-2) people, that often included a husband and wife, 
although generally a median of one person (IQR 1-2) was in charge of selling medicines and 
this situation may have contributed to building close relationships with customers. One clinical 
pharmacy owner said that he had recently moved from one village to another and that his 
customers had followed him as they would still seek care at his new cabinet, whilst he had not 
yet attracted new customers. 
Customers were also reported to choose a private shop instead of a government facility due to 
personal relationships. Private shopkeepers argued that they were more pleasant, polite and 
receptive to customer needs than government health workers, and one even associated health 
workers' conduct with that of the Khmer Rouge guerrilla organisation. 
"They [government health workers working at health facilities] are Khmer Rouge, not Kru Pets" 
(Wholesaler supplying retailers #3 MDRSC stratum) 
Furthermore, customers were not only reported to choose a particular provider based on their 
own experience but als~ .. on that of other customers. Reputation within a community was 
reported to be key for increasing demand. 
135 
"Customers come here because of my reputation [ ... J customers make my reputation, it is 
mouth to mouth" (Drug shop # 6, remote market, MDRF stratum) 
Reputation was said to be built on providers' expertise in providing complementary services to 
drug sales, including medical consultation and clinical care services, and Kru Pets working at 
clinical pharmacies or as mobile providers were reportedly perceived to have more expertise 
than other providers, notably grocery and village shopkeepers who voluntarily admitted their 
lack of expertise. 
"/ don't have health qualifications so / only sell drugs here so / have the smallest business of the 
vii/age" (Village shop #1, accessible market, MDRF stratum) 
This was also backed - up by the analysis of retail market shares by provider types presented 
in earlier in this chapter. 
The agency role of grocery and village shopkeepers appeared to be more limited than that of 
other providers: 49.8% (95%ci 35.7-64.0) of grocery shops and 53.9% (95%ci 45.2-62.5) of 
village shops reported deciding which antimalarial customers received whilst 92.6% (95%ci 
89.1-96.1) of mobile providers and 75.9% (95%ci 67.0-84.8) of pharmacies and clinical 
pharmacies did so (Table 5-9). 
Table 5-9: Private providers reporting deciding which antimalarial customers receive 
As % of private providers for whom the information was available, by provider type (N=635) 
Percentage of providers reporting 
deciding which antimalarial drugs 
customers receive (95%ci) 
Pharmacies/Clinical 75.9% 
Pharmacies n=96 (67.0-84.8) 
Drug Shops 73.3% 
n=101 (63.6-83.0) 
Mobile Providers 92.6,% 
n=201 (89.1-96.1) 
Grocery Stores 49.8% 
n=88 (35.7-64.0) 
Village Shops 53.9% 
n=149 (45.2-62.5) 
Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey data, 38 sub-districts, June 2009 
During 551s, private providers described 2 different scenarios in which customers had a written 
prescription for antimalarials at the time of their visit. In the first scenario, one village 
shopkeeper reported that customers would come with prescriptions to buy drugs that the Kru 
Pets from whom they had first sought care had recommended but for which they were out of 
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stock, and that customers would then return to the treatment provider who would administer 
the treatment, in the case of an injection for instance. In the second scenario, a drug 
shopkeeper explained that it was common for health facility staff to have their own private 
shops, write prescriptions to their patients and send them to their shop, generally managed by 
their wives, or to the shop of someone they knew. 
"[Krujpets at the hospitals write prescriptions and send patients to shops that are managed by 
their wives." (Grocery shop #7, remote market MDRF stratum) 
Health qualifications were also reported to signal expertise. During the as, more than three-
quarters of pharmacies/clinical pharmacies, drug shops and mobile providers reported having 
health qualifications compared to just above one quarter of grocery and village shops (Table 5-
10). Compared to all other retailer types, village shops were less likely to report a staff 
member who had completed secondary or even primary education as indicated by the 95% 
confidence interval (Table 5-10). Very few retailers reported employing a pharmacist or 
pharmacist assistant and the most frequently reported qualifications were midwives followed 
by medical assistants. as data showed that a median of 2 people generally worked at private 
outlets, of whom one was sometimes reported, during SSls, to be qualified, generally working 
at the local health facility, or semi-qualified, having received some training just after the fall of 
the Khmer Rouge regime. Some mobile providers also reported having acquired experience in 
the United Nations camps that were set up in Cambodia after the fall of the Khmer Rouge 
regime. 
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Table 5-10: Retailers reporting having a staff member with completed primary and 
secondary education and with health qualifications 
As % of providers for whom the information was available, by provider type (N=644) 
Shopkeepers reporting they Pharmaciesl Drug shops Mobile Grocery Village 
had a staff member ••• clinical n=103 providers stores shops n=153 
pharmacies n=202 n=90 
n=96 
••.• who has completed 98.7% 93.0% 80.5% '84.4% 59.3% 
primary school (96.3-100) (87.8-98.2) (73.0-88.2) (76.2-92.6) (51.0- 67.7) 
••• who has completed 92.0% 80.6% 54.6% 56.1% 31.5% 
secondary school (86.1-97.8) (72.6-88.4) (46.0-63.2) (42.1-70.0) (23.4-39.6) 
•••• with health qualifications 89.6% 
82.4% 75.4% 27.8% 26.2% 
(83.2-96.0) (74.5-90.4) (67.5-83.4) (17.0-38.7) (18.3-34.2) 
••. who is 1.1% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
a pharmacist (0.0-2.7) (0.0-0.0) (0.0-1.5) (0.0-0.0) (0.0-0.0) 
••. who is 0.0% 0.5% 0.4% 0.0% 0.3% 
a pharmacist assistant (0.0-0.0) (0.0-1.5%) (0.0-1.4%) (0.0-0.0) (0.0-1.0%) 
••. who is a nurse 21.6% 
17.5% 21.2% 3.0% 7.7% 
(4.8-46.7) (9.3-25.7) (15.3-27.1) (0.0-6.5) (2.7-12.6) 
••. who is a midwife 25.0% 
22.2% 15.5% 1.9% 3.8% 
(15.0-35.1) (13.0-31.4) (10.1-21.0) (0.0-4.6) (0.0-7.3) 
... who is a medical doctor 15.8% 
2.0% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
(7.8-23.9) (0.0-4.3) (0.0-2.1) (0.0-0.0) (0.0-0.0) 
••• who is a medical assistant 27.5% 
22.0% (10.1- 6.5% 5.8% 1.9% 
(17.8-37.1) 35.7) (3.0-10.0) (0.9-10.6) - (0.0-4.0) 
Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey data, 38 sub-districts, June 2009. 
5.3.6 Provision of cocktail therapy 
During SSls, the provision of cocktail therapy was said to affect customers' choice of provider 
for antimalarial drugs. However, during the as, few providers actually reported selling 
antimalarial drugs as part of cocktails (Table 5-11). The reasons for this are unclear but it is 
possible that providers underreported this practice during the as. During the survey, those 
who said they reported selling antimalarials as part of cocktails reported that cocktails involved 
a mixture of up to 7 different types of drugs, although more generally 3. The most common 
antimalarial drugs included in cocktails were reportedly quinine, followed by chloroquine or 
artesunate, supplemented most frequently by paracetamol or sometimes tetracycline (but 
never in combination with quinine) and finally vitamin C. During SSls, almost all private 
providers reported that providing cocktails was more profitable than selling other drugs only, 
with as data revealing that the median price charged for cocktails for treating malaria was US$ 
1.88 (IQR 0.71-2.82). 
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Table 5-11: Retailers reporting selling antimalarial drugs as part of cocktail therapies for 
treating malaria symptoms 
As % of providers for whom the information was available, by provider type (n=644) 
Percentage of providers who 
reported selling antimalarial 
in cocktail therapy (9s%ci) 
Pharmacies/Clinical Pharmacies 4.4% 
n=96 (0.0-8.2) 
Drug Shops 4.9% 
n=103 (0.0-9.0) 
Mobile Providers 2.5% 
n=202 (0.0-9.4) 
Grocery Stores 3.4% 
n=90 (O.O-S.O) 
Village Shops 4.3% 
n=ls3 (0.0-8.0) 
Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey data, 38 sub-districts, June 2009. 
5.3.7 Provision of blood testing services 
The as data showed that some private shopkeepers stocked RDT or offered microscopy 
services and that it was variable across provider types. The availability of blood testing was 
reportedly higher at outlets providing treatment such as mobile providers, pharmacies/clinical 
pharmacies and government health facilities (Table s-12). 
Table 5-12: Retail availability of blood testing services 
As % of providers for whom the information was available (N=789) 
Percentage of providers Percentage of providers 
offering microscopy services where RDT were 
(9s%ci) available (9s%ci) 
Pharmacy/clinical 
pharmacies 37.8% 57.9% 
n=96 {27.3-48.4} {47.1-68.9} 
Drug stores 32.3% 38.5% 
n=103 {19.8-44.8} {27.6-49.4} 
Mobile providers 44.8% 41.7% 
n=202 (36.7-53.0) (32.9-50.5) 
Grocery stores 3.6% 33.8% 
n=90 {O.O-7.2} {18.0-44.6} 
Village shops 3.7% 8.7% 
n=lsl {0.0-7.1} (4.4-12.9) 
Government facilities 48.9% 86.4% 
n=4s (26.4-71.s) (7s.8-97.0) 
Village Malaria Workers 3.1% 72.1% 
n=102 ," (0.0-7.5) (58.7-8s.6) 
Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey data, 38 sub-districts, June 2009. 
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However, during SSls with antimalarial retailers, the provision of blood testing services was 
rarely reported as a strategy for attracting custom. Customers were reportedly rarely 
interested in receiving a blood test because they were said to claim that they could recognize 
malaria themselves. 
"Customers don 't want to have their blood tested because they know it is malaria, they say 
they got it last year". (Wholesaler supplying retailers #7, MORSC stratum) 
Providers who reported offering blood testing services were probed about their actions when 
customers refused to take a test. Most providers said that they would sell the drugs though a 
couple indicated they would warn customers that if the treatment failed or "something went 
wrong" they would decline any responsibility and would refuse any complaints from 
customers. One provider also reported that in such a case he would sell the antimalarial drug 
but at a lower dose than usual. 
"When customers do not want to take a blood test, I give the drugs but in smaller quantities 
and I warn them [customers] that if something goes wrong or if they are not cured, they cannot 
come back and complain" (Grocery shop #11, remote market, MORF stratum) 
Another reason for not providing blood tests by some shopkeepers was that customers were 
reported to have visited private laboratories before visiting shops so that they already had a 
written prescription confirming malaria infection and would therefore only buy antimalarials. 
One shopkeeper reported not selling ROTs because he said that the regulation forbade taking 
blood at private shops. A couple of shopkeepers also mentioned that the availability of a single 
buffer vial in a box of 10 tests prevented them from selling single ROT units to individual 
patients as the latter could not perform the test alone when back home. 
General shopkeepers admitted being uncomfortable testing blood, a practice perceived to be 
within the remit of providers of treatment services (e.g. injections) only. 
"I don't do blood tests. It is because I do not do treatment, I am not a Kru Pet. I only do 
cocktails" (Village shop #1, accessible market, MORF stratum). 
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Whilst RDT were perceived to be easy to use and to produce fast results, their accuracy was 
questioned and preference was given to microscopy services, perceived to provide more 
precise results. 
"I stocked 1V1alacheck before; I had received training from PSI. But I stopped stocking it because 
now there is a clinical pharmacy with a microscope in the area" (Grocery shop #7, remote 
market, MDRSC stratum). 
One clinical pharmacy owner argued that RDT were only effective for detecting severe malaria 
cases whilst another one indicated that RDT, such as Malacheck, could only detect P.f 
parasites, which was reported to be a challenge as patients could be infected by other parasite 
types. However, microscopy services were likely to require more expertise than RDT, creating 
barriers for untrained shopkeepers to test blood. This was corroborated by the OS report 
which showed that microscopy services tended to be less common at grocery and village shops 
than at other outlets (Section 2.6)(ACTwatch Group, 2009b). 
"Only my husband uses the microscope, he was trained when he was working for the 
Government" (Pharmacy/clinical pharmacy # 9, accessible market, Phnom Penh). 
During SSls, some retailers also reported frequent RDT stock-outs. 
"I have problems with the availability of tests. I don't know why but sometimes I cannot buy 
tests. I just heard from my supplier that it was because of a problem with manufacturing 
capacity" (Mobile Provider # 2, accessible market, MDRF stratum). 
5.3.8 Offering credit 
During the outlet survey, 40.5% of all providers reported they had offered credit to 
antimalarial drug customers during the month preceding the survey, with a significantly larger 
percentage of mobile providers doing so compared to other provider types (Table 5-13). The 
most frequently mentioned customer types to which credit was reportedly given included 
. people who could not afford (22.0% of providers), people known to the provider (12.0%) and 
regular customers (3.5%). 
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Table 5-13: Retailers who reported offering credit to antimalarial customers 
As % of all providers for whom the information was available (N=627) 
Percentage of outlets who reported offering credit to 
antimalarial customers in the past month {95%ci} 
Pharmacy/Clinical Pharmacy 25.7% 
n=94 {16.4-35.1} 
Drug Store 27.4% 
n=99 {17.5-37.3} 
Mobile Provider 58.4% 
n=199 {50.4-66.4} 
Grocery Store 35.7% 
n=86 {21.6-49.8} 
Village Shop 37.8% 
n=149 {29.5-46.2} 
Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey data, 38 sub-dlstncts, June 2009. 
Yet during SSls, almost all providers who reported providing credit said that it was limited to 
customers that they had known for a long time. Some respondents said they did not offer 
credit to customers in general because of the challenge of being reimbursed. Several providers 
who offered credit indicated that customers sometimes paid them back after many months or 
even years and, at times, never so that default payments reportedly led to large sums of 
money lost. 
"Bad debts are an important cost, around 4 million riel [around US$ 900] per year lost" {Mobile 
provider # 8, remote market, M DRF stratum} 
In summary, SSls with providers suggested that malaria treatment was highly differentiated 
across providers, notably between private shops and government providers. Consumers were 
said to prefer private commercial retailers over public health facilities because the former 
were more conveniently located, with some providing door-to-door services; available at any 
time of day and night; and offered a more courteous and reliable source of malaria treatment. 
Customers were perceived to rely on their personal experience and when they had gained 
positive experiences, they remained loyal to these providers. Reputation within the 
community was also reported to be key for increasing demand. Reputation appeared to be 
built on providers' length of operation in a market and perceived experience in treating 
.malaria. Customers were said to prefer Malarine because of its perceived high quality and 
popularity, creating stocking incentives for providers. However, Malarine's reported side 
effects were said to lead customers to choose other drugs, notably monotherapies. Some 
providers therefore reported that they continued stocking artemisinin monotherapies even 
though they knew that sales of such products were forbidden. There was some evidence that 
cheaper products and services available locally attracted customers, including when these 
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were provided free of charge by village malaria workers. The provision of cocktail drugs was 
also reported as a profitable activity that attracted custom, although during the as few 
providers reported offering malaria treatment in cocktail form. The provision of blood testing 
services was rarely reported as a strategy for attracting custom for antimalarial drugs although 
it was clear that microscopy services and RDT were available from many outlets. Overall, 
microscopy services were reported to require training and expertise and, whilst RDT were 
perceived to be easy to use, they were said to be less precise for confirming malaria infection. 
Finally, credit facilities were restricted to customers known to providers but were also 
sometimes made available to those ,who could not afford treatment, despite the risks of 
payment defaults. 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the range of retail providers and antimalarial drugs available in the retail sector 
was described and their relative importance assessed. The retail market was defined from an 
economic lens and market concentration by provider and product types, market accessibility 
and malaria transmission risk were assessed. Market contestability as perceived by private 
shopkeepers was explored and the degree of product differentiation and nature of non-price 
competition within the retail market were analysed. The structure and operations of private 
retailers are likely to be shaped by the structure of the distribution chain and conduct of their 
suppliers, which are analysed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE PRIVATE COMMERCIAL SECTOR 
DISTRIBUTION CHAIN FOR ANTIMALARIAL DRUGS 
6.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter, the structure of the private commercial sector distribution chain for 
antimalarial drugs is described and the importance and nature of product differentiation and 
non-price competition is assessed for different levels of the chain. In Section 6.2, the 
distribution chain for antimalarial drugs is mapped, wholesalers' characteristics and the range 
of products stocked are presented and concentration and contestability at different levels of 
the chain are assessed. In Section 6.3, the importance and nature of product differentiation 
and non-price competition in the distribution chain for antimalarial drugs are considered. In 
this Chapter, we use quantitative data from the ACTwatch Outlet Survey (OS) and Supply Chain 
Survey (SCS) and qualitative data collected during semi-structured interviews (SSls) with 
retailers and wholesalers. 
6.2 Structure of the distribution chain 
This section describes the structure of the distribution chain serving the retail markets 
presented in Chapter 5. 
6.2.1 Identifying wholesale suppliers 
Wholesalers who supplied antimalarials directly to retailers were identified using OS data on 
retailers' top 2 supply sources for antimalarial drugs, focusing on a random sample of 20 sub-
districts. Retailers reported a total of 322 supply sources, of which 91 (28%) were obvious 
duplicates (a source named by more than one shopkeeper). Uncertainties around the 231 
other suppliers' business name or location were clarified by calling wholesale outlets, and in 
the absence of contact numbers, advice on location was sought from local informants, 
including PSI staff members and data collectors who had participated in the OS data collection. 
Through this process, an additional 65 (20%) duplicates were identified. For 39 (12%) supply 
sources, there was too little information on either business name or location for identification, 
so these sources were removed. A total of 127 (39%) suppliers remained and formed the 
sample of terminal wholesalers. Out of the 127 terminal level wholesalers sampled, 92 were 
invited to participate in the supply chain survey (SCS), of which 89 were successfully 
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interviewed and 3 refused, 18 were duplicates, 5 were not eligible (stocking neither 
antimalarials nor rapid diagnostic tests for malaria (ROT) at the time of the interview or in the 
preceding 3 months), 2 could not be interviewed for other reasons and 10 were not found 
(Table 6-1). All 89 terminal wholesalers who were successfully interviewed were asked about 
their top two supply sources for antimalarials. 
A sample of 26 unique wholesalers, referred to as intermediate-1 wholesalers as they supplied 
terminal wholesalers, were identified, comprising 12 wholesalers who had already been 
identified at the terminal level (as they also supplied retailers directly), and 14 new 
wholesalers. Of these 14 wholesalers, 6 were successfully interviewed, 2 refused, 4 were not 
eligible and 2 could not be interviewed for other reasons (Table 6-1). All 6 successfully 
interviewed intermediate wholesalers were asked about their two top supply sources for 
antimalarials. 
Two intermediate-2 wholesalers were identified, both of whom had already been identified at 
previous levels and who had reported antimalarial manufacturers to be their top two supply 
sources. To this effect, the top of the chain was deemed to have been reached. 
Table 6-1: Supply chain survey data collection process 
Levels of Initial Number Number Number Number Number not Number Number of 
operation Sample identified of of not interviewed not interviews 
Size at refusals duplicates eligible2 for other found completed 
previous 1 reasons3 
level(s) 
Total - - 5 18 9 4 10 95 
Terminal 127 - 3 18 5 2 10 89 
Intermediate-1 26 12 2 0 4 2 0 6 
Intermediate-2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 
1 ... l. Wholesalers Included In the initial sample size and found to··be duplicates dUring data collection. Outlets not stockmg 
antimalarials or ROT at the time of the interview or in the preceding 3 months. 3 At terminal level, 1 wholesaler was 
closed at the time of visit and 1 wholesaler had moved. At intermediate-1 level, one wholesaler had closed down and 
one did not speak English or Khmer. 4 This is the top of the chain, defined as the level at which wholesalers who were 
reported to supply intermediate-1 wholesalers mentioned manufacturers to be their two top supply sources for 
antimalarials. Source: ACTwatch Supply Chain Survey in 20 sub-districts, August-November 2009 
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6.2.2 Mapping the distribution chain for antimalarial drugs 
The overall structure of the private commercial sector distribution chain for antimalarials in 
Cambodia is depicted in Figures 6-1 and 6-2. As described in Chapter 4, the structure of the 
distribution chain was explored by classifying wholesalers into mutually-exclusive categories 
(MECs) defined by the levels they supplied, whilst for analytical' purposes, wholesalers were 
grouped into 2 broader and overlapping categories, with one including wholesalers supplying 
retailers and one wholesalers supplying wholesalers. Table 6-2 shows the relationship between 
MECs and analytical categories. 
Figure 6-1: Representation of the antimalarial Figure 6-2: Representation of the antimalarial 
distribution chain showing interactions between distribution chain showing the overlap 
levels by mutually exclusive wholesaler category between wholesaler categories used for 
~ analysis __ MANUFACTURER [ MANUFACT U RER ~ ----- --
-------------
INTi WS 
TERMINALWS 
RETAILER 
WS is for wholesaler; INT is for intermediate 
WhoIeeaIe ... 
SUPPLYI 
WHOLESALERS 
I 
Wholesalers 
SUPPLYING 
RETAILERS 
(83.2%) 
R E TA ILE R 
Source: ACTwatch Supply Chain Survey in 20 sub-districts, August-November 2009 
Table 6-2: Relationship between mutually exclusive and analytical categories of wholesalers 
ANALYTICAL 
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE CATEGORIES OF WHOLESALERS CATEGORIES OF 
WHOLESALERS 
Total 
Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply 
Retailers Retailers Terminal Intermediate Intermediate, Retailers WS 
& WS & Terminal Terminal WS 
Terminal WS & Retail 
. 
WS 
Percentage of 100% 83.2% 9.5% 5.3% 1.0% 1.0% 93.7% 16.8% 
WS 
(Number of WS) (95) (79) (9) (5) (1) (1) (89) (16) 
WS is for wholesaler I. I I I I II· • • . I L ____ ~ _____ ~ _____ ~ ____________ I 
Source: ACTwatch Supply Chain Survey in 20 sub-dist ricts, August-November 2009 
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The private commercial sector distribution chain had a pyramid shape with a particularly broad 
base and narrow top: wholesalers were concentrated at the lowest level of the chain, with 
83.2% supplying retailers only, 10.5% supplying wholesalers and retailers and 6.3% wholesalers 
only. Overall, a small proportion of wholesalers reported they imported antimalarial drugs 
and/or bought directly from drug manufacturers (Table 6-3). Suppliers operated at 3 
overlapping levels of operation (intermediate-2 wholesalers, intermediate-l and terminal 
wholesalers), with nearly all wholesalers (93.7%) supplying retailers and very few supplying 
wholesalers only (6.3%). 
Table 6-3: Wholesalers' buying practices 
As % of all wholesalers interviewed 
Import antimalarial drugs 
Buy directly from antimalarial drug 
manufacturers 
% 
(N) 
% 
(N) 
WHOLESALER CATEGORIES 
ALL 
SUPPLY SUPPLY 
WHOLESALERS RETAILERS 
3.2% 18.8% 2.3% 
(95) (16) (89) _. 
5.3% 18.8% 3.4% 
(95) (16) (89) 
Source: ACTwatch Supply Chain Survey in 20 sub-districts, August-November 2009 
SSls with wholesalers importing antimalarial drugs revealed that they preferred bypaSSing 
wholesalers and supplying retailers directly in order to avoid intermediaries' mark-ups being 
added on top of their products' prices. 
"We try to avoid selling to other wholesalers because they add their margin and then the retail 
price of our product goes up [ ... ]"(Wholesaler supplying retailers #1, Phnom Penh) 
Wholesalers who imported antimalarials never reported exchanging products with one 
another. Vertical integration did not seem to !7xist as none of the retailers or wholesalers 
reported owning other retail or wholesale businesses. 
Intersectoral transactions sometimes occurred between retailers with private shops reporting 
'public (military forces and public health facilities) or nongovernmental (NGO and research 
institutes) suppliers as one of their top two supply sources for antimalarial drugs. However, no 
public facilities reported a private wholesaler as one of their top suppliers. 
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6.2.3 Wholesalers' characteristics 
Wholesalers had been in operation for a median of 10 years (IQR 6-16) and were relatively 
small businesses as they had a median of 2 workers (IQR 2-3), although wholesalers supplying 
wholesalers tended to be slightly bigger with 3 workers (IQR 2-4) (Table 6-4). Wholesalers 
stocked a median of 2 (lQR 2-4) different antimalarial products and frequently other consumer 
goods (Table 6-4) with 22% of wholesalers reporting selling toiletries, 18% mobile airtime, 
8.5% cigarettes, 6% groceries and 6% household goods. 
Table 6-4: Years in operation, wholesale outlet size and range of products sold 
WHOLESALER CATEGORIES 
SUPPLY SUPPLY 
CHARACTERISTICS ALL 
WHOLESALERS RETAILERS 
Years in operation median 10 10 10 
IQR 6-16 8-16 6-16 
(N) (89) (14) (83) 
.. _-----_. .................... " ... "." .... " ................................... 
Number of people median 2 3 2 
working at outlet IQR 2-3 2-4 2-3 
(N) (94) (16) (88) 
. .. .. , ................................... _ ............ " ................. 
Sells other products in % 39.0% 31.3% 39.3% 
addition to (N) (95) (16) (89) 
pharmaceuticals1 
• 1 IQR IS for inter-quartile range, other products Included tolletnes, mobile air time, 
cigarettes, prepared food/ groceries and/or household goods. Source: ACTwatch Supply 
Chain Survey in 20 sub-districts, August-November 2009 
Most (93.7%) wholesalers reported selling antimalarials directly to patients/care takers, with a 
higher proportion doing so amongst wholesalers supplying retailers compared to wholesalers 
supplying wholesalers (95.5% vs. 81.3%) (Table 6-5). 
There was some evidence of private sector sales to public retail outlets, with for example 
village malaria workers (VMWs) and public hospitals mentioned by private wholesalers to be 
customers for antimalarial drugs (Table 6-5). However, as indicated in the previous section, 
private wholesalers were never reported by government providers to be one of their top 2 
suppliers for antimalarial drugs, indicating that private sector sales to public outlets were 
unlikely to have been the norm. 
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Table 6-5: LVholesalers' customers for antimalarial drugs 
As % of wholesalers interviewed for whom the information was available 
WHOLESALER CATEGORIES 
SUPPLY SUPPLY 
ANTIMALARIAL CUSTOMER TYPES ALL 
WHOLESALERS RETAILERS 
Patients/ ca re-ta kers % 93.7% 81.3% 95.5% 
(N) (95) (16) (89) 
Retail outlets 
... 
Retail pharmacies % 30.5% 50.0% 28.1% 
(N) (95) (16) (89) 
Depots A and/or B % 17.0% 43.8% 13.5% 
(N) (94) (16) (89) 
Drug shops % 40.7% 37.5% 40.5% 
(N) (91) (16) (89) 
Cabinets % 43.2% 62.5% 40.5% 
(N) (95) (16) (89) 
.. _-------------, ... 
Private health facilities % 10.5% 37.5% 9.0% 
(N) (95) (16) (89) 
Franchised Sun Quality Health Clinics % 3.3% 6.7% 3.7% 
(N) (92) (15) (89) 
... 
Grocery stores % 26.9% 25.0% 27.0% 
(N) (93) (16) (89) 
Mobile vendors % 16.1% 25.0% 16.9% 
(N) (93) (16) (89) 
Public hospitals % 12.6% 31.3% 11.2% 
(N) (95) (16) (89) 
.. _--_. 
Public health centres % 10.5% 25.0% 9.9% 
(N) (95) (16) (89) 
Village malaria workers % 14.9% 18.8% 15.7% 
(N) (94) (16) (89) 
NGO/mission clinics % 7.4% 18.8% 5.6% 
(N) (95) (16) (89) 
Wholesale outlets 
Wholesale pharmacies % 17.9% 43.8% 14.6% 
(N) (95) (16) (89) 
General wholesale businesses % 9.6% 18.8% 9.0% 
(N) (94) (16) (89) 
Customers in other countries % 1.1% 0.0% 1.5% 
(N) (93) (15) (78) 
1 .. NGO IS for non-governmental organisation. These Include clinical pharmaCies and any other outlets 
~roviding inpatient care (but larger than cabinets). Source: ACTwatch Supply Chain Survey in 20 sub-
districts, August-November 2009 
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Data on wholesalers' health qualifications, training and knowledge are presented in Table 6-6. 
Around 63% of all wholesalers reported employing a member of staff with health 
qualifications, with the most common qualifications reported to be midwives (34%), followed 
by medical doctors, whilst 15% reported employing a member of staff with pharmacist 
qualifications. In addition, 60% of wholesalers reporting employing staff who participated in in-
service training related to malaria treatment (Table 6-6). 
Wholesalers' knowledge of the recommended first line treatment for uncomplicated P.! was 
high: 76.3% of all wholesalers reported ASMQ to be recommended by government with this 
knowledge being more common amongst wholesalers supplying higher levels of the chain 
(81.2% of wholesalers supplying higher levels compared to 74.7% of wholesalers supplying 
retailers) (Table 6-6). ACT was identified as the most effective treatment for P.f malaria in 
adults by 70% of wholesalers supplying higher levels and 87% of wholesalers supplying 
retailers. However, ACT was less frequently mentioned as the most effective treatment for the 
treatment of P.! malaria in children, with nearly 74% of all wholesalers doing so (Table 6-6). 
Table 6-6: Wholesalers' knowledge, qualifications and training 
As % of wholesalers interviewed for whom the information was available 
WHOLESALER CATEGORIES 
HEALTH QUALIFICATIONS, TRAINING AND 
KNOWLEDGE ALL SUPPLY 
SUPPLY 
WHOLESALERS RETAIL LEVEL 
Employ a member of staff with health % 63.4% 50.0% 65.5% 
qualifications (N) (93) (16) (87) 
........................ .. _--
Employ staff who participated in in- % 59.8% 62.5% 61.6% 
service training related to malaria (N) (92) (16) (86) 
treatment 
................... " .... 
Identify an ACT as the most effective % 86.1% 70.0% 87.0% 
medication for treating uncomplicated (N) (72) (10) (69) 
Pf malaria in adults 
.... _ ................. 
Identify an ACT as the most effective % 73.6% 77.8% 72.0% 
medication for treating uncomplicated (N) (53) (9) (50) 
Pf malaria in children " 
.. _._ ................. 
Correctly identify the government % 76.3% 81.3% 74.7% 
recommended first line treatment for (N) (93) (16) (87) 
uncomplicated Pfmalaria 
~ource: ACTwatch Supply Chain Survey in 20 sub-districts, August-November 2009 
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6.2.4 Range of antimalarials and ROT stocked 
Of the 95 wholesalers interviewed, around 5% did not stock any antimalarial drugs at the time 
of the survey but reported stocking antimalarials during the 3 months preceding the survey. 
Artemisinin combination therapy (ACT) availability was relatively high with 88.4% of all 
wholesalers stocking it at the time of the survey and somewhat higher amongst wholesalers 
supplying retailers (89.9%) than those supplying wholesalers (81.3%) (Table 6-7). The ACT 
artesunate and mefloquine (ASMQ) was stocked by 85.3% of all wholesalers and Malarine, the 
socially marketed first line therapy in the private commercial sector, by 81% of all wholesalers. 
Overall, 75.8% reported having at least one ACT in stock throughout the 3 months preceding 
the interview (Table 6-7). 
Non-artemisinin monotherapy (nAMT) was stocked by around 34% of all wholesalers and 
artemisinin monotherapy (AMT) by around 27% of all wholesalers, although the importation, 
distribution and sale of the latter had been banned in November 2008. As for ROT, 86% of all 
wholesalers stocked ROTs and 76% Malacheck, the socially marketed product (Table 6-7). 
Table 6-7: Antimalarial and ROT wholesale availability 
As % of wholesalers interviewed 
WHOLESALER CATEGORIES 
AVAILABILITY ALL SUPPLY SUPPLY 
WHOLESALERS RETAILERS 
Had antimalarials in stock % 94.7% 87.5% 96.6% 
(N) (95) (16) (89) 
.. . ............................................................................. 
Had ACT in stock % 88.4% 81.3% 89.9% 
(N) (95) (16) (89) 
.............................................................................. 
Always had at least one ACT in % 75.8% 75.0% 76.4% 
stock over the past 3 monthsl (N) (95) (16) (89) 
........................................ "." ................................. 
Had AMT in stock % 27.4% 25.0% 28.0% 
(N) " (95) (16) (89) 
................. " .......................................................... , 
Had nAMT in stock % 33.7% 31.3% 34.8% 
(N) (95) (16) (89) 
.............................................................................. 
Had RDT in stock % 86.3% 87.5% 87.6% 
(N) (95) (16) (89) 
ACT is for artemisinin combination therapy; AMT for artemisinin monotherapy; nAMT for non artemisinin 
monotherapy; RDT for rapid diagnostic test for malaria. 1lndicator calculated as [(Number of wholesalers with ACT in 
stock) - (Number of wholesalers with stock-out in past 3 months) + (Number of wholesalers who stocked other ACT 
than those surveyed during the period of stock out)]/ (Total Number of wholesalers surveyed. Source: ACTwatch 
Supply Chain Survey in 20 sub-districts, August-November 2009 
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In terms of the importance of first-line treatments for malaria in relation to other antimalarials 
within the distribution chain: ASMQ accounted for 63% of all antimalarial drugs stocked and 
93% of all ACT stocked, with Malarine accounting for 58% of all antimalarials stocked and 86% 
of all ACT stocked; finally, chloroquine accounted for 13% of all antimalarial drugs stocked and 
for 77% of all nAMT. As for ROT, Malacheck represented 89% of all ROT stocked. 
6.2.5 Antimalarial and ROT sales volumes 
Antimalarial sales volumes for the week preceding the survey appeared to be low: amongst all 
wholesalers, the median number of adult equivalent treatment doses (AETOs) sold was 2 (IQR 
0,10) for ACT and 0 (IQR 0,0) for both AMT and nAMT (Table 6-8). When restricting the 
calculation to wholesalers who stocked each corresponding antimalarial category, volumes 
were higher with 2.1 (IQR 0,10) doses of ACT, 0.4 (0,10) of AMT and 5.8 (IQR 0,16.7) doses of 
nAMT reported to have been sold over the week preceding the survey (Table 6-9). 
Several factors may have contributed to these somewhat surprisingly low wholesale sales 
volumes. First, wholesalers reported selling antimalarials to end-users and they shared many 
common characteristics with retailers. As a result, their business many have overall not been 
very different from that of retailers. Second, malaria prevalence is relatively low in Cambodia 
so sales volumes may just be lower than one would expect to observe at wholesale outlets. 
Third, sales volumes were recalled for the week preceding the survey, which was implemented 
between August and November 2009 and antimalarial wholesalers may have sold the bulk of 
their stocks at the start of the malaria season in Mayor June, implying that the recall period 
may have been too short for capturing representative wholesale sales. Alternatively, data 
collection may have taken place too late in relation to the wholesale stocking cycle. However, 
asking wholesalers to recall their sales volumes over a longer period than a week would have 
likely introduced recall bias and/or many non-responses (the recall issue is assessed in Chapter 
8 of this thesis). 
152 
Table 6-8: Sales volumes amongst all wholesalers 
In adult equivalent treatment dose (AETO) for antimalarials and in test unit for· ROT, 
among all wholesalers with sales volume dati2 
WHOLESALER CATEGORIES 
ANTIMALARIAL CATEGORIES ALL SUPPLY SUPPLY 
Formulation N=93 WHOLESALERS RETAILER 
N=15 N=83 
ACT Median 2.0 2.0 2.0 
(All products were tablets) IQR 0.0-10.0 0.0-10.0 0.0-10.0 
AMT Median 0.0 0.0 0.0 
All IQR 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 
.................................................. 
AMT Median 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tablet IQR 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 
..... " ......................................... .. " ................... ............ , ...... " ......................... 
AMT Median 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Injectable IQR 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 
nAMT Median 0.0 0.0 0.0 
All IQR 0.0-0.0 0.0-2.0 0.0-0.0 
......................................... _ .... ..................... _ ................................................. 
nAMT Median 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tablet IQR 0.0-0.0 0.0-2.0 0.0-0.0 
............ , ................................. ,. ................................................................. " .... 
nAMT Median 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Injectable IQR 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 - 0.0-0.0 
ROT Median 0.0 10.0 0.0 
IQR 0.0-20.0 0.0-30.0 0.0-20.0 
ACT is for artemisinin combination therapy; AMT is for artemisinin monotherapy; nAMT is for non 
artemisinin monotherapy; ROT is for rapid diagnostic test for malaria. IQR is for inter-quartile range; Source: 
ACTwatch Supply Chain Survey in 20 sub-districts, August-November 2009 
32For antimalarials: there were a total of 93 wholesalers with antimalarial sales volume data (reported or imputed 
or set as null if did not stock). Note on the imputation process: during the study, 100 wholesalers were identified, of 
which 95 were interviewed and 5 refused (Table 6-1). Out of the 95 interviewed, 3 wholesalers interrupted the 
interview before the drug inventory so sales volumes were set as missing for all antimalarial categories. Out of the 5 
wholesalers that refused, 1 did not stock any antimalarial (only ROT) so sales volumes were set as zero, and for the 
other 4 wholesalers who stocked antimalarials sales volumes were set as missing. For 4 outlets that did not stock 
antimalarials at the time of the survey but stocked ROT only, sales volumes were set as zero for all antimalarial 
categories. For ROTs, there were 94 wholesalers with sales volumes and no imputation was required because sales 
volumes were never missi~g for those who participated in the inventory. Sales volumes were however set as 
missing for 6 wholesalers, including 5 who had refused to participate in the SCS and who stocked ROT and 1 who 
interrupted the interview before the inventory. At the level supplying retail outlets, median sales volumes 
estimated on the sample of 85 wholesalers for which volumes were not missing. 
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Table 6-9: Sales volumes amongst wholesalers with antimalarials in stock 
In adult equivalent treatment dose (AETO) for antimalarials and in test unit for· ROT, 
amongst wholesalers stocking corresponding antimalarial drug category/ROT at the time of the survey. 
WHOLESALER CATEGORIES 
ANTIMALARIAL CATEGORIES ALL SUPPLY SUPPLY 
WHOLESALERS RETAIL LEVEL 
ACT Median 2.1 3.0 2.2 
All IQR 0.0-10.0 0.0-10.0 0.0-10.0 
(N) (84) (13) (80) 
... _ ....... _ ................................................... 
AMT Median 0.4 0.0 0.8 
All IQR 0.0-10.0 0.0-0.42 0.0-11.3 
(N) (24) (4) (23) 
..................................................... _ ..•...... ........................ . ................. "" .. "" ....• " ...................... , .. 
nAMT Median 5.8 2.6 6.7 
All IQR 0.0-16.7 0.0-83.3 0.0-16.7 
(N) (32) (5) (31) 
................................................................. 
ROT Median 0.0 10.0 0.0 
IQR 0.0-20.0 0.0-30.0 0.0-20.0 
(N) (81) (13) (75) 
ACT is for artemisinin combination therapy; AMT is for artemisinin monotherapy; nAMT is for non 
artemisinin monotherapy; ROT is for Rapid diagnostic test for malaria. IQR is for inter-quartile range; N is 
the number of wholesalers at a given level who stocked antimalarials for corresponding antimalarial 
category Source: ACTwatch Supply Chain Survey in 20 sub-districts, August-November 2009 
6.2.6 Concentration in the distribution chain 
During SSls with wholesalers, most respondents reported facing competition from wholesalers 
located in their district or their province whilst some said that wholesalers located further 
away also competed, notably when the latter delivered antimalarials to retailers. In the 
context where many wholesalers operated at different levels of the chain, it was not possible 
to use traditional measures (e.g. HHI) for assessing concentration at terminal and intermediate 
levels of the chain. 
An alternative approach for assessing concentra'tion in the distribution chain was to look at the 
number of times each supplier is mentioned. A limitation to this approach within our study 
was that data were collected on retailers and wholesalers' top 2 supply sources by name, 
which could have made the market look artificially concentrated if retailers and wholesalers 
also used other suppliers. We investigated the potential of using data on the number of 
mentions for assessing concentration drawing on data on the total number of suppliers that 
each retailer and wholesaler reported buying antimalarial drugs from during the as and SCS, 
supplemented by information on the name of each supplier they used collected during 551 with 
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retailers and wholesalers. as and SCS data showed that the majority (71%) of retailers 
reported having a single supplier for antimalarial drugs whilst 23% reported using 2 suppliers 
and 6% 3 or more suppliers. Similarly, 63% of wholesalers reported using a single supplier for 
antimalarial drugs, 26% two suppliers and 11% three of more (Figure 6-3). 
This was in tune with data collected during SSls, where both retailers and wholesalers reported 
using one or two suppliers only for antimalarial drugs. 
"/ always buy from the same supplier" (Mobile provider #2, accessible market, MDRF stratum) 
"/ have always used the same 2 suppliers since / started, 8 years ago" (Wholesaler supplying 
retailers #1, MDRF stratum) 
In cases where retailers and wholesalers reported using 2 suppliers, they commonly 
mentioned the non-governmental organisation Population Services International in Cambodia 
(PSI Cambodia) and a local supplier operating within their district or province. Reasons for this 
will be explored later in this chapter under product differentiation and non-price competition 
section. 
1SS 
Figure 6-3: Retailers and wholesalers l supply sources for antimalarials 
As % of retailers and wholesalers interviewed 
Retailers1 
1% 
• Missing data 
• Reported having a 
single supplier 
• Reported having two 
suppliers 
Reported having 3 or 
more suppliers 
Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey in 38 sub-districts, June 2009 
l From the OS data, it was unclear why for 5% of retailers' supply sources data were missing. This may have reflected 
refusals from retailers to disclose the number of antimalarial suppliers they used or retailers may have forgotten or 
perhaps did not know from how many suppliers they had bought antimalarials from, especially if respondents were 
not the person in charge of buying antimalarials 
Wholesalers 
• Reported having a single 
supplier 
• Reported having two 
suppliers 
Reported having 3 or 
more suppliers 
Source: ACTwatch Supply Chain Survey in 20 sub-districts, August to November 2009 
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In view of these findings, concentration within the distribution chain was explored using data 
on the number of times each unique supplier was mentioned at a given level of the chain. 
Table 6-10 presents the results. The level supplying wholesalers was relatively more 
concentrated than the level supplying retailers. The 89 unique terminal wholesalers that 
supplied retailers were drawn from a total of 167 mentions, with 87 (97.8%) unique suppliers 
accounting each for less than 5% of all mentions (or together for 84% of all mentions) whilst 2 
(2.2%) wholesalers accounted each for more than 5% of all mentions (or together for 16% of 
all mentions). These 2 suppliers who each accounted for more than 5% of all retailers' 
mentions were PSI Cambodia that distributed the socially marketed subsidized ACT and RDT 
and one private commercial wholesaler During the SCS, the 16 unique intermediate 
wholesalers (that supplied terminal and intermediate wholesalers) were drawn from a total of 
137 mentions, with 14 (87.5%) wholesalers accounting each for less than 5% of all mentions 
(or together for 26.3% of all mentions) whilst 2 (12.5%) wholesalers accounted each for more 
than 5% of all mentions (or together for 73.7% of all mentions) (Table 6-10). PSI Cambodia and 
the private commercial wholesaler were also those 2 suppliers with more than 5% of all 
mentions at higher levels. Overall, they accounted for 39.0% of all mentions, with PSI 
Cambodia accounting for 35.1% of all mentions. 
Table 6-10: Concentration in the distribution chain for antimalarial drugs 
Distribution chain Number of Number of Number of Number of 
level suppliers mentions at suppliers with suppliers with 
interviewed previous level each < 5% of each ~ 5% of all 
all mentions1 mentions1 
Supply wholesalers 16 137 14 (26.3%) 2 (73.7%) 
Supply retailers 89 167 87 (84%) 2 (16%) 
As % of all mentions accounted by these suppliers Out of 89 terminal wholesalers who supplied retailers directly, 
67.4% were mentioned once, 29.2% were mentioned 2 to 4 times, 2.2% 8 or 9 times and 1.1% 18 times. Out of the 
16 intermediate-l wholesalers (those supplying terminal wholesalers), 75% of intermediate-l suppliers accounted 
for 1.2% of all mentions whereas 12.5% of intermediate-i" suppliers accounted for 76.2% of mentions. Out of the 2 
intermediate-2 wholesalers (those supplying intermediate-l wholesalers), 1 accounted for 92.3% of all mentions 
whilst the other one for the remaining 7.7% of all mentions. 
Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey data for 20 sub-districts, June 2009 and ACTwatch Supply Chain Survey data, 
August-November 2009. 
Finally, the relative importance of different antimalarial types flowing down the distribution 
chain was assessed by using sales volumes data collected for each antimalarial in stock at the 
time of the survey. We found that 57.4% of wholesalers who sold antimalarials the week 
before the survey reported the ACT ASMQ as their top selling antimalarial, 29.6% chloroquine, 
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7.4% artemether, 1.9% the ACT dihydroartemisinin and piperaquine, and 1.9% the ACT 
artemisinin and piperaquine and primaquine. Whilst these figures cannot be extrapolated to 
market shares per se, they provide a feel of the relative "popularity" of providers and products 
in the distribution chain. They indicated the overall predominance of PSI Cambodia, notably at 
the level supplying wholesalers, and of the recommended first line ACT ASMQ. 
6.2.7 Barriers to market entry and exit 
Wholesalers reported regulatory requirements to be the major obstacle for opening a drug 
business, followed by the lack of capital and access to capital, and lack of experience in running 
a drug business. 
Many wholesalers appeared to have circumvented regulatory obstacles, even though during 
the SCS, around 82% of all businesses reported they had been visited by a pharmaceutical 
inspector in the year preceding the survey (Table 6-11). Around 39% of all wholesalers 
reported having a drug outlet license allowing them to wholesale pharmaceutical drugs (Le. 
pharmacy license), although this proportion was 66.7% at the level supplying wholesalers and 
36.8% at that supplying retailers. The possession of a license did not imply that it was currently 
valid. Less than 30% of all wholesale outlets had any up-to-date licenses and this proportion 
varied across chain levels with around 44% of wholesalers supplying wholesalers having an up 
to date license compared to 27% of those supplying retailers. Furthermore, only 10% of all 
wholesalers interviewed were observed to have the up-to-date license required to wholesale 
pharmaceuticals. 
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Table 6-11: LlIholesale licensing & inspection 
As % of all wholesalers for whom the 
information was available 
WHOLESALER CATEGORIES 
SUPPLY SUPPLY 
REGISTRATION STATUS ALL 
WHOLESALERS RETAILERS 
Reported having a license allowing % 38.7% 66.7% 36.8% 
wholesale of pharmaceuticals1 (N) (93) (15) (84) 
...................................................................... 
Reported having a license allowing retail % 65.6% 93.3% 63.1% 
of pharmaceuticals2 (N) (90) (15) (84) 
.......................................... , ........................... 
Reported having an import permit % 1.1% 7.1% 0.0% 
(N) (90) (14) (85) 
...................................... ................ , ............ 
Reported having a manufacturer license % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
(N) (92) (16) (86) 
............... .................................................... 
An up-to-date license from the MOH was % 29.5% 43.8% 27.0% 
observed1 (N) (95) (16) (89) 
.................................... ............................... 
An up-to-date general business or trading % 31.6% 52.1% 27.0% 
license was observed (N) (95) (16) (89) 
, ..................................... ............................. 
Reported they had been visited by a % 82.4% 86.7% 81.2% 
pharmaceutical inspector in the past year (N) (91) (15) (85) 
1 . . .. pharmacy license authorlsmg drug outlets to wholesale and retail. 2Pharmacy, depot A or B licenses authorlsmg 
drug outlets to retail only. Of the 95 wholesalers interviewed, 36 reported to have a wholesale license (Le. 
pharmacy license), 58 reported to NOT have a wholesale license, 1 refused to respond to this question. Among the 
36 wholesalers who reported to have a wholesale license, 20 wholesalers displayed this license or showed them to 
interviewers, 16 did not. Of the 20 observed wholesale licenses, only 10 were up-to-date at the time of interview. 
Source: ACTwatch Supply Chain Survey data, August-November 2009. 
Relatively more stringent regulatory barriers were perceived to prevent entry to the import 
market. The first obstacle related to the costs of registering and obtaining an import license 
and clearing customs. At the time of the study, only registered drugs that were registered with 
the Ministry of Health's (MOH) Department of Drug and Food (DDF) could be legally imported 
in Cambodia. Registering a drug required the submission of several documents, including 
documents on drug provenance (marketing authorisation in the country of origin, 
manufacturer contact details and good manufacturing practice -certificate) and qualitative and 
quantitative data on methods of preparation, ingredients, and clinical trial results. The drug 
registration process was reported to cost around US$ 1720 (manufacturer's registration US$ 
1200, drug trade mark registration US$ 50, drug quality control fee US$ 25033, fee to 
registration committee US$ 220). Once a drug was registered, businesses reported that they 
33 US$ 50 paid to the National Laboratory Control for Drug Quality Testing and US$ 200 to the DDF for 
drug registration 
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had to obtain an import permit from the DDF for each shipment, at a cost of US$ 5034• When 
shipments were received, clearing customs required the submission of several other 
documents and the payment of 10% value-added tax (VAT). At times, storage costs at 
sea/airport would also apply. Finally, in addition to these formal fees, informal payments made 
to the authorities were also reported to be important cost components. 
"On top of the shipment value, I have to pay 10% VAT and the rest. If you do not pay "the rest" 
then your shipment will take a long time to clear" (Wholesaler supplying retailers #1, Phnom 
Penh) 
Institutional lags associated with each step of the importing process were said to be major 
hurdles to importing pharmaceutical products. Following regulatory changes in 2009, the time 
to obtain a permit was reported to have generally decreased significantly from 30-45 days to 
1-3 days, depending on the number of permits to be processed by the DDF. However, 
wholesalers reported that this was "in principle" only, as registration could take up to 5 or 6 
months. One respondent said they preferred the previous regulatory system through which it 
was possible to import with a temporary license whilst waiting for the final license. In addition, 
repeat applications required at each shipment were thought to be time-consuming. Obtaining 
customs clearance was also said to be a lengthy process. 
"Sometimes, whilst I wait for authorization, regulatory authorities come with false excuses and 
I have to wait. It is not only at the Ministry of Health, it comes at each stage of the process" 
(Wholesaler supplying wholesalers #2, Phnom Penh). 
The second obstacle to entering the import market was the lack of capital and access to capital 
for running an import business. One importer estimated that setting up a business like his 
would cost around US$ 250,000, with 80% of the total cost going towards buying the initial 
drug stock, and the remainder mainly coveri'ng vehicles and furniture. Another importer 
argued that better access to capital was desperately needed, notably for importers not 
r~ceiving credit from their suppliers. 
34 at the time of the study, this was a new regulation. Under previous regulatory arrangements, a permit 
fee of US$ 80 was payable for a shipment including less than 50 different products and US$ 100 for 
shipment of more than 50 different products. Permits were valid for a period of 6 months. 
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"My supplier does not give me credit so this business needs access to capital. When I import I 
have to pay as much as 30% of the total order value by teletransfer 30 days in advance [ ... J it is 
challenging because in Cambodia banking facilities are weak and there is a high risk of non-
payment". (Wholesaler supplying wholesalers #3, Phnom Penh) 
The lack of capital was reported to be generally addressed with financial contributions from 
drug manufacturers, although it implied vertical restrictions imposed by suppliers on 
importers. For example, one importer explained that as his supplier had contributed to the 
costs of drug registration the minimum order value he could now import from that supplier 
was US$ 200,000. 
"Who pays what of the registration process is negotiated between the manufacturer and the 
importing company. When the manufacturer pays the full cost or a Jarge share of the 
importation cost, it somewhat implies no discount or/and no credit or even restrictions imposed 
by the manufacturer, for example, on the product price or in terms of the minimum value that 
can be purchased". (Wholesaler supplying wholesalers #2, Phnom Penh). 
Following on the regulatory requirements and associated costs described above, importers 
were generally in some sort of sole distributionship agreement with overseas suppliers or in 
some kind of tacit "gentlemen's agreement" with other drug importers such that each product 
was said to be imported by a single company. 
Perhaps more importantly, the third and last barrier to entering the import market was related 
to the size of the market for malaria treatment in Cambodia, with the provision of malaria 
treatment perceived to be dominated by government providers who dispensed antimalarial 
drugs free of charge to patients and by the social marketing programme of subsidized ACT in 
the private sector implemented by PSI Cambodia. 
"We do not stock the ACT artesunate and mefloquine because it is already !Jold by one supplier . 
. It is not feasible to have several companies importing the same drugs, because the market is 
too small. In addition, antimalarial drugs in general are provided free at government health 
facilities and at highly subsidised prices at private shops. There is no incentive for private 
commercial businesses to import and distribute these drugs." (Wholesale r supplying retailers 
#1, Phnom Penh) 
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This argument was somewhat supported by the as and SCS data which showed that the ACT 
ASMQ that was available on the market was that imported by PSI Cambodia for the purpose of 
the social marketing. However, this was not the case for other antimalarial drugs, notably 
artesunate, which was found to originate from Vietnam and China, and chloroquine, from 
Thailand, India, Vietnam and China. In addition, 31.5% of AMT and 38.5% of nAMT were of 
unknown origin so additional manufacturers and therefore importers may have distributed 
these drugs, despite the reported government/PSI Cambodia crowding out effect. Antimalarial 
drugs of unknown provenance could have reflected the operations of unregistered businesses 
and/or the availability of unregistered products, perhaps counterfeit and substandard drugs. 
6.3 Provider conduct: product differentiation and non-price competition 
This section explores the key axes of product differentiation and non-price competition in the 
private sector distribution chain: it describes the inherent product characteristics perceived to 
be the most valued by retailers and wholesalers when choosing a supplier, and the strategies 
used by wholesalers operating at different levels of the chain to distinguish their products and 
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services from those of other suppliers on non-price attributes, and to shape customers' 
stocking and pricing behaviours. The key strategies reportedly used to attract custom are 
described below and cover delivery services, credit facilities, reliable drug supplies, drug 
information and selling antimalarial drugs of perceived high quality. 
6.3.1 Delivery services 
During SSls, most retailers and wholesalers reported that they chose suppliers that delivered 
antimalarial drugs directly to their outlets. The SCS data showed that less than one quarter of 
wholesalers delivered, with delivery services being less frequent at lower levels of the chain 
(Table 6-12). 
Table 6-12: Wholesalers' delivery activities 
As % of wholesalers for whom the information was 
WHOLESALER CATEGORIES 
available 
SUPPLY 
SUPPLY 
BUSINESS PRACTICES ALL 
WHOLESALERS 
RETAIL 
LEVEL 
Deliver antimalarials to customers % 23.7% 46.7% 23.0% 
(N) (93) (15) (87) 
Source: ACTwatch Supply Chain Survey data, August-November 2009. 
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During SSls, wholesalers supplying wholesalers, notably those importing antimalarial drugs 
were reported to compete intensively with wholesalers operating at lower levels of the chain, 
through their wide-reaching and well organized delivery networks operated by sales teams 
travelling to sell drugs out of their vans or, more generally, take orders for supplies to be 
delivered the following month or couple of months. 
"Big companies compete a lot; it is hard for us who do not have vans for delivering orders." 
(Wholesaler supplying wholesalers #1, MDRSe stratum) 
as data also showed that the probability of reporting a top supplier who delivered antimalarial 
drugs varied by retail outlet location (Table 6-13). For instance, retailers located in the MDRF 
stratum were significantly less likely to buy antimalarials from a top supplier that delivered 
compared to those in the MDRse stratum (21.0% vs. 46.6%, p<0.0001) (Table 6-13). Similarly, 
retailers located in remote areas were significantly less likely to report a top supplier for 
antimalarials that delivered compared to retailers located in more accessible areas (19.5% vs. 
42.2%, p=0.001) whilst retailers in moderately accessible markets were more likely to do so 
than retailers in other markets (43.4% vs. 29.1%, p=0.01) (Table 6-13). Retailers in areas at 
lower risk of malaria were also more likely to receive antimalarial drugs from a supplier that 
delivered compared to those in areas at higher risk (43.3% vs. 29.3%, p=0.01) (Table 6-13). 
There were also significant differences in delivery services reported by different retail outlet 
types (Table 6-13), with a significantly higher percentage of pharmacies/clinical pharmacies 
that reported at least one top supplier who delivered antimalarial drugs compared to other 
provider types (74.4% vs. 24.2%, p<0.0001), and significantly lower percentages of mobile 
providers (20.6% vs. 38.1%, p<0.05) and village shops doing so (8.4% vs. 40.0%, p<0.001) 
compared to other provider types (Table 6-13). This reflected the significantly higher 
proportion of village shops in remote areas' compared to other outlets (62.4% vs. 30.7%, 
p=0.0001) and that of mobile providers in the MDR Free stratum (63.4% vs. 45.6%, p=0.011). 
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Table 6-13: Characteristics of retailers supplied by a wholesaler with delivery services 
As % of retailers for whom the information on at least one of their top 2 supply sources for antimalarials 
was available 
N Percentage of retailers reporting 
receiving antimalarials from at least one 
supplier who delivered* 
Retail outlet location 
Stratum 
MDR Free stratum 296 21.0%* 
MDR Suspected/Confirmed stratum 351 46.6%* 
Accessibility level 
Accessible 158 40.9% 
Moderately accessible 177 43.4%* 
Remote 312 19.5%* 
Malaria transmission risk level 
High malaria transmission risk area 107 31.0% 
Moderate malaria transmission risk area 370 28.1% 
Low malaria transmission risk area 170 43.3%* 
Retail outlet category 
Pharmacies/Clinical Pharmacies 96 74.4%* 
Drug stores 103 42.5% 
Mobile providers 202 20.6%*-
Grocery shops 91 23.4% 
Village shops 155 8.4%* 
* . 
.. , .J. significant difference In suppliers delivery services by retail outlet location and type (chi test with Rao and Scott 
correction, p<O.OS). Source: ACTWatch Outlet Survey for 38 sub-districts, June 2009 
During 551s, several retailers reported that they never received visits from importers' sales 
teams in general, either because the latter did not visit their area or did not stop at their 
shops. 
"No importers distribute in this area; they stop at O'Krieng town and do not go farther" (Drug 
shop # 6, remote market, MDRF stratum) 
"Sales representatives pass on the road but t~ey do not stop at my shop" (Grocery store # 7, 
remote market, MDRF stratum) 
Whilst it is unclear why sales teams did not stop at all shops within the areas they visited, one 
importer indicated that they did not distribute to all areas because of high travelling costs and 
low expected sales volumes. 
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"We rarely supply the province of Mondulkirps because it is far and therefore expensive to 
serve these areas, and there are not enough customers" (Wholesaler supplying wholesalers #2, 
Phnom Penh). 
These factors are likely to have influenced shopkeepers' choice of suppliers and as a result 
they may have shaped the structure of the distribution chain, as more remote outlets were 
reported to buy antimalarial drugs from smaller suppliers operating locally. 
liThe largest share of my business is to sell antimalarials to patients, but I also wholesale for 
other retailers who are not served by importers because these retailers are located too far 
away for importers and in areas that are difficult to reach". (Village shop #1, accessible market, 
MDRF stratum). 
6.3.2 Credit facilities 
Around 40% of all wholesalers offered credit to their antimalarial customer~ in the past 3 
months, with little difference across chain levels, and those who did offered a median of 30 
days credit (IQR 3-90) (Table 6-14). 
During SSls, credit was reported as a key strategy for attracting custom. For example, one 
wholesaler reported attracting customers by providing credit for at least 2 months as one 
month was thought to be too short for attracting customers. However, many wholesalers 
indicated that credit was offered to long-term customers only, a statement which was 
supported by providers operating at lower levels of the chain who reported they obtained 
credit from suppliers they had known for a long time. 
Several providers also reported borrowing one or a couple of antimalarial drug packs from 
neighbouring shops in order to meet an immediate demand for a product out of stock and 
"paying back" one or two days after by returning the quantity borrowed of the corresponding 
product. 
35 Province in North-East Cambodia 
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Table 6-14: Wholesalers' credit facilities 
As % of wholesalers for whom the information was available 
WHOLESALER CATEGORIES 
SUPPLY 
SUPPLY 
CREDIT FACILITIES ALL 
WHOLESALERS 
RETAIL 
LEVEL 
Provided credit to customers in the past 3 % 39.6% 42.8% 40.0% 
months (N) (91) (14) (85) 
-_.-_ ... 
Most common terms of credit offered in the Median 30 30 30 
past 3 months (number of days) 
IQR (3-90) (10-75) (3-90) 
Source: ACTWatch Outlet Survey for 38 sub-districts, June 2009 
The main reason for not offering credit mentioned during SSls with wholesalers was the risk of 
non-payment. For example, a female wholesaler reported she did not provide credit because it 
would be impossible for a woman to chase customers to obtain payment, and indicated that 
not offering credit drove customers away to other shops. 
6.3.3 Drug availability and stock reliability 
as and SCS data showed that few shopkeepers used more than one supply source for 
antimalarial drugs. During SSls, retailers and wholesalers were asked about the reasons for 
having more than one supplier. Many respondents reported that they used more than one 
supplier as one of them was an importer selling one antimalarial type only such that they had 
to buy other products from a different supplier. In addition, importers were said to deliver on a 
monthly basis and wholesalers and retailers sometimes reported the need to buy supplies in-
between sales team visits. In addition, importers were at times reported to be out of stock or 
have limited stocks, such that providers reported they had to rely on other supply sources for 
antimalarial drugs. PSI Cambodia's stock-outs were frequently mentioned as a reason for 
having a second supplier. 
"I rarely buy from PSI because they don't come often, approximately once during the dry 
. 
season and 2-3 times during the rainy season; and when they reach here they sometimes do 
not have a lot of stock left" (Wholesaler supplying wholesalers #5, MDRSC stratum) 
Finally, shopkeepers, notably retailers, reported that they sometimes purchased antimalarials 
from government providers who were the only suppliers of those drugs. 
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6.3.4 Perceived drug quality 
During SSls, several respondents reported buying from PSI Cambodia because it was an NGO 
supported by the MOH to sell quality malaria treatment. 
"I buy from PSI because there are a lot of fake and ineffective drugs in the market" (Wholesaler 
supplying retailers #3, MDRSC stratum) 
"My supplier for Malarine is PSI because they are legal, they are an NGO. They sell products of 
high quality" (Wholesaler supplying retailers # 4, MDRF stratum) 
The proportion of shopkeepers who reported PSI Cambodia as one of their top 2 suppliers for 
antimalarial drugs varied however by chain level and retailer type. The OS data showed that 
14.3% of retailers reported buying antimalarial drugs directly from PSI Cambodia, with 
pharmacies/clinical pharmacies being significantly more likely to report PSI Cambodia as a top 
supplier compared to other retailer types (47.5% vs. 14.4%, p<O.0001), whilst ~obile providers 
were significantly less likely to do so (3.3% vs. 27.6%, p=O.001). As for wholesalers, 65% of 
those supplying retailers and 75% of those supplying wholesalers reported PSI as one of their 
top 2 suppliers for antimalarial drugs. 
Another signal of quality highly valued by a couple of shopkeepers was wholesalers that 
travelled in air-conditioned vans when taking orders and delivering orders. Finally, a few 
shopkeepers also indicated they preferred buying antimalarials with a DDF registration sticker 
on their packs, which they perceived as drugs of high quality. 
6.3.5 Product promotion 
Product promotion for antimalarial drugs "'las rare as it was generally only conducted by 
wholesalers that imported antimalarial drugs. All importers were reported to have promotion 
teams visiting customers at least once a month. Importers themselves indicated that they 
sometimes used different sales teams for different customers, sending sales representatives to 
retail outlets and medical representatives to private clinics and doctors. Promotion therefore 
appeared to be tailored to the customers and products, with relatively more technical 
promotion (e.g. action of the drug, side effects) to providers of treatment services 
(pharmacies/clinical pharmacies, mobile providers) compared to drug-only sellers. 
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Promotion activities conducted by manufacturers and importers including workshops or group 
training sessions were reported to have some positive influence on wholesalers and retailers 
business and stocking practices. For example, one importer of antimalarial drugs reported that 
drug manufacturers conducted promotion activities through medical congresses, during which 
importers gained the skills and information needed for increasing their sales. 
"Manufacturers help boosting the sales by inviting company staff to workshop and seminars 
during which drugs are promoted to doctors." (Wholesaler supplying wholesalers, #2, Phnom 
Penh). 
A retailer explained that attending PSI Cambodia's training session influenced his stocking 
decisions, leading him to stock the ACT ASMQ and stop selling other antimalarial drug types. 
"Before I was invited to training by PSI, I stocked other drugs than Malarine. Then, PSI trained 
us and they said that their products were of better quality and that we should stock these". 
(Village shop #1, accessible market, MDRF stratum). 
By contrast, the role of sales representatives was reported to be mixed. One wholesaler said 
that sales representatives did not conduct any particular promotional activities and only asked 
whether additional stocks were needed whilst a couple of wholesalers explained that PSI 
Cambodia's sales teams used vertical restraints. 
"Sales reps do not do anything. They do not try to convince me to buy anything else. They just 
come and ask if I need supplies" (Wholesaler supplying retailers #9, MDRF stratum) 
"My supplier's sales teams have conditions: if you want to buy Malarine you need to buy 
condoms as well" (Wholesaler supplying wholesalers #3, MDRF stratum) 
"Only PSI has restrictions. The sales representatives sell Malarine if we buy condoms as well. A 
. lot of condoms" (Wholesaler supplying wholesalers #4, MDRF stratum) 
Finally, one wholesaler expressed his scepticism about the rational of the social marketing 
programme. 
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"I wonder whether the Government and PSI play tricks by doing marketing and ordering 
doctors to mainstream their products. I wonder if Government gains a profit to let PSI promote 
Malarine. "(Wholesaler supplying retailers #1, MDRF stratum) 
6.3.6 Suppliers' expertise and reputation and suppliers as sources of information 
During 551s, several retailers and wholesalers indicated that they bought antimalarials from 
suppliers that they perceived to have knowledge about malaria and to provide information on 
new drugs and treatment regimens. 
"We buy from our regular supplier who is also a government doctor working at the referral 
hospital. He knows a lot, he informs us on how to use new drugs and how to dispense 
according to the weight of patients". (Pharmacy/clinical pharmacy #1, accessible market, 
MDRF stratum) 
One retailer said that he bought antimalarials from a supplier because other retailers did so 
too. 
"I have one regular supplier and I do not change. There is no particular reason, I just like buying 
from the same supplier every time. Also, other shopkeepers buy from him and I like to do the 
same" (Mobile provider # 2, accessible market, MDRF stratum). 
6.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the private commercial sector distribution chain for antimalarial drugs was 
described, including the general structure of the chain, wholesalers' characteristics, range of 
products stocked, concentration and entry/exit barriers at different levels of the chain. Key 
axes of product differentiation and non-price competition amongst wholesalers were analysed. 
The thesis now turns to the analysis of price setting and price competition in retail markets and 
in the private commercial sector distribution chain for antimalarial drugs. 
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CHAPTER 7 PRICING AND PRICE COMPETITION 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapters 5 and 6, the structure of retail markets and of the private commercial sector 
distribution chain for malaria treatment was described and key aspects of product 
differentiation and non-price competition were highlighted. This chapter now turns to the 
analysis of price competition in retail markets and in the private commercial sector distribution 
chain. It uses quantitative data from the ACTwatch Outlet Survey (OS) and Supply Chain Survey 
(SCS) and qualitative data collected during Semi-Structured Interviews (SSls) with retailers and 
wholesalers. 
as data showed that the median price of one adult equivalent treatment dose (AETD) of the 
ACT artesunate and mefloquine (ASMQ), the first line treatment for P.! malaria was US$ 1.18 
at pharmacies/clinical pharmacies and drug shops, US$ 1.88 at mobile provider outlets, US$ 
1.61 at grocery stores and US$ 1.64 at village shops (ACTwatch Group, 2009b) (see Table 2-3). 
These figures were 2 to 3 times higher than the recommended retail price (RRP) for Malarine 
(US$ 0.61), the socially marketed subsidized ACT, and between 3.5 to 5 times higher than one 
AETD of chloroquine, the non-artemisinin based monotherapy (nAMT) recommended first line 
treatment for P.v and most sold non-ACT product (ACTwatch Group, 2009b) (Table 2-3). As for 
the median price of artemisin-based monotherapy (AMT), it was 2 to 3 times higher than that 
of the ACT ASMQ. When antimarials in injectable form were considered, the median price of 
nAMT and AMT was 4 to 12 times and 12 to 17 times higher than that of ASMQ in tablet form 
respectively (author's own calculations) (Table 2-3). When the price of blood testing was 
included, the total cost of appropriate management of confirmed P.! malaria was around US$ 
2.00 (author's own calculations) (Table 2-3). 
In this chapter, we investigate retailers and wholesalers price setting behaviours for 
antimalarial drugs and analyse the intensity of price competition in retail markets. The focus is 
on private providers' price setting decision because all antimalarial drugs dispensed at 
government-owned outlets were generally reported to be dispensed free of charge (ACTwatch 
Group, 2009b) and none of the government providers reported a private commercial 
wholesaler as one of their top 2 suppliers for antimalarial drugs (Chapter 6), indicating that 
they generally received antimalarial supplies at no cost. The chapter is structured as follows. 
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II 
Section 7.2 describes providers' price setting behaviours as reported by retailers and 
wholesalers themselves during SSls. Section 7.3 describes purchase prices and price mark-ups 
for different antimalarial categories as they flow down the distribution chain. Section 7.4 
analyses the influence of market, outlet and product characteristics on retail price mark-ups. 
7.2 Price setting behaviours 
Almost all private retailers reported setting their prices themselves based on drug purchase 
prices and the cost of travelling to their supplier's outlet or that of paying private taxis for 
delivering their orders. Very few shopkeepers reported considering other costs. Retail private 
outlets were generally small and located at the front of providers' living premises such that 
operating a drug business was not reported to create additional costs aside from those of 
purchasing drug supplies. When shopkeepers did consider other costs, they mentioned drug 
license fees and in a few instances other local taxes. However, as described in Chapter 5, in 
practice few retailers were observed to have drug outlet licenses. Furthermore, the only tax 
mentioned was that paid monthly by providers who operated within phsars (tax amount 
ranged between US$ 0.25 to US$ 0.50) and turnover/revenue taxes were never mentioned. 
When asked about how they set their price mark-ups, nearly all retailers said they sought to 
make a profit. 
"/ set my price on the basis of the purchase price, not upon whether people can payor not, and 
I add 30% on top of the purchase price" (Mobile provider #8, remote market, MDRF stratum) 
However, many shopkeepers argued that their price setting decision was constrained by the 
price set by other providers. Customers were said to shop around in search of the cheapest 
price such that charging higher prices was almost impossible without losing some or all 
customers. 
. "If I sell at a higher price, customers might decide to buy from another shop" (Drug shop #3, 
moderately accessible, MDRSC stratum) 
"I charge 5,000 riel for antimalarial drugs, which is the same price as other shops, otherwise no 
one will buy from me" (Wholesaler supplying retailers #9, MDRF stratum) 
171 
This led some shopkeepers to consider other costs incurred by consumers when seeking care 
by setting their price as a function of the price charged at outlets located further away plus the 
cost of transport that customers would incur if they chose to seek care at those outlets. As a 
drug shopkeeper explained: 
"Patients have to pay 10,000 riel rUSs 2.5} to go to the health centre and come back here by 
taxi; this is why people come to my shop because I am not more expensive" (Drug shop #6, 
remote market, MDRF stratum) 
There were, however, a few exceptions. One mobile provider argued that he was the "price 
leader" as he would set his price first whilst other shopkeepers would follow by charging the 
same price. Finally, a couple of shopkeepers reported that they competed intensely on price as 
they charged lower prices than other providers. 
Recommended retail prices (RRP) on antimalarial drugs, other than Malarine, were not 
observed. Very few retailers reported setting their price for Malarine at the recommended 
level and those who did reported being constrained by customers' knowledge about the RRP. 
"It is written on the pack so I have no choice than follow. Customers know" (Drug Shop #10, 
accessible market, MDRF stratum). 
Most shopkeepers reported that they did not follow the RRP because it was too low and did 
not provide a sufficient margin on top of their purchase price. 
"It is not possible to respect a RRP of 2,500 riel rUS$0.61}. An appropriate profit is 2,000 riel. I 
buy 1 pack at around 1,700 riel from PSI so if I sell it to my customers at 2,500 riel the profit is 
just too small". (Drug shop #3, moderately accessible, MDRSe stratum) 
A couple of shopkeepers also argued that the RRP provided a "recommendation" for setting 
prices as opposed to an "obligation". 
Finally, all retailers refuted collaborating on price with other shopkeepers. 
Several retailers mentioned varying their price as a function of the total amount spent by a 
customer. Retailers said they gave discounts to customers who bought antimalarial drugs 
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alongside other drugs or consumer goods and/or to customers perceived to be poor. A few 
retailers reported giving discounts to customers who bargained for lower prices, notably by 
arguing that drugs were cheaper at other local shops. Finally, many retailers said that they 
chose their supply sources for antimalarial drugs on the basis of wholesalers' selling prices, 
indicating that they would buy from suppliers offering the lowest price. 
Wholesalers reported very similar price setting behaviours. Wholesalers said they set their 
price on the basis of the antimalarial purchase price, transport cost and profit opportunities, 
with many arguing their price setting behaviour to be constrained by the price charged at 
other shops. To maximise profit, wholesalers indicated choosing their supply sources on the 
basis of wholesale selling prices, as retailers did. 
Several wholesalers reported that they varied their prices as a function of volume sold. This 
was consistent with SCS data, which showed that wholesalers would charge their minimum 
wholesale price to customers purchasing a median volume of 9 AETDs (IQR 6-12). However, 
some wholesalers also reported varying prices regardless of the volume sold, by charging a 
lower price for one antimalarial pack when selling to retailers than to patients. 
"The importance of pricing is not the volume. It depends on whether the customer is another 
seller or a patient. The seller needs to make a profit when he resells to patients so I charge a 
lower price to sellers than I do to patient" (Wholesaler supplying retailers #9, Phnom Penh) 
This was in line with the SCS data which showed that the minimum median volume sold 
wholesale was low, at 0.90 AETD (lQR 0.5-1) with little variation across chain levels (0.75 AETD 
at the level supplying retailers and 1 AETD at the level supplying wholesalers). 
A couple of wholesalers also said that they would decrease the price of "slow moving" 
antimalarials or of those getting close to their expiry dates. Finally, all wholesalers denied 
collaborating on price with other wholesale shopkeepers. 
Differences between wholesalers' price setting behaviours were however identified across 
chain levels, notably between wholesalers who did not import antimalarials and those who 
did. First, importers said that they considered a broader range of costs than those reported by 
other wholesalers~' including freight and insurance costs, staff salaries, promotion costs, in-
country transport costs and, at times, interest on trade credit. 
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"/ add 45 to 55% on the ClF [cost, insurance and freight] price plus promotion cost" (Wholesaler 
supplying wholesalers # 1, Phnom Penh) 
Second, importers reported giving discounts and bonuses, with discounts ranging from 2% to 
10% depending on whether customers paid cash or credit, and bonus schemes such as "buy 
10, get one free", sometimes combined with gifts such as "buy 30, get a fan". 
Finally, one importer reported that his price mark-up was constrained by the intense 
competition his products faced from the socially marketed subsidized ACT, Malarine and the 
provision of free malaria treatment at government outlets. 
In summary, retailers and wholesalers had similar price setting behaviours. Providers reported 
setting their price on the basis of antimalarial purchase price and their price mark-ups on the 
basis of transport costs. At the top of the chain, importers considered a broader range of costs 
when setting up their prices, including overhead and promotion costs amongst others. In 
addition, most providers admitted seeking profits, although many argued that their pricing 
decision was constrained by the price set by other shops. Second and third-degree price 
discrimination strategies were commonly reported by both retailers and wholesalers who 
varied prices on the basis of volume purchased and customers' characteristics. The next 
section describes antimalarial purchase prices and price mark-ups as antimalarial drugs flow 
down the private commercial distribution chain. 
7.3 Purchase prices and price mark-ups 
This section describes purchase prices and price mark-ups for different antimalarial drug 
categories and ROT as they flow down the private commercial distribution chain (Section 
7.3.1), followed by purchase prices and mark:ups in retail markets (Section 7.3.2). 
7.3.1 Wholesale purchase prices and price mark-ups 
Table 7-1 presents median wholesale purchase prices for the different antimalarial categories 
and ROT across chain levels. The median price paid by wholesalers to purchase one AETO 
varied across antimalarial drug categories. AMTs had the highest median purchase price per 
AETO (US$ 2.70), which was six times higher than the median price for ACT (US$ 0.45) and 
thirty times higher than that for nAMT (US$ 0.09). Within the AMT and nAMT drug categories, 
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there were also large variations in the price paid for different dosage forms. The median 
purchase prices for injectables were higher than those for tablets (US$ 14.15 for AMT and US$ 
4.21 for nAMT compared to US$ 2.26 for AMTs and US$ 0.08 for nAMT respectively) (Table 7-
1). For RDT, the median purchase price paid by wholesalers was US$ 0.19 (Table 7-1). 
Table 7-1: Wholesale purchase prices 
In US$ per antimalarial AETO and ROT unit 
WHOLESALER CATEGORIES 
ANTIMALARIAL CATEGORIES ALL SUPPLY SUPPLY 
formulation N=7S WHOLESALERS RETAILERS 
N=12 N=74 
ACT (n) (132) (22) (127) 
all products Median 0.45 0.40 0.45 
were tablets IQR 0.40-0.57 0.33-0.47 0.40-0.57 
AMT (n) (28) (5) (26) 
all Median 2.70 2.26 2.S5 
IQR 2.20-12.70 2.17-16.42 2.26-11.32 
........................ ................. ", .................................... ............... ........................ ...................... " 
." ...... '" .......... " ..... " ......... 
AMT (n) (15) (2) (14) 
tablet Median 2.26 2.21 2.26 
IQR 1.96-2.45 2.17-2.26 1.96-2.45 
.................. " ........ ..................... , ............................................. . ............................................................................................. 
AMT (n) (13) (3) (12) 
injectable Median 14.15 16.41 - 12.74 
IQR 10.19-16.98 1.79-17.44 10.19-16.98 
nAMT (n) (29) (6) (28) 
all Median 0.09 O.OS 0.10 
IQR 0.07-1.00 0.08-0.85 0.06-3.57 
" .................................................................. ............................... . ................................................................ " ........................... 
nAMT (n) (23) (5) (18) 
tablet Median O.OS O.OS O.OS 
IQR 0.06-0.11 0.08-0.09 0.06-0.11 
..................................... , ............................................................... . ..................................................................................... " ..... 
nAMT (n) (6) (1) (6) 
injectable Median 4.21 4.46 4.21 
IQR 3.96-4.46 4.46-4.46 3.96-4.21 
ROT (n) (71) (11) (68) 
Median 0.19 0.05 0.19 
IQR 0.05-0.22 0.05-0.20 0.07-0.22 
.. . . ACT IS for artemlsrnrn combrnatlon therapy; AMT IS for artemlsrnrn monotherapy; nAMT is for non-artemisinin 
monotherapy; RDT is for rapid diagnostic tests for malaria; (n) is number of product observations; N is number of 
wholesalers for whom information was available; IQR is for interquartile range. 
Source: ACTwatch Supply Chain Survey, August-November 2009. 
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Table 7-2 and Table 7-3 present median wholesale mark-ups on the different antimalarial 
categories and ROT in percent and absolute terms respectively. As it was relatively common for 
wholesalers to vary prices, high, mid and low mark-ups are presented. 
The median mid percent mark-up for ACT was around 41%, and was generally higher than that 
for other antimalarial types: 17% for AMT and 29% for nAMT: However looking at tablets 
alone, the median mid percent mark-up for nAMTs was similar to that of ACTs (42% and 41% 
respectively). In absolute terms, mark-ups per AETO were the highest on AMT (US$ 0.50), 
followed by ACT (US$ 0.19) and nAMT (US$ 0.07). On Malarine, the median percent mid mark-
up was 41.7%, equivalent to US$ 0.19 in absolute terms. 
There were variations in absolute median mid mark-ups across dosage forms: on AMT, the 
median absolute mark-up was US$ 0.31 for tablets compared to US$ 2.83 for injectables, and 
on nAMT it was US$ 0.04 for tablets compared to US$ 0.68 for injectables. These variations 
reflected higher purchase prices for injectables. For ROT, the median wholesale percent mark-
up was 33%, equivalent to US$ 0.05 in absolute terms. The median ROT percent mark-up was 
63% among wholesalers supplying wholesalers compared to 33% among wholesalers supplying 
retailers. 
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Table 7-2: Wholesale percent price mark-ups 
In % on top of one antimalarial AETO and ROT unit purchase price 
WHOLESALER CATEGORIES 
ANTIMALARIAL ALL SUPPLY SUPPLY CATGEORIES N=77 WHOLESALERS RETAILERS formulation N=ll N=73 
Mark-up (%) Mid Low High Mid Low High Mid Low High 
ACTl (n) (129) (19) (124) 
all products Median 41.2 29.4 47.1 39.0 28.6 47.0 39.1 29.4 47.1 
were IQR 25.0- 15.0- 25.0- 29.4- 17.6- 38.9- 25.0- 15.0- 25.0-
tablets 66.7 55.3 76.5 61.8 47.1 76.5 66.7 55.3 76.5 
AMT (n) (28) (5) (26) 
all Median 16.7 16.0 18.3 19.3 16.7 22.0 18.0 16.0 19.2 
IQR 7.3- 4.9- 9.3- 16.7- 16.7- 16.7- 8.4- 5.3- 10.9-
29.2 24.9 38.1 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9 42.9 
..... " ......................... .................................... ..................................... _-_._-_ . 
AMT (n) (15) (2) (14) 
tablet Median 16.7 14.3 16.7 18.0 16.7 19.0 13.7 10.7 17.5 
IQR 6.2- 4.6- 7.7- 16.7- 16.6- 16.6- 6.2- 4.6- 7.7-
25.0 16.7 33.3 19.3 16.7 22.0 25.0 16.7 33.3 
................................ ..................................... . .......•............................ 
AMT (n) (13) (3) (12) 
injectable Median 20.0 16.7 20.0 29.9 29.9 30.0 22.5 18.3 24.9 
IQR 11.8- 5.3- 14.2- 3.4- 3.4- 3.4- 13.0- 9.7- 15.4-
42.9 36 42.9 976.0 976.0 976.0 49.4 39.4 46.4 
nAMT (n) (29) (6) (28) 
all Median 29.3 20.7 31.6 25.1 16.7 32.0 28.8 22.8 29.9 
IQR 14.0- 11.6- 18.6- 19.4- 9.1- 22.2- 12.9- 12.8- 18.1-
60.0 42.9 100.0 42.8 20.7 58.7 70.0 47.8 100.0 
.............................. ....•.. " ........................... . ..... " ................. " .......... 
nAMT (n) (23) (5) (22) 
tablet Median 42.3 25.0 42.9 29.3 16.7 38.0 37.2 26.0 40.4 
IQR 20.0- 14.0- 20.0- 20.9- 9.1- 25.0- 20.0- 16.7- 20.0-
100.0 60.0 122.2 42.9 20.7 58.8 100.0 60.0 122.2 
- ." ............................... .................................... . .. " ....... " ................... ,,, .. _---_._-_. 
nAMT (n) (6) (1) (6) 
injectable Median 15.6 11.3 20.0 19.4 16.7 22.0 15.6 11.3 19.9 
IQR 5.9- 5.9- 5.9- 19.4- 16.7- 22.2- 5.9- 5.9- 5.9-
25.0 25.0 25.0 19.4 16.7 22.2 25.0 25.0 25.0 
ROTl (n) (67) (10) (64) 
Median 33.3 25.0 35.7 62.5 50.0 75.0 33.3 25.0 36.4 
IQR 18.8- 13.1- 19.7- 25.0- 25.0- 25.0- 20.0- 13.6- 20.0-
81.3 62.5 93.8 300.0 300.0 300.0 75.0 50.0 87.5 
ACT is for artemisinin combination therapy; AMT is for artemisinin monotherapy; nAMT is for non-
artemisinin monotherapy; ROT is for rapid diagnostic tests for malaria; (n) is number of product 
observations; N is number of wholesalers for whom information was available; IQR is for inter-quartile 
range. 
l Note on calculation of ACT percent mark-up: at the time of the study, ASMQ and ROT sold in the private 
sector were imported into Cambodia with the financial support of the Global Fund. In-country distribution 
and sales were conducted by PSI Cambodia. In the analysis of price data, PSI Cambodia's purchase price 
was set to 0 so the percent mark-up could not be calculated for PSI Cambodia and was set to missing and 
therefore excluded from this table. Source: ACTwatch Supply Chain Survey, August-November 2009 
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Table 7-3: LVholesale absolute price mark-ups 
In US$ per antimalarial AETO and per ROT 
WHOLESALER CATEGORIES 
ANTIMALARIAL ALL SUPPLY CATEGORIES WHOLESALERS 
formulation N=78 N=12 
Mark-up CUSS) Mid Low High Mid Low High 
ACTl (n) (132) (22) 
(all Median 0.19 0.16 0.24 0.20 0.14 0.27 
products IQR 0.13- 0.07- 0.15- 0.13- 0.07- 0.19-
were 0.34 0.27 0.37 0.33 0.24 0.37 
tablets) 
AMT (n) (28) (5) 
All Median 0.50 0.38 0.53 0.57 0.57 0.57 
IQR 0.26- 0.19- 0.38- 0.42- 0.38- 0.48-
2.64 2.83 2.64 5.20 5.21 5.21 
............... " ........... "." ... 
AMT (n) (15) (2) 
Tablet Median 0.31 0.22 0.38 0.40 0.37 0.43 
IQR 0.17- 0.11- 0.19- 0.38- 0.36- 0.38-
0.40 0.38 0.48 0.42 0.38 0.48 
... " .................................... _--
AMT (n) (13) (3) 
injectables Median 2.83 2.83 2.83 5.21 5.21 5.21 
IQR 1.27- 0.71- 1.42- 5.21- 5.21- 5.21-
5.20 5.10 5.66 17.46 17.46 17.46 
nAMT (n) (29) (6) 
All Median 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.06 
IQR 0.03- 0.01- 0.04- 0.01- 0.00- 0.02-
0.20 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.14 0.21 
- ............. ............... ....... _. __ .-
nAMT (n) (23) (5) 
Tablet Median 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.05 
IQR 0.02- 0.01- 0.02- 0.01- 0.00- 0.02-
0.11 0.1 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.06 
........ _ .......... _ ............... 
nAMT (n) (6) (1) 
injectables Median 0.68 0.50 0.87 0.87 0.74 1.00 
IQR 0.25- 0.25- 0.25- 0.87- 0.74- 1.00-
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.74 1.00 
ROTl (n) (71) (11) 
Median 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 
IQR 0.02- 0.02- 0.02- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01-
0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
SUPPLY 
RETAILERS 
N=74 
Mid Low High 
(127) 
0.19 0.16 0.24 
0.13- 0.08- 0.14-
0.35 0.30 0.38 
(26) 
0.49 0.38 0.60 
0.24- 0.19- 0.38-
2.83 2.83 2.83 
(14) 
0.30 0.21 0.38 
0.17- 0.11- 0.19-
0.40 0.38 0.48 
(12) 
2.83 2.83 2.83 
1.34- 1.1- 1.70-
5.43 5.15 5.66 
(28) 
0.08 0.06 0.08 
0.03- 0.02- 0.03-
0.20 0.22 0.21 
(22) 
0.05 0.03 0.07 
0.02- 0.01- 0.02-
0.11 0.1 0.11 
(6) 
0.68 0.50 0.87 
0.25- 0.25- 0.25-
1.00 1.00 1.00 
(68) 
0.05 0.05 0.06 
0.02- 0.02- 0.02-
0.14 0.12 0.14 
ACT IS for artemisinin combination therapy; AMT is for artemisinin monotherapy; nAMT is for non-artemisinin 
monotherapy; RDT is for rapid diagnostic tests for malaria; (n) is number of product observations; N is number of 
wholesalers for whom information was available; IQR is for inter-quartile range. 
l Note on calculation of ACT absolute mark-up: at the'time of the study, ASMQ and RDT sold in the private sector 
were imported into Cambodia with the financial support of the Global Fund. In-country distribution and sales were 
conducted by PSI Cambodia. In the analysis of price data, PSI Cambodia's purchase price was set to 0 so the percent 
mark-up could not be calculated for PSI Cambodia and was set to missing. However, in absolute terms, PSI 
Cambodia's price mark-ups were calculated as: selling price-purchase price, which equals selling price Source: 
ACTwatch Supply Chain Survey, August-November 2009 
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7.3.2 Retail purchase prices and price mark-ups 
Median purchase prices paid by commercial retailers for their supplies are presented in Table 
7-4 for each antimalarial category and for ROT. 
On ACT, drug shops and pharmacies/clinical pharmacies reported paying a significantly lower 
median purchase price compared to other retailers: at drug shops, the median price was 
US$ 0.60 and the median difference with all other retailer types was US$ -0.23 (95% ci -0.38 to 
0.08); at pharmacies/clinical pharmacies, the median price was US$ 0.68 and the median 
difference was US$ -0.14 (95% ci -0.26 to -0.03). By contrast, mobile providers reported a 
median purchase price of US$ 1.10 or US$ 0.28 (95% ci 0.13 to 0.44) higher than the median 
price reported by all other retailers. 
For Malarine in particular, the median purchase price was higher than the RRP of US$0.61, 
expect for drug shops where it was US$ 0.60; between other retailers, it rang~d between US$ 
0.69 for pharmacies/clinical pharmacies to US$ 1.10 for village shops and differences in 
purchase prices were significant. Compared to all other retailer types, prices were US$ 0.27 
(95% ci -0.45 to -0.12) lower for drug shops and US$ 0.14 (95% ci -0.25 to -0.04) lower for 
pharmacies/clinical pharmacies; by contrast, compared to prices at all other retailer types, 
prices were US$ 0.29 (95% ci 0.12 to 0.49) and US$ 0.24 (95% ci 0.08 to 0.45) higher for mobile 
providers and village shops respectively. 
For AMT tablets, mobile providers reported a median purchase price significantly higher than 
any other retailer types (median price US$ 2.64, and median difference US$ 0.11, 95% ci 0.19 
to 0.34). In injectable form, the median AMT price was not statistically different across outlet 
types, ranging between US$ 12.71 at pharmacies/clinical pharmacies and US$ 16.95 at village 
shops. 
Finally, the nAMT median price was significantly lower at pharmacies/clinical pharmacies than 
at other retailer types (median price US$ 0.14, median difference US$ -0.14, 95% ci -0.85 to 
0.04). 
For ROT, the median purchase price ranged from US$ 0.21 at grocery shops to US$ 0.29 at 
mobile providers. When comparing the median purchase price at each outlet category with 
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that at all other outlets, the median purchase price was significantly higher at 
pharmacies/clinical pharmacies (median difference of US$ 0.04, 95% ci 0.01-0.10). 
Several explanations for these observed differences are possible. As described in Chapter 5, 
pharmacies/clinical pharmacies and drug shops were more likely to operate in accessible 
markets compared to other retailer types, suggesting that they were likely to be served by a 
chain made of fewer intermediaries - which under the assumption of "multiple" 
marginalization36 would enable them to buy ACT at lower prices. In addition, they were 
together responsible for two-thirds of antimalarial volumes sold whilst they represented one 
quarter of all antimalarial retail outlets. They were therefore likely to purchase larger volumes 
than other retailer types, enabling them to extract higher discounts from their suppliers. By 
contrast, mobile providers reported buying ACT and AMT tablets at a significantly higher price, 
which is not surprising as they were significantly less likely to report a top supplier that 
delivered, suggesting that they were served by a chain made of more intermediaries. 
36 In economic theory, double marginalization occurs when mark-ups are added on top of purchase 
prices at two stages of the distribution chain. In a case of multiple chain levels, this phenomenon could 
be referred as "multiple marginalization". 
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Table 7-4: Retail purchase prices 
In US$ per antimalarial AETO and per ROT 
RETAILER CATEGORIES 
ANTIMALARIAL PHARMACIES/ DRUG MOBILE GROCERY VILLAGE 
CATEGORIES CLINICAL STORES PROVIDERS STORES SHOPS 
formulation PHARMACIES N=82 N=102 N=82 N=76 
N=81 
ACT (n) (126) (98) (106) (53) (64) 
all Median 0.68* 0.60* 1.10* 0.78 0.94 
IQR 0.47-1.06 0.38-0.94 0.71-1.32 0.59-1.18 0.59-1.52 
AMT (n) (36) (39) (53) (30) (36) 
all Median 2.45 2.64 3.01 2.64 2.56 
IQR 2.23-12.71 2.36-12.71 2.64-14.12 2.45-3.01 2.26-2.82 
....................................................... _ ............... 
AMT (n) (15) (29) (26) (25) (31) 
Tablet Median 2.44 2.45 2.64* 2.56 2.52 
IQR 1.70-2.45 2.26-2.84 1.88-2.82 2.45-2.82 2.26-2.64 
....... ................... . ....................................... 
AMT (n) (21) (9) (20) (5) (5) 
Injectable Median 12.71 16.48 15.54 15.82 16.95 
IQR 3.53-17.51 12.72-18.83 11.77-16.95 11.77-16.95 9.89-16.95 
........................................................................ 
AMT (n) - (1) - - -
Suppository Median - 14.12 - - -
IQR - 14.12-14.12 - - -
nAMT (n) (18) (16) (23) (13) (16) 
all Median 0.14* 0.14 3.26 _0.16 0.34 
IQR 0.10-0.23 0.11-0.94 0.23-4.94 0.16-0.34 0.11-4.15 
...... .............................................. _ ............... 
nAMT (n) (21) (13) (10) (10) (14) 
tablet Median 0.14 0.11 0.18 0.16 0.27 
IQR 0.10-0.23 0.11-0.16 0.14-0.34 0.16-0.19 0.11-3.57 
-----_ ................ " .................... " ............... _ ............... 
nAMT (n) - (3) (13) (3) (2) 
injectable Median - 3.95 4.45 4.45 3.71 
IQR - 3.95-5.93 3.46-5.44 3.36-4.45 3.71-5.93 
ROT (n) (56) (32) (59) (20) ( 18) 
Median 0.23* 0.28 0.29 0.21 0.28 
IQR (0.19-0.28) (0.20-0.35) (0.24-0.47) (0.21-0.26) (0.24-0.47) 
. . . . .. ... ACT IS for artemlSln1n combination therapy; AMT IS for artemlSln1n monotherapy; nAMT is for non-artemlSInIn 
monotherapy; RDT is for rapid diagnostic tests for malaria; (n) is number of product observations; N is number of 
retailers for whom information was available; lOR is for inter-quartile range. * Difference between median price at 
given outlet and all other retailer types pooled is statistically different from zero, Hodges-lehmann median 
difference at p=O.OS. Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey in 38 sub-districts, June 2009 
Tables 7-5 and 7-6 present retail price mark-ups in percent and absolute terms respectively. 
On ACT, the median percent mark-up was Significantly lower at village shops than at other 
.. 
retailer types (28.6%, mean difference -10.7%, 95% ci -20.0 to 2.9) (Table 7-5). However, in 
absolute terms, the difference between mark-ups at village shops and other outlet types was 
not statistically different (median difference US$ -0.01, 95% ci -16.8 to 0.02), with mark-ups 
ranging between US$ 0.28 at pharmacies/clinical pharmacies to US$ 0.54 at mobile providers 
(Table 7-6). This reflected the higher price paid by village shops to purchase ACT (Table 7-4), 
notably Malarine (US$ 0.24 higher than at other retailer types). 
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On Malarine specifically, the median percent mark-up was significantly higher at drug shops 
compared to other outlet types (66.7%, median difference 20.0%, 95% ci 4.17 to 41.27) (Table 
7-5). The median price mark-up was 50.0% at mobile provider outlets, 42.9% at village shops, 
40.0% at pharmacies/clinical pharmacies and 25.0% at grocery stores (Table 7-5). In absolute 
terms, the median mark-up on Malarine was significantly lower at pharmacies/clinical 
pharmacies compared to other shops (US$ 0.24; median difference of US$ 0.18, 95% ci -0.20 to 
-0.02) (Table 7-6). The median absolute mark-up was US$ 0.51 at drug stores, US$ 0.47 at 
mobile provider outlets, US$ 0.24 at grocery stores and US$ 0.35 at village shops (Table 7-6). 
For AMT in tablet form, pharmacies/clinical pharmacies reported the lowest median price 
mark-up, both in percent and absolute terms (respectively 15.4%, median difference -27%, 
95% ci -54.2 to -12.3; and US$ 0.38, median difference US$ -0.75, 95% ci -1.17 to -0.38) (Tables 
7-5 and 7-6) . By contrast, village shops had a significantly higher median mark-up compared to 
other retailer types (median differences of 26.9%, 95% ci 10.0 to 46.15 and US$ 0.75, 95% ci 
0.34 to 1.13) (Tables 7-5 and 7-6). On AMT injectables, the median mark-up difference was, in 
percent terms, the highest between village shops and other outlet types (23.8%, 95% ci 1.68 to 
40.0), but the difference in absolute terms was not statistically different (Tables 7-5 and 7-6). 
The second largest and significant percent mark-up difference was observed between mobile 
providers and other provider types (17.1%, 95% ci 1.38 to 39.4), which was equivalent in 
absolute terms to a median mark-up of US$ 3.53 (95% ci 0.94 to 6.21) and which was higher at 
mobile providers than at other shops. 
On nAMT, village shops reported a significantly higher median mark-Up in absolute terms on 
nAMT tablets (US$ 0.38, median difference US$ 0.23, 95% ci 0.01 to 2.96). For the few 
observations of nAMT in injectable form, a significantly higher median mark-up, both in 
percent and absolute terms, was observed at drug stores. Finally, on chloroquine, the 
recommended first-line treatment for P. v, median mark-up differences both in volume and 
.. 
value terms were not statistically different across retailer types. The median percent mark-up 
was 61.3% at pharmacies/clinical pharmacies, 100.0% at drug stores, 100.0% at mobile 
provider outlets, 185.7% at grocery stores and 100.0% at village shops; the median absolute 
mark-up was US$ 0.08 at pharmacies/clinical pharmacies, US$ 0.12 at drug stores, US$ 0.21, at 
mobile provider outlets, US$ 0.30 at grocery stores and US$ 0.13 at village shops (Tables 7-5 
and 7-6). On RDT, grocery shops reported a significantly lower price mark-up both in percent 
,.' 
and absolute terms than all other retailer types (11.1%, median difference -16.6%, 95% ci -7.9 
to 30.3; median absolute mark-up US$ 0.02, median difference US$ -$0.06, 95% ci -0.02--0.09). 
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Table 7-5: Retail percent price mark-ups 
In % on top of one antimalarial AETO and ROT unit purchase price 
RETAILER CATEGORIES 
ANTIMALARIAL 
VILLAGE CATEGORIES PHARMACIESz DRUG MOBILE GROCERY 
formulation N=77 
STORES PROVIDERS STORES SHOPS 
N=75 N=101 N=57 N=72 
ACT (n) (119) (85) (104) (51) (59) 
all products Median 40.0 50.0* 50.0 40.0 28.6* 
were tablets IQR 20.0-80.0 25.0-106.9 25.0-66.7 20.0-60.0 14.3-55.6 
AMT (n) (32) (39) (46) (29) (33) 
All Median 16.7* 29.2 42.9 33.3 60.0* 
IQR 7.1-42.9 16.7-55.5 25.0-71.4 20.0-41.2 42.9-84.6 
............................................................ 
AMT (n) (19) (28) (26) (25) (29) 
Tablet Median 15.4* 37.1 33.3 29.2 60.0* 
IQR 7.7-25.9 16.7-90.5 25.0-66.7 16.7-41.2 37.1-87.5 
................................ " .......................... 
AMT (n) (13) (9) (20) (4) (4) 
Injectable Median 28.0 29.0 50.0* 38.5 47.1* 
IQR 7.1-42.9 16.7-41.2 25.0-77.8 20.0-42.9 42.9-66.7 
........................................... ............. , ... -. 
AMT (n) (1) 
Suppository Median 
-
6.7 - - -
IQR - 6.7-6.7 - - -
nAMT (n) (18) (16) (23) (13) (15) 
All Median 53.8* 100.0 127.3 177.8 100.0 
IQR 7.1-100.0 66.7-150.0 50.0-185.7 33.3-185.7 66.7-150.0 
............... " .. " ............. " .... " ................. 
nAMT (n) (18) (13) (10) (10) - (13) 
Tablet Median 53.8 100.0 100.0 185.7 366.7 
IQR 7.1-100.0 66.7-115.5 80-233.3 33.3-185.7 66.7-366.7 
............................. " .. ........... " .......... 
--
nAMT (n) (3) (13) (3) (2) 
Injectable Median - 191.7* 150.0 33.3 216.7 
IQR 
-
191. 7-275.0 50.0-185.7 17.6-177.8 66.7-366.7 
ROT (n) (54) (32) (57) (20) (18) 
Median 36.4 33.3 33.3 11.1* 33.3 
IQR 11.8-150.0 20.0-135.0 0.0-114.0 11.1-33.3 20.0-58.0 
... ACT is for artemisinin combination therapy; AMT is for artemisinin monotherapy; nAMT IS for non-artemlSInIn 
monotherapy; RDT is for rapid diagnostic tests for malaria; (n) is number of product observations; N is number of 
retailers for whom information was available; IQR is for inter-quartile range. * Difference between median price at 
given outlet and all other retailer types pooled is statistically different from zero, Hodges-Lehmann median 
difference at p=O.OS. Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey in 38 sub-districts, June 2009 
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Table 7-6: Retail absolute price mark ups 
In US$ per antimalarial AETD and per RDT 
ANTIMALARIAL PHARMACIES/ 
CATEGORIES CLINICAL 
formulation PHARMACIES 
N=77 
ACT (n) (119) 
all products Median 0.28* 
were tablets lOR 0.16-0.55 
AMT (n) (32) 
All Median 0.62 
lOR 0.07-3.30 
............................ • ......... H •• 
AMT (n) (19) 
tablet Median 0.38* 
lOR 0.00-0.56 
>.-. ........................................................ , ... 
AMT (n) (13) 
injectables Median 3.30 
lOR 0.85-8.47 
............ " ............................................ 
AMT (n) 
suppository Median -
IQR -
nAMT (n) (18) 
All Median 0.08* 
lOR 0.00-0.23 
........................................................ 
nAMT (n) (18) 
tablet Median 0.11* 
lOR 0.02-0.24 
......................... 
nAMT (n) 
injectables Median -
IQR -
RDT (n) (59) 
Median 0.08 
lOR 0.02-0.17 
RETAILER CATEGORIES 
DRUG MOBILE GROCERY VILLAGE 
STORES PROVIDERS STORES SHOPS 
N=75 N=101 N=57 N=72 
(85) (104) (51) (59) 
0.48 0.54 0.37 0.35 
0.24-0.78 0.24-0.71 0.12-0.47 0.24-0.55 
(39) (46) (29) (33) 
1.20 1.81 0.98 1.69 
0.56-2.64 0.75-7.53 0.56-1.50 1.09-2.26 
...................................... " ............... ................................................................ .. .... , ............................................................ , 
(28) (26) (25) (29) 
0.75 0.75 0.94 1.51* 
0.38-1.13 0.38-1.13 0.38-1.13 1.09-2.08 
.. , ................................................ ... ,,, ............. ,.,, ............................. ,, ....................... .. ............................ " ............ " ............... 
(9) (20) (4) (4) 
4.52 8.47* 2.35 9.04 
2.82-7.06 4.24-11.30 1.88-6.78 4.24-11.30 
........................................................ .......................................................................... . ............. ............................. -............ 
(1) 
0.94 - - -
0.94-0.94 - - -
(16) (23) (13) (15) 
0.13 2.47* 0.30 0.41 
0.11-0.47 0.23-5.93 0.21-0.30 0.13-7.71 
....................................................... ............................................... . ........................ . ...................................... . .................. 
(13) (10) (10) (13) 
0.23 0.23 0.30 0.38* 
0.18-0.40 0.18-0.40 0.15-0.30 0.12-2.97 
................... ....... .. ..................................................... ................... .. ........................................................... (3) (13) (3) (2) 
10.88* 5.93 1.48 13.60 
10.88- 2.47-6.92 0.59-7.90 3.95-13.60 
11.37 
(40) (62) (25) (20) 
0.14 0.12 0.02* 0.12 
0.06-0.24 0.00-0.24 0.02-0.09 0.05-0.18 
ACT is for artemisinin combination therapy; AMT is for artemisinin monotherapy; nAMT is for non-artemisinin 
monotherapy; RDT is for rapid diagnostic tests for malaria; (n) is number of product observations; N is number of 
retailers for whom information was available; lOR is for inter-quartile range. * Difference between median price 
at given outlet and all other retailer types pooled is statistically different from zero, Hodges-Lehmann median 
difference at p=0.05. Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey in 38 sub-districts, June 2009 
In summary, our results showed that mark-ups varied Significantly across providers, 
antimalarial generic type and dosage forn1. Pharmacies/clinical pharmacies reported the 
lowest median mark-up on the subsidized ACT in absolute terms; the lowest mark-up on AMT 
tablets in both percent and absolute terms; and, the lowest percent mark-up on nAMT in 
general and in absolute terms on nAMT tablets. By contrast, drug shops reported the highest 
percent mark-up on subsidized ACT and the highest mark-up, in both percent and absolute 
terms, on nAMT injectables; village shops reported the highest median percent mark-up on 
AMT tablets and injections, and the highest median absolute margin on AMT tablets; finally, 
mobile providers reported the highest mark-up on AMT injections in absolute terms and the 
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second highest on AMT tablets. Determinants of retail price mark-ups are analysed in the next 
section. 
7.4 Determinants of antimalarial retail price mark-ups 
This section analyses the determinants of antimalarial retail price mark-ups. It was of interest 
to analyse wholesalers' price setting behaviours as well, however, in the context of 
overlapping chain levels and their implications for defining wholesaler markets and measuring 
market concentration (Section 6.2.6), such analysis could not be conducted. Similarly, as RDT 
sales volume data were not collected during the OS, it was not possible to calculate a 
concentration measure for that market in order to analyse retailers' price setting decisions for 
RDT. 
For the analysis retailers' pricing behaviour for antimalarial drugs, three measures were 
available, namely antimalarial price, percent mark-up and absolute mark-up. We chose to 
focus the analysis on percent mark-up for two reasons. First, as highlighted in Section 7.2 retail 
prices are largely influenced by purchase prices and therefore by pricing decisions of economic 
actors operating at higher levels of the chain (e.g. manufacturers). Mark-ups therefore capture 
retailers' price setting behaviour by isolating it from pricing decisions made upstream in the 
chain. Similarly, percent mark-ups were preferred to their absolute equivalent as they offered 
a measure of retailers' decisions "standardized" by price level. This section is structured as 
follows. Section 7.4.1 presents a series of hypotheses on antimalarial retail percent mark-up 
variations drawing on the theoretical and empirical literatures and results presented in the 
previous two chapters in terms of product differentiation and non-price competition. In 
Section 7.4.2, the methods used for hypothesis testing are described. Section 7.4.3 presents 
the results, which are then discussed in Section 7.4.4. 
7.4.1 Hypotheses on antimalarial retail percent mark-ups 
Table 7-7 presents the set of hypotheses tested in the analysis of retail percent mark-ups. The 
development of these hypotheses draws on the Industrial Organization (10) literature, 
empirical findings from the literature (Chapter 3) and results presented in this thesis (Chapters 
5,6 and 7). 
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Table 7-7: Hypotheses about retail percent mark-up variations 
No. Hypothesis of higher percent mark- Rationale 
ups: 
1. In more concentrated markets Traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance sequence 
2. In more remote markets Higher costs of wholesale supplies (Goodman et aI., 
2009) 
3. In markets at lower risk of malaria Lower antimalarial availability (PSI, 2007); May reflect 
transmission lower contestability than in markets at higher risk of 
malaria transmission 
4. At pharmacies/clinical pharmacies and Higher overhead costs (mobile providers travel to 
mobile providers patients' home); Consumer preferences (Chapter 5) 
5. At outlets that have been operating for Consumer preferences (Chapter 5) 
longer 
6. At outlets that that do not have a top Higher costs of wholesale supplies (Chapters 6 and 7) 
supplier that delivers orders 
7. On unbranded products Empirical findings from previous studies (Chapter 3) 
B. On products sold in injectable form Consumer preferences (Chapter 5); May reflect service 
fee for administering injections 
9. On products with lower sales volumes Higher mark-ups on "slow moving" products 
7.4.2 Methods for hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis testing was conducted through bivariate and multivariable analyses. The bivariate 
analysis was exploratory, focusing on generic types that each accounted for 5% or more of the 
total market in volume terms. The 5 antimalarial generic types were the ACT ASMQ; the ACT 
DHA+PP; the AMT artesunate; and nAMTs chloroquine and quinine. Median percent mark-up 
differences were analysed across categorical predictor variables, including market accessibility 
levels, market's malaria transmission risk level, outlet type, wholesale deliveries, antimalarial 
brand status and dosage form. Relationships between percent mark-ups and continuous 
variables, including HHI calculated on antimalarial sales volumes and values, outlet's length of 
time in operation and sales volumes for particular product during the week preceding the 
survey were explored by looking at the correlation coefficients between mark-ups and these 
variables. 
To assess the marginal effect of each of the predictors on price mark-ups, a multivariable 
analysis was conducted. A regression model was developed using the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method. The STATA survey estimation command svy:regress was used to adjust for the 
potential clustering of drug price observations within outlets (with primary sampling units set 
as retail outlets), control for design-based heteroscedasticity and produce robust variance 
estimates (StataCorp., 2009). Markets with a single antimalarial outlet - IIsingleton strata" -
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were treated as single sampling units with their variance imputed using the average of the 
variances from strata with several antimalarial outlets (StataCorp., 2009). Price mark-up 
observations were included for all antimalarial generic types, except for primaquine for which 
there was a single observation. Mark-ups were logged to reflect their skewed distribution and 
regressed on market, outlet and product characteristics. The analysis was conducted using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated on public and private antimalarial sales volumes 
and sales values in turn. 
7.4.3 Results 
Tables 7-8 and 7-9 present the results of the bivariate analysis between percent mark-ups and 
market, outlet and product characteristics. Few significant differences in percent mark-ups 
were identified across these characteristics. As already mentioned mark-ups on ACT were 
significantly higher at drug stores compared to all other provider types and conversely 
Significantly lower at village shops. The bivariate analysis also showed significant differences 
between mark-ups on artesunate, with higher mark-ups at village shops and at outlets that did 
not report a supplier that delivered orders, and significantly lower mark-ups in outlets 
operating in accessible markets rather than in more remote markets. Finally, correlations 
between percent mark-ups and market concentration measures were very small and not 
statistically significant. 
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Table 7-8: Relationships between retail mark-ups and market, outlet and product 
cha racte ristics 
ACT AMT nAMT 
ASMQ DHA+PP Artesunate Chloroquine Quinine 
n Median n Median n Median n Median n Median 
Market characteristics 
........................................... 
MORF stratum 134 42.8% 22 150.0% 52 37.1% 23 100.0% 2 50.0% 
..................... 
--
......................................... .................... , ._----
MORSC stratum 224 42.8% 26 33.3% 70 37.1% 31 100.0% 6 127.3% 
............................ ........................................ 
Accessible 131 I 40.0% 6 38.1% 43 20.0%* 42 100.0% 11 185.7% 
Moderately accessible 
Remote 
low transmission risk 
Moderate transmission risk 
High transmission risk 
Outlet types 
Pharmacy/Clinical Pharmacy 
Drug Shop 
Mobile Provider 
Grocery Store 
Village Shop 
Outlet's supplier delivers 1 
Yes 
No 
Antimalarial brand statusl 
160 I 
...•..... " ................. 
67 
145 
134 
79 
98 
73 
90 
47 
50 
163 
., ......................... 
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42.8% 24 33.3% 
. ................... 
42.8% 6 I 21.4% 
..................... 
50.0% 14 33.3% 
...... " ............. 
40.0% 15 33.3% 
42.8% 7 55.5% 
40.0% 13 33.3% 
55.6%* 9 25.0% 
42.8% 6 60.0% 
40.0% 4 25.0% 
25.0%* 4 20.0% 
45.8% L ... ~.? ....... 33.3% 
40.0% 24 33.3% 
................. ..................... 
37 50.0% 28 100.0% 2 100.0% 
.......................... , ........ " .... , .................... -_._-_ . 
42 41.2% 10 150.0% 15 127.3% 
......................................... 
35 ~ 42.8% 21 66.7% 9 177.8% .................. " . -----53 33.3% 21 150.0% 7 127.3% 
." .................. f---._--
34 42.8% 12 100.0% 12 150.0% 
........................................... 
13 16.7%* 17 61.3% 1 7.1%* 
--_._- ............................ " ......... " .,,,, ................ 
_. __ ._-
29 25.0% 12 100.0% 3 191.7%* 
......................................... 
27 33.3% 8 100.0% 14 150.0% 
.......................................... 
25 33.3% 9 185.7% 4 33.3%* 
.... _- ......... .. , .................. r--.----
28 60.0%* 8 100.0% 6 185.7% 
R%. , ........................................ ,. 46 23.1% 19 88.7% 7 127.8% . .......................................... ................... 76 42.8%* 35 100.0% 21 150.0% 
Branded 358 
~--------------------~. Unbranded 0 
t--4_2._8_%--~·····6§···· .. · .. ·· .. ··1:::::!~:;:~:~::::·:t--~_~---t-~--~-:~-~-- -~.~-. ·::::~~~-t~::::::~ .. 2 
26 
33.3% 
-... ----
150.0% 
Antimalarial dosage form 
Tablet 358 42.8% I 36 L::~~:::~~::::J 109 37.1% 54 r:::~·9.g:;:9.~::::::::::~L 100.0% _ 
ACT is for artemisinin combination therapy; AMT is for artemisinin monotherapy; nAMT is for non-artemisinin 
monotherapy; ASMQ is for artesunate and mefloquine; OHA+PP is for dihydroartemisin and piperaquine; MORF 
stratum is for stratum without multi-drug resistance; MORSC stratum is for stratum with suspected or confirmed 
multi-drug resistance; 1 At least one of the top 2 suppliers mentioned by retailers was reported to offer delivery 
services for antimalarials; 2 Branded innovator or branded generic. Unbranded are all generics; *Hodges-Lehmann 
median difference between the median price mark-up at given outlet and median price at all other retailer types is 
statistically different from zero at pSO.05. Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey in 38 sub-districts, June 2009 
Table 7-9: Relationships between retail mark-ups, market concentration, sales volume and 
outlet's length of time in operation 
Market concentration Outlet's characteristics 
HHlon HHlon Sales volume the Outlet's length of time in 
antimalarial antimalarial week preceding the operation 
sales volumes sales values survey 
Correlation 
coefficient 0.033 -0.003 -0.022 
with percent -0.041 
mark-ups 
.. 
*slgnlflcant at the 5% level. Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey in 38 sub-districts, June 2009 
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These relationships may however be confounded by the associations between market 
characteristics, outlet types and wholesale deliveries. For example, village shops were more 
likely to operate in the MDRF stratum, in which markets were more likely to be remote and 
village shops were less likely to report a top supplier for antimalarials that delivers. 
In order to disentangle the effects of the different predictors on retail mark-ups and measure 
their relative and marginal importance, an OLS log-linear regression model was developed and 
the following price mark-up equation was estimated: 
Log MARK-UP=~o +~lHHI+~2STRATUM+~3ACCESSIBILlTY+~4RISK +~5 OUTLET_TYPE+~6 
SUPPLlER_DELlVERS+ ~7 TIME_IN_OPERATION + ~7GENERIC_TYPE +~8 BRAND_STATUS+ 
~22 DOSAGE_FORM+~23 VOLUMES_SOLD +)+E 
Where all variables are described in Table 7-10 and where E is the error term. 
In order to disentangle the effects of the different predictors on retail mark-ups and measure 
their relative and marginal importance, an OLS log-linear regression model was developed. The 
model is described in Table 7-10. Correlations between predictor variables used in the model 
are available in Appendix 12. 
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Table 7-10: Description of the regression model for all antimalarial price percent mark-ups 
VARIABLE DEFINITION MEAN 
Outcome variable 
LOG MARK-UP AETD Log of percent mark-up 3.81 
Predictor variables 
HHI_VOLUME Hirschman Herfindahl index on private and public sector 0.33 
antimalarial sales volumes by markee 
HHI_VALUE Hirschman Herfindahl index on private and public sector 0.32 
antimalarial sales values by market1 
SALES VOLUME Antimalarial volume sold the previous week (AETD) 2.07 
LENGTH_OF _OPERATION Number of years respondents have been in operation in 10.9 
that business (years) 
MARKET'S ACCESSIBILITY LEVEL 
ACCESSIBILITY LOW (omitted) 1 if market is remote 0.23 
ACCESSIBILITY MODERATE 1 if market is moderately accessible 0.43 
ACCESSIBILITY HIGH 1 if market is accessible 0.33 
MARKET'S MALARIA TRANSMISSION RISK 
RISK HIGH (omitted) 1 if market is at high malaria transmission risk 0.23 
RISK MODERATE 1 if market is at moderate malaria transmission risk 0.39 
RISK LOW 1 if market is at low malaria transmission risk 0.38 
STRATUM 
MDRF STRATUM(omitted) 1 if stratum is MDR-Free 0.39 
MDRSC STRATUM 1 if stratum is MDR-Suspected/Confirmed 0.61 
OUTLET TYPE 
PHARMACY/CLINICAL PHARMACY (omitted) 1 if outlet is pharmacy/clinical pharmacy - 0.24 
DRUG STORE 1 if outlet is drug store 0.22 
MOBILE PROVIDER 1 if outlet is mobile provider 0.24 
GROCERY STORE 1 if outlet grocery store 0.13 
VILLAGE SHOP 1 if outlet is village shop 0.16 
WHOLESALE DELIVERIES 
TOP SUPPLIER DELIVERS 1 if at least one top supplier delivers 0.41 
TOP SUPPLIER DOES NOT DELIVER (omitted) 1 if none of the top 2 suppliers deliver 0.59 
GENERIC TYPE 
ARTESUNATE+MEFLOQUINE (omitted) 1 if antimalarial is artesunate+mefloquine 0.49 
DIHYDROARTEMISININ +PIPERAQUINE 1 is antimalarial is dihydroartemisin+piperaquine 0.05 
ARTEMISININ+PRIMAQUINE+PIPERAQUINE 1 if antimalarial is artemisinin+primaquine+piperaquine 0.03 
CHLOROQUINE 1 if antimalarial is chloroquine 0.07 
QUININE 1 if antimalarial is quinine 0.12 
MEFLOQUINE 1 if antimalarial is mefloquine 0.01 
SULPHADOXINE-PYRIMETHAMINE 1 if antimalarial is sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine 0.24 
ARTESUNATE 1 if antimalarial is artesunate 0.15 
ARTEMETHER 1 if antimalarial is artemether 0.06 
DIHYDROARTEMISININ 1 if antimalarial is dihydroartemisinin 0.01 
BRAND STATUS 
BRANDED (omitted) 1 if antimalarial is branded innovator or generic 0.73 
UNBRANDED 1 if antimalarial is unbranded generic 0.27 
DOSAGE FORM 
TABLET (omitted) 1 if antimalarial is in tablet form 0.89 
INJECTABLE 1 if antimalarial is in injectable form 0.10 
MRDSC_STRATUM is for stratum with suspected and confirmed multi-drug resistance; MDRF _STRATUM is for 
stratum without multi-drug resistance; 1geographical definition of retail markets was set as the commune (Section 
5.2.4). Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey data in 38 sub-districts, June 2009 
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The model estimated using the HHI calculated on antimalarial sales volumes had a R2 of 0.1436 
(Table 7-11). Retail percent mark-ups were significantly affected by antimalarial generic type and 
brand status. Compared to the ACT ASMQ, retail mark-ups on artesunate alone were 50.5% lower 
(p<O.OOl) and on chloroquine 67.8% higher (p<O.OOl). Percent mark-ups were 41.3% higher on 
unbranded antimalarials than on branded products (p=0.002). 
Sales volumes for the week before the survey and outlet's length of operation had relatively small 
effects on price mark-ups with levels of significance just outside the 5% cut-off: an increase in one 
AETD sold was associated with mark-ups 0.9% (p=0.063) lower, and similarly an increase in one year 
in outlet's length of operation with mark-ups 1% (p=0.077) lower. 
Market concentration, accessibility, malaria transmission risk, outlet type and wholesale supplies had 
no significant influence on retail mark-ups (p-values > 0.1). 
The model estimated using the HHI calculated on antimalarial sales values had a R2 of 0.1453, and 
the results were similar to those described above (Table 7-11). 
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Table 7-11: OLS log-linear regression model 0/ antimalarial retail price percent mark-ups 
Model using HHI calculated on private & public Model using HHI calculated on private & public 
antimalarial sales volumes antimalarial sales values 
(n=641, F<O.0001, R2=O.1436) (n=641, F<O.0001, R2=O.1453) 
Independent variable Coefficient Standard Error P value Coefficient Standard Error P value 
HHI VOLUME -0.228 0.193 0.237 
HHI VALUE -0.302 0.211 0.153 
MDRSC STRATUM -0.026 0.136 0.848 -0.015 0.137 0.913 
ACCESSIBILITY MODERATE 0.011 0.171 0.949 -0.015 0.170 0.928 
ACCESSIBILITY HIGH -0.129 0.140 0.313 -0.137 0.128 0.285 
RISK MODERATE -0.220 0.139 0.114 -0.222 0.140 0.112 
RISK LOW -0.125 0.139 0.373 -0.125 0.141 0.378 
DRUG STORE 0.161 0.157 0.304 0.160 0.155 0.304 
MOBILE PROVIDER 0.126 0.156 0.420 0.129 0.156 0.407 
GROCERY STORE -0.104 0.173 0.546 -0.106 0.172 0.537 
VILLAGE SHOP 0.137 0.215 0.524 0.132 0.212 0.534 
LENGTH OF OPERATION -0.010 0.005 0.077 -0.0100 0.006 0.076 
TOP SUPPLIER DELIVERS 0.052 0.107 0.625 0.045 0.107 0.670 
SALES VOLUMES -0.009 0.005 0.063 -0.010 0.005 0.055 
INJECTABLE 0.187 0.260 0.473 0.183 0.259 0.480 
DIHYDROARTEMISININ +PIPERAQUINE 0.097 0.267 0.718 0.070 0.257 0.785 
ARTEMISININ+PRIMAQUINE+PIPERAQUINE 0.403 0.229 0.080 0.309 0.230 0.181 
CHLOROQUINE 0.679 0.171 <0.001 0.683 0.171 <0.001 
QUININE 0.097 0.267 0.718 0.226 0.311 0.467 
MEFLOQUINE -0.378 0.246 0.125 -0.391 0.235 0.097 
SULPHADOXINE-PYRIMETHAMINE 0.169 0.224 0.452 0.263 0.229 0.251 
ARTESUNATE -0.505 0.142 <0.001 -0.514 0.141 <0.001 
ARTEMETHER -0.338 0.297 0.257 -0.338 0.298 0.257 
DIHYDROARTEMISININ -0.651 0.801 0.417 -0.648 0.794 0.415 
BRANDED -0.413 0.133 0.002 \ -0.417 0.133 0.002 
CONSTANT 4.444 0.275 <0.001 4.483 0.283 <0.001 
--
MRDSC_STRATUM is for stratum with suspected and confirmed multi-drug resistance; Shaded cells correspond to variables which were not relevant to the model 
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Out the nine hypotheses described in Table 7-7, only one was verified, with percent mark-ups 
higher on unbranded drugs than on branded products. In addition, our model predicted that 
compared to the ACT ASMQ, retail percent mark-ups were higher on chloroquine and lower on 
artesunate. These results suggest an inverse relationship between percent mark-ups and drug 
purchase prices, which is in line with findings from previous studies (Section 3.4.3). 
Other results were, from a classical economic theory perspective, surprising. Our model 
showed that retail price mark-ups were not significantly affected by market characteristics, 
notably market concentration measured by the HHI. However, given the heterogeneity of the 
markets under study (Le. across strata and in terms of concentration, accessibility and malaria 
transmission risk levels), mark-ups could be affected by particular predictors in different ways 
and different intensities in markets with different characteristics. Therefore, the following 
potential interaction effects were investigated: effect of HHI on retail percent mark-ups across 
strata, accessibility and risk levels (HHI*STRATUM, HHI*ACCESSIBILlTY, HHI*RISK); effect of 
accessibility/risk on mark-ups across strata and risk/accessibility 
(ACCESSIBILlTY*STRATUM, RISK*STRATUM, ACCESSIBILlTY*RISK}37. 
The following equation was estimated: 
Log MARK-UP=f30+f31HHI+f32STRATUM+f33ACCESSIBILlTY+f34RISK + f3s HHI*STRATUM+ 
f36 H HI * ACCESSI BI LlTY+ f37 H HI * RISK+ f38 STRATU M * ACCESSI BI LlTY+ f39 STRATU M * RISK+ 
levels 
f310 ACCESSIBILlTY*RISK+f311 OUTLET_ TYPE+f312 SUPPLlER_DELlVERS+ f313 TIME_IN_OPERATION + 
f314 GENERIC_TYPE +f31S BRAN D_STATUS+f316DOSAG E_FORM+f317 VOLUMES_SOLD +E 
The model was estimated by including a" interaction groups at once and by testing the 
statistical significance of their effect on retail percent mark-up using the F-test (adjusted Wald 
test). Where the effect of an interaction group was not statistically significant, the group was 
dropped and the model re-run to assess the effect on the remaining interaction groups and 
other estimates. Interaction groups with no significant effect on retail mark-ups were dropped 
one at the time and the process was repeated until the best model fit was identified. 
As before, the model was estimated using the HHI (our measure of market concentration) 
calculated on a" private and public sector antimalarial sales volumes and then on a" private 
37 to illustrate, STRATUM*ACCESSIBILITY is the interaction group including six interactions: interactions 
between each stratum (STRATUM_MDRSC and STRATUM_MDRF) and each of the 3 different levels of 
accessibility (ACCESSIBILITY_HIGH, ACCESSIBILITY_MODERATE; ACCESSIBILITY_LOW). 
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and public sector antimalarial sales values. The inclusion of interaction parameters between 
variables leads to different coefficient estimates for all variables and their interpretation is 
different to that in a model that does not include interactions (Kirkwood and Sterne, 2003). 
Appendix 13 provides a description of our calculation steps. Coefficients, standard errors and 
p-values of linear combinations of predictor variables were calculated using STATA 11 post-
estimation command lincom (StataCorp., 2009). Results are presented in Table 7-12. 
194 
Table 7-12: OLS log-linear regression model 0/ antimalarial retail price percent mark-ups, considering interactions between predictor variables 
Model using HHI calculated on private & public antimalarial sales volumes Model using HHI calculated on private & public antimalarial sales values 
(n=641, F<O.OOOl, R2=0.1748) (n=641, F<O.OOOl, R2=0.1898) 
Predictors Coefficient Standard Error Pvalue Coefficient Standard Error Pvalue 
HHI VOLUME -0.485 0.220 0.028 
HHI VALUE 
-0.121 0.196 0.536 
MDRSC STRATUM -0.500 0.150 0.001 -0.716 0.194 <0.001 
ACCESSIBILITY MODERATE -0.157 0.276 0.571 1.150 0.311 <0.001 
ACCESSIBILITY HIGH -0.177 0.226 0.443 -0.262 0.190 0.169 
ACCESSIBILITY MODERATE*HHI VOLUME 1.527 0.484 0.002 
ACCESSIBILITY HIGH*HHI VOLUME -0.400 0.439 0.362 
ACCESSIBILITY MODERATE*HHI VALUE - - -
ACCESSIBILITY HIGH*HHI VALUE 
- - -
MDRSC STRATUM*ACCESSIBILITY HIGH 1 0.660 0.232 0.005 0.788 0.269 0.004 
RISK MODERATE -0.208 0.139 0.135 0.095 0.200 0.637 
RISK LOW -0.121 0.142 0.395 0.019 0.215 0.929 
RISK MODERATE*ACCESSIBILITY MODERATE - - - -0.711 0.311 0.023 
RISK MODERATE*ACCESSIBILITY HIGH - - - -0.110 0.271 0.685 
RISK LOW*ACCESSIBILITY MODERATE - - - -0.707 0.323 0.029 
RISK LOW*ACCESSIBILITY HIGH - - - 0.345 0.281 0.221 
DRUG STORE 0.104 0.153 0.496 0.041 0.158 0.794 
MOBILE PROVIDER 0.022 0.149 0.880 0.069 0.152 0.649 
GROCERY STORE -0.184 0.169 0.277 -0.180 0.166 0.279 
VILLAGE SHOP 0.043 0.215 0.841 0.053 0.193 0.783 
LENGTH OF OPERATION ~ -0.010 0.005 0.082 -0.008 0.006 0.151 
TOP SUPPLIER DELIVERS 0.061 0.101 0.544 0.013 0.106 0.903 
SALESVOLUMES -0.009 0.005 0.065 -0.009 0.005 0.090 
INJECTABLE 0.192 0.266 0.471 0.255 0.247 0.304 
DIHYDROARTEMISININ +PIPERAQUINE 0.097 0.267 0.718 0.097 0.245 0.690 
ARTEMISININ+PRIMAQUINE+PIPERAQUINE 0.403 0.229 0.080 0.337 0.220 0.126 
CHLOROQUINE 0.745 0.170 <0.001 0.682 0.166 <0.001 
QUININE 0.097 0.267 0.718 0.289 0.305 0.344 
MEFLOQUINE -0.378 0.246 0.125 -0.438 0.261 0.094 
SULPHADOXINE-PYRIMETHAMINE 0.169 0.224 0.452 0.113 0.230 0.623 
ARTESUNATE -0.489 0.140 <0.001 -0.504 0.136 <0.001 
ARTEMETHER -0.307 0.303 0.312 -0.324 0.290 0.264 
DIHYDROARTEMISININ -0.643 0.702 0.360 -0.469 0.720 0.516 
BRANDED -0.376 0.128 0.004 -0.356 0.127 0.005 
CONSTANT 4.634 0.278 <0.001 4.302 0.274 <0.001 
MRDSC_STRATUM is stratum with suspected and confirmed multi-drug resistance; STRATUM_MDRSC*ACCESSIBILlTY_MODERATE omitted. STRATUM_MDRSC*ACCESSIBILlTY_MODERATE is used for estimating the 
difference between (i) effect of being sold in moderately accessible market compared to accessibility low market in MDRSC stratum and effect of being sold in moderately accessible market compared to accessibility low 
market in MDRF stratum [(mark-up access_mod - mark-up access low) MORSC- (mark-up access_mod - mark-up access low) MORF and (ii) difference between effect of being sold in MDRSC compared to MDRF in moderately accessible market 
and effect of being sold in MDRSC compared to M DRF in accessibility low market [(mark-up MORSC - mark-up MORF) ACCESS MOD - (mark-up MORSC - mark-Up MORd ACCESS LOW. The model estimated that (mark-up access_mod - mark-up 
access low) MORSC =( mark-up access_mod - mark-up access low) MORF stratum, and that mark-up MORSC - mark-up MORF ACCESS MOD = (mark-up MORSC - mark-up MORF) ACCESS LOW. Respectively these effects are included in the model as 
ACCESSIBILITY_MODERATE and STRATUM_MDRSC; "_" correspond to interactions for which the combined effect on retail percent mark-Up was not statistically significant. 
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Model of price mark-ups for all antimalarials estimated using HHI calculated on sales 
volumes. The model had a R2 of 0.1748. Compared to the model without interactions, similar 
results were obtained in terms of the marginal effect of antimalarial generic type, and brand 
status on retail percent mark-ups. In addition, retail mark-ups were significantly and differently 
affected by concentration and by strata in markets at different levels of accessibility. 
An increase of 0.1 in the HHI in moderately accessible markets was associated with percent 
mark-ups 13.7% higher (p<O.OOl) whilst in remote and accessible markets it was associated 
with mark-ups 4.9% (p=0.028) and 5.8% lower respectively (p=0.052) (Table 7-13). 
Table 7-13: Effect of /iffl on retail percent mark-ups across accessibility levels 
All antimalarials, HHI calculated on public and private sales volumes 
Effect of a increase (+0.1) in HHI across Coefficient P-value 
market accessibility levels 
ACCESSI BILITY _LOW -0.485 0.028 
ACCESSIBILITY_MODERATE 1.370 <0.001 
ACCESS I BILITY _H IG H -0.577 0.052 
. . Steps undertaken for calculating coeffiCients described Appendix 13 . 
In moderately accessible markets, the effect of concentration on retail mark-ups is in line with 
the predictions of classical economic theory, with higher mark-ups in more concentrated 
markets. By contrast, in remote markets and accessible areas, lower retail mark-ups in more 
concentrated markets may have reflected the importance of the role played by government in 
the provision of antimalarial drugs through better access to public sector healthcare services in 
these areas (in remote markets, this may have reflected the provision of malaria treatment by 
VMWS)38. In accessible markets, lower mark-ups in more concentrated markets may have 
reflected the greater contestability of accessible markets compared to remote ones and a 
strategy used by established shopkeepers to deter entry and maintain market power. Finally, 
.. 
private providers may have competed on quality instead of price if it can be assumed that 
consumers were more quality sensitive than price sensitive. In more concentrated markets, 
lower mark-ups could therefore reflect the lower costs being associated with less intense 
competition on quality. 
38 Government providers were treated as one provider in each market and their sales volumes were 
summed. 
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Perhaps, more importantly, retail mark-ups in remote and moderately accessible markets in 
the MORF stratum were 50% (p<O.OOl) higher than those in the MORSC stratum (Table 7-14). 
This result may have reflected higher transport costs for getting antimalarial supplies in 
remote and moderately accessible market segments of the MORF stratum compared to those 
of the MSRSC stratum. As shown in Chapter 6, retailers located in the MORF stratum were less 
likely than those in the MORSC stratum to report that one 'of their top 2 suppliers for 
antimalarials delivered orders (Table 6-13). Also remote markets in the MORF stratum were on 
average more remote than those in the MORSC stratum. In the former, shopkeepers had to 
travel for 6 hours (IQR 5.0-8.2) to reach the closest commercial centres whilst in the latter for 
4.5 hours (IQR 4.7-5.0). 
Table 7-14: Effect of strata on retail percent mark-ups across market accessibility levels 
All antimalarials, HHI calculated on public and private sales volumes 
Effect of strata across accessibility levels Coefficient P-value 
ACCESSI BILllY _LOW -0.500 <0.001 
ACCESSI BILllY _MODERATE -0.500 <0.001 
ACCESSI BI LIlY _H IG H 0.159 0.342 
MORse is stratum with suspected and confirmed multi-drug resistance; MORF is stratum 
without multi-drug resistance; Effect in MORSe stratum compared to baseline MORF stratum; 
Steps undertaken for calculating coefficients described Appendix 13. 
Model of price mark-ups for all antimalarials estimated using HHI calculated on sales values. 
The model had a R2 of 0.1898 (Table 7-12). Compared to the previous model, similar results 
were obtained in terms of the relative and marginal effects of antimalarial generic type, brand 
status and strata 39 on retail percent price mark-Ups. There were also 3 additional important 
results. 
First, retail mark-ups were not Significantly affected by market concentration as measured by 
.. 
the HHI in this study. Second, retail mark-ups were affected significantly and differently by 
accessibility in markets at different levels of malaria transmission risk (Table 7-15). Retail 
percent mark-ups were: 
• 115.0% (p<O.OOl) higher in moderately accessible segments than in remote segments 
in high transmission risk markets. 
• 43.8% (p=0.02) higher in moderately accessible segments than in remote segments in 
moderate risk markets. 
39 Results on effect of strata on price mark-ups detailed in Appendix 13, Table A.13.1 
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These results are difficult to interpret. They may have reflected the focus of malaria control 
activities in high risk and remote market segments, through the provision of free diagnosis and 
treatment, which as suggested during 551s, tempered the exercise of market power. 
Table 7-15: Effects of accessibility on retail percent mark-ups across malaria risk levels 
All antimalarials, HHI calculated on public and private sales values 
Effects of accessibility across markets at different Coefficient P-value 
risk of malaria transmission 
RISK_HIGH 
ACCESS I BI L1TY _LOW (omitted) 
ACCESSIBILITY_MODERATE 1.150 <0.001 
ACCESS I BILITY _H IG H -0.262 0.169 
RISK_MODERATE 
ACCESSIBILITY_LOW (omitted) 
ACCESSIBILITY_MODERATE 0.438 0.020 
ACCESS I BI L1TY _H IG H -0.372 0.100 
RISK_LOW 
ACCESSIBILITY_LOW (omitted) 
ACCESSIBILITY_MODERATE 0.442 0.120 
ACCESSIBILITY_HIGH 0.083 0.718 
. . Steps undertaken for calculating coefficients described Appendix 13 . 
Third, retail mark-ups were affected significantly and differently by malaria transmission risk in 
markets at different levels of accessibility (Table 7-16). Retail percent price mark-ups were: 
• 115.0% (p<0.001) lower in high risk than in moderate risk segments in remote markets. 
Again, this may have reflected competitive pressures from public sector supply on 
retailers' pricing decisions, as suggested during 551s. 
• 61.6% (p=0.020) and 68.7% (p=0.011) higher in high risk than in moderate and low risk 
segments respectively in moderately accessible markets. This may have reflected 
lower transport costs for getting antimalarial supplies in low risk and moderately 
accessible markets given that shopkeepers in these market segments were more likely 
to report a supplier for antimalarial drugs with delivery services (Table 6-13) 
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Table7-16: Effects of malaria transmission risk on retail mark-ups across market accessibility 
levels 
All antimalarials, HHI calculated on public and private sales values 
Effects of transmission risk in markets at different Coefficient P-value 
accessibility levels 
ACCESSIBILITY_LOW 
RISK_HIGH (omitted) 
RISK_MODERATE 1.150 <0.001 
RISK_LOW 0.019 0.929 
ACCESSIBILITY_MODERATE 
RISK_HIGH (omitted) 
RISK_MODERATE -0.616 0.027 
RISK_LOW -0.687 0.011 
ACCESSIBILITY_HIGH 
RISK_HIGH (omitted) 
RISK_MODERATE -0.015 0.935 
RISK_LOW 0.083 0.718 
Steps undertaken for calculatmg coefficients described AppendIx 13. 
The final models were re-estimated for the ACT ASMQ alone in order to assess the extent to 
which the retail mark-up variations explained by our model were influenced by antimalarial 
generic drug type. The focus is on ASMQ as it was at the time of the study the first line 
treatment for P.f and the most commonly dispensed antimalarial drug. Table 7-17 describes 
the model. Table 7-18 presents the results, supplemented by additional Tables in Appendix 13 
for the calculation of coefficients. The results are interpreted for the model estimated using 
HHI calculated on sales volumes first followed by the model using HHI calculated on sales 
values. 
Model of price mark-ups for ACT ASMQ only estimated using HHI calculated on sales 
volumes. The model had a R2 of 0.1460 (Table 7-18) and most of the results were similar to 
those of the model estimated on all antimalarial drugs presented in Table 7-12, although the 
marginal effects of accessibility levels and concentration on ASMQ mark-ups were larger. 
Retail mark-ups were 53.5% higher on ASMQ sold in remote and moderately accessible 
segments in MDRF markets than those in MDRSC markets (p<O.OOl) (Appendix 13, Table 
A.13.2). An increase of 0.1 in the HHI increased mark-ups by 17.6% in moderately accessible 
markets (p<O.OOl) whilst in remote areas it decreased mark-ups by 9.8% (p=0.002) (Appendix 
13, Table A.13.3). v 
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Table 7-17: Description of the regression model of ASMQ retail percent price mark-ups only 
VARIABLE DEFINITION MEAN 
Outcome variable 
LOG MARK-UP AETD Log of percent mark-up 3.76 
Predictor variables 
HHI_VOLUME Hirschman Herfindahl index on private and public 0.33 
sector antimalarial sales volumes by markee 
HH,-VALUE Hirschman Herfindahl index on private and public 0.32 
sector antimalarial sales values by markee 
SALES VOLUME Antimalarial volume sold the previous week (AETD) 1.76 
LENGTH_OF _OPERATION Number of years respondents have been in 10.4 
operation in that business (years) 
MARKET'S ACCESSIBILITY LEVEL 
ACCESSIBILITY LOW (omitted) 1 if market is remote 0.20 
ACCESSIBILITY MODERATE 1 if market is moderately accessible 0.44 
ACCESSIBILITY HIGH 1 if market is accessible 0.36 
MARKET'S MALARIA TRANSMISSION RISK 
RISK HIGH (omitted) 1 if market is at high malaria transmission risk 0.21 
RISK MODERATE 1 if market is at moderate malaria transmission risk 0.37 
RISK LOW 1 if market is at low malaria transmission risk 0.41 
STRATUM 
MDRF STRATUM (omitted) 1 if stratum is MDR-Free 0.36 
MDRSC STRATUM 1 if stratum is MDR-Suspected/Confirmed 0.63 
OUTLET TYPE 
PHARMACY/CLINICAL PHARMACY (omitted) 1 if outlet is pharmacy/clinical pharmacy 0.27 
DRUG STORE 1 if outlet is drug store 0.23 
MOBILE PROVIDER 1 if outlet is mobile provider 0.23 
GROCERY STORE 1 if outlet grocery store 0.13 
VILLAGE SHOP 1 if outlet is village shop 0.14 
WHOLESALE DELIVERIES 
TOP SUPPLIER DELIVERS 1 if at least one top supplier delivers 0.45 
TOP SUPPLIER DOES NOT DELIVER 1 if none of the top 2 suppliers deliver 0.55 
1 ... Market definition IS presented In Chapter s. Source: ACTwatch as data In 38 sub-districts, June 2009 
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Table 7·18: OLS log-linear regression of ASMQ retail price percent mark-ups, considering interactions between predictor variables 
Model using HHI calculated on private & public Model using HHI calculated on private & public 
antimalarial sales volumes antimalarial sales values 
(n=336, F<O.OOOO, R2=0.1460) (n=336 F<O.OOOO, R2=0.1348) 
Predictors Coefficient Standard Error P value Coefficient Standard Error P value 
HHI VOLUME -0.980 0.319 0.002 
HHI VALUE -0.128 0.245 0.959 
MDRSC STRATUM -0.536 0.159 0.001 -0.723 0.189 <0.001 
ACCESSIBILITY MODERATE -0.77 0.315 0.015 0.965 0.359 0.008 
ACCESSIBILITY HIGH -0.70 0.316 0.027 -0.343 0.286 0.232 
I ACCESSIBILITY MODERATE* HHI VOLUME 2.537 0.656 <0.001 
ACCESSIBILITY HIGH*HHI VOLUME 0.647 0.659 0.327 
ACCESSIBILITY MODERATE*HHI VALUE - - -
ACCESSIBILITY HIGH*HHI VALUE - - -
MDRSC STRATUM*ACCESSIBILITY HIGH 0.794 0.256 0.002 0.969 0.288 0.001 
RISK MODERATE -0.062 0.150 0.682 0.228 0.300 0.447 
RISK LOW 0.108 0.163 0.509 0.362 0.342 0.291 
RISK MODERATE*ACCESSIBILITY _MODERATE - - - -0.557 0.400 0.166 
RISK MODERATE*ACCESSIBILITY _HIGH - - - -0.047 0.373 0.899 
RISK LOW*ACCESSIBILITY MODERATE - - - -0.866 0.432 0.047 
RISK LOW*ACCESSIBILITY HIGH - - - 0.154 0.401 0.701 
DRUG STORE 0.314 0.204 0.126 0.235 0.200 0.240 
MOBILE PROVIDER -0.126 0.184 0.484 -0.013 0.186 0.941 
GROCERY STORE -0.186 0.214 0.385 -0.153 0.213 0.473 
VILLAGE SHOP -0.402 0.202 0.048 -0.354 0.225 0.118 
LENGTH OF OPERATION -0.012 0.005 0.027 -0.009 0.007 0.140 
TOP SUPPLIER DELIVERS 0.187 0.130 0.153 0.096 0.136 0.481 
SALESVOLUMES 0.002 0.012 0.896 0.006 0.013 0.659 
CONSTANT 4.503 0.304 <0.001 3.832 0.321 <0.001 
MRDSC_STRATUM is stratum with suspected and confirmed multi-drug resistance; STRATUM_MDRSC*ACCESSIBILlTY_MODERATE omitted. STRATUM_MDRSC*ACCESSIBILlTY_MODERATE is used for estimating the 
difference between (i) effect of being sold in moderately accessible market compared to accessibility low market in MDRSC stratum and effect of being sold in moderately accessible market compared to accessibility 
low market in M DRF stratum [(mark-up access_mod - mark-up access low) MORSC - (mark-up access_mod - mark-Up access low) MORF and (ii) difference between effect of being sold in MDRSC compared to MDRF in moderately accessible 
market and effect of being sold in MDRSC compared to MDRF in accessibility low market [(mark-up MORSC - mark-up MORF ) ACCESS MOD - (mark-up MORSC - mark-up MORF ) ACCESS l OW. The model estimated that (mark-up access_mod -
mark-up access low) MORSC =( mark-up access_mod - mark-up access low) MORF stratum, and that (mark-up MORSC - mark-up MORF ) ACCESS MOD = (mark-up MORSC - mark-up MORF ) ACCESS lOW. Respectively these effects appear in the model as 
ACCESSIBILITY_MODERATE and STRATUM_MDRSC;"- " corresponds to interactions for which the combined effect on retail percent mark-ups was not statistically significant. 
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There were three additional results. The first is that retail mark-ups were significantly and 
differently affected by accessibility in the MORF and MORSC strata. In the MORF stratum, being 
sold in a remote market increased retail mark-ups by 77.2% compared to moderately 
accessible markets (p=0.015) and by 70.5% compared to accessible markets (p=0.027) (Table 7-
19). In MORSC stratum, being sold in a remote market also increased retail mark-ups by 77.2% 
compared to moderately accessible markets (p=0.015) (Table' 7-19). As supposed earlier, 
shopkeepers operating in remote markets and in the MORF stratum may have faced higher 
transport costs for getting ASMQ supplies as they were less likely to report a supplier who 
delivered orders (Table 6-13). 
Table 7-19: Effects of accessibility on ASMQ retail percent mark-ups across strata 
ASMQ only, HHI calculated on public and private sales volumes 
Effect of accessibility on retail mark-ups across Coefficient P-value 
the 2 strata 
MORF STRATUM 
ACCESSIBILITY MODERATE -0.772 0.015 
ACCESSIBILITY HIGH -0.705 0.027 
MORSC STRATUM 
ACCESSIBILITY MODERATE l -0.772 0.015 
ACCESSIBILITY HIGH 0.089 0.789 
MORSC_STRATUM IS stratum With suspected and confirmed multi-drug resistance; MORF IS stratum 
without multi-drug resistance; Steps undertaken for calculating coefficients described Appendix 13. 
Isee footnote Table 7-12. 
The second result is that retail mark-ups on ASMQ were significantly affected by outlet type, 
with mark-ups 40.2% lower at village shops than at pharmacies/clinical pharmacies (p=0.048) 
(Table 7-18). Retail mark-ups at village shops were Significantly lower than at drug shops 
(F-test=0.03) but not significantly different than at grocery stores or mobile provider outlets. 
Overall, mark-ups on ASMQ were the highest at pharmacies/clinical pharmacies and drug 
shops, although it did not translate into higher consumer prices as has reported in Table 3-3 
(ACTwatch Group, 2009b) because these providers paid significantly lower prices for their 
ASMQ supplies than other provider types .. did (Table 7-4). In the case of pharmacies/clinical 
pharmacies this likely reflected the situation where these providers were significantly more 
likely to report PSI Cambodia as a top supplier compared to other retailer types (Section 6.3.4). 
The third and last result is that an increase of 1 year in outlet's length of operation decreased 
mark-ups by 1.2% (p=0.027) (Table 7-18). This is in contradiction with our hypothesis that long-
established prov~ders may use market power to charge higher mark-ups. Providers in 
operation for longer may have charged lower mark-ups in order to deter potential competitors 
from entering the market. Conversely, these providers may have been in operation for longer 
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because they charged lower mark-ups thereby increasing demand for their products and being 
overall more successful. Finally, they may also have been motivated by other objectives than 
profit maximization such as for example serving their communities. 
Model of price mark-ups for ACT ASMQ only estimated using HHI calculated on sales values. 
The model had a R2 of 0.1348 (Table 7-18) and, again, most results were similar to those 
obtained with the model considering all antimalarial drugs (Table 7-12). For instance, retail 
mark-ups were significantly higher in remote and moderately markets of the MORF stratum 
than in those of the MORSC stratum, although with a larger marginal effect (72.3%, p<0.001) 
(Appendix 13, Table A.13.4). The only difference between the two models was that the 
interaction group ACCESSIBILlTY*RISK had no significant effect on ASMQ mark-ups (F-
test=0.07). Finally, compared to the model of ASMQ mark-ups that considered the HHI 
calculated on antimalarial sales volumes, outlet type and outlet's length of operation had no 
significant effect on retail percent mark-ups. 
Table 7-20 summarises the results of the quantitative analysis of retail percent mark-ups on all 
antimalarial drugs and on ASMQ. There were 7 key results: 
• Higher antimalarial mark-ups in market segments in which shopkeepers were less 
likely to report a supplier with delivery services (i.e remote, MORF, higher risk 
segments) (Table 6-13). 
• Higher ACT mark-ups at pharmacies/clinical pharmacies and drug shops than at other 
retail outlet types. This did not however translate into higher consumer prices (Table 
3-3) because these providers purchased ACT at lower prices than other retailer types 
(Table 7-4). This may have reflected higher proportions of pharmacies/clinical 
pharmacies and drug shops reporting a supplier who delivered orders (Table 6-13), 
with pharmacies/clinical pharmacies significantly more likely to report PSI Cambodia as 
one of their top two suppliers for antimalarial drugs (Section 6.3.4). 
• Lower mark-ups in high risk segment of remote markets and similarly lower mark-ups 
in remote segments of high risk markets - perhaps reflecting the effect of government 
supply in t.hese areas on retailers' pricing. 
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• Evidence of a positive relationship between concentration and mark-ups in moderately 
accessible segment whilst a negative relationship was observed in remote and 
accessible segments - in the latter the evidence was relatively weak (as shown by p-
values) and the effects relatively small. 
• Higher antimalarial retail mark-ups on unbranded antimalarials than on branded 
products as has been observed in other settings (Section 3.4.3). 
• Higher price percent mark-ups on ASMQ than on artesunate (an AMT), but with higher 
purchase prices this translated to higher absolute price mark-ups on artesunate (2 to 5 
times higher) and higher consumer prices (2 to 3 times higher) compared to ASMQ 
(Table 2-3). 
• Retail price percent mark-ups on injectable antimalarial were not statistically different 
than on antimalarial tablets. However, evidence showed that absoll:lte price mark-ups 
on AMT injection were 6 to 26 times higher than on ASMQ tablet, which translated 
into higher consumer prices (Tables 2-3 and 7-6) 
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Table 7-20: Summary of the effects of market, outlet and product characteristics on retail 
percent mark-ups 
Modell I HHI calculated on antimalarial sales volumes I HHI calculated on antimalarial sales values I ALL ANTIMALARIALS I ASMQonly I ALL ANTIMALARIALS I ASMQonly 
Predictor variable & statistically significant effect on price mark-ups: 
In more +13.7% (p<0.001) in +17.6% (p<0.001) in - -
concentrated moderately accessible moderately accessible 
markets segments segments 
(+0.1 in HHI) -S.8% (p=0.052) in -9.8%(p=0.002) in 
accessible segments remote segments 
-4.9% (p=0.028) in (Appendix 13 Table 
remote segments A.13.3) 
(Table 7-13). 
In more remote - +77.2% (p=0.015) -l1S% (p<0.001) -
markets compared to moderate compared to 
accessible markets in moderately accessible 
MORF and MOR markets in high risk 
segments segments 
+70.S% (p=0.027) -43.8% (p=0.02) 
compared to accessible compared to 
markets in MORF moderately accessible 
segment (Table 7-19) markets in moderate 
risk segments 
(Table 7-15) 
In markets at - - -l1S%(p<O.OOl) -
higher risk compared to 
moderate risk 
markets in remote 
segments; +61.6% 
(p=0.027) compared 
to moderate risk 
markets and +68.7% 
(p=O.Ol1) compared 
to low risk markets in 
moderately accessible 
segments (Table 7-16) 
In the MDRF +SO.O (p<0.001) in +S3.S% (p<0.001)in +71.6% (p<0.001) in +72.3% (p=0.001) 
stratum remote and moderately remote and moderately remote and in remote and 
accessible markets accessible markets moderately accessible moderately 
compared to those in compared to those in segments compared accessible 
MORSC (Table 7-14) MORSC to those in MORSC segments 
(Appendix 13, Table (Appendix 13, Table compared to those 
A.13.2) A.13.1) in MORSC 
(Appendix 13, 
Table A.13.4) 
Pharmacy/clinical - +40.2%(p=0.048) - -
pharmacy compared to village 
shops (Table 7-18) 
In outlets in - -1.2% (p=0.027) - -
opera.tion for (Table 7-18) 
longer (+1 year) 
ACTAMSQ -74.S% (p<0.001) -68.2% (p<0.001) 
compared to compared to 
chloroquine chloroquine and 
+48.9% (p<0.001) +SO.4% (p<0.001) 
compared to artesunate compared to 
(Table 7-12) artesunate 
Branded -3S.6% (p=0.004) -37.6%(p=0.004) 
compared to compared to 
unbranded(Table 7-12) unbranded 
ACT ASMQ is artemisinin combination therapy artesunate and mefloquine; MORSC is multi-drug resistance 
confirmed or suspected; MORF is multi drug resistance free; Shaded cells correspond to predictors that were no 
relevant to the model. Source: ACTwatch Outlet Survey data, 38 sub-districts, June 2009 
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7.5 Summary 
This chapter has described retailers' and wholesalers' price setting behaviour as perceived by 
providers themselves, presented purchase prices and price mark-ups for different antimalarial 
categories and for RDT and analysed retail percent mark-up determinants. Results indicated 
that retail percent price mark-ups were affected by market, product and outlet characteristics 
but to different degrees in different segments of the market. These results demonstrated the 
heterogeneity of retail markets for malaria treatment and highlighted the influence of 
distribution chain structure and wholesalers' conduct. These results will be discussed in 
Chapter 9. The thesis now turns to a comparative analysis of different methods for studying 
antimalarial wholesalers and retailers. 
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CHAPTER 8 COMPARATIVE ANALYSES OF DIFFERENT 
METHODS FOR STUDYING ANTIMALARIAL RETAILERS AND 
WHOLESALERS 
8.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to compare different methods for identifying and sampling 
wholesalers and measuring retail and wholesale sales volumes. We focus on these 2 particular 
methodological issues because they are important first steps in the study of competition in 
markets for malaria treatment. In Chapter 3, the review of methods for identifying and 
sampling wholesalers found that the "bottom-up" approach, which consists of asking providers 
to identify their supply sources, has been the common approach for identifying wholesalers 
but that key challenges emerge with regards to whether all providers had ~een identified and 
how a representative sample can be drawn under this uncertainty. As for measuring sales 
volumes, there is limited evidence on which of the reviewed methods may provide the most 
accurate estimates at retail and wholesale outlets. 
This chapter is structured in 2 parts. The first part looks at a range of methods for identifying 
and sampling wholesale providers whilst the second focuses on methods for measuring retail 
and wholesale sales volumes. In the first part, four different methods for identifying and 
sampling antimalarial wholesalers are assessed, including the use of official lists of registered 
drug providers, key informant interviews, the "bottom-up" method and the snowball census. 
The focus is on wholesalers rather than retailers because the former have been less 
researched and the relevance of methods appropriate for identifying and sampling retailers is 
unknown at higher levels of the chain ... In the second part, two methods for measuring 
antimalarial sales volumes are compared, namely the recall method that was used during the 
ACTwatch Outlet Survey (OS) and Supply Chain Survey (SCS) and the retail audit technique, 
which are together referred as the Sales Level Survey (SLS). The focus is on both wholesale and 
retail outlets because few studies have measured sales volumes at either level and the relative 
effectiveness of each method is unknown. Each of the 2 parts of this chapter describes the 
range of methods to be assessed, the data collection process, and the results in terms of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the different methods. 
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8.2 Comparing four methods for identifying and sampling wholesalers 
8.2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, six methods for identifying and sampling providers were reviewed: use of existing 
lists of providers, key informant interviews, outlet census, provider interviews, review of sales 
receipts and household survey. Provider listings, key informant interviews, provider interviews 
and review of sales receipts have been used for identifying both wholesale and retail outlets 
whilst outlet census and household survey have been used for identifying retailers only. 
However, there is limited evidence on the relevance of each of these methods and on how 
they compare to one another. This gap is addressed in the next sections. 
8.2.2 Methods for data collection and analysis 
At the retail level, the census method appears to be the most reliable approach for measuring 
the number of antimalarial providers in a given area. Both formal and informal providers 
operating at the time of the census can be captured. The census relies however on the 
inclusion of all relevant types of outlets that may stock antimalarials and the diligence of 
survey fieldworkers in visiting all outlets. The census is also a costly method and is therefore 
generally conducted in small areas and rarely at national level as it would require extensive 
resources. 
Overall, the appropriateness of the census method for identifying wholesalers is questionable. 
We do not know which outlets may act as wholesalers given that retailers often also wholesale 
and we do not know where outlets may be located, for example, in which towns, or which 
parts of towns. In Cambodia, only in the capital city, Phnom Penh, were wholesalers 
concentrated in one area called Olympic. Using the census for identifying and sampling 
wholesalers therefore implies that large areas would need to be scrutinised, a process which 
would likely be relatively costly. As for the household survey, it is relevant for identifying 
retailers visited for treating malaria symptoms but unlikely to be so for wholesalers who may 
trade bulk quantities only, notably at higher levels of the chain. 
When developing this study, two other methods, which were not identified during the review 
described in Chapter 2, were considered, namely the use of customer lists and exit interviews 
208 
outside wholesale shops to identify the wholesale businesses that purchased from higher level 
wholesalers. 
The use of customer lists may be limited by the availability of such lists, although one could 
argue that they may be more frequently found at wholesale than at retail outlets given that 
wholesalers may deliver orders to their customers and therefore keep customers' names and 
addresses (Rik Bosman and Prashant Yadav, personal communications,). However, in 
Cambodia, the proportion of wholesalers who reported delivering antimalarials to customers 
varied across chain levels and overall only a small proportion of wholesalers did so (around 
one-fifth at the level supplying retailers and less than half at the level supplying other 
wholesalers) (Chapter 6). The availability of customer lists for identifying wholesalers was 
therefore doubtful. Furthermore, if such lists were kept, wholesalers could be reluctant to 
share them with interviewers, for confidentiality issues and fear that their lists could be shared 
with competitors. Finally, where accessible, customer lists could be out dated or with 
incomplete information. The use of such lists was therefore considered to be generally 
inappropriate. 
As for exit interviews outside wholesale shops, the main challenge in Cambodia was that 
antimalarials were often reported by wholesalers themselves to represent a small share of 
their total business, implying that interviewers may have to wait many days outside a shop 
before they can identify a wholesale antimalarial customer. 
"Customers for antimalarials do not come every day but every 5 to 10 days" (Wholesaler 
supplying retailers #9, MDRF stratum) 
Other challenges with exit interviews are that not all shopkeepers may accept having 
interviewers standing outside their shops,,,and customers may be in a rush when leaving the 
shop. or reluctant to share information on their name, address and products purchased 
(although such reluctance can be an issue for any provider survey). Perhaps, more importantly, 
the main challenge shared by the use of customer lists and exit interviews is that a sample of 
higher level wholesalers must first be identified in order to use these approaches! 
In summary, outlet census, household survey, use of customer lists and exit interviews can be 
ruled out as feasible and effective methods for identifying and sampling antimalarial 
wholesalers. 
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As for the use of outlet sales receipts, which have been used for identifying wholesalers in 
Kenya (Tavrow et aI., 2003), their relevance will be explored in the second part of this chapter 
because they can also potentially be used for measuring sales volumes. 
In this context, the first part of this chapter explores the relevance of the remaining potential 
options for identifying ad sampling wholesalers: using official lists and conducting key 
informant interviews, supplemented with two methods developed for addressing the peculiar 
challenge of identifying and sampling wholesale businesses: the "snowball census technique" 
and the "bottom-up" method (Chapter 4 and described in more detail later in this chapter). 
The appropriateness of each method for identifying and sampling wholesalers is explored 
through a SWOT analysis by assessing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of 
each approach. For the purpose of this study, the strengths and weaknesses of a particular 
method refer to its practical implementation pros and cons. For example, one of the strengths 
(implementation pro) of using existing lists of providers available from commercial 
organizations (e.g. IMS Health) would be that data for identifying and sampling providers are 
easily collected, whilst a weakness (implementation con) would be the cost of purchasing 
these data. Opportunities and threats relate to the nature of the data collected such that for 
example using existing lists offers the opportunity for collecting additional information on each 
outlet, for example, providers' characteristics, whilst a threat may be that the list is incomplete 
because data have been collected for a particular type of outlet or geographical area. 
For the comparative analysis, key findings from the SWOT analysis are summarised using a 
spider diagram for each method, which was developed using a rough ranking of relative 
performance of each method in comparison of the other 3 methods on two dimensions: the 
nature of data collected (shape of the chain for antimalarial drugs; total wholesalers in the 
chain serving the study areas; number of antimalarial wholesalers operating in a particular 
area, antimalarial wholesaler level of operation; antimalarial wholesaler's name and location; 
informal wholesalers) and implementation speed and cost. 
The next sections describe in turn the use of official lists, key informant interviews, snowball 
census techniqu: and bottom-up approach for identifying and sampling wholesalers. Then, the 
4 methods are compared. 
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8.2.3 Results 
8.2.3.1 Using official lists 
The appropriateness of official lists for identifying and sampling wholesalers was assessed 
using two sets of lists. 
The first set, kept at the Ministry of Health's (MOH) headquarters in Phnom Penh, included 3 
lists: (i) a list of companies registered to import pharmaceutical drugs and medical equipment; 
(ii) a list of import permits delivered to registered importers before each shipment; and (iii) a 
list of antimalarial drugs registered for importation and in-country distribution and sales, which 
included, for each registered drug, the name of the local company that had completed the 
drug registration process. For locally manufactured drugs, the registration process was, at the 
time of this study, conducted by the manufacturer and for drugs manufactured outside 
Cambodia by one importer on behalf of the manufacturer (Chapter 6). 
The second set of lists, which were available from MOH's provincial health departments 
(PHDs), included the lists of drug outlets registered to wholesale and/or retail pharmaceutical 
drugs in each province. At the time of this study, there were no other sources of drug outlet 
lists, such as, for example, those developed by commercial institutions or previous studies. 
The collection of the first set of lists was conducted in May 2009 and repeated in October 2009 
in order to capture potential updates of the lists that could have occurred since the earlier 
visit. Official lists collected in Khmer were translated into English by a local researcher before 
the analysis. 
Of the first set of lists kept at the MOH's headquarters, two were successfully collected: (i) the 
list of companies registered to import pharmaceutical drugs and medical equipment and (iii) 
the list of registered pharmaceutical drugs. As for (ii), the list of import permits delivered to 
registered companies before each shipment, it could not be accessed. Reasons for this were 
unclear but Government authorities may have been suspicious of the ways this list would be 
used and of the overall objectives of our study. All the collected lists were in English. 
Of the 2 available lists at the MOH's headquarters, the list of registered importers provided, 
for each company, information on the name of the company, name of the pharmacist in 
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charge in the company, address and telephone number of the company, MOH registration 
number and registration date of expiration. There were 156 importers listed. For several 
importers, the registration's expiry date had passed, with for example 4 importers for which 
registration had expired in 1999. From this list, it was not possible to tell whether these 
importers were not registered anymore or whether they were registered and the registration 
date of expiry had not been updated. The list was collected in August 2009 but was dated 
November 2008 so it may also have omitted importers who had recently received registration 
or were in the process of receiving registration. It was also not possible to distinguish 
companies that imported antimalarial drugs from those that imported other pharmaceutical 
drugs in general or medical equipment. 
The list of antimalarial drugs provided information on the product brand name, active 
ingredient(s) and strength, dosage form, pack size, manufacturer name, country of 
manufacture, registration date and registration expiry date. The list was dated 23rd July 2009, 
implying that the information it contained had been updated relatively recently at the time of 
this study. 
Using this list, it was possible to calculate the number of antimalarials manufactured locally 
and the number that were imported. From there, whilst the list did not provide information on 
the name of the importer, it was possible to approximate the number of companies that 
imported antimalarial drugs, by using our knowledge about importers' business practices in 
Cambodia. Out of 26 antimalarial drugs registered, 6 were produced locally and 20 imported. 
Semi-structured interviews (SSls) with wholesalers had revealed that those who imported 
antimalarial drugs acted as the local agent of one foreign manufacturer, each generally 
producing one antimalarial product (Chapter 6). This therefore implied that 20 wholesalers 
imported antimalarial drugs. However, for 3 antimalarials manufactured overseas, registration 
and expiry dates were missing and for 11 r.egistration expiry dates had passed by several years. 
Taking this into account, there were 6 registered importers of antimalarials drugs at the time 
of the study. However, 2 were registered to import artemisinin monotherapies (AMT), for 
which registration had been revoked following the ban on AMT in November 2008. Accounting 
for this, the number of registered antimalarial importers was estimated to be 4. 
As for the lists a~ailable at PHDs, 8 lists out of a total of 24 were collected. Due to financial and 
time constraints, lists were collected during the SCS that took place in 16 of the 24 malaria 
endemic provinces. Consequently, 8 provinces were not visited and lists could not be collected. 
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Furthermore, for the 16 provinces visited, we collected lists for 8 provinces and for the other 8 
lists were not accessible: in 7 provinces, PHDs were closed or the relevant officer in charge was 
not available at the time of our visits and in 1 province, Bantey Meanchey, there was no PHD 
and the registration of drug outlets was handled in the neighbouring province of Siem Reap, 
from where, however, there was no available list of registered outlets for Bantey Meanchey 
province. Available lists were in Khmer and translated into English by a local researcher before 
analysis. The information provided by the lists was relatively consistent across provinces, 
although the overall layout varied. Lists were generally stratified by district, providing 
information on district population, number of outlets registered, and outlet name, name of 
person in charge, name of owner, address and license expiry date. One list also provided 
information on outlets that awaited registration and another on the type of service provided, 
such as drug sales only (e.g. pharmacies) or drug sales and treatment services (e.g. clinical 
pharmacy). Information on license expiry date was sometimes missing or expiry dates had 
passed. Furthermore, in many cases, some districts were actually missing from the lists. It 
could have been that no outlets were registered in these areas or the lists for particular 
districts may have been kept separately. Table 8-1 presents the number of registered outlets 
identified by province and district. From the lists, it was not possible to distinguish outlets that 
wholesale drugs from those that retail only. 
Table 8-1: Registered drug outlets in lists collected at Provincial Health Departments 
-
Number of registered retail and/or 
wholesale outlets listed 
Province District 
Phnom Penh Chamkar Morn 147 
Toul Kork 78 
Kampong Cham Chamkar Leu 13 
Prey Chhor 17 
Kratie Kracheh 0 
Sambour 0 
Steung Treng Thalabarivat n/c 
Steung Treng 2 
Siem Reap Siem Reap 49 
Varin n/c 
. Puok 2 
Kralanh 1 
Angkor Chum n/c 
Kampong Thorn Stoung n/c 
Prasat Sambo n/c 
Steung Sen 18 
Santuk n/c 
Baray 4 
Preah Vihear Tbaeng Meanchey 11 
" 
Rovieng n/c 
Choam Ksant 6 
Koh Kong Koh Kong 3 
n/c =not collected, In the case of an area for which the list of registered outlets was missing. 
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Surprisingly, in a couple of provinces, lists were also available for outlets that operated without 
licenses. PHD and district authorities reported developing these lists for informational 
purposes and in efforts towards regulating and/or working with private drug providers. These 
lists provided the same scope of information as those for registered outlets. The reliability of 
the data they provided was, however, as questionable as that of official lists. 
The SWOT analysis for the use of official lists for identifying and sampling antimalarial drug 
wholesalers is presented in Figure 8-1, which summarises this section's findings. It shows that 
collecting official lists is a simple process but that it requires financial and human resources 
and time if lists are not centrally kept. Furthermore, lists may not always exist nor be accessed. 
Official lists of outlets that operate without a license can be available, albeit in rare occasions, 
and providers' location is, at times, available. Official list data are however generally outdated, 
and do not distinguish between outlets that sell drugs wholesale and handle antimalarial drugs 
to others that do not. These are clearly important limitations if a representative sample of 
antimalarial wholesalers is to be drawn from official lists for the purpose of a research study. 
Figure 8-1: Using official lists: a SWOT analysis 
lone provincial department did not keep lists of registered outlets. 2Ministry of Health provincial departments could 
not be visited and the list of import permits could not be accessed at the Ministry of Health 
The next section explores the appropriateness of key informant interviews (KKls) for 
identifying and sampling wholesalers as well as the potential for combining key informant 
interviews with official lists. 
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8.2.3.2 Conducting key informant interviews 
Table 8-2 gives an overview of interviews conducted with 10 key informants in order to 
identify and sample antimalarial wholesalers. The topic guide used for conducting these 
interviews is available in Appendix 4. 
Table 8-2: Overview of key informant interviews 
Interview date & location Informant's organization Number of informants 
identifiers interviewed 
March 2008 - Workshop to CNM 3 
launch the ACTwatch Study PSI Cambodia 2 
in Nairobi, Kenya 
CNM 1 
April/May 2009 - Cambodia DDF 3 
PSI Cambodia 1 
CNM is for National Centre for Ministry of Health's National Centre for Parasitology, Entomology and Malaria 
Control; PSI Cambodia for Population Services International Cambodia Country Office. DDF_is for of the Department 
of Drugs and Food 
In March 2008, during the ACTwatch study launch meeting,S interviews were conducted with 
informants from the MOH's National Centre for Parasitology, Entomology and Malaria Control 
(CNM) and Population Services International in Cambodia (PSI Cambodia). These informants 
were asked to draw on a large white paper board the structure of the private commercial 
sector distribution chain for antimalarial drugs in Cambodia (Figure 8-2). 
Informants reported that more than 100 companies imported pharmaceutical drugs into 
Cambodia, which somewhat corroborated data from the list of registered importers handling 
pharmaceutical drugs and/or medical equipment (i.e. 156 companies listed). 
Whilst informants did not know the exact number of private commercial importers of 
antimalarial drugs, they thought that few companies imported such drugs because the social 
marketing programme was perceived to crowd-out the private commercial sector through the 
distribution of subsidized products to most private commercial outlets in Cambodia. Similarly, 
at lower levels of the chain, informants were unable to provide the exact number of outlets 
selling antimalarial drugs but estimated that 2735 drug outlets operated in Cambodia. This 
included 942 registered businesses, of which 635 were reported to operate in provincial towns 
and 307 in Phnom Penh, and around twice as many operating without licenses (1793 outlets), 
including 1680 in provincial towns and 113 in Phnom Penh (Figure 8-2). Informants described 
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the distribution chain for antimalarial drugs as having 4 levels from factory gates/ports of entry 
down to retailers, with companies located at the top of the chain delivering drugs right down 
to the bottom of the chain through teams of sales representatives. They also indicated that 
informal trade of antimalarial drugs was widespread, illustrated by the face of the bandit on 
the left hand side of Figure 8-2. 
Figure 8-2: The private commercial sector distribution chain for pharmaceutical drugs in 
Cambodia: findings from key informant interviews. 
Note:"lntermediate wholesaler 2 (Province)" should read as "Intermediate wholesaler 1 
(Province)" and "Intermediate wholesale (Phnom Penh)" should read as "Intermediate 
wholesaler 2 {Phnom Penh)". 
Source: Key informant interviews, ACTwatch Study Launch, Nairobi, Kenya, March 2008. 
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In April/May 2009 5 additional interviews were conducted with public and private sector 
informants who were identified in consultation with the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI) 
offices in Cambodia and through the snowball sampling technique40 for their expert knowledge 
on the overall structure and characteristics of the private commercial sector distribution chain 
for antimalarial drugs. 
All these informants were asked about the structure of the distribution chain and at each level 
the number of providers stocking antimalarial drugs. Figure 8-2 shows that the chain was 
thought as having 4 mutually-exclusive categories (MECs), including intermediate-3 suppliers 
(importers), intermediate-2 suppliers (based in Phnom Penh), intermediate-1 suppliers (based 
in provincial towns) and terminal suppliers. Intermediate-3 suppliers were reported to supply 
all wholesale levels and retailers located at district level, but not retailers operating in Phnom 
Penh or at provincial level who instead were served by intermediate-2 and intermediate-1 
wholesalers only. Whilst it was not surprising that importers did not supply antimalarial drugs 
to retailers located in Phnom Penh (because there is no malaria in the capital city), it was 
surprising that importers were not reported to serve retailers in provincial towns where 
malaria was endemic. Figure 8-2 also suggests that intermediate-2, intermediate-1 and 
terminal wholesalers operated at distinct geographical levels (Le. Phnom Penh, provincial 
towns and districts) with each level serving retailers within their geographical "catchment" 
area. These findings were different to those presented in Chapter 6, which reported 5 MECs of 
wholesalers, importers serving provincial and district areas and in practice overlapping levels 
of operation (e.g. terminal wholesalers operating at intermediate 1 or/and intermediate 2 
level(s)). 
To estimate the number of providers stocking antimalarial drugs at each level, one informant 
working at the MOH's Department of Drugs and Food (DDF) used the list of companies 
registered to import pharmaceutical pr.oducts and medical equipment to identify those 
handling antimalarials. Of the 156 registered importers, our DDF informant estimated that 50 
companies imported antimalarials whilst the remaining occasionally imported when answering 
government procurement bids. Phone interviews were then conducted with the 50 import 
companies in order to verify the accuracy of the information. We talked to 24 of the 50 
importers but could not reach the remaining 26 because either no one answered our calls or 
phone numbers ';!'Jere incorrect and new numbers could not be found. A total of 8 registered 
40The snowball sampling technique consists of asking initial respondents to identify new study participants, 
who are subsequently invited to take part in the study. This technique is repeated with each respondent 
until no new participants are identified. 
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companies reported that they imported antimalarial drugs, a number higher than that 
identified by using official lists alone (Le. 4 importers). This approach may have however 
overestimated the number of antimalarial drug importers because during phone interviews 
the reliability of information collected was questionable as it was not always possible to speak 
to the person in charge. 
At lower levels of the chain, DDF officials estimated that 2809 outlets sold pharmaceutical 
drugs nationwide, including 138941 registered outlets and 1420 that may have operated 
without a license. Such numbers may have been based on data from official lists kept at 
provincial level and transferred to the MOH central office, although this was not certain. It was 
also not possible to collect information on the number of provinces upon which these 
estimates were based nor to conduct phone interviews with a sample of these outlets in the 
absence of outlet identifiers (name, location and telephone numbers). Overall, these estimates 
were somewhat similar from those collected in March 2008 during the first set of KKls (i.e. 
2735 outlets, with 1793 operating without a license), although a higher number of outlets 
were estimated to be registered by the DDF than by other key informants. 
The SWOT analysis for the use of KKls for identifying and sampling antimalarial drug 
wholesalers is presented in Figure 8-3. Key informant interviews provided some information 
on the structure of the chain, although it differed on several aspects to the evidence presented 
in Chapter 6. Klls are a useful method for estimating the number of wholesalers, notably when 
combined with official lists. However, this method is not well suited for identifying and 
sampling wholesalers operating at lower levels of the chain. Informants are generally not able 
to estimate the number of wholesalers operating at intermediate and lower levels of the chain 
nor provide detailed information on providers' names, locations and contact details so key 
informant interviews are not on their own a suitable approach for developing a sampling 
frame. 
41 Includes 519 pharmacies, 126 depots A, 568 depots Band 176 pharmacies 'provisional' managed by 
civil servants who are pharmacists and that should only be opened outside government working hours 
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Figure 8-3: Key informant interviews: a SWOT analysis 
1 for example, in the case of informants located at provincial level; 2unless combined with additional interviews such 
as for example phone interviews with providers. However, phone interviews rely on the knowledge of respondents 
available to answer calls. 
An alternative method that addresses some of the issues concerned with identifying and 
sampling antimalarial wholesalers through official lists and/or KKls is to ask retailers stocking 
antimalarials to identify their supply sources for antimalarial drugs. This is the approach 
referred as the "bottom-up" method that was used during the SCS (see Chapters 4 and 6) and 
which is assessed in the next section. 
8.2.3.3 The bottom -up approach 
During the SCS, a bottom-up approach was used for sampling wholesalers of antimalarial drugs 
(see Chapter 4). Briefly, retailers stocking antimalarials were identified through a census of all 
outlets that potentially sold antimalarials and they were asked to identify their 2 most 
important supply sources for antimalarial drugs and provide information on each supplier's 
business name, location (town, physical address and/or location identifiers) and contact details 
(telephone number). All supply sources mentioned by retailers who operated in the sampled 
20 sub-districts were then visited and, in turn, asked about their top 2 supply sources for 
antimalarials. This process was repeated until the top of the chain was reached. 
In order to verify that important suppliers had not been missed through the 'bottom-up 
approach' we also asked retailers and wholesalers interviewed during as and SCS about the 
total number of suppliers they bought antimalarial drugs from in the past 3 months. Results 
presented in Chapter 6 showed that 94% of retailers and 89% of wholesalers reported buying 
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antimalarials from one or two suppliers only. To assess how many suppliers have been missed 
in cases where outlets reported 3 or more wholesale sources, providers were asked during 
semi-structured interviews (SSls) to name all their suppliers for antimalarial drugs. We found 
that all suppliers identified during SSls that had not been mentioned during the surveys had 
been identified by other shopkeepers during as or SCS, indicating that collecting only 2 supply 
sources was sufficient for capturing all supply sources. 
An important strength of the bottom up approach is that it provides the opportunity to 
identify informal providers in a more systematic manner than lists or Klls and this was 
corroborated during semi-structured interviews (SSls) with providers. 
"The Government has asked supply sources X and Y to stop [selling] artesunate but we can still 
order it and the suppliers deliver it secretly" (Wholesaler supplying wholesalers #4, MDRF 
stratum) 
The bottom-up approach was however not without challenges as identified during the SWOT 
analysis (Figure 8-4). 
Figure 8-4: The bottom-up approach: a SWOT analysis 
1 in some cases, suppliers that had been mentioned to stock antimalarial drugs at the previous level reported they 
did not stock antimalarial drugs. 
First, in the absence of an existing updated list of antimalarial retailers, the bottom-up 
approach requires data from an as, implying that significant financial resources were required. 
The SCS was implemented for around US$ 15,000 (although more would have been required if 
wholesalers had been located farther apart) to which an additional US$ 50,000 might have 
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been spent for conducting the 0542• It also required significant planning as the as needed to 
be conducted sufficiently in advance in order for supply source data to be available at the time 
of the start of the SCS. However, the as could not take place too much in advance of the start 
of the SCS because supply sources could have changed rapidly. During our study, this was not 
an issue as the as was conducted at the start of the malaria season in June 2009 and supply 
source data were available by the end of July 2009, with the SCS conducted between August-
November 2009. 
Second, supply chain surveyors sometimes had to ask local informants for assistance in 
locating outlets in which the mentioned suppliers were reported to work. This is because 
retailers had often identified their suppliers for antimalarial drugs by the name of the person 
with whom they generally dealt rather than the name of the outlet, or because outlets' 
location identifiers were poorly informative. Chapter 6 showed that 14% of the 127 terminal 
wholesalers that had been identified as "unique" were actually duplicates and a further 8% 
could not be found. Whilst during the SCS this was not an issue because all terminal 
wholesalers mentioned were surveyed, it could have been problematic if one had wanted to 
select a sample from this list. Training data collectors in recording information and piloting 
data collection therefore appear as crucial aspects of the implementation phase of the 
bottom-up approach. 
Third, the bottom-up approach method identified wholesalers operating in the distribution 
chain serving a sample of 20 sub-districts but one may have been interested in estimating the 
total number of antimalarial wholesalers operating in the whole country. At the top of the 
chain, Klls and official lists could be used for estimating the number of antimalarial drug 
importers and at retail level a census would provide an estimate of the total number of 
antimalarial providers operating at sub-district level, which could then be scaled up to the total 
number of sub-districts in the whole cou,ntry and provide an estimate of the total number of 
retailers: However, this approach would not be appropriate at wholesale level because scaling 
up the number of mentioned wholesalers in each sub-district by the total number of sub-
districts would overestimate the size of the wholesaler population because each wholesaler 
42 Information on the actual amount spent by PSI Cambodia for implementing the OS was not available. 
In 2008, a research agency estimated the total cost of implementing both ACTwatch Household and 
Outlet Surveys at US$ 80,490 (PSI Cambodia, personal communication,). Assuming the two surveys were 
conducted in the same sub-districts at the same time and accounting for fixed and semi-fixed costs of 
training data collectors, transportation and supervision, we estimated the cost of the as at roughly US$ 
50,000. 
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may serve more than one sub-district. The snowball census method, which is discussed in the 
next section, was developed with the aim of addressing this "scaling-up" issue. 
8.2.3.4 The snowball census 
The snowball census method was used for identifying the total number of antimalarial 
wholesalers who operated in each district visited during the SCS with the aim of estimating the 
total number of antimalarial wholesalers operating in the country. 
The snowball census consisted of creating a list of all antimalarial wholesale sources 
mentioned during the SCS conducted at the previous level, and then using the snowball 
technique approach to identify others in the district engaged in wholesale antimalarial/RDT 
trade. To verify that these suppliers were involved in antimalarial trade, data collectors visited 
each supplier and completed a simple table covering the business name, owner name, contact 
details (Le. address and telephone number), whether they wholesale antimalarials, and the 
type of business (e.g. whether they stock drugs only or drugs and other consumer goods). 
A total of 95 wholesalers were invited to participate in the snowball census, of which 34% 
refused to participate43 • Several factors may have contributed to this refusal rate. First, the 
snowball census questions were asked at the end of the supply chain survey and respondents 
may have been impatient to go back to their business. Second, wholesalers may have been 
comfortable talking about their business but uncomfortable talking about other similar 
businesses operating in their area, whom they may have perceived to be competitors. 
Of those who participated in the snowball census, 62% did not identify any other antimalarial 
drug wholesalers, 22% identified one other antimalarial wholesaler, 6% identified two, 5% 
three and 5% four or six. Overall, 51 new antimalarial wholesalers were identified through the 
snowbal~ census in addition to the 100 wholesalers identified through the bottom-up approach 
(Appendix 14). Therefore combined with the bottom-up approach that provides a list of 
antimalarial wholesalers operating in different areas, the snowball census method can be used 
to identify all antimalarial wholesalers operating in a particular area. However, it becomes 
unclear how these data can be used for estimating the total number of wholesalers in the 
whole country because wholesalers in a given area may operate at different levels of the chain. 
43 Of 95 wholesalers interviewed, 32 refused to participate in the snowball census. 
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The snowball census therefore only partially addressed the limitation of the bottom-up 
method in relation to the data not being scalable. Furthermore, the snowball census method 
did not provide information on the level of the distribution chain at which the snowballed 
wholesalers operated. Last but not least, many providers appeared to be uncomfortable with 
the snowball method, which was reportedly perceived by some wholesalers as an act of 
denunciation. 
N/ can't tell you the name of other antimalarial wholesalers within the district. / am sorry. This is 
because if / tell you their names health or trade inspectors may go and visit them. Something 
bad will happen if these wholesalers do not have a license./J (Fieldworker #l's written comment 
on the snowball census section of a wholesaler SCS questionnaire). 
Figure 8-5 presents the SWOT analysis for the snowball census. In sum, the snowball census is 
easy and cheap to implement but it needs to be combined with a survey of providers unless 
another approach can be used to identify at least one wholesaler in each study area. It also has 
the potential to identify informal suppliers. However, the main weakness of the snowball 
census is that it does not provide any information on the level(s) of the chain at which 
snowballed wholesalers operate. Many wholesalers may also refuse to participate and 
therefore limit the completeness of the survey. Finally, there are challenges in scaling up the 
number of wholesalers operating in a given area to the whole country. 
Figure 8-5: Snowball census: a SWOT analysis 
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8.2.3.5 Comparing methods for identifying and sampling antimalarial wholesalers 
Given that there is no gold standard method for identifying and sampling wholesalers, it is not 
possible to be certain that all relevant providers have been identified when using a particular 
method. It is however possible to compare the relative performance of each method and 
combination of methods. This is done in Figure 8-6 where official lists, key informant 
interviews, bottom-up approach and snowball census have each been assessed against 8 
dimensions, which are considered as key for identifying and sampling wholesalers in a study of 
the private commercial sector distribution chain for antimalarial drugs. 
Two dimensions relate to the implementation of each method, including (i) affordability and 
(ii) speed. An additional 6 dimensions relate to the nature of data collected, including (iii) the 
shape of the chain, (iv) total antimalarial wholesalers in the chain, (v) number of antimalarial 
wholesalers operating in a particular area, (vi) wholesalers' level(s) of operation, (vii) 
wholesalers' name and location, and (viii) informal wholesalers. For each dimension, the 
methods were rated by the author using a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 assigned to dimensions 
against which methods performed poorly and 4 to those against which they performed well 
(see Appendix 15 for a rationale of scores). 
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Figure 8-6: Relative performance of 4 different methods for identifying and sampling 
antimalarial wholesalers. 
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Official lists and Klls are expected to be quicker and cheaper to implement than the census-like 
snowball census and the bottom-up approach that requires a structured survey for identifying 
antimalarial supply sources. However, the data official lists and key informant interviews 
provide are likely to be inaccurate and/or incomplete in terms of outlet's location, whether 
outlets wholesale or retail, and whether they stock antimalarials. For example, in Kratie 
province, there were no drug outlets on official lists for Kracheh "and Sambo districts (Table 8-
1). However, in Kracheh district, 7 antimalarial wholesalers were found to operate through the 
bottom-up method and one additional wholesaler through the snowball census; and in Sambo 
district 3 antimalarial wholesalers were identified through the bottom up method and an 
additional 8 through the snowball census (Appendix 14). 
The relative performance of 2 different combinations of methods, official lists plus key 
informant interviews and bottom-up plus snowball census is also explored by depicting for 
each combination the highest score of the 2 combined methods on the nature of data 
collected and the lowest score of the 2 combined methods on implementation costs and speed 
(Figure 8-7). This analytical approach is used because whilst combining methods offers the 
opportunity to collect more data, implications in terms of time and cost required for 
implementing the combined 2 methods need to be considered. 
Figure 8-7: Relative performance of 2 different combinations of methods 
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8.2.4 Conclusion 
The bottom-up approach and the snowball census appear as a superior method to official lists 
and Klls for identifying and sampling wholesalers. However, the implementation of bottom-up 
and snowball census methods is more costly and more time consuming. In addition, during our 
study, the value added of the snowball census was small as we encountered many refusals 
from wholesalers. However, in other settings where providers are willing to identify fellow 
sellers (personal communication, ACTwatch Group), the bottom-up and snowball approach is 
likely to be the most suitable method for identifying and sampling antimalarial wholesalers, 
providing that time and financial resources are not an issue. 
8.3 Comparing two methods for measuring retail and wholesale sales volumes 
8.3.1 Introduction 
Section 3.3.4 identified 4 methods for measuring private sector sales of pharmaceutical drugs 
in low income settings, namely reviewing providers' sales records, asking providers to recall 
their sales volumes, conducting exit interviews with customers and retail audits. The review 
pointed out that none of these approaches could be treated as the IIgold standard" providing 
the most precise estimate. 
During the as and SCS, shopkeepers were asked to recall the volumes of antimalarials and 
rapid diagnostic tests for malaria (ROTs) sold during the week preceding the interview. This 
approach was chosen because written records were likely to be rare; if available, they were 
likely to be kept private; and, if accessible, they were likely to be of poor quality. In this 
context, the recall technique appeared as a relatively convenient and inexpensive method for 
measuring sales volumes. However, the retail audit technique is an alternative method, which 
could be perceived to provide more accurate responses as it does not rely on respondents' 
ability to remember their sales volumes. At the time of this study, this method had already 
been used for measuring sales volumes during surveys of shops stocking antimalarial drugs in 
Tanzania (Alba et aI., 2010a, Goodman et aI., 2009) but limited information was available on 
how it would compare with the recall method. 
In this context of uncertainty on how best to estimate sales volumes at private commercial 
outlets in a low income setting, the remainder of this chapter aims to assess the degree of 
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agreement between sales volume estimates measured through the recall and retail audit 
techniques, and explore the relative strengths and weaknesses of each method from an 
implementation perspective. It first presents the methods for data collection and analysis, and 
sales volume estimates obtained through the recall and retail audit methods and discusses the 
two different methods. The potential of using written sales records for collecting sales volume 
data is also assessed. 
8.3.2 Methods for data collection and analysis 
8.3.2.1 The Sales Level Survey 
Sales volume data were collected through the recall method and through the retail audit 
method, together referred to as the Sales level Survey (SLS). Figure 8-8 gives an overview of 
the design of the SlS. 
Figure 8-8: Design of the Sales Level Survey 
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The retall audit technique consisted of visiting each sampled outlet 2 times with a 2-week time 
interval between each visit. At the first visit, referred to as the Sales level Survey 1 (SLS1), 
data on quantities stocked of each product were collected. At the second visit, referred to as 
the Sales level Survey 2 (SlS2), data on quantities stocked and quantities delivered between 
1st and 2nd visits, quantities thrown away/transferred to other shops or sent back to 
wholesalers or confiscated were collected for each product in stock, including products in 
stock at either· or both visits. To collect these data, respondents were asked to check any 
available written records or sales receipts and in the absence of records, to recall these 
quantities. 
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The recall technique consisted of asking retailers and wholesalers to recall the quantities sold 
during the 2 week time interval between SLSl and SLS2. It was implemented at the start of 
SLS2 before collecting stock data in order to minimise bias as recall may have been influenced 
by the process of counting stocks. A time interval of 2 weeks between the two visits at each 
outlet was chosen based on (i) the existing literature in which a 2-week time interval was 
considered to be reasonable for capturing wholesale deliveries (Goodman et aI., 2009, Alba et 
aI., 2010a) and (ii) the public health literature in which a recall period of a maximum of 2 
weeks has generally been used for collecting data such as fever episodes in household surveys 
(PSI, 2008a, CMS 2007, CMBS 2004). 
The SLS was implemented in the same private commercial wholesale and retail outlets. At 
wholesale level, it took place during the SCS, with SLSl taking place at the end of the SCS and 
SLS2 two weeks later as a standalone survey. At retail level, the SLS was conducted as a 
standalone survey. All types of antimalarial drugs in all dosage forms and package types and 
ROTs were surveyed. For antimalarials, data were collected in terms of both full packs and 
loose tablets (i.e. those kept in containers/tins). When collecting stock data for antimalarials 
stored in half-full containers, interviewers counted the number of tablets left in each 
container, or they used a ruler for measuring the height of the container, height of tablets left 
in the container and number of tablets in a full container (either by asking providers to 
estimate the quantity of tablets in a full container or by looking at the packaging information). 
These data were then used to estimate the number of tablets stocked 44• ROT data were 
collected in terms of single ROT units. 
For interviewing wholesalers, data collection instruments used during the SCS, including the 
information sheet and questionnaire, were adapted and SLS-related sections added (Appendix 
4). For interviewing retailers, a small questionnaire, like that used during the SCS, was 
developed to collect outlet identifiers and a minimum set of respondent characteristics (name, 
location identifier and range of products sold). Inventory sheets used at wholesale outlets 
were adapted to collect data at retail outlets (Appendix 4). To record data on products in stock 
at SLS2 but not in stock at SLS1, new inventory sheets were developed for both wholesale and 
retail outlets. All retail audit data collection tools were piloted, for SLSl during the pilot of the 
SCS and for SLS2 as a standalone pilot few weeks later. A team of two interviewers entered 
each business" informed shopkeepers about the study objective and obtained consent. 
44 By calculating: (height of tablets left in the container*number of tablets in full container)/height of the 
container 
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Interviews were conducted in Khmer, with the person most involved in the management of the 
business. It was preferable, but not essential, to interview the same person at each SLS 
interview. However, it was only essential to get consent once at SLS1 to cover both visits, 
although it may have been necessary to read the information sheet again at SLS2 if the 
respondent was different than at SLS1. Interviews were conducted in the premises, with 
breaks each time a customer arrived. Interviewers then asked whether they could return after 
2 weeks and if so they arranged an appointment, making use of a calendar for scheduling the 
next visit. Two weeks later, on the day and time of the arranged appointment, interviewers 
returned to each business. If they could not return at the agreed time or day, they called the 
business using the business' contact details collected at SLS1 and scheduled a new 
appointment on the same day or following day or two. 
Sampling wholesalers and retailers. The aim was to explore whether 2 methods for measuring 
sales volumes, namely the recall method and retail audit method, agree sufficiently that they 
can be used interchangeably. In order to identify the threshold at which a difference between 
estimates would be considered of importance, discussions with other researchers interested in 
private sector antimalarial sales volumes in low income countries were conducted. During 
these discussions, recall and retail audit methods were perceived to 'disagree' if an average 
difference of 10% between estimates obtained through the 2 different methods was found. In 
other words, the null hypothesis was set as no difference between methods for measuring 
sales volumes where no difference in practical terms was considered to be any difference less 
than 10%. At the time of our study there was no evidence available from past studies on the 
standard deviation of the difference in sales volume estimates obtained through the 2 
different methods. A range of sample sizes was therefore calculated at varying standard 
deviation, accounting for a drop-off or "attrition rate" of 40%45 (Table 8-3). The sample size 
calculation was performed using the STATA 11 command sampsi. In light of our aim and after 
careful consideration of the logistical a'1d financial implications of the different sample sizes, 
60 outlets were to be sampled in each sector as this was sufficient for detecting a mean 
difference at or above 10%, with a standard deviation of 20 (at the 5% significance level with 
power 90%) (Table 8-3). 
45 Attrition rate of 40% accounts for outlets not stocking antimalarials or rapid diagnostic tests at the 
time of the study, duplicates, refusals and drop-off in-between visits. 
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Table 8-3: Sample size calculations for the Sales Level Survey 
Mean of the percent Standard Sample size 1:. Sample size 2: 
variations between RC and RA deviation number of retail or Sample size 1 
estimates, in % wholesale outlets accounting for a 
required "drop off" rate of 
40% 
15 24 34 
10 20 43 60 
25 66 92 
30 95 133 
RC IS for Recall; RA is for Retail Audit technique 
Wholesale outlets were sampled from the list of outlets to be surveyed during the SCS. All 68 
wholesalers who operated in areas that could be visited 2 times with a 2-week time interval 
were selected (Appendix 16). This number is higher than the target sample size of 60 outlets 
for logistical reasons, allowing a larger sample to be visited at no additional cost. Wholesale 
outlets not found, not stocking antimalarials or not available at the time of the SLS were not 
replaced. The wholesale sample was similar to that of the SCs: outlets had a median of 2 
workers (IQR 2-2), had been in operation for 10 years (IQR 4-13) and around 70% employed a 
member of staff with health qualifications, with nurse/midwife being the most commonly 
reported qualification type. 
Retail outlets were sampled from the list of outlets interviewed during the as, excluding 
outlets located in sub-districts visited during the SCS, in order to avoid re-visiting the same 
outlets and therefore mitigating respondent fatigue and refusals46• The geographical location 
of each sub-district and the number of outlets stocking antimalarials at the time of the as 
were also used to select areas in which all outlets could each be visited 2 times with a 2-week 
time interval47, accounting for one repeat visit at outlets busy or closed at first and/or second 
visits. A total of 107 retailers were sampled (Appendix 17). Sampled retailers included 
pharmacfes/clinical pharmacies (13%), drug shops (21%), mobile providers (20%), grocery 
stores (26%) and village shops (20%). They shared similar characteristics with those of the 
whole as sample: staff with health qualifications were more commonly found at pharmacies 
(84.6%), drug shops (76.2%) and mobile providers (70.0%) than at grocery and village shops 
46 Retail outlets may have already been visited for the SCS in the situation where they also engaged in 
wholesale trade and supplied other retailers in the sub-districts; retailers may have also participated in 
semi-structured interviews. 
47 A random sample would have complicated logistics and supervision and increased the amount of 
financial resources required. 
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(13.0% and 11.8% respectively) and the most commonly reported health qualifications were 
nurses/midwives. A median of 2 people (IQR 1-2) worked at the sampled outlets and shops 
had been in operation for a median of 8 years (IQR 2-15). The sample size was larger than the 
sample targeted initially as additional outlets could be visited at no additional cost and provide 
adequate fieldwork to data collectors. The retail sample was also bigger than the wholesale 
sample because a higher rate of "attrition" was expected amongst retailers who operated in 
harder-to-reach areas. Retail outlets not found, not stocking antimalarial or not available at 
the time of the SLS were not replaced. 
Of the 67 wholesalers initially sampled, 58.2% participated in the SLS: at first visit, 9.0% 
refused to participate, 1.5% were not available, 7.5% not found and 13.4% were duplicates; At 
second visit, 10.4% refused to participate (Table 8-4). Of the 107 retailers initially sampled, 
61.7% participated in the SLS: at first visit, 24.3% were not eligible to participate because they 
did not stock antimalarials (clearly a limitation of using existing lists for sampling providers as 
described in the first part of this chapter!), 7.5% were not found, 4.7% refused to participate; 
at second visit 1.9% refused to participate (Table 8-4). 
Table 8-4: From initial to final samples: overview of the SLS at wholesale and retail outlets 
Number of wholesale Number of retail 
outlets surveyed, outlets surveyed, 
as % of initial sample as % of initial sample 
Initial sample 67 (100%) 107 (100%) 
First visit (SLS1): 
Completed 46 (68.7%) 68 (63.5%) 
Not eligible l 0(0.0%) 26 (24.3%) 
Closed at time of visit/Not available 1 (1.5%) 5 (4.7%) 
Not found 5 (7.5%) 8 (7.5%) 
Duplicated 9 (13.4%) 0(0.0%) 
Second visit (SLS2): 
Completed 39 (58.2%) 66 (61.7%) 
Refusals 7 (10.4%) 2 (1.9%) 
Final sample " 39 (58.2%) 66 (61.7%) 
1 . . .. 
respondent not eligible If did not stock antimalarials at time of VISit 
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Measuring wholesale and retail sales volumes. For each antimalarial observation, volume 
estimates collected in tablet or pack units (or through the partially full container/ tin approach) 
through the retail audit technique (RA) and the recall method (RC) were converted into adult 
equivalent treatment doses (AETO) following the approach described in Chapter 4 (Section 
4.5). ROTs were kept as single units, as collected. 
RA estimates were calculated as: 
RA sales volume estimate= (Total quantities stocked at 5L51) + (Quantities delivered between 
5L51 and 5L52) - (Quantities disposed of between 5L51 and 5L52) - (Total quantities stocked at 
5L52). 
Antimalarials/ROT observations without a pair of RA RC estimates (that is one RA estimate and 
one RC estimate) were dropped. This situation may have occurred in the case of respondents 
who refused to disclose sales volume information through one or both methods or because of 
incomplete product information (e.g. missing strength data) that impeded the calculation of 
AETO. In outlets stocking more than one type of antimalarial/ROT (that is with more than one 
pair of RC and RA estimates), the outlet's total sales volume was estimated by calculating the 
sum of all RC estimates and that of all RA estimates in order to obtain for each outlet one 
estimate of total sales volume measured through the recall method and one estimate through 
the retail audit method. We found that surveyed antimalarials were available in tablet and 
injectable forms only. Tablets were commonly stocked in packs, and injectables were generally 
in individual ampoules. Tablets kept in tins/containers were rare and found at retail outlets 
only. 
SLS at wholesale outlets. At total of 104 different antimalarial products were surveyed (that is 
the number of different antimalarials in stock at the time of visit). Sales volumes were 
.. 
estimated-for 73.1% antimalarial products through the recall method and for 78.8% through 
the retail audit method (Table 8-5). Missing sales volume data were due to, for the recall 
method, wholesalers' inability or refusal to recall their sales volumes or, for the retail audit 
method, wholesalers' refusal to let interviewers record stock data or inability to recall 
quantities received or disposed (Table 8-5). Furthermore, during the retail audit method, sales 
volumes were initially calculated for 90.4% of all antimalarials surveyed but for 12% sales 
volumes were found to be negative and were excluded from the analysis, as they clearly 
indicated data collection errors (e.g. quantities stocked at first visit were higher than quantities 
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stocked at second visit although shopkeepers did not report any quantities received). For RDT, 
34 different products were surveyed and sales volumes were estimated for 76.5% of these 
through the recall method and for 85.3% through the retail audit method. Again, missing data 
were due to wholesalers' refusals or inability to recall either their sales volumes or quantities 
received and/or disposed (Table 8-5). 
Table 8-5: Data collected on wholesale sales volumes using recall and retail audit methods 
as % of total number of products surveyed 
Number of products surveyed1 
Product type surveyed Antimalarials ROT 
Total number (%) 104 (100%) 34 (100%) 
Recall method (RC) 
Sales volumes estimated 76 (73.1%) 26 (76.5%) 
- Not remembered 17 (16.3%) 7 (21.6%) 
- Refused 11 (10.6%) 1 (2.9%) 
Retail Audit method (RA) -
Sales volumes estimated (excluding negatives) 2 82 (78.8%) 29 (85.3%) 
Sales volumes estimated (including negatives) 94 (90.4%) 31 (91.2%) 
Stock data collected 96 (92.3%) 31 (91.2%) 
- Refused 8 (7.7%) 3 (8.8%) 
Received quantities collected 103 (99.0%) 33 (97.1%) 
- Refused 1 (1.0%) 1 (2.9%) 
Disposed quantities collected 101 (97.1%) 33 (97.1%) 
- Refused 3 (2.9%) 1 (2.9%) 
1 .. l At the second VISit of the Retail Audit method dUring which the Recall method was Implemented. negative sales 
volume estimates were obtained when calculating (quantities in stock at 1st visit + quantities received in-between 
the 2 visits - quantities at 2nd visit - quantities disposed in-between the 2 visits), e.g. quantities stocked at first visit 
were higher than quantities stocked at second visit although shopkeepers did not report any quantities received. 
These negative estimates were excluded from the analysis. 
Overall, wholesale sales volumes were estimated through both methods for 62 antimalarials 
and 23 RDTs (data not shown). The tota.! volumes of antimalarial/RDT sold at each outlet was 
estimated by calculating the sum of all RC and the sum of all RA estimates in order to obtain a 
single pair of RC and RA total sales volume estimates, corresponding to the sample size that 
will be used during the analysis. We obtained 34 pairs of recall and retail audit estimates for 
antimalarials and 23 for RDT (data shown in section 8.3.3, Table 8-7). 
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SLS at retail outlets. A total of 143 antimalarial products were surveyed and sales volumes 
were estimated, through the recall method for 91.0% of these and through the retail audit 
method for 80.4% (Table 8-6). For RDT, 42 different products were surveyed and sales volumes 
were estimated for 97.6% through the recall method and for 83.3% through the retail audit 
technique (Table 8-6). 
Table 8-6: Data collected on retail sales volumes using recall and retail audit methods. 
Number of products surveyed1'as % of 
total number of products surveyed 
Antimalarials ROT 
Total surveyed 143 (100%) 42(100%) 
Recall method (RC) 
Sales volumes estimated 130 (91.0%) 41 (97.6%) 
- Not remembered 4 (2.8%) 1 (2.4%) 
- Missing2 10 (7.0%) -
Retail Audit method (RA) 
Sales volumes estimated (excluding negatives) 3 115 (80.4%) 35 (83.3%) 
Sales volumes estimated (including negatives) 121 (84.6%) 39 (92.9%) 
Stock data collected 121 (84.6%) 39 (92.9%) 
- Refused 12 (8.4%) 3 (7.1%) 
- Missing2 10 (7.0%) 
-
Received quantities collected 133 (93.0%) 42 (100.0%) 
- Missing2 10 (7.0%) -
Disposed quantities collected 133 (93.0%) 42 (100.0%) 
- Missing2 10 (7.0%) 
-
. . J. .. At the second VISit of the Retail Audit method dunng which the Recall method was Implemented. missing strength 
data impeded calculation of data in terms of adult equivalent treatment doses. 3 negative sales volume estimates 
were obtained when calculating (quantities in stock at 1st visit + quantities received in-between the 2 visits -
quantities at 2nd visit - quantities disposed in-between the 2 visits), e.g. quantities stocked at first visit were higher 
than quantities stocked at second visit although shopkeepers did not report any quantities received. These negative 
estimates were excluded from the analysis. 
Overall, retail sales volumes were estimated through both methods for 113 antimalarials and 
33 RDT (data not shown). At each retail outlet, we calculated the total volume sold estimated 
through the 2 different methods as the sum of all RC and the sum of all RA estimates so as to 
obtain a single pair of RC and RA estimates per outlet. We obtained 58 pairs of recall and retail 
audit estimates for antimalarials and 33 for RDT. At one retail outlet, however, the total 
volume sold was surprisingly high and well above other retailers' total sales volumes (although 
it may have been accurate if the retailer also engaged in wholesale sales). This outlying 
observation obscured the interpretation of results so it was excluded from the main analysis, 
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which was run on 57 pairs of antimalarial estimates and 33 pairs of ROT estimates (data shown 
in section 8.3.3, Table 8-7). Results including the "outlier" are however reported in a footnote 
to result Table 8-7. 
Comparing sales volumes obtained through RC and RA. The level of agreement between RA 
and RC methods was explored following the Bland-Altman approach (Bland and Altman, 1986, 
Altman and Bland, 1983, Bland and Altman, 2010). 
1) The first step was to calculate, for each outlet, the difference between RA and RC sales 
volume estimates. Formally: 
where RAj and RCj are sales volumes estimated through the 2 different methods at outlet i. 
2) The second step was to estimate the bias of the measurement by 2 methods, which is 
the mean of the differences between the 2 different methods, and its standard 
deviation. Formally: 
where xi the difference between RA and RC in outlet; or (RAi - RCJ, x = RA - RC 
the mean of the differences between RA and RC across all outlets, n the total number 
of outlets with a pair of RA and RC estimates and SO the standard deviation. 
Before undertaking this second step, care was taken to confirm that that the 
differences between sales volumes estimated through the 2 different methods 
followed a normal distribution, by using histograms (figures not shown). 
3) The third step was to estimate, for each outlet, the total volume of antimalarials/ROT 
sold a~d explore whether there was an association between total volume sold and the 
bias (i.e. the mean of the difference, b1). This is because for the bias to be a 
meaningful estimate of the level of agreement between the 2 different methods, the 
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bias should be constant throughout the range of measurements; in other words, we 
explored whether the mean difference was constant for small and large sales volumes. 
In the absence of a recognised gold standard method for measuring sales volumes, an 
outlet's total sales volume was estimated as the average of RC and RA estimates. 
Formally: 
The association between total volume sold and measurement bias was explored 
graphically using a scatter plot of the differences against total volume sold and 
confirmed statistically using a correlation coefficient obtained through the STATA 
command bap/ot (Jull and Frydenberg, 2010). 
4) The fourth step was to calculate the interval within which 95% of paired estimates 
were expected to lie - the interval is referred to as the (upper and lower) limits of 
agreement between the 2 methods. This interval tells us how far apart measurements 
by the 2 methods are likely to be for most outlets (Bland and Altman, 1986) Formally: 
LoA = RA - RC ± 1.96 SD Cd) 
8.3.2.2 Fieldworkers' experiences in conducting the Sales Level Survey 
In order to compare the retail audit technique and recall methods for measuring sales 
volumes, we collected data on interviewers' accounts of collecting sales volume data through 
each technique. The objective was to explore issues that could not be investigated solely from 
measuring sales volumes through the 2 different methods, by revealing the implementation 
process and perceptions of interviewe'rs. Data were collected from notes written up by 
fieldworkers at the end of each outlet visit, using a large blank space on each questionnaire. In 
these diaries, fieldworkers were asked to describe and compare their experiences in collecting 
data across products (antimalarials compared to ROT), and for antimalarials, across dosage 
forms (tablets compared to non-tablets) and packaging types (loose tablets compared to 
packed tablets; drugs stocked in non-original packaging). They were also asked to reflect on 
the overall implementation process, drawing on their observation of shopkeepers' behaviour 
during the implementation of each method. 
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Semi-formal group discussions were also organised during the course of the fieldwork to clarify 
fieldworkers' accounts recorded in the diaries. These discussions provided a forum for 
fieldworkers to elaborate on particular topics, share arduous experiences, discuss their views 
and trade funny stories. Group discussions also had the advantage of creating interactions 
between fieldworkers, which prompted other fieldworkers to remember their own 
experiences on particular aspects of the implementation process (Green and Thorogood, 
2004), through which additional data less salient or not captured in diaries were collected. 
Group discussions were facilitated by the candidate, with the assistance of a trained research 
assistant. Discussions were not tape-recorded and written notes were taken by both the 
candidate and the research assistant. Ethics-wise, fieldworkers' participation as research 
subjects was explained to each candidate during the recruitment process and consent was 
received orally from each fieldworker recruited. Group discussions were conducted with each 
of the 3 fieldworker teams involved in the SLS. A total of 5 group discussions were conducted, 
each with a team of 4 data collectors lasting an average of 1.5 hours. For the SLS in the 
wholesale sector, 3 group discussions were organised: the first discussi~n took place a few 
days after the start of data collection, the second at the end of SLS1, the third at the end of 
SLS2. For the SLS in the retail sector, 2 group discussions were organized in mid data collection 
and at the end of SLS2. Topics discussed during group discussions are presented Appendix 4. 
Fieldwork diaries kept in Khmer were translated into English by a trained research assistant 
and diaries were typed in WORD Microsoft Office. These data were analysed using a simple 
thematic content approach through which recurrent themes under each of the topics 
discussed were listed and compared. Notes taken during group discussions by the candidate 
and her assistant were reviewed, compared and typed by the candidate after each group 
discussion using WORD Microsoft Office. Notes were categorized as either empirical 
observational notes from fieldworkers, which were treated as diary data and typed with the 
diaries' accounts, or as the candidate's personal interpretation of issues explored during the 
discussions, which were entered into a separate document. 
8.3.2.3 Costs 0/ implementing Retail Audit Technique and Recall Methods 
Project expenditure records were used for calculating the financial costs of implementing the 
recall method and the retail audit method. Specifically, we used expenditure records for the 
SLS implemented at retail outlets for costing the implementation of retail audit technique and 
recall methods in both retail and wholesale outlets. There were two reasons for doing so. First, 
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the SLS implemented at wholesale outlets was conducted at the same time as the SCS and 
documenting specific costs for the SLS component was problematic. Second, we did not expect 
the costs of the SLS wholesale to be very different than those of the SLS retail: both surveys 
were conducted over a period of 30 days so the resources required in terms of human 
resources and communications were expected to be the same; and, whilst retail outlets were 
located in harder-to-reach areas they were somewhat less scattered so travel costs for the SLS 
at wholesale outlets were not expected to have been much lower than those of the SLS at 
retail outlets. 
8.3.3 Results 
8.3.3.1 Level of agreement between retail audit technique and recall methods 
Figure 8-9 presents the scatter plots which were developed for investigating (i) the existence 
of an association between the size of the measurement (sales volumes) and the measurement 
bias (mean difference), and (ii) the level of agreement between retail-audit technique and 
recall methods. On each plot, the y-axis shows the between-method differences and the x-axis 
the corresponding volume being measured at each outlet. The dashed blue line drawn at y=O 
represents the line of equality between the volumes measured by the two different methods. 
The mean of the between-method differences (b1) is represented by the horizontal red line 
and the limits of agreement between the 2 methods are represented by the 2 horizontal 
dashed red lines. 
Plot (a) for wholesale antimalarial sales shows no evidence of correlation between the 
between-method differences and the size of the volumes sold. This was confirmed by a 
coefficient of correlation r = -0.04 (p=0.83). The mean difference between RA and RC estimates 
for antimalarials was nearly 4 AETDs indicating that the retail audit method provided on 
average higher estimates than the recall method and it was statistically significant (95% ci 0.6-
7.2) (Table 8-8). The limits of agreement indicated that for 95% of paired estimates the retail 
audit method would give higher sales volumes than the recall method by up to 23 AETDs(95% 
ci 16.0 to 28.0) or lower sales volumes by up to 15 AETDs (95%ci -20.4 to -9.0) (Table 8-7). 
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Figure 8-9: Scatter plots of the between-method differences against volumes of sales measured 
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Plot (c) for ROT sales volumes at wholesale outlets did not indicate that the between-method 
differences were correlated to the volumes sold (r=0.04, p=0.86). The mean difference was 1 
test with the recall audit providing, on average, larger sales volumes than the retail audit 
method but this difference was not statistically significant (95%ci -6.0-4.0) (Table 8-7). As for 
the limits of agreement, they indicated that for most paired estimates the recall audit would 
give higher sales volumes than the retail audit method by up to 24 tests (95% ci 14-32 ) or 
lower by up to 22 tests (95% ci 13-31) (Table 8-7). 
At retail outlets, there was some indication from Plots (b) and (d) that the mean difference and 
limits of agreement are not constant throughout the range of sales volumes being measured, 
with between-method differences being positively correlated with volumes sold (for 
antimalarials r =0.49, p<O.OOl ad ROT r =0.38, p=0.03). 
Table 8-7: Results from the Bland - Altman approach 
Sample Mean of the Limits of Agreement (LoA)2 
size1 differences RA-RC 
(95% ci)2 
Lower LoA Upper LoA 
(95%ci3) (95%ci3) 
Wholesale Outlets 
Antimalarials 34 +3.9 doses -15 doses +22.8 doses 
(0.6 to 7.2) (-20.4 to -9.0) (16.0 to 28.0) 
ROT 23 -1 test -24 tests +22 tests 
(-6.0 to 4.0) (-32.0 to -14.0) (13.0 to 31.0) 
Retail Outlets 
Antimalarials 57t +1.4 doses -7.8 doses +10.6 doses 
(0.2 to 2.6) (-9.7 to -5.5) (8.3 to 12.5) 
ROT 33 +1 test -8 tests + 9 tests 
(-1.0 to 3.0) (-5.0 to -10.0) (6.0 to 12.0) 
1 l o • Number of outlets with a single pair of RC and RA sales volume estimates. 95%cl for the mean difference and the 
limits of agreement were obtained using the STATA command baplot. The LoA is the interval within which the 
difference will lie for 95% of paired estimates. 3 95%ci for the limits of agreement, which were used for assessing 
the precision' of the estimated limits of agreement, were calculated manually. Formally: 
95% ciLoA = LoA ± (t * SELoA), where SELoA is the standard error of the limits of agreement, with 
SELoA indicating how far the true value of each of the upper and lower limits is likely to be and calculated as 
SELoA= J3.~D2 and t the point of the Student distribution at probability=O.OS and n-l degrees of freedom with 
sample size n. t When running the analysis on the sample size of 58 (that is when including the outlying outlet with 
sales volumes of 119 AETD, the mean difference was 2 AEDT (95%ci 0.23-4.0) and limits of agreement -12 AETD to 
16 AEDT. There was evidence of significant (and stronger) correlation between sales volumes and difference in 
measurement between methods with r=0.823 (p<O.OOO). 
Source: Sales Level Survey, August-October 2009 
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These results will be discussed in Section 8.3.4. The next section turns to fieldworkers' 
experiences in implementing retail and recall techniques as well as their perceptions of 
shopkeepers' reactions to each method, drawing on fieldwork diaries and group discussions 
with fieldworkers. In addition, availability of written sales records for antimalarials and ROTs at 
retail and wholesale outlets, as reported by fieldworkers, is also discussed. 
8.3.3.2 Fieldworkers' experiences and perceptions 
Written sales records. The rare availability of written sales records, notably at retail shops, 
was reported by most fieldworkers. 
"She said that she has not forgotten to record her sales. She said that she just did not keep such 
records" (Fieldwork diary #3 about keeping written records of sales volumes at a retail outlet) 
In addition, as expected, where these records were available, shopkeepers, notably 
wholesalers who more commonly reported to keep such records, refused to share these data 
sources. 
"They refused to show us their records because they said it was private" (Fieldwork diary #1 
about keeping written records of sales volumes at a wholesale outlet) 
Recall method. Data collectors found the recall technique to be a more convenient approach 
for collecting sales volume data, notably at retail outlets where shopkeepers said they rarely 
had customers for malaria treatment. 
"She said it is a small business because her area also has Vii/age Malaria Workers [who] would 
not take money from malaria patients" (Fieldwork diary #16 about the recall method 
implemented at a retail outlet) 
Data collectors also mentioned that retailers seemed to be more comfortable remembering 
sales volumes of ROT than antimalarials and that this was because performing a malaria test 
was a more memorable and discrete event than selling antimalarials. 
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"He said he always does a test~ but can~t remember the tests~ results [ ... ] so he was not sure 
about how many patients [with malaria] he had~ and [ ... ] what and how many tablets he gave 
[to each patient]" (Fieldwork diary #4 about the recall method implemented at a retail outlet) 
However, data collectors often questioned the accuracy of recall of sales volume data 
collected both at retail and wholesale outlets. 
"She said: "it might be like this~ [or] it may be like that~~. (Fieldwork diary #1 about the recall 
method implemented at a retail outlet). 
"She might have misreported her sales volumes~ because I saw 5 empty boxes of antimalarials 
near her". (Fieldwork diary #5 about the recall method implemented at a wholesale outlet) 
Data collectors indicated that, when shopkeepers could not remember their sales volumes, 
this was because they often handled other consumer goods alongside antimalarials and/or 
ROT, including toiletries or groceries, which were their main selling items. Another reason was 
that more than one person worked at the shop, making it more difficult for respondents to 
provide accurate estimates. Fieldworkers also said that they perceived wholesalers to be less 
capable of remembering their sales volumes because they generally handled a wider range of 
drugs and sold larger volumes. 
Retail audit technique. Data collectors reported that counting stocks was relatively easy and 
quick because of the small range of antimalarials/ROT available at each outlet. They also 
reported that counting ROT tended to be easier than antimalarials, especially when 
antimalarials where kept in opened tins. For example, one interviewer explained that in one 
shop the tin was not transparent, preventing him from using the ruler so that he had to count 
each table! left in the tin. Also, at times, interviewers reported they had estimated more pills 
in the tin at the second than at the first visit although shopkeepers said that no new tin had 
been opened. Interviewers said that when they collected data on quantities received and 
disposed shopkeepers remembered generally very easily because the reported quantities were 
generally small and often null. They also reported that shopkeepers were generally surprised 
to be asked about disposed quantities because they said that they never throw products away 
nor send these, back to suppliers, expect to PSI for exchange of close to expiry antimalarial 
drugs. However, data collectors reported important challenges around the implementation of 
the retail audit technique. 
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First, they indicated that counting stocks was not always possible: for around 8% of 
antimalarials stocked both wholesalers and retailers refused to let interviewers count the 
quantities in stock (Table 8-6). 
"They did not allow us to count and they did not want to count for us at all [ ... ] they said they 
didn't want to spend time with us [ ... ] they said that it [the survey] was useless and wasting 
their time" (Fieldwork diary #40 about the retail audit technique implemented at a wholesale 
outlet). 
"She claimed that I asked the same question at first visit. She said that I should write the same 
amount as at first visit". (Fieldwork diary #2 about the retail audit technique implemented at a 
wholesale outlet.) 
Second, data collectors reported that in many cases shopkeepers preferred to estimate by 
memory their stock, rather than have these counted. Fieldworkers added that this situation 
was more common amongst wholesalers who refused to let interviewers open the cupboards 
where they kept the drugs. This was corroborated by the SLS quantitative data, which showed 
that at first visit stocks of antimalarial drugs were counted for around 51% of all antimalarial 
products surveyed at wholesale outlets compared to 97% at retail outlets (Table 8-8). 
Table 8-8: Products for which interviewers effectively counted the quantities in stock 
as % of products surveyed at first and second visits 
At first visit (SLS1) Wholesale outlets Retail outlets 
Number of Percent with Number of Percent with 
products stock data products surveyed stock data 
surveyed "counted" "counted" 
Antimalarial drugs 113 51.3% 136 97.1% 
RDT 41 56.1% 41 78.0% 
At second visit (SLS2) Wholesale outlets Retail outlets 
Number of Percent with Number of Percent with 
products stock data products surveyed stock data 
surveyed "counted" "counted" 
Antimalarial drugs 104 57.7% 143 78.3% 
RDT 34 61.7% 42 76.2% 
Source: Sales Level Survey, August-October 2009 
In some cases, data collectors explained during group discussions that the quantities stocked 
were estimated by memory due to factors beyond the control of shopkeepers. For example, 
one wholesaler was said to be refurbishing his shop at first visit so that it was not possible to 
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proceed to the stock count. In other cases, one wholesaler and one retailer did not stock all 
drugs at the shop premises but at their home so the stock count could not be performed. 
As during the recall technique, data collectors questioned the accuracy of the stock data they 
had recorded. Data collectors said that in some shops they counted higher quantities at second 
that at first visit, although no new supplies were reportedly received. During a group 
discussion, a data collector explained that in one wholesale outlet, the shopkeeper had 
prepared an order at first visit (so quantities were not counted as 'stocked') but that a few 
days later the customer had cancelled the order and the shopkeeper had put the drugs back 
on the shelves but forgot to consider it as a new quantity received. Last but not least, 
fieldworkers reported being worn out by the implementation of the retail audit method, not 
because of the process of counting products but actually because of respondents' attitudes. 
"She blamed me about what the questions asked" (Fieldworker #1 during a group discussion) 
"I could hear that she whispered 'what the hell they come again" (Fieldworker #1 during a 
group discussion) 
This section demonstrated that the recall method was a convenient method for collecting sales 
volume data, specifically in a setting where written sales records were not available or not 
accessibility, and where the number of customers for ROT and antimalarials was reported to 
be low. However, fieldworkers did question the accuracy of recalled estimates and they 
perceived shopkeepers selling larger volumes, a wider range of drugs and other consumer 
goods to have more difficulty remembering their sales volumes for antimalarial drugs and 
ROTs. As for the retail audit technique, whilst interviewers reported that it was relatively easy 
and quick to count stocks and collect quantities disposed and received, it was neither always 
pleasant nor feasible to do so because"of respondent's attitudes towards the survey, notably 
at wholesale outlets. The next section presents the relative costs of implementing the recall 
and retail audit methods. 
8.3.3.3 Costs of implementing retail audit technique and recall methods 
Using expenditure records for the SLS implemented at retail outlets, it was estimated that the 
.~ 
implementation of the retail audit technique amounted to US$ 8,369 and that of the recall 
method for US$ 4,404 (Table 8-9). It is not surprising that the retail audit method was found to 
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be more expensive than the recall method given that it requires twice as much human 
resource time (data collection and supervision) and transportation, as well as additional 
resources during the planning phase, including fieldworker training and pilot of data collection 
instruments. 
Table 8-9: Costs of implementing retail audit technique and recall methods 
based on resources used for implementing the 2 methods at retail outlets 
Number of 
units 
Number of Days 
Unit-Day 
Total Costs (US$) Cost categories (e.g. people, Cost (US$) 
cars) 
RA RC RA RC 
Personnel 
method method method method 
Fieldworkers working fee 4 30 15 16 1,920 
Fieldworkers' per diem 4 30 15 20 2,400 
Supervisors working fee 1 15 8 23 345 
Supervisors' per diem 1 15 8 20 300 
Training 
Training room 1 3.5 3 100 300 
Training attendance fee 5 5 5 5 125 
Pilot of survey tools 5 4 2 16 320 
Communications - - - - 279 
Transportation 
Fieldworkers' Car 1 30 15 - 1,554 
Other transport modes 
49 - -(boat, motos) 
Supervisors' Car 1 15 8 - 777 
TOTAL 8,369 
RA IS for retail audit technique; RC is for recall 
Source: Retail Sales level Survey, Project Expenditure Records, October 2009 
8.3.4 Conclusion 
We compared two methods for measuring private sector sales volumes: the retail audit 
technique and recall methods, and assessed the potential of using written sales records. 
Before discussing our results, some limitations regarding the design of this comparative study 
are to be noted. First, the final samples were relatively small, notably at the wholesale level 
where only 34 antimalarial and 23 ROT observations were available. A second limitation is that 
whilst negative retail audit estimates clearly indicated data collection errors, which were 
excluded from the analysis, positive outliers may also have been errors and may have biased 
estimates too.· Third, recalled sales volumes that were compared to the retail audit estimates 
were collected at the second visit, which may have contributed to improving their accuracy as 
shopkeepers who expected a second interview may have paid more attention to 
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antimalarial/ROT sales. Fourth, our study did not assess the repeatability of the retail audit and 
recall method, which is an important component in comparative studies for exploring the 
properties of different methods: replicated measurements of the same variable using the same 
method are generally conducted in the medical field, when for example comparing 2 devices 
for measuring blood pressure on a sample of individuals {Bland and Altman, 1986}. However, it 
was not possible during this study to explore the repeatability of our methods because of time 
and financial constraints. Perhaps, more importantly, repeating the retail audit technique at 
the same wholesale outlets would have been problematic in terms of respondents' 
acceptability. 
At wholesale outlets, the analysis using mean difference and limits of agreements did not 
allow us to conclude that the 2 methods 'agreed'. The mean difference in antimalarial sales 
volume estimates between the 2 methods was significant and large {4 AETOs, 95% ci 0.2-7.2} 
compared to the median volumes sold at wholesale outlets over a 2-week period {estimated to 
range between 0.8 and 11.6 AETOs depending on the antimalarial category48}. In most cases, 
the mean difference was also well above the 10% threshold used for sample size calculations: 
for example in one outlet the between-method difference actually represented 200% of the 
sales volumes being measured! The limits of agreement which provide an indication of the 
difference between the measurements at individual outlets confirmed that estimates obtained 
through the 2 different methods would greatly disagree for most measurements. The analysis 
of ROT sales volumes showed that the 2 methods could, on average, be used interchangeably: 
the mean difference was small and no statistically significant {1 test, 95% ci -6.0 to 4.0}. 
However, sales volume measures varied greatly at individual outlet. For example, in one 
wholesale outlet, the between-method difference for ROT represented 550% of the sales 
volumes being measured. This was reflected in the limits of agreement that indicated that for 
most outlets the 2 methods would disagree by around 23 tests. 
With the choice of the method likely to dramatically affect the size of the volumes being 
measured, there would be important implications if one wishes to measure sales volumes 
specifically at each outlet, for example in the context of an intervention rewarding individual 
seller as a function of the volume sold. In a study of the market for malaria treatment, this 
48 Table 6-9 showed that the median number of AETDs sold the week before the SCS among all 
wholesalers ra'nged between 0.4 and 5.8 AETDs across antimalarial categories. Assuming constant 
weekly sales, it can be estimated that the median volume of AETDs sold over a 2-week period is 
between 0.8 and 11.6 AETDs depending on the antimalarial category. When all antimalarials were 
considered, the median volume sold over a 2-week period was 0 (IQR 0.0-6.75) (data not shown). 
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would also have implications if the objective is to measure market size in terms of 
volumes/values purchased. If the aim is to calculate the HHI or concentration ratio, the 
implications are however less clear: if the bias is constant across volumes being measured, 
there would be no major implications in using a particular method for calculating market 
shares. However, if the bias is not constant, as was the case at retail outlets, using for example 
the retail audit technique method would overestimate market concentration if it is assumed 
that the retail audit technique tends to overestimate to a greater extent large volumes sold 
than small volumes. 
There are several reasons that may explain the between-method differences. At wholesale 
level, fieldworkers reported that shopkeepers had difficulties remembering antimalarial sales 
volumes as they generally stocked a wide range of products. It is also possible that wholesalers 
underestimated their sales volumes during recall for fear of disclosure to competitors or 
regulatory authorities. Fieldworkers also experienced some challenges when implementing the 
retail audit method, during which it was not always possible to count the quantities stocked. 
During the SLS, wholesalers were also asked, as part of the SCS, about their business 
characteristics and practices and this may have influenced the implementation and outcomes 
of the SLS, by creating fatigue and/or anxiety amongst both respondents and fieldworkers, 
leading to data collection errors. Retail audit estimates might have been in some cases 
contaminated by "recall" bias for stock data, and if wholesalers had underreported their sales 
volumes through the recall technique they may well have misreported their stocks during the 
retail audit technique. 
At retail outlets, results were more difficult to interpret because bias and limits of agreement 
were not constant throughout the range of measurements. However, qualitative data 
collected through fieldworkers' diaries and group discussions indicated that recall and retail 
audit techniques both worked relatively well at retail outlets. Regarding the recall method, 
shopkeepers did not report retailers to have had a hard time remembering their sales volumes. 
However, shopkeepers also said that it was easy for them to count stocks. Assuming that 
shopkeepers might have had more difficulty recalling larger than smaller quantities sold, the 
retail audit technique might have provided more accurate measures for larger volumes than 
the recall method, as reflected by the between-method differences with the retail audit 
method providing higher estimates than the recall method with increased sales volumes. In 
this context, the retail audit technique method might give more accurate results, which may 
justify the additional resources required for implementing this method. However, our results 
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show that this method is prone to many data collection errors and implementation challenges. 
Table 8-10 summarises the challenges encountered when using written sales records, recall 
method and retail audit technique for measuring retail and wholesale sales volumes. 
Table 8-10: Problems encountered when measuring sales volumes 
Methods Problems encountered 
Limited Complexity Time Fear of Recall bias/ 
feasibility consuming/ disclosure data collection 
Cost errors 
Review written records1 ttl ttl 
Recall method ttl ttl 
Retail audits ttl ttl ttl ttl ttl 
1. • It IS also possible for wntten sales records to be Incomplete 
Whilst our analysis does not provide firm conclusions on which method is more likely to 
provide more accurate sales estimates, it demonstrates that in Cambodia where sales volumes 
were small, the recall method appeared to have had key advantages: retailers were perceived 
to easily remember their sales volumes, wholesalers were perceived to find it less invasive and 
fieldworkers found it more convenient. The suitability of different methods is however likely to 
differ across settings (country, market), a situation that adds challenges in conducting research 
on retail and wholesale markets (e.g. development of study design, training of fieldworkers). 
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CHAPTER 9 DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the final objective of this thesis which is to analyse the implications of 
the interplay between market structure, provider conduct, consumer demand and regulation 
on the availability, price and quality of malaria treatment and to draw recommendations for 
public health policy and future research. The chapter starts by reviewing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the methods used for collecting and analysing the data used in this thesis. Areas 
where additional data would have benefited the analysis are also identified (Section 9.2). The 
chapter continues by summarising and discussing the findings presented in Chapters 5 to 7 in 
light of the theoretical literature on models of markets and competition and the empirical 
literature on retail markets and private commercial sector distribution chains in developing 
countries (Section 9.3). The chapter ends by developing recommendations for policy and 
future research on private commercial markets for antimalarial drugs in Cambodia and more 
generally in other malaria-endemic countries that engage in nationwide subsidy schemes for 
Artemisinin Combination Therapy (ACT) (Section 9.4). 
9.2 Methodological strengths and weaknesses 
In this section, the strengths and weaknesses of the methods used for collecting and analYSing 
the data used in this thesis are reviewed and discussed, and areas where additional data would 
have benefited the analysis are identified. 
9.2.1 Obtaining a representative sample of providers 
Our analYSis used representative data on retail markets and the private commercial sector 
distribution chain for malaria treatment serving malaria-endemic areas of Cambodia. Retail 
data were drawn from the ACTwatch Outlet Survey (OS) - a cross-sectional survey of retail 
outlets stocking antimalarial drugs identified through a census of all public and private outlets 
with the potential to do so in a representative sample of malaria-endemic areas. We built on 
this sample to study wholesalers by focusing on the top 2 suppliers for antimalarial drugs for 
each retail outlet, and repeated this process until the top of the chain was reached, meaning 
that our sample of wholesalers surveyed during the Supply Chain Survey (SCS) can also be 
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considered as representative. The completeness of this bottom-up approach for sampling 
wholesalers in Cambodia in relation to other approaches previously used in the literature, 
including official lists or interviews with key informants, was demonstrated in Chapter 8. The 
scope of the data used in the thesis is wider than that used in other studies, which focused on 
smaller geographical areas (e.g. districts) (MMV, 2007, Goodman et aI., 2004) or particular 
type(s) of private provider types, notably the most accessible and formal ones (e.g. pharmacies 
operating in urban areas or drug shops in peri-urban areas) (Russo, 2007, Russo and McPake, 
2010), or those operating at the extremities of the distribution chain (e.g. importers or 
wholesalers supplying retailers as opposed to intermediate wholesalers) (PSI, 2007, Tavrow et 
aI., 2003, Amin and Snow, 2005, Adome et aI., 1996). These data offered a full picture of the 
market for malaria treatment from retailers up to wholesalers operating at the top of the chain 
and demonstrated the heterogeneity of retail and wholesale markets. Finally, the availability of 
data representative to all malaria endemic areas offered a reliable sampling frame for 
qualitative research, through semi-structured interviews (SSls) with both retailers and 
wholesalers operating at different levels of the chain. 
9.2.2 Obtaining high participation and response rates 
We achieved high participation rates, despite the commercially and legally sensitive topics 
covered with retailers and wholesalers. This reflected attention to emphasising the 
confidentiality of data collected and anonymity of providers participating in the study. There 
were however some refusals to answer questions related to licensing, despite these questions 
being asked towards the end of the interview when interviewees were likely to feel more 
comfortable. We encountered relatively few refusals from antimalarial retailers and 
wholesalers on questions regarding their purchase and selling prices, in comparison to other 
countries in which the same study was implemented, especially at the wholesale level 
(ACTwatch Group, personal communication). However, during our study and as observed 
elsewhere wholesalers who imported antimalarial drugs were reluctant to share the price at 
which they purchased their supplies (ACTwatch Group, personal communication). By contrast 
among retailers, response rates were high in Cambodia, providing a sample of around 640 
price mark-up observations. 
It is possible that respondents deliberately misrepresented their behaviour, perhaps by 
reporting lower selling prices, as they would not want to be seen as making excessive profits, 
which would have led to an underestimation of the mark-ups. One way for assessing the 
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validity of mark-up data during our study would be to compare purchase prices reported by 
providers with selling prices stated by the suppliers they purchased from. However, in a given 
outlet, as and SCS did not collect information on which of the top 2 supply sources for 
antimalarial drugs mentioned a particular product was purchased from, so it was not possible 
to match directly retail purchase and wholesale selling prices reported by different providers in 
the chain. 
Respondents may also have misreported their stocking behaviour, notably of banned 
antimalarial drugs. Drug stocks were generally stored at the shop premises in transparent 
storage cabinet and separate storage rooms were rarely found, except amongst wholesalers 
who imported antimalarial drugs. However, it is possible that some providers stocked a few 
boxes of illegal drugs, notably artemisinin monotherapy (AMT) banned at the time of the 
study, that they could hide under the cabinets where other drugs were displayed. The practice 
of dispensing cocktail therapies might have also been underestimated as cocktail packages can 
be prepared at the time of consumer purchase. If these practices were widespread among our 
respondents, market availability and quality outcome measures may have been biased, with 
availability of inappropriate or ineffective treatment dispensed underestimated. 
Qualitative research through SSls with retailers and wholesalers provided the opportunity to 
follow up cases where inventory or purchase price had been refused and where banned 
products were in stock. As demonstrated throughout the thesis by providers' quotes on 
particularly controversial issues, this offered a more conducive forum than the as and SCS for 
collecting data which were sensitive both commercially and legally. In addition, we did not 
tape record our interviews, which may have reassured providers and widened the scope and 
depth of data collected. Several other factors allowed for sensitive topics to be followed up at 
the time of the interview and in-depth data to be collected on factors influencing provider 
conduct. First of all, the author worked with the same translator from the start of data 
collection in April 2009 to the end in November 2009 and the 2 researchers had a strong 
working relationship. Second, simultaneous translation was used during each of the SSls that 
were conducted in Khmer with retailers and wholesalers (total of 33, except two interviews 
that were conducted in English, one with PSI Cambodia and one with a private commercial 
wholesaler). Through this approach, the author had the opportunity to "participate" in the 
interview, bydosely following up issues with respondents. Third, being two women aged 30 
years old, including one foreigner and one of Khmer origin is perceived by the author to have 
helped the data collection process, especially in shops where women operated. The latter may 
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have felt more comfortable sharing their business practices, understanding of the market and 
challenges with us than with men or more generally with younger surveyors. For example, 
during several 551s, we were offered to share respondents' lunches or given coconut rice to 
take away with us. Finally, all three wholesalers who imported antimalarial drugs at the time of 
the study were interviewed 2 to 3 times during the course of the research, which provided 
several opportunities to explain the study objectives and answer providers' questions and 
concerns, which contributed to building trust between us and the interviewees. 
9.2.3 Measuring market structure and provider conduct 
Previous studies have demonstrated the utility of the Industrial Organization (10) literature in 
providing insights into the functioning of health care markets, notably those for 
pharmaceutical drugs, including antimalarial drugs in low income countries (Goodman, 2004, 
Bennett, 1996, Nakamba et aI., 2002, Gaynor, 2006). The analytical framework presented in 
Figure 4-1 therefore built on economic concepts related to market structure, provider conduct 
and consumer demand and illustrated how their interactions affect market performance. To 
address the aim of our study, market performance was defined in the public health terms of 
availability, price and quality of malaria treatment. 
The analytical framework provided guidance on the range of data to be collected to study 
market structure and provider conduct. However, in developing countries there is a lack of 
routine data on health care markets. Furthermore, the analytical framework did not dictate 
the choice of measures nor which measurement techniques should be used to study the 
market. In addition, methods for studying markets in low income countries are under-
developed and those available lack adaptation for studying informal providers (Conteh and 
Hanson, 2003) and distribution chains. The complexity of the functioning of markets and lack 
of empirical work in this area imply that it is not clear which structure and conduct variables 
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should be used and how best they should be measured, let alone how their determinants 
should be studied. 
Market definition 
The analysis of competition first requires the difficult task of defining markets on product and .. 
geographic dimensions. Ideally we would have used household data on treatment seeking 
behaviour (location and type of provider visited and drugs obtained) for defining the product 
and geographic definition of the retail markets. However, these data were not available at the 
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time of the PhD research. Instead we used data collected during the 05 on the complete range 
of public and private providers of antimalarial drugs operating in the study areas (our product 
dimension), and conducted 551s to assess the completeness of 05 data. The conceptual 
framework did not suggest which approach to use for defining the geographical dimension of 
the market. The 10 literature proposes various approaches so an assessment of the suitability 
of several geographical boundaries was conducted during 551s, during which data on 
provenance of retail customers for malaria treatment and perceptions of antimalarial retail 
providers themselves of competition they faced from other providers were collected. Through 
this approach, the retail market was defined as the commune. However, it is possible that 
retailers overestimated the degree of competition they faced, as has been observed elsewhere 
(Goodman, 2004, Amin, 2002), and that we overestimated the geographical boundaries of the 
market. However there was not enough data available at the time of this thesis to conduct 
such an assessment. In the context of Cambodia where mobile providers represented an 
important source for antimalarial drugs, and drawing on evidence from 551s, it is however most 
likely that a narrower definition of the market boundaries, such as for example the village, 
could have underestimated the size of retail markets. 
At wholesale level, the market definition was broader and variable across areas. For instance, 
in accessible areas the geographical definition is likely to have been at national level and to 
include all wholesalers operating in the distribution chain for antimalarial drugs. By contrast, in 
more remote areas, the geographical definition is likely to have been narrower, at the 
provincial or district level and to include wholesalers supplying retailers only. This is because 
wholesalers operating at national level (i.e. importers) were less likely to supply remote outlets 
directly and therefore to have competed with wholesale outlets based closer to the periphery. 
In this context and because of overlapping chain levels (e.g. with wholesalers operating at 
several levels of the chain, especially at lower levels), it was not possible to use a geographical 
definition for the wholesale markets. Instead, the level(s) at which wholesalers operated was 
(were) used to analyse competition in the private commercial sector distribution chain. 
Market concentration and contestability 
Data on antimalarial sales volumes at each retail and wholesale outlet were collected by asking 
providers to recall the quantities of each drug they sold the week preceding the 05 and 5C5 
respectively. As discussed in Chapter 8, the recall method used in the 5C5 offered several 
advantages for collecting sale volume data compared to alternative methods. 
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In retail markets, measures of market concentration included the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index 
(HHI) and concentration ratios (CR) where the former could not be calculated. During our 
analysis, it was difficult to make firm conclusions on the extent to which concentration 
measures reflected the extent of competition in retail markets for malaria treatment. 
First, our market concentration measures include both private· and public antimalarial sales 
volumes and values, with all government outlets within each market treated as one provider 
on the basis that government providers were not expected to compete with one another. It is 
possible that this analytical approach distorted market concentration measures that were later 
used in the analysis of retail price mark-ups, by masking the impact of the relative importance 
of private sales volumes on private retailers' price mark-ups. This could have been one reason 
for the inverse relationship between price mark-ups and concentration in remote and 
accessible markets found in chapter 7. However, based on our findings that government 
providers competed with private commercial providers as revealed during SSls, we feel that it 
was important to include the volumes dispensed at government outlets in the analysis of 
market concentration as excluding them might have misrepresented the degree of retail 
competition. 
Second, in the context of overlapping chain levels, some private retailers may have operated 
as wholesalers as suggested during SSls (Section 6.3.1). Retailers operating as terminal 
suppliers for drug outlets located in more remote areas have commonly been observed in 
developing countries (Foster, 1991, MMV, 2007, Adikwu, 1996, Yadav, 2007, Battersby et aI., 
2003, 10M, 2004, Palafox et aI., 2009). During our study, it was not possible to separate out 
wholesale and retail sales. Including retailers' wholesale sales in the calculation of the HHI for 
retail markets may have had 2 implications: the first is that it may have overestimated the 
degree of market concentration, which - as with the inclusion of government sales volumes -
could have been one reason for the inverse relationship between price mark-ups and 
concentration in accessible and remote markets found in Chapter 7. The second implication 
relates to the overestimation of the size of the market for antimalarials, as some drug flows 
may have been double counted at both wholesale and retail levels. It is difficult to assess the 
degree to which this occurred, but it is somewhat reassuring that the order of magnitude of 
the Cambodia MOH's estimates for the total number of doses required for treating all malaria 
cases annually was similar to our estimates of what was actually used over a one year period. 
However, from the available data it is not possible to assess the extent to which those who 
received antimalarial drugs actually needed to receive these medicines. FinallV, it is important 
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to note here that one cannot make a direct link between sales volumes in adult equivalent 
treatment doses (AETDs) and patients treated, as in practice many customers will be obtaining 
drugs for children and/or purchasing incomplete doses, so the number of customers to whom 
drugs were sold will be considerably higher than the volume of AETDs dispensed. 
At wholesale level, it was not possible to use traditional measures for assessing market 
concentration because of the problems of defining wholesale markets. Instead we used the 
number of times a supplier was mentioned at the previous level as a proxy measure to assess 
the relative importance of each wholesaler operating at a given level. The frequency of 
mentions should however be interpreted with caution as it is does not measure the market 
share of a supplier in the wholesale market but provides instead an indication of the frequency 
of use of particular suppliers by buyers at the next level. 
Concentration measures, including traditional measures such as the HHI and CR, do not 
incorporate an indication of contestability, which is an important aspect of market structure to 
be considered during the analysis of market competition. Contestability was assessed using 
qualitative data on providers' perceptions of ease of entry and exit of the market collected 
during 551s. The assessment was therefore prone to the subjectivity of providers. In 2011, 
another 05 was conducted in the same study areas, during which a census of all potential 
outlets stocking antimalarial drugs was repeated. Future research may therefore use these 
data to gain further insight into contestability in retail markets by looking at the turnover of 
retail outlets (i.e. outlets' entry and exit) between different points in time and comparing this 
to our findings from 551s. 
Provider conduct 
The analysis of the nature and intensity of competition in retail markets and in the distribution 
chain started by using 551 data on providers' perceived variations in the degree of competition 
across provider types and antimalarial products, and in the extent of product differentiation 
and non-price competition, by identifying which providers and products were perceived by 
consumers to be of higher quality and how providers responded to these reported consumer 
preferences. Providers' pricing behaviour and the extent of price competition and providers' 
response to regulation were also investigated during 551s. As discussed above, assessing the 
intensity of competition through the use of qualitative data is prone to the subjectivity of 
providers and these methods have overall rarely been used by economists. However, during 
our study they contributed to the application of our conceptual framework, design of the 
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quantitative analytical model for studying retail price mark-up determinants and interpretation 
of these findings (Coast et aI., 2004). 
Retailers' price setting behaviour and the extent of price competition in retail markets were 
analysed by following the traditional structure-conduct-performance approach by investigating 
whether more concentrated markets were associated with the exercise of market power. 
Limitations of this approach that hypothesizes a causal link between structure and conduct, 
combined with that of using HHI as the measure of market competition are widely recognised 
in the 10 literature (Tirole, 1988, Church and Ware, 2000). Market concentration as measured 
by the HHI may be endogenous, that is the result of providers' pricing decision, demand or cost 
factors (Gaynor and Vogt, 2000, Gaynor, 2006). For example, firms that can produce at a lower 
cost have the ability of charging lower prices and are therefore likely to have higher market 
shares than firms with higher costs. Keeping these limitations in mind during our study, retail 
percent price mark-ups were regressed on market characteristics (including concentration, 
accessibility and malaria transmission risk), strata, outlet and product characteristics. We 
chose to analyse percent price mark-ups as our outcome variable rather than price. As 
previously mentioned, consumer prices are heavily influenced by price decisions of economic 
actors operating at all levels of the distribution chain, including manufacturers, wholesalers 
and retailers, so they cannot be considered as a measure of retailers' price setting behaviour 
alone. Paying close attention to the overall context in which market structure, provider 
conduct and consumer demand interacted was shown to be key in the analysis of retailers' 
price setting decisions, as reflected by the important influence of, for example, market 
accessibility levels on retail price mark-ups. As mentioned above, another as was conducted in 
2011 and it is possible that additional as will be conducted in the near future. If price mark-up 
data were to be collected during these surveys, it will provide an opportunity to analyse the 
effects of variations over time in retail market structure on price mark-ups. For example, a 
recent study analysed anti-retroviral therapy (ART) price determinants in Brazil over a period 
of 13 years, exploring the influence of drug transaction characteristics and market competition 
measures on changes in ART prices from each supplier between consecutive years (Meiners et 
aI., 2011). 
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9.2.4 Measuring market accessibility and risk of malaria transmission 
The Cambodia's MOH categorises malaria-endemic villages by risk categories using data on the 
distance of each village to the forest. In this thesis, relatively recent data on malaria 
transmission risk for 2009 were used. Given that markets were defined as communes, a 
composite index of malaria transmission risk was compiled to estimate risk, with each market 
assigned the level of risk for the majority of its population. Our measure is therefore an 
approximate measure of risk in each market. 
Market accessibility levels were measured using data on the average time to travel in a 4-
wheel drive vehicle from the group of villages covered in each market to the nearest road and 
from there to the closest main commercial centre. Data on distance of each village to the 
nearest road were relatively old, dating from 2004. Recent development and improvement of 
the road network may have led to an underestimation of level of accessibility in some markets. 
The validity of our approach was however backed up by asking local informants with 
experience of travelling in Cambodia their impressions of market remoteness, including data 
collectors who participated in the OS, and also through the author's observations during data 
collection for the SCS. 
9.3 Discussion of findings in light of the theoretical and empirical literatures 
This section draws together the evidence presented in the thesis and considers it in the light of 
the theoretical literature on models of markets and competition and empirical literature on 
studies of retail markets and private commercial sector distribution chains for malaria 
treatment in developing countries. The section starts by summarizing key features and 
outcomes of the retail market for malaria treatment in Cambodia before discussing the factors 
influencing the relative role of the public and private sector in the supply of malaria treatment, 
private providers' price setting decisions and malaria treatment quality. 
9.3.1 Key features and outcomes of the market for malaria treatment 
This section summarizes key features of the retail market for malarial treatment, including .. 
total market size, market shares across provider types within and between public and private 
sectors, availability and price of antimalarials and rapid diagnostic tests for malaria (ROTs), and 
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issues around the quality of malaria treatment. It draws on both the thesis results, and other 
literature on malaria treatment in Cambodia, as reviewed in Chapter 3. 
We would expect the market for antimalarial drugs in Cambodia to be smaller in volume terms 
than that of other countries where malaria prevalence is higher, such as those in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The potential for comparison across countries was however limited as the size of 
antimalarial drug markets in developing countries has rarely been researched. We estimated 
that around 500,000 adult equivalent treatment doses (AETD) were dispensed per annum in 
areas at risk of malaria transmission in Cambodia, which is equivalent to 0.17 doses per capita. 
As expected this was much lower than was found in a study of 3 rural districts of Tanzania, 
where the market was estimated at 234,000 AETDs sold annually, equivalent to 1.7 doses per 
capita (Goodman, 2004). However, in value terms, the difference was not so marked. In our 
study the value of antimalarials dispensed per annum was estimated at US$ 1 million, 
equivalent to US$ 0.37 per capita, whilst in rural Tanzania the total value was US$ 109,000, 
equivalent to US$ 0.75 per capita (Goodman, 2004). This may have reflected the higher ability 
and willingness to pay for higher value antimalarials in Cambodia due to higher income levels 
than in Tanzania, as reflected by the difference in gross domestic product per capita between 
the two countries at the time of the respective studies (Cambodia US$ 739 in 2009 vs. 
Tanzania US$ 290 in 2004). 
Private commercial providers were the most common type of provider visited for treating 
malaria fever (ACTwatch Group, 2009a) and accounted for 75% of all antimalarial sales 
volumes, with private providers of clinical services accounting for 44% of the total market. The 
popularity of the private sector in the provision of malaria treatment has been reported in 
other recent studies conducted in Cambodia (Ozawa and Walker, 2011, Meesen et aL, 2011) 
and in many other developing countries (Snow et aL, 1992, Adome et aL, 1996, Goodman, 
2004, Molyneux et aL, 1999, Rutebemberwa et aL, 2009, van der Geest, 1987, Agyepong and 
Manderson, 1994, Foster, 1991, Foster, 1995, Geissler et aL, 2000, Hamel et aL, 2001, Krause 
and Sauerborn, 2000, McCombie, 1996, Ndyomugyenyi et aL, 1998, Njau et aL, 2006, Ruebush 
et aI., 1995, Salako et aI., 2001). 
However, government providers also played an important role in the supply of malaria 
treatment, dispensing 25% of all antimalarial AETDs. This importance was also observed in 
other countries. The latest evidence from the ACTwatch project shows public sector market 
shares in volume terms of 18-27% in Madagascar, the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
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Benin, 42% in Uganda and 60% in Zambia (O'Connell et aI., in press). One exception was 
Nigeria, where public sector providers accounted for only 2% of the antimalarial market 
(O'Connell et aI., in press). Within the public sector, health facilities are expected to be the 
most important source of antimalarial drugs. In Cambodia, their role was relatively marginal as 
they were responsible for only 9% of the total market. The most important government 
providers were Village Malaria Workers (VMWs), with two VMWs operating in around half of 
the villages located within 2 kilometres of the forest (CNM's VMW project manager personal 
communication), accounting for 16% of all antimalarial volumes dispensed in the study areas. 
Antimalarial availability was variable across providers types, with around two-thirds of 
government-owned outlets, half of pharmacies/clinical pharmacies, one third of mobile 
providers and less than one tenth of grocery and village shops stocking any antimalarial drug in 
the malaria-endemic study areas (ACTwatch Group, 2009b). ACT availability was overall low 
amongst these outlets, notably at private commercial outlets, with availability ranging 
between 19% and 50% across private provider types stocking (ACTwatch Group, 2009b). In 
other settings where ACT price subsidy and social-marketing like activities have been 
implemented, ACT achieved similar market shares, ranging between 38-51% in 3 pilot studies 
conducted in areas of Angola, Tanzania and Uganda (Sabot et aL, 2009, Vamey and 
Schaferhoff, 2011). By contrast, in settings without price subsidy or informational activities for 
promoting ACT to providers and consumers, market shares were much smaller, accounting for 
less than 25% of the total volume of antimalarials distributed across all sectors and countries 
(O'Connell et aL, in press). 
Prompt paraSitological confirmation of all suspected malaria cases by either microscopy or 
ROTs is recommended before treatment is started (WHO, 2010b, CNM, 2008). However, during 
our study availability of blood testing services was lower than that of antimalarial drugs in 
general. Outside public health facilities, blood testing services were relatively rare as observed 
in other countries (O'Connell et aI., in press). ROTs were more commonly stocked than 
microscopy services across all sectors, with ROT availability ranging between 9% and 50% 
across private provider types and being significantly higher at pharmacy/clinical pharmacy, 
drug shops and mobile providers than at grocery and village shops (ACTwatch Group, 2009b). 
This was much higher than in other ACTwatch countries, where ROTs were available at less 
than 20% of private shops (O'Connell et aL, in press). 
Cost of appropriate management of confirmed P./malaria (ROT+ACT) ranged between 
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US$ 1.53 and US$ 2.35 across private provider types, indicating that cost was likely to have 
been a major barrier for most Cambodians to access effective treatment. The median price of 
one AETO of the ACT ASMQ at private commercial retail outlets ranged between US$ 1.18 and 
US$ 1.64 across outlet types. It was 2 to 3 times higher than the RRP of the subsidized ACT 
(US$ 0.61) and between 3.5 to 5 times more expensive than one AETO of chloroquine, the non-
ACT with the highest sales volume at the time of the as (ACTwatch Group, 2009b). The median 
price of ROT ranged between US$ 0.33 and US$ 0.71 across private commercial outlets 
(author's own calculations using as data). In the public sector, antimalarial drugs, ACT and ROT 
were generally available free of charge (ACTwatch Group, 2009b). 
Issues around the quality of malaria treatment obtained included poor access to 
parasitological diagnosis, poor adherence to diagnosis test results, inappropriate medicines 
dispensed and drug quality concerns. As described in Chapter 2, less than half of 1,551 
individuals who reported having had malaria-like fever in the 2 weeks preceding the household 
survey conducted in our study areas said they had received a diagnostic test (ACTwatch Group, 
2009a). The majority of those who reported testing positive to malaria (87% of those who 
received a test) said they received a cocktail medicine that did not contain any antimalarial 
drug and only 35% received an ACT, of which 21% received it the same day or day after 
(ACTwatch Group, 2009a). Furthermore, of those who reported testing negative to malaria, 
11% said they received an antimalarial drug and 7% an ACT. Finally, of those who did not 
receive a test or were unsure of the test results, 11% reported receiving an antimalarial drug 
and 5% an ACT (ACTwatch Group, 2009a). 
Whilst ACT accounted for 60% of the market, the subsidized ACT Malarine accounted for less 
than 40% of antimalarial volumes sold at private commercial outlets. nAMT and AMT were 
widely available, with-nAMT (other than chloroquine) accounting for 13% of all volumes sold in 
the market, arid AMT, whose consumption is argued to fuel multi-drug resistance, for 8%. 
Further quality concerns relate to the availability of counterfeits and substandard products, 
which consumers are unlikely to be able to distinguish from genuine and good quality products 
at the time of purchase. In Cambodia, these concerns are directed to AMT and nAMT 
specifically, with some years ago 71% of 133 private drug outlets found to sell either fake or 
substandard ,?rtesunate and 60% fake or substandard mefloquine (Rozendaal, 2001). More 
recently, in 2006, 27% of 451 antimalarial drug samples collected at 171 private drug outlets 
operating in four provinces in the MORSC stratum were counterfeits (Lon et aI., 2006) 
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9.3.2 Factors affecting the relative role of private and public providers 
The extensive role of the private commercial sector in the supply of antimalarial drugs 
reflected the interplay between market structure, provider conduct and consumer demand. 
Cambodia's health system was recovering from its entire destruction during the Khmer Rouge 
regime (1975-1979) followed by many years of economic and political instability (until 1998). 
Evidence showed that the majority of private shops opened at the end or shortly after this 
period of instability, when unmet needs and demand for health services and products were 
likely to be high. At the time of our study, in 2009, retail shops made up 80% of all outlets 
stocking antimalarial drugs and were 4 times more numerous than government providers, 
meaning that they were a much more geographically accessible source of antimalarial drugs. 
Compared to government providers, private outlets also had the advantage of less frequent 
stock-outs, being open longer hours, even at night, and in the case of mobile providers, the 
willingness to travel to patients' homes. Proximity to home and convenience were highly 
valued by consumers and these attributes led them to prefer private shops over government 
outlets. This was in tune with evidence from the ACTwatch household survey during which the 
most important factor influencing Cambodians' treatment seeking behaviour was "easy 
access" (ACTwatch Group, 2009a). 
Government failures in public sector provision of malaria treatment included the opportunity 
cost of travelling longer distances and waiting times at public health facilities, and the risk that 
drugs may not be available. In addition, public health facilities had shorter opening hours and 
the staff members were reported to be much less friendly. However, with an average number 
of 10-14 VMWs per market where they operated, VMWs were likely to have been a highly 
convenient source of treatment. In ~ddition, it is possible that they were a more reliable 
source of antimalarial drugs compared to health facilities, experiencing less frequent stock-
outs as they received their supplies from a more integrated distribution chain structure 
(directly from the MOH instead of the Central Stores-Operational district-Health facility route). 
With the advantages of proximity and free treatment, VMWs therefore represented an 
attractive source of treatment. 
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9.3.3 Factors affecting price setting for antimalarial drugs 
Results presented in Chapter 7 show that median percent mark-ups across different 
antimalarial categories ranged between 16% and 42% at wholesale level and between 15% and 
366% at retail level across different antimalarial categories. From the evidence presented in 
the thesis it is not possible to draw firm conclusions on whether prices were at the competitive 
level i.e. the extent to which they diverted from marginal cost. However, the available 
evidence suggested that several factors may have contributed to antimalarial prices set above 
the competitive level, with the intensity of competition varying across different market 
segments. This section discusses the conditions that prevailed on the market that may have 
influenced price setting behaviours, including aspects of market structure, provider conduct 
and consumer demand. 
Market concentration 
The number of shopkeepers operating in retail markets was highly variable, ranging between 1 
and 32 retailers, indicating the heterogeneity of retail market structures. Market concentration 
measures calculated using the HHI on antimalarial sales volumes ranged between 0.12 and 
1.00 which according to US anti-trust guidelines indicates that market structure ranged from 
unconcentrated to monopoly. This suggests that retail markets for malarial treatment were 
located throughout the perfectively-competitive-monopoly spectrum. The median HHI 
calculated on antimalarial sales volumes was 0.50 (0.34-0.74), which, again, according to US 
anti-trust guidelines indicates high concentration (U.S. Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission, 2010). Therefore, monopolistic competition or an oligopoly structure 
seems to have been an appropriate characterization of most retail markets for malarial 
treatment. 
As expected from a classical econom!.c theory perspective, market concentration and retail 
mark-ups were positively associated but in moderately accessible markets only. In these 
markets, an increase of 0.1 in the HHI calculated on antimalarial sales volumes led to percent 
price mark-ups 14% higher. By contrast, whilst the relationship between market concentration 
and price mark-ups was significant in less accessible markets, it was negative (although the 
effects were relatively small and evidence of these effects relatively weak). For example, in 
remote markets, an increase of 0.1 in the HHIled to price mark-ups 5% lower. These effects of 
market concentration were significantly larger on ACT ASMQ price mark-ups, with an increase 
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of 0.1 HHI associated with ASMQ mark-ups 17% higher in moderately accessible markets and 
with mark-ups nearly 10% lower in remote markets. 
As previously mentioned, these results might have reflected the provision of malaria treatment 
by government providers leading private providers to limit pricing by charging lower mark-ups. 
During SSls with private shopkeepers, government providers notably VMWs that had the 
advantage of proximity were perceived to increase the intensity of competition faced by 
private retailers, which might have resulted in lower consumer prices in markets where VMWs 
operated. However, it is also possible that consumers were more sensitive to quality than 
price, implying that providers might have competed on quality attributes rather than price. In 
our markets with relatively low concentration, higher mark-ups might have reflected the 
higher costs of providing better quality of care There are no theoretical predictions of the 
effect of competition on quality in markets where prices are determined by firms (Gaynor, 
2006) and the potential for discussing our results in light of the empirical literature is very 
limited. Most of the empirical literature on quality competition in hc:alth care markets has 
focused on hospital markets in high income countries and provides mixed results (Gaynor, 
2006) with some evidence suggesting that competition increases quality (Gaynor et aI., 2010) 
whilst other studies found that competition reduces quality (Propper et aI., 2004). However, in 
a study of the market for hospital services in Bangkok, a negative correlation between profits 
and concentration was found combined with some association between lower concentration 
and higher quality (Bennett, 1996). 
Overall, in our study, the effects of concentration on price mark-ups were relatively small 
compared to that of other predictors. First, antimalarial price mark-ups were significantly and 
more largely affected by accessibility and malaria transmission risk levels, with in high and 
moderate risk areas, lower mark-ups in remote markets (115% and 44% respectively) 
compared to "moderately accessible markets, perhaps reflecting the importance of public 
sector supply through malaria control interventions targeting these areas. Second, mark-ups 
were higher in remote markets than in more accessible markets in the MDRF stratum, a result 
that pointed to the influence of the distribution chain structure on consumer prices. For 
instance, percent mark-ups on ASMQ were 77% higher in remote markets than in moderately 
accessible markets and 70.5% higher in remote markets compared to accessible markets. This 
might have reflected the higher costs of purchasing ASMQ faced by providers operating in 
these areas as they were significantly less likely to receive supplies from a supplier with 
delivery services. Evidence showed that the structure of the chain varied by remoteness and 
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outlet type as observed in other countries (MMV, 2007, Chukwujekwu, 2007). In our study, 
more remote providers, including mobile providers, grocery stores and village shops were 
served by a chain made of more intermediaries, as they purchased supplies from local 
wholesalers. By contrast, more accessible providers were served by wholesalers operating at 
provincial or national level. As expected under the assumption that each seller adds its own 
mark-ups, higher consumer prices were observed at mobile providers, grocery stores and 
village shops compared to pharmacies/clinical pharmacies and drug shops (ACTwatch Group, 
2009b). 
The distribution chain for antimalarial drugs had a pyramid shape with fewer suppliers at the 
top of the chain and more numerous suppliers at the bottom, as observed in other countries 
(Yadav, 2007, Yadav and Conesa, 2008, Tavrow et aL, 2003, 10M, 2004, Battersby et aL, 2003, 
IFC, 2008, RBM, 2007, Shretta and Guimier, 2003, CHAI, 2008b, Russo, 2007, Russo and 
McPake, 2010, Chukwujekwu, 2007, MMV, 2007). With a rapid narrowing of the number of 
wholesalers operating in the distribution chain, we would expect more intense competition at 
the bottom of the chain compared to the top. This was partly demonstrated by the analysis of 
wholesale market concentration using the percentage of all supply source mentions that each 
unique supplier represented. However the analysis of wholesale price mark-ups at different 
levels of the chain did not indicate that price percent mark-ups were higher at the level 
supplying wholesalers than at that supplying retailers. However, in the context of overlapping 
distribution chain levels, it is not possible to conclude firmly on how price mark-ups compared 
at different levels of the chain. 
In the absence of evidence of vertical integration, antimalarial providers were expected to be 
free to choose their suppliers, which products to stock and what price to charge. This 
contrasted with situations observed in several malaria-endemic countries such as for example 
Benin, Nigeria" and Zambia, where the. structure of the chain was expected to have had more 
influence on retailers' decisions (RBM, 2007). In Benin, wholesalers sometimes owned 
pharmacies, which in some areas served a network of depots operating in less accessible 
areas, with the latter to be served exclusively from their affiliated pharmacy (Tougher et aL, 
2009). In Zambia, one vertically integrated business engaged in the import, wholesale and 
retail of antimalarials (Palafox et aI., 2011). In Nigeria, vertical integration was found to be 
common wit~in the distribution chain, with manufacturers and importers having vertically 
integrated wholesalers or third-party logistics service providers (Palafox et aL, 2009). 
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However, in Cambodia, the evidence demonstrated that retailers and wholesalers used 1 or 2 
supply sources for antimalarial drugs and that they did not generally switch to other suppliers, 
suggesting that competition might have been limited at all levels. 
More specifically at the top of the distribution chain, PSI Cambodia was the only importer of 
the subsidized ACT and no private commercial wholesalers imported ACT products. Several 
factors prevented wholesalers from entering the ACT import market. The first is that ASMQ 
was not available commercially and was co-blistered specifically for Cambodia by one 
manufacturer. The second is that whilst other manufacturers could decide to pre-pack the 
product to enter the market, the costs would likely be prohibitive for most wholesalers wishing 
to import the product in the absence of a price subsidy. Third, the popularity of the subsidized 
ACT amongst both providers and consumers was reported to be the result of the promotional 
activities of the social marketing programme, including branding, mass media communications 
and training of private providers. At the top of the chain, this created entry barriers as large 
investments in registration processes and advertising activities would be necessary to 
communicate information about a new antimalarial drug. During SSls, importers highlighted 
that the market for malaria treatment was too small for realizing scale economies such that 
the potential for gaining the minimum market share required to be profitable was very limited. 
Whilst a monopoly situation prevailed on the market for ACT, PSI Cambodia's objectives were 
however assumed to be unrelated to profit-maximization, following social responsibility 
principles to benefit society at large, by assessing the ability and willingness to pay of the 
target groups (PSI, 2003). 
Product differentiation 
The thesis findings indicated that product differentiation was quite strong within the market 
which may have created the potential for exercise of market power in pricing decisions. 
Providers of clinical services attracted customers through their higher health qualifications and 
wider range of drugs stocked compared to other outlets. Such product differentiation might 
have encouraged consumers to perceive that these providers as a more appropriate source of 
antimalarial drugs than other shops (Meesen et aI., 2011). We would therefore expect the 
intensity of competition between private outlets to be reduced, offering providers of clinical 
services some discretion in their price setting decisions and the opportunity to charge higher 
prices mark-ups than other types of providers. This was partly verified by our data, which 
showed price mark-ups on ASMQ 40% higher at pharmacies/clinical pharmacies than at other 
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provider types. However it did not translate into higher consumer prices (ACTwatch Group, 
2009b) as these providers purchased ACT at a lower price than other provider types. 
Antimalarial drugs were far from being homogenous products, including ACT, AMT and nAMT, 
with the latter available in tablet, injectable or suppository form. The evidence demonstrated 
the popularity of the socially marketed ACT amongst consumers who were reported to 
perceive Malarine as a product of high quality. Despite this perceived popularity, the socially 
marketed product accounted for less than 40% of all antimalarial AETD sold in the market. 
AMTs were reported to be popular, perhaps because they have been available for a relatively 
long time in Cambodia and were said to have less side effects that ASMQ. Retail price mark-
ups on artesunate were 49% lower than on ASMQ, but with higher purchase prices this 
translated to absolute price mark-Ups 2 to 5 times higher than on ASMQ across outlet types 
and AMT consumer prices 2 to 3 times higher. Furthermore, whilst price mark-ups on 
injectable antimalarial drug were not statistically different than on antimalarial tablets, as 
data showed that absolute price mark-ups were much higher than those on other antimalarial 
categories and dosage forms, with AMT absolute price mark-ups 6 to 26 times higher than for 
ACT tablets and 8 to 37 times higher than on nAMT injections, which translated into higher 
consumer prices (author's own calculation, see Chapters 2 and 5). 
Insights from monopolistic and oligopoly models 
As discussed above, the structure of markets in monopolistic competition was relevant to 
some retail markets where there were many sellers, ease of entry and exit and relatively low 
concentration. In the short run, private providers would each act as a monopoly and make 
economic profits (provided that they have profit maximising objectives), with price set above 
marginal cost because each faces a downward sloping demand curve. In the long run and in 
the absence of entry barriers, economic profits would be driven to zero. However, with 
differentiated 'products, firms would retain some discretion in setting their price. 
In oligopoly markets with a sufficiently small number of providers, each one would be 
expected to take the actions of the competing providers as given when selecting its own 
actions. Several models of oligopoly behaviours described in Chapter 3 may provide insights 
into the factors that affecting price setting decisions. 
In the standard price leadership model, the market leader sets his price first given the likely 
supply of other providers at that price, whilst other providers would set their prices following 
\ 
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the leader's choice. With a homogenous product, followers are assumed to be perfect 
competitors and charge the price set by the leader (Varian, 1999). This was illustrated during a 
SSI with a mobile provider who argued that he set his own price first to maximize his profits 
whilst other providers were perfect competitors, as they charged the same price. In markets 
where government providers might have been the leader, private providers were not expected 
to be conventional followers, given that diagnosis and antimalarial drugs were dispensed free 
of charge at public health facilities or by VMWs. Instead, SSls revealed that private providers 
set their own price considering the broader costs for consumers of seeking care in the public 
sector, notably transport costs which were easily estimated (as opposed to opportunity costs 
for consumers which would be hard to value by private providers). As discussed above, in 
markets where VMWs operated, it is possible that providers limited their prices in order to 
retain consumers. At higher levels of the chain, PSI Cambodia was the market leader so we 
could expect other importers to follow. However, in these market segments with strong 
product differentiation, followers would have retained some discretion in setting their price, 
charging higher or lower prices than the market leader. 
The kinked demand model may help explain the reasons why the consumer price of the 
socially marketed ACT might have been above the RRP. Supply shortages have occurred 
repeatedly since the start of the social marketing programme and have been argued to create 
opportunities for sellers to charge high mark-ups and set price above the RRP. In the context of 
strong product differentiation, the demand curve faced by each provider would be more 
elastic for price increases than for price cuts. Levels of ACT mark-ups may have resisted 
erosion if providers believed that any price cuts they made might be matched by competitors 
whilst price increases would not. 
A key feature of oligopoly is the tension between cooperation and self-interest: firms have an 
incentive to cooperate in order to l1'l.aximize their joint profits but there are incentives that 
hinder sustained cooperation as each seller pursues its own profit. Models of tacit collusion 
amongst retailers/wholesalers offered some insights into private shopkeepers' price setting 
decisions. Most markets had few providers (mean 5, see Section 5-2-6), creating incentives for 
private providers to collude rather than pursue their own self-interest, and two factors might 
have contributed to prevent cheating and sustain collusion. First, whilst there was no formal 
professional association of drug sellers, private providers had the opportunity to meet during 
the regular training sessions organized by PSI and obtain information on competitors' prices. 
Second, during data collection, we witnessed that when providers were out of stock of a 
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particular product they actually borrowed from other shops in order to satisfy an immediate 
consumer demand. In markets where collusion was effectively sustained, antimalarial prices 
would be expected to be as high as the monopoly model. Interestingly, during qualitative 
interviews, all antimalarial retailers and wholesalers refuted collusion, arguing they faced 
intense price competition, with a couple of retail providers even indicating cutting their prices 
in order to attract custom. 
All these models offered some insights on the nature of interactions that may have taken 
place. As mentioned before, in view of the heterogeneity of markets for antimalarial drugs, it is 
not possible to say which models were the most appropriate and different types of 
interactions may have taken place in different markets. 
9.3.4 Factors influencing treatment quality 
There are many aspects to good quality treatment for malaria. First, access should be prompt 
and take place within 24 hours after the onset of fever. Second, providers should have the 
expertise to treat malaria treatment, and use this expertise in the interest of their patients. 
Third, malaria infections should be confirmed by testing patient blood. Fourth, blood test 
results should be adhered to, with ACT dispensed to P.f/mixed cases, chloroquine to P. v cases 
and no antimalarial to negatives. Fifth, the appropriate medicine should be available and of 
good quality. 
The data presented in this thesis showed that competition in retail markets did not lead to the 
optimal provision of quality malaria treatment: accessibility to health-qualified providers 
stocking antimalarials and ACT in particular was limited, access to parasitological diagnosis was 
poor, adherence to blood test results was lacking, inappropriate treatments were dispensed 
and the quality of antimalarial drugs was questionable. The factors that influenced these 
.. 
outcomes are discussed in this section. 
Whilst competition in retail markets increased accessibility to antimalarial drugs, there was 
some indication that accessibility was in reality still quite restricted. Evidence from 551 
suggested that private providers clustered in more accessible areas. The literature on spatial .. 
product differentiation suggests that firms face different incentives in their location decisions 
,., 
(Hotelling, 1929), with sellers locating close to competitors in an attempt to capture more 
consumers ("market share effect") or further away if product differentiation is sufficiently 
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strong ("market power effect") (Netz and Taylor, 2002). 551s with shopkeepers indicated that 
the "market share effect" might have dominated in most markets, with retailers locating 
where the demand was greatest and clustering in more accessible areas, including around 
phsars or alongside main roads and roundabouts. By contrast, VMWs clearly increased 
accessibility in villages where they were introduced, and may also have improved quality of 
care, although the evidence is limited (Yeung et aI., 2008). However, at the time of our study, 
they operated in only around half of villages at high risk of malaria in Cambodia (CNM personal 
communication) and accounted for only 1% of initial visits for treating malaria fever in the 
study areas (ACTwatch Group, 2009a). 
As noted above, the negative relationship between price mark-ups and concentration 
observed in some markets suggested that consumers might have been more sensitive to 
quality than price, implying that providers might have competed on quality attributes rather 
than price. In some cases consumers were reported to have the ability to assess the true 
quality of a product after its purchase or through the experience of other consumers, 
suggesting that malaria treatment might have been an experience or reputation good. 
However, consumers' understanding of the quality of malaria treatment based on their own 
experience or that of others was likely to be imperfect, meaning that malaria treatment was 
more of a credence good whose technical attributes were not well understood and their true 
quality never observed. Under such conditions, competition may have focused on easily 
observable attributes (including proximity, opening hours, range of drugs stocked and 
friendliness) rather than on less observable technical aspects required for providing high 
quality of care, implying that the quality of malaria treatment might not have been enhanced 
in more competitive remote and accessible markets. 
This was borne out by several dimensions of treatment quality. First, outside public health 
facilities, microscopy services were relatively rare, a situation that reflected a mixture of 
factors. Microscopes were ,likely to have been too expensive for most private shops and 
consumer demand expected to be low, as a lab service was perceived by most providers to be 
a different type of business to that of selling drugs and treating. Microscopes also required 
skills that private providers voluntarily admitted not having, except 'when they were 
government doctors working in the nearby health centre. Whilst RDTs were more commonly 
available, several factors can be put forward to explain poor access to confirmed diagnosis 
reported by the as, reflecting the interplay between the inherent characteristics of the 
product, provider conduct and consumer demand. At the time of the study, Malacheck only 
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detected P.f malaria, a situation which according to data from SSls created some confusion 
amongst private providers about what to do with negative cases as it did not rule out P.V 
infections. Partly as a result private providers perceived the socially marketed RDT to be of 
little help in the management of malaria fevers. SSls also revealed some confusion amongst 
providers around whether blood testing was authorized in private shops. However, the low use 
of diagnostics might also have reflected providers' strategies for increasing convenience for 
consumers by avoiding waiting for blood tests and/or increasing affordability as the combined 
cost of RDT and ACT (around US$ 2.00) was likely to deter most consumers. In view of the 
differential in RDT and ACT prices (with ACT prices being 1.75 times more expensive than RDT), 
providers might have had a strong incentive to sell ACT without a blood test rather than sell a 
blood test with the risk of losing drug sales to those with a negative test. Poor access to 
diagnosis may also have reflected imperfect information on the part of consumers who 
perceived the risk of fever being malaria to be higher than it actually was. 
Even in situations where parasitological diagnosis was performed, evidence showed that 
adherence to test results was poor. ACT was found to be dispensed to cases who tested 
negative for malaria whilst positive P.! cases were treated with other antimalarial drugs and/or 
other medicines, including cocktail therapies (ACTwatch Group, 2009a). The consumption of 
cocktail therapies was found to be widespread, with antimalarial-based cocktails commonly 
containing quinine, chloroquine or artesunate, combined with vitamin C and paracetamol. 
During SSls, providers reported dispensing cocktails as a means to increase profitability, with 
cocktails containing antimalarial drugs sold at a median price of US$ 1.88. As for the use of 
nAMT, notably chloroquine, which accounted for 20% of the market in volume terms, it may 
have reflected P. v treatment malaria. nAMT consumption might also have reflected its relative 
affordability compared to ACT, which was around 4.5 times more expensive. However, its 
consumption for treating confirmed P.! malaria or other illnesses would have certainly led to 
treatment failure. During SSls, consumers were reported to prefer AMT, notably artesunate 
tablets, over ASMQ which was said to have unpleasant side effects associated with 
mefloquine. The use of AMT has however important negative societal externalities as it 
contributes to the spread of artemisinin resistance. 
Poor quality of malaria treatment may have been exacerbated by the use of counterfeit or fake 
medicines. W}1ilstour study did not assess the quality of antimalarial drugs, evidence showed 
that 38.5% of AMT and 31.5% of nAMT were of unknown provenance and it possible that 
counterfeit or substandard products competed with genuine medicines by taking advantage of 
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consumers' inability to assess product quality. The problem of "lemons" where better quality 
products are driven out of the market by cheaper products of low quality (Akerlof, 1970) might 
have therefore emerged on the market for non-ACT. 
Although providers of clinical services were reported to attract consumers through their health 
qualifications, very few of these private providers had the relevant health qualifications for 
selling drugs, let alone administering injections. However, in the context of imperfect and 
asymmetric consumer information, private providers acted as agent for consumers, as 
indicated by OS data, with most mobile providers, pharmacies/clinical pharmacies and drug 
shops choosing on behalf of the patient which medicines to dispense. By contrast, the agency 
role of grocery and village shopkeepers seemed to be more limited, which reflected their lack 
of expertise. However, some of these outlets reported selling cocktail therapies for treating 
malaria fever, indicating that they had the potential to induce demand and include 
unnecessary drugs in cocktail packages. 
Several quality failures highlighted the limited capacity of authorities to enforce regulations, 
including the likely prevalence of counterfeit drugs, AMTs and unlicensed outlets. Availability 
of AMT in the market at the time of the study indicated the inefficacy of regulatory 
mechanisms introduced in November 2008 for withdrawing it from the market. There had 
been limited communication of the ban until the end of March 2009, the date at which the 
MOH requested AMT manufacturers and wholesalers to collect these drugs from the markets 
and retailers and to stop displaying and selling AMT through an information announcement 
letter, which failed to specify the nature of the "strict measure" to be used in case of non-
compliance. In this context, incentives for private wholesalers and retailers to stop selling AMT 
might have been particularly limited. In addition, complying with the ban might have 
translated to important financial losses for most shopkeepers who, as indicated during SSls, 
bear the full inventory risk in the absence of arrangements for them and their suppliers to 
send stocks back to manufacturers. 
At the time of our study, only 8% of retail providers (ACTwatch Group, 2009b) and around 10% 
of wholesalers reported having a MOH license authorizing the sales of pharmaceutical 
products, although the majority of antimalarial providers reported they had received the visits 
of health inspectors in the past year. In 2009, there were only 70 drug outlet inspectors for the 
whole country and recruitment of inspectors was said to be difficult (DDF, personal 
communication). At the time of the study, health inspectors had no judiciary power and their 
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role was limited to the provision of information and advice to drug shopkeepers. Since data 
collection, however, around half of MOH inspectors obtained judiciary power (personal 
communication, OOF). In addition, a few months after our study, the MOH announced the 
closure of around 65% of illegal private drug shops (BMJ, 2010). The implications in terms of 
the characteristics of the market described in the thesis are unclear. On the basis of the 
proportions of retail outlets operating without a license in our study area, the majority of 
antimalarial providers would have been closed down, implying that accessibility of malaria 
treatment would now be much more restricted in areas where unlicensed providers might 
have been the only source of treatment. However, the extent of the closures in practice 
remains unclear. Further insights on the impact of this "crackdown" on the prevalence of 
unlicensed outlets and AMT will be provided by the next OS. 
This section has summarised key features and outcomes of the market for malaria treatment 
in Cambodia and discussed the findings presented in the thesis in light of the theoretical and 
empirical literatures, focusing on factors influencing the relative role of public and private 
providers in the provision of malaria treatment, providers' price setting decisions and quality 
of malaria treatment. The next section presents a set of recommendations for policy and 
future research for improving the key market outcomes of availability, price and quality of 
malaria treatment. 
9.4 Recommendations for policy and future research 
In this section, recommendations for policy and future research for improving prompt access 
to quality malaria treatment are presented, drawing on the results presented in this thesis and 
on relevant evidence from the empirical literature. 
Establishing jar reaching distribution networks and improving product stock reliability 
With the advantage of proximity and willingness to travel to patients' home, private providers 
increased accessibility to malaria treatment. However, their potential for doing so may not 
have been fully exploited. OS data showed that large proportions of outlets that were 
expected to stock antimalarials in malaria endemic areas did not. Moreover, not all 
antimalarial outlets stocked the recommended first line ACT and ROT, including government .. 
providers, and as reported in Chapter 2 and during SSls (Section 6.3.4), stock-outs were 
frequent. In the private commercial sector, it likely reflected a situation where PSI Cambodia's 
distribution network failed to reach the more remote outlets. Evidence from the OS 
demonstrated that less than 15% of shopkeepers reported PSI Cambodia as one of their top 2 
273 
suppliers for antimalarial drugs, implying that, in the context that retailers rarely used more 
than 2 suppliers, they were not reached by PSI Cambodia distribution network (Section 6.3.4). 
This was also borne out by evidence collected through SSls with private commercial retailers. 
By contrast 65% of wholesalers supplying retailers and 75% of those supplying wholesalers 
reported PSI as one of their top 2 suppliers for antimalarial drugs, indicating that subsidized 
ACT and RDT reached to a greater extent consumers living in more accessible areas (in the 
context that most wholesalers also operated as local retailers). Widening the reach of 
distribution services for ACT and RDT has therefore the potential to contribute to improve 
product availability and equity in availability. 
Evidence presented in Chapter 7 shows that in some market segments market concentration 
and retail price mark-ups were significantly and positively associated. Increasing ACT 
availability through far-reaching distribution networks could therefore contribute to increase 
retail competition and potentially decrease ACT retail prices. Our results also indicated higher 
price mark-ups in less accessible markets and at outlets not supplied by a wholesaler who 
delivers orders. As noted before, this may have reflected higher transport costs faced by these 
retailers when purchasing their supplies. Finally, the analysis of ACT purchase prices showed 
that retailers generally purchased ACT at a higher price than wholesalers, and at a price above 
the RRP, with some indication that retailers operating in more remote market segments (e.g. 
village shops, mobile providers) purchased ACT at a higher price than those in more accessible 
areas (e.g. pharmacies/clinical pharmacies). This suggested that mark-ups were added at each 
level of the chain (ACTwatch Group, 2009b). Widening distribution networks would therefore 
provide an opportunity for reducing retailers' wholesale costs for ACT and potentially ACT 
retail price mark-ups and prices. 
Expanding the reach of distribution services to remote areas where the road network is poor, 
notably during the rainy season that coincides with the season of high malaria transmission 
risk, is however likely to be costly for policy makers. However, it may be possible to build on 
the distribution networks of other importers of pharmaceutical drugs in general. During 
qualitative interviews with importers, these suppliers indicated that they will be willing to 
participate in the distribution of ACT and even suggested expanding their' networks for that 
purpose. Financial and non-financial incentives would be required for engaging with these 
wholesalers but these could be less costly than expanding the distribution network of one 
importer only and have the benefits of less risk of stock-outs, provided supplies are available 
from manufacturers. A variety of incentives were suggested by importers such as a fast track 
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import process for their own products, an exemption of import permit for each shipment, a 
decrease of the value added tax rate and/or better access to capital. The potential of 
introducing these incentives could be explored by Government by engaging with private 
wholesalers through consultative meetings. There might also be non-financial incentives for 
importers to distribute socially marketed ACT through the positive externalities associated 
with the prestige of carrying products benefiting from intense promotional activities (Vickers 
and Waterson, 1991). These may act as a signal of the high quality of the other products 
handled by these wholesalers providing them opportunities to increase the sales of their own 
products. Promotion was reported to be an important cost for importers and increasing 
promotion of their products that way would not involve additional expenses. Further research 
into the costs of implementing far-reaching distribution channels is therefore required. 
Improving drug stock reliability at public health facilities through enhanced capacity in public 
sector supply chain management would be crucial to encourage consumers to visit facilities 
where these commodities were, when available, provided free of charge (ACTwatch Group, 
2009b). However, this may not be sufficient for improving access to public health facilities and 
equity in access because of the limited numbers and sparse distribution of public health 
facilities. An alternative strategy could be to expand the network of village malaria workers 
(VMWs). Trained volunteers operating at village level increased convenience in accessing 
potentially higher quality malaria treatment and were likely to have more reliable antimalarial 
and RDT stocks because of the relatively integrated nature of their distribution chain 
compared to public health facilities. In addition, community-based programmes have been 
associated with improved coverage and equity of health care services in Cambodia (Grundy et 
aI., 2009). However, there is limited evidence on the contribution of VMWs in improving 
access to quality malaria where they have been introduced (Yeung et aI., 2008). An evaluation 
of the effectiveness of the VMW programme is being conducted in Cambodia and will 
contribute to address this knowledge gap. However, further research into the programme's 
cost-effectiveness and sustainability will be required. 
A more deep-rooted issue for increasing ACT availability in both public and private sectors lies 
in the procurement of the combination therapy, artesunate and mefloquine which is co-
blistered and packaged in age-specific packs specifically for Cambodia by an overseas based 
manufacturer. Switching to a co-formulated ACT that is available commercially for Cambodia, 
such as dihydroartemisinin and piperaquine, could therefore contribute to improve availability, 
notwithstanding requiring improvements in procurement processes. 
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Decrease wholesale and retail ACT prices (increase ACT subsidy) 
Even with wider far-reaching distribution networks, ACT could still be too expensive for some 
private providers to purchase. At the time of the study, PSI's selling price to wholesale and 
retail outlets was nearly half a dollar per adult pack (US$ 0.42), which was much higher than 
the wholesale price of nAMT in tablet form, including chloroquine, the most popular 
monotherapy. In addition, even in cases where ACT might have been sold at the level of the 
RRP, the cost of one adult equivalent treatment dose was two times higher than that of 
chloroquine (ACTwatch Group, 2009b). Therefore widening the distribution network is unlikely 
on its own to improve either availability or uptake of quality malaria treatment. 
There may be potential for decreasing PSI's wholesale price, notably through the Affordable 
Medicine Facility for malaria (AMFm). The AMFm was proposed in 2003 by the Institute of 
Medicines that suggested ACT be highly subsidized at the manufacturer level and made 
available to both public and private importers, with the objectives of making ACT available to 
consumers at a price similar to that of older and less effective drugs (10M, 2004). In Cambodia, 
the AMFm would "replace" the social marketing programme, with the objective of having 
several private commercial wholesalers importing the subsidized ACT and distributing it 
through their existing distribution network. The introduction of the AMFm has been delayed in 
Cambodia because the ACTs ASMQ and dihydroartemisinin and piperaquine (that will most 
probably replace ASMQ if the AMFm is launched in the context of multi-drug resistance) have 
not yet gained the Global Fund's quality assurance qualifications (The Global Fund, 2011). 
On the basis of the evidence available in the thesis, existing levels of competition in the 
distribution chain might not have ensured competitive prices so a higher subsidy may not feed 
down the point of purchase. The potential for increasing competition should therefore be 
explored. At the top of the chain, whilst all importers expressed interest in ACT during our SSls, 
they were nonetheless worried that volumes were too small and that margins will not cover 
their promotion and transport costs. They also feared other importers would free-ride on the 
externalities created by the promotional activities of their sales teams. In this context, they 
nearly all want to enter into an exclusive distributionship agreement with ACT manufacturer. 
The AMFm could be designed differently using pooled procurement at 'national level with 
promotional activities conducted by the CNM or PSI, who could then outsource distribution to 
private commercial wholesalers with pre-existing distribution networks (CNM, personal 
communication). At lower levels of the chain, inducing competition may be possible by 
lowering entry barriers through better access to capital for shopkeepers willing to enter the 
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antimalarial wholesale market, providing that minimum quality standards are met. This is likely 
to require additional strategies explored later in this chapter. 
Experiences in using RRP on antimalarial drugs are limited and have proved to have different 
effects on consumer prices. In Cambodia, since the start of the programme around ten years 
ago, the subsidized ACT always had a RRP and evidence demonstrated that retail prices were 
generally above the RRP (Sabot et aL, 2008, Yeung et aL, 2011). By contrast, in Senegal, private 
pharmacies purchased the subsidized first-line ACT from public sector medical stores and 
added an average 35% to the price of an adult dose, which translated into a retail price only 
4% higher than the RRP (Sabot et aL, 2008, Kone et aL, 2007). In two districts of Tanzania, a 
subsidy scheme was piloted and in one district it was combined with a RRP printed on ACT 
packs. The subsidy effectively decreased the price of ACT below the price paid by consumers in 
the control area and below the price of older antimalarials. However, ACT prices were higher 
in the district with the RRP than in the district without (Sabot et aL, 2008), calling for caution in 
the use of RRP. 
During our study, some retailers indicated that when consumers were informed about the 
RRP, they were constrained to sell the subsidized ACT at that recommended price. This 
therefore supports the use of RRP, combined with effective communications to consumers 
(explored in more detail later in this chapter), and points to the second issue of setting the 
level of the RRP. 
Little research has been conducted in Cambodia on the level at which RRP should be set. At the 
time of our study, the RRP for ACT was US$ 0.61, based on a study on consumers' willingness 
to pay conducted some years ago (PSI, 2003). As for RDT, no similar research is known to the 
author to have been conducted in Cambodia. Several private retailers argued that the RRP was 
set too low and did not provide sU,fficient profits. Generating evidence on retailers' (and 
wholesalers') overhead costs including transport, rent, staff, etc and their relative importance 
should also be considered in order to investigate the levels of profit perceived to be 
"sufficient" by private providers. During SSls, we had the opportunity to collect data on cost 
categories and their relative importance and private shopkeepers were open to sharing their 
expenses. One challenge for future studies lies in the identification of incremental costs of 
running a d~ug business in the context where shopkeepers generally operated within their 
home. 
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Intensify provider training and communications to consumers 
As discussed above, quality of malaria treatment is multidimensional and there are not enough 
data on private providers' practices in this thesis to conduct an assessment of strategies for 
improving the technical quality of care that they provide. Oata in this thesis suggested 
however that knowledge, practical experience, ROT and ACT availability and price, providers' 
confidence in malaria diagnostics and ACT and consumer demand influenced providers' 
practices. 
The limited reported use of ROT was partly related to the inherent characteristics of the 
product, which at the time of this study was sensitive to P.! infection only. The recent 
replacement of the old socially marketed ROT by a test detecting both P.! and P.v malaria 
offers an opportunity for promoting the utility of ROT use in managing malaria-like fevers. 
Practical training on using ROT should be facilitated as those stocking ROT often did not feel 
comfortable using it, including wholesalers, of whom the majority also served end-users. 
Training could take the form of workshops or group training sessions, which have already been 
reported to positively influence wholesalers' and retailers' stocking practices as revealed by 
SSls conducted with retailers and wholesalers (Section 6.3.5). 
Removing any opportunities for providers to dispense inappropriate therapies will be crucial 
for improving the quality of malaria treatment. This difficult task could first be addressed by 
switching from co-blistered artesunate and mefloquine to a co-formulated ACT. Evidence from 
past studies showed selling artesunate and mefloquine individually by cutting blisters or 
removing tablets from packaging was a common practice amongst private providers (Yeung et 
aI., 2008), meaning that even if sales of AMT are banned, they remain easily accessible to 
providers but also consumers who may decide to take artesunate alone to avoid side effects 
associated with mefloquine. Potential for providing incentives to manufacturers to produce co-
blistered ACT and fast-track international prequalification procedures could contribute to the 
introduction of appropriately formulated ACT. This should be a priority on the international 
agenda given the negative externalities for the spread of multi-drug resistance in Cambodia 
and to other malaria-endemic countries. 
Even if more private providers are given the opportunity to stock ACT, through wider reach of 
distribution chains and lower wholesale prices, availability may however remain low. Retail 
providers operating in the more remote markets may be reluctant to stock ACT if they expect 
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consumer demand for these products to be low because of the lack of information on what 
constitutes appropriate quality malaria treatment. 
Expanding and intensifying social marketing-like activities, including road shows, radio 
messages, TV ads etc could improve consumer information on ACT efficacy compared to older 
antimalarial drugs and the need for confirmed diagnosis to mitigate treatment failure and 
negative externalities for multi-drug resistance. These activities could also be expanded to 
non-malarial areas in the context of mobile populations with no or little immunity to malaria 
who travel to forested areas. A more intense communication campaign about the RRP is also 
required. 
Reviewing regulation and extending its supportive role 
In view of findings from previous studies, counterfeit or substandard products might have 
been available on the market (Newton et aL, 2008, Lon et aL, 2006, MOH, 2004b, MOH, 2001, 
Dondorp et aL, 2004, Newton et aL, 2001). However, as mentioned before we did not assess 
quality of antimalarial drugs. Further assessment of this is underway at retail level through the 
collection of drug samples during the OS conducted in 2011. Similar research activities should 
be conducted at the different levels of the chain. 
Finally, reviewing the regulatory framework requires clarity over whether private providers are 
legitimate outlets for malaria treatment, in particular diagnostic testing, and, within the 
private sector, which outlets are legitimate to do so. Review of the regulatory framework 
should be conducted centrally at the MOH in collaboration with provincial and district 
authorities through which the regulation framework could be communicated to private 
providers. If review of the regulation framework is to be conducted by local authorities alone, 
there may be a risk of regulation capture by local authorities which in some areas were 
witnessed during this research to be involved in provision of health care services in the private 
sector. At the time of the study, we also witnessed great heterogeneity in involvement of local 
authorities with private providers in terms of information or education meetings conducted. 
This showed that a supportive role of regulation is possible and that the potential for 
extending it should be explored by policy makers. 
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9.5 Conclusion 
In Cambodia, as in many other low-income malaria-endemic countries, management of 
malaria fever is inadequate, notably in retail shops where the majority of people seek care: 
diagnosis is often presumptive or adherence to blood test results is poor; ACT is expensive and 
availability is low; alternative antimalarials that are less effective, albeit not necessarily 
cheaper, are used; and, ACT is dispensed to people who are not in need of such therapy. This 
situation has important implications, not only in terms of treatment failures and delays in 
access to appropriate treatment, but also in terms of the negative societal externalities of drug 
resistance. 
To address these issues, interventions working with shopkeepers are being implemented, with 
the aim to improve treatment availability, price and quality. Retailers are the last link in a chain 
of manufacturers and wholesalers and their supply sources have an important influence on 
their selling practices. Yet, there is limited evidence on the functioning of the market for 
malaria treatment and how it affects retail treatment outcomes. This is partly due to the 
methodological challenges of studying healthcare markets in poor countries, where routine 
data are rarely available and methods under-developed or lacking adaptation (Conteh and 
Hanson, 2003). The complexity of the functioning of markets and lack of empirical work in this 
area imply that it is not clear how to improve shopkeepers' selling practices. 
In this context, the thesis makes two important contributions to the literature. First, it provides 
evidence on how market structure, provider conduct, customer demand and regulation 
affected retail treatment outcomes in Cambodia. Drawing on concepts from the 10 literature 
and previous work from Conteh and Hanson (Goodman, 2004, Conteh and Hanson, 2003), and 
Goodman (GoQdman, 2004), the thesis used a mix-method approach, including cross-sectional 
quantitative data and semi-structured interviews with retailers and wholesalers. Evidence 
demonstrated that retail and wholesale competition increased accessibility to malaria 
treatment in Cambodia's malaria endemic areas, but did not lead to optimal supply of 
affordable quality treatment. Several market and government failures were evident, including 
intense product differentiation, imperfect consumer information on treatment quality, high .. 
concentration, poor public sector treatment accessibility and ineffective regulation. These 
provided opportunities to use market power to increase mark-ups on antimalarial drugs, 
although not in all market segments, highlighting the heterogeneity of retail markets and the 
influence of distribution chain structure and wholesaler's conduct on the availability, price and 
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quality of malaria treatment. Second, the thesis provides evidence on the relative contribution 
of different empirical methods, including relatively novel ones, for studying private drug 
markets in developing settings, and demonstrates that the suitability of different methods or 
combination of methods is likely to differ across settings (retail vs. wholesale, countries). 
The private commercial sector is likely to remain an important source of malaria treatment and 
pharmaceutical drugs in Cambodia and in other developing countries. Evidence provided in 
this thesis is therefore relevant to interventions working with retailers and the wider 
environment in which they operate to improve access to quality health care in poor countries. 
Recommendations include widening distribution networks for ACT and RDT; improving product 
stock reliability; decreasing wholesale and retail product prices; intensifying providers' 
training; diffusing information to consumers on what constitutes appropriate management of 
malaria fever; and strengthening regulation and the potential to extend its supportive role. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 Methods for reviewing the range of approaches used for 
studying markets for pharmaceutical drugs in low and middle income countries 
The literature search focused on methods used in studies of markets for pharmaceutical 
drugs in low and middle income countries. Two types of methods for studying markets 
were searched: the methods for collecting data (e.g. survey, existing databases) on key 
variables of a market (e.g. structural aspects including range of providers and products, 
sales volumes, and elements of provider conduct such as price mark-ups) and methods for 
analyzing these data (e.g. market concentration measures, price-mark-up determinants). 
Methods were identified by searching databases indexing social science studies (Table A-
1). Searches were conducted using key terms from database thesaurus, where available 
and by limiting the search to studies published between January 1980 and December 2010 
in English or French. Searches were finalised in January 2011. 
Table A-I Database Search Strategy 
Databases Key terms (free terms, unless specified) 
Pubmed Pharmaceutical preparationst*, Medicine, Pharmaceutical drug 
Embase Commercet* 
Econlit Retail, Wholesale, Distribution chain, Supply chain 
IBSS Private sectort 
JSTOR Competition, Economicst , Sales±, Drug Marketing ± 
Business Source Premier Mark-up, Profit, Margin 
tMesh term under PubMed; *The term pharmaceutical preparations and Commerce were specific 
to PubMed; Under other databases, medicine and pharmaceutical drug free words were used in 
place of pharmaceutical preparations; Commerce refers to the interchange of goods or 
commodities, especially on a large scale, between different countries or between populations 
within the same country. It includes trade (the buying, selling, or exchanging of commodities, 
whether wholesale or retail) and business (the purchase and sale of goods to make a profit); Under 
the other databases, free key words, including retail, wholesale, distribution chain or supply chain 
were used. For other key terms, Mesh terms were used as free words, expect for Economics which 
was also an indexed term under Econlit and which was used in combination with terms sales and 
drug marketing in order to refine results and reduce the number of hits; ± used under Econlit only 
Studies were included if they took place in African, Asian and Latin American low and 
middle ~ncome countries. Studies that looked at one or several aspects of pharmaceutical 
drug markets (in terms of market structure and provider conduct) were included in the 
review. Bibliographies of identified studies were checked for additional references. 
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The grey literature on methods for studying antimalarial markets in low and middle 
income countries was identified during a workshop on survey methods in developing 
countries. The workshop was organised in 2008 by the Malaria Medicines Venture, a not-
for profit public-private partnership. Staff working in various organisations, including, 
amongst others, the UK Department of International Development, IMS Health, Malaria 
Consortium, Population Services International, the University of Harvard, the World Bank 
and the World Health Organization shared their knowledge and experiences in studying 
pharmaceutical drug markets in developing country settings. Additional unpublished 
studies were identified during key informant interviews with staff members of the Clinton 
Foundation and MIT-Zaragoza International Logistics Program involved in antimalarial 
market surveys. 
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APPENDIX 2 Methods for reviewing the empirical evidence 
on private commercial sector distribution chains 
The search strategy aimed to identify published, grey and unpublished studies on the retail 
distribution chain for malaria treatment in low and middle income countries. Published studies 
were identified by searching web-based databases, using key terms pertaining to market 
structure and price mark-ups (Table A-2). Grey and unpublished sources were identified by 
searching the websites of organisations involved in research related to the distribution chain 
for malaria treatment in low and middle income countries and contacting key informants 
within these institutions (the William J. Clinton Foundation, Medicines for Malaria Venture, 
Dalberg Global Development Advisors, Health Action International Europe, MIT-Zaragoza 
International Logistics Program). Searches were finalised in September 2011. 
Table A-2 Database search strategy 
Databases 
Keywords 
PubMed 
Private sectort ; Commercet *; Private 
providers; Retail sector; Supply chain; 
Distribution chain 
Antimalarialst; Malariat ; Non-
prescription drugst;Prescription drugst ; 
Drugs, essential t 
Price; Pricing; Mark-up(s); Profit margin; 
Price component 
Developing countriest ; Africa t ; Asia, 
Westernt;Asia, South-easternt; Latin 
Americat 
Econlit IIBSS 
Private sector; Retail sector; 
Wholesale; Supply chain; 
Antimalarials; Pharmaceuticals 
Price; Pricing; Mark-up(s); Profit 
margin; Price component 
t Mesh term; *The interchange of goods or commodities, especially on a large scale, between different countries or 
between populations within the same country. It includes trade (the buying, selling, or exchanging of commodities, 
whether wholesale or retail) and business (the purchase and sale of goods to make a profit) 
[http://www.ncbLnlm.nih.gov!sites!entrez, accessed 10 March 2008]. PubMed searches were limited to 
government publications, journal articles and technical reports. 
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APPENDIX 3 Malaria Journal manuscript 
Patouillard ef 01. Malaria )oumal2010. 9:50 
h ttp:JIWWN.rna lar iajournal.com/(ont en V911150 
Retail sector distribution chains for malaria 
treatment in the developing world: a review of 
the literature 
Edith Patouillard 1*, Kara G Hanson1, Catherine A Goodman1,2 
Abstract 
Background: In many low-income comtries. the retail sector plays an important role in the treatment of malaria 
and is increasingly being considered as a channel for improving medicine availability. Retailers are the last link in a 
distribution chain and their supply sources are likely to have an important influence on the availability. quality and 
price of malaria treatment. This article presents the findings of a systematic literature review on the retail sector 
distribution chain for malaria treatment in low and middle-income countries. 
Methods: Publication databases were searched using key terms relevant to the distribution chain serving all types 
of anti-malarial retailers. Organizations involved in malaria treatment and distribution chain related activities were 
contacted to identify unpublished stLX.:fies. 
Results: A total of 32 references distributed across 12 developing countries were identified. The distribution chain 
had a pyramid shape with numerous suppliers at the bottom and fewer at the top. The chain supplying rural and 
less-formal outlets was made of more levels than that serving urban and more formal outlets. Vvholesale markets 
tended to be relatively concentrated. especially at the top of the chain where few importers accounted for most of 
the anti-malarial volumes sold. Wholesale price mark-ups varied across chain levels. ranging from 27% to 99% at 
the top of the chain. 8% at intermediate level (one study only) and 2% to 67% at the level supplying retailers 
directly. Retail mark-ups tended to be higher. and varied across outlet types. ranging from 3% to 566% in 
pharmacies. 29% to 669% in drug shops and 100% to 233% in general shops. Information on pricing determinants 
was very limted. 
Conclusions: Evidence on the distribution chain for retail sector malaria treatment was mainly descriptive and 
lacked representative data on a national scale. These are important limitations in the advent of the Affordable 
Medicine Facility for Malaria. which aims to increase consumer access to artemisinin-based combination therapy 
(ACn. through a subsidy introduced at the top of the distribution chain. This review calls for rigorous distribution 
chain analysiS. notably on the factors that influence AG availability and prices in order to contribute to efforts 
towards improved access to effective malaria treatment. 
Background 
In many low- and middle-income countries. the retail 
sector plays an important role in the provision of 
malaria treatment [1-14]. For example. it was the first 
source of care for around 45% of households seeking 
malaria treatment across four communities in Enugu 
State. Nigeria [15] and in three rural districts of 
• Corrt"'>j:xmdt"rce: ~lthPi!touiltlrd~'hhtl'1.dc.uk 
Iiondon 5c hool of Hyglt'll!' and Tro~jcal Mt><.1idne. Kt'Hlt'I Strf>t>\. L oo:.10n. 
lJIi. 
Tanzania nearly 40% of all anti-malarial \'olumes were 
dispt.'Jlsed within the retail sector [16]. Retail providt. ... s 
tend to operate closer to homes [15,17-19] and offer a 
more reliable and wider range of drugs than public 
health providers [2.11,14.18-20]. sometimes at lower 
costs [14.21-23]. 
The market for anti-malarial drugs includes artemisi-
nin-based combination therapy (ACT), which is the 
most effective drug regimen and the official first· line 
treatment in mO!>t dt.·\'cloping countril'S. non-artemisinin· 
drugs. some of which were recommended before the 
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ACI' era (e.g. chloroquine. amoduquine. suJphadoxinc-
p}Timcthamine and quinine). and artcmisinin moner 
thcrapit.-s. These three product t}pr:5 are a"'aibble under 
differen t form u1a tions inc1udi ng tablds. suppositories. 
Sll.'q)Cnsitns, syrups and liqu id injectables. Some are sold 
under thd r proprietary names. and referred to as inner 
..-ator brands when they are products patC'nted by their 
originators. or branded generics in the case of gcncric 
wrsitns of innontor products markcted under a diffcr-
ent mmc. Others arc sold as unbranded gcnerics with-
rut a protricbry mmc. 
Within the mail market. these products are sold by a 
'wide range of prmidcrs whose characteristics va ry sub-
stantiaUy across scttings. PrmidcTS can be pharmacies. 
drug shops, grocery stores. marl:d stalls or itincrant 
hawl:ers. In Last and West Africa. drug shops that spe-
cialize in handling drugs pby a maior roll'. such as in 
Tanzania whcre they accounted for 88'~ of rctail secwr 
anti-malarial sales volumes [161. Mobile wndors are 
common in West Africa.. but are rardy found in East 
and Southern Africa [241. Outlets staffed by trajned 
pharmacists arc rare in all countries [17.'25;. and con-
centrated in urban ucas. whilst drug shops can be 
found in both urban and more densely populated rural 
arcas. finally. gcncral shops that scU drugs alongside 
hOUSl'hold goods arc oftcn the oo1y ml"Clicine rrtlilt.'rs in 
more remote rural "iDages. 
Pharmacies are gcncrally authorized to stock both pre-
scription-001y drugs and oycr-thc-countcr (OTC) pro--
ducts. while othcr outlets can only scll nrc drugs. 
although in practice some illegally stock prescription-
oo1y medicines [241. Wnilst anti-malarial drug ayaj}abil-
ity is rcbtiwly high in the rcbil scctor [19.25-30!. the 
range of anti-mabrials is gcnerally lowcr in outlcts 
which are more rcmote or haye Icss qualified staff 
[19.25.28.31). ACr is rarely a"'ailable outside facilities 
and pharmacies because of thdr high price rdatiye to 
oldcr. less cfft.'dh-c alternatiyes. For example. in six dis-
tricts of Zambia. ACT accounted for oo1v 7~ of all a.nt~ 
malarials sold in the rctail sector [33} a~d in Tanzania. 
the old monotherapy sulphadoxinc-pyrimcthamine (SP) 
was the most commoo1v rrtlilt."Cl anti-malarial. folloWl'<l 
by artcmisinin monoth~rapies [34:. The a"'ailability of 
artemisinin monotherapics is highly Hriable. but a 
major cause of concern as their use is like1}' to contri-
bute to the dc..-t'lopmcnt of artcml.!.inin rcsL..-tance [35~. 
Othcr conccr~ around the quality of CAre prmidt."ti in 
the rcbil sector rl'latc to retailers' lacl: of qll3.lificatitns, 
poor knowledge of drugs and dosagcs [36-39J. and 
stocking of unregistered [28.31) and sometimes substan-
dard or counterfdt drugs [6.19.40-44]. Although care 
pro"ided by pharmacics is far from pcrft.'d [45.4{,1. mo!>1 
of these conccrns are dircctL'<:l to non-pharmacy outlets. 
Drug shop staff are rardy qualified pharmacists [47}. 
Poage 20114 
ha\ing at best a basic nursing background [24.26J or 
sometimes just secondary education [471. Gcneral retai-
lers ha,,-c ["r°en fcwC'T qualifications and some are i11i ter-
ate [18,20!. 
lbese drug retaiK.'rs are the last linl in a chain cl sup-
plicrs and thcir practices arc Iikc1}' to be hca"oi1y influ-
coced by what happens further up the distribution 
chain. Rcbil ayailabilit~·. for instance. will be affected by 
which troducts arc a..-aila.ble from suppliers. the markct-
ing strategies used to promote certain drugs. and the 
registration of drugs and reguJation of prmidcfS furthcr 
up the chain. Rebil prices wiU be influenced by whac-
sale prices. and the cost of obtaining and storing goods. 
Retail quality 'will be detcrmined b}' how products ha,,-c 
~n handl(."ti and stored highcr up the chain. In turn. 
the beha"oiour of suppliers in the chain wi1l be intlu-
cnccd by the nature of competition and rcguJa.tion that 
the')'° facc. 
Undt.'rsbndin~ the distributitn chain for anti-mabriak 
is. therefore. ~ucial in designing interwntions to 
impro,,-c mail Sl'Ctor care. This is of particular impor-
ta.nce in the light cl the implcmcntation of the Afford-
able Medicines facility for Malaria (Ac\H-m). which wiU 
rely on existing distribution chains to ddiycr hca"ily 
subsidized ACr to consumers. This article aims to sup-
port such initiatiyt.'S b}O summarizing the current sbte of 
knowledge on the rctail sector distribution chain for 
malaria treatment in low- and middlt. .... income countries. 
Methods 
Scope of the review 
'Inc rcbil sector distribution chain rcfers to alllt."'t"C'ls of 
the in-cou ntry distribution chai n. in othcr 'words to the 
chain ofwholt.'S31t.'rs Sl'r'ring the rdail sedl ... The focus is 
on supplit.,rs Yorbo opcrate from the point whcre cmtmod-
ities lea\-c the factory gate or port of en try doYo" to those 
dircctJy suppl}ing retailers. for the purpose 'Of the rt"\icw. 
a taxonomy of suppJicrs was dcwlopcd (figure 1). Suppli-
ers who scU directly to rctailt.'rs are tcrmed terminal sup-
plicrs. Thcsc bu}' from upstrcam supplicrs, rcfcrrcd to as 
prima,,' su ppJicrs if th£'}o arc the point of cotry into thc 
distribution chain. or inlermaiiat£ supplicrs if they thcm-
scl,,'cs obtain drugs from p-imary suppliers. 
Uterature 5eaR:h and review strategies 
The search strategy aimed to identify published. grey 
and unpublished studies on the retail Sl'dor di!>1ribution 
chain for malaria treatmcnt in low- and middle·incomc 
countries. Published studies were idcntified by searching 
W'C'I> based databases. using key ternlS pcrtaining to mar-
l:ct structure and price mark-ups (Table 1). Gn"Y and 
unpublished sourccs were idcntified by scarching the 
wcbsitcs of organizaticns imuln'<l in rcscarc:h rc1a1l.'<l to 
the distribution chain for malaria trcatmcnt in low and 
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middle income countries and contacting i.eC)'. informants 
within these instibltions the William ,_ Ointon l1lunm-
tion . Medicines for 1' ... t.aJaria Venture. DaIberg Global 
Dcv lopment Ad"isors. Health Action International 
urope. Mf -Zaragoza fnternationallogisti rag ram). 
Searches were finaLimd in ebruary W09. 
Studt were included ifthq .. pro"ided data specifiCAlly 
on anti-mila rials for products stocked. "nlume sold and 
mark-ups. tudies that looked at the struct:tfrc d the dis-
tribution chain. in t£nns of supply .so~. supplier num-
bers and characteristics for both anti- malarials and 
medicines in general were also included on th basis that 
anti-ma.laria1s arc cxpcdl.>d to foDow the arne distribution 
route as other drugs and represent an important share of 
aU drugs distributed in de..°wping countri. 0 
Th rC\o-icw focuses on wholesalers but j nd ud two 
aspects of re1ailcr bchav iour rclC';ant to the study of th 
distribution chain! their sources of 'upply and the mark-
up they add at the rct.ail IC\o-cl Other J.Spocts of the retail 
market, uch as its tructurc and operations ha ~ been 
fCYicwed clscwh TC [_4 0 tudi were excluded if they 
compared retail prices to international rclcrcn e pri 
without any information on price components aero 
distribution chain levels. 
Resu ts 
rurty-two rcfcrcn exploring the distribution chai n 
for anti-malarials and phanna utica.1 drug in ncral 
were identified. The e\t·jdence they pro"ide focu es 
mainly on supply sources. with more Limited attention 
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Table 1P>ub1ished li1le:ratwe search straI:egiJ: databases and Ike, wards 
to the number and charactEristics d suppliers, .and anti-
malrui.al sales ';oJumcs and mark-ups (Table _ . Methods 
used included document reviews and structured o r 
unstructured inten"if.!WS with retailers, wholesalers and 
informants working at C£lltraI government lC't1lil. 
Stru'CtLre of the distribution main 
This section summariz.cs c~idc ncc o n the s hape of the 
distribution chain a nd the number .and types of suppli-
ers operating at each LC't·cl.OveraD, the chain had a P}T-
amid shape s imil.ar to that of other private distribution 
channels, with fewer s uppliers at t he top and more 
numerous suppliers at the bottom [ _5,16.29,31,32, 
48-55~ 'l'he number o f levels within the chain ransed 
from zero (in the case where retail ers obtained droSS 
directly from the factory gatc) up to four Levels (in the 
case o f a chain made up of tcnninal, two intermediate 
and pr mary levels). The chain sening more remote out-
lets and those with less quiIified staff te nded to have 
more numerous levels. h ere were two inkrmed iate 
lCl.1lls o f general wholesalers in the chain scn.ing genera1 
shops operating in three rural districts in anzania but 
no intermediate level in the chain send.n.g drug shops 
located in the same dist:rict:s [3 _J. In a rur.al district o f 
ga.nda, two intermediate lC't'els o f wholes.alers suppLied 
the ch ain down to general stores and market stalls 
whilst the chain sen-ing drug shops had a single inter -
mediair lcvcl of wholesws [26 . 
Data o n the toml number o f suppliers operatin G at 
each level of the anti-malarial distribution chain were 
generally lacking. Whe n available, data ma inly con-
cerned registered suppliers of pharmaceutical produdls 
in sene raJ [25 _ 6.31.48-50.52} and rarelypro\ided infor-
mation o n the Intal number d suppliers hs.ndJing anti-
malArials [29,;Q,51.53). (');'ersll the number of import£r.s 
operating in a countr)r wasrepor1Ed 1D range from 1 to 
50 [53). In Burkina Fuo, there were 4- pridte imjX)rters 
and in Ugand 15 impor ters and 50 wholesalers, wit.h 
the latter sometimes owned by irnportcr:s [5 . he t)"pc 
of businesses acting as terminal , intermediate .and pri-
mary supplie rs is described below, although as will 
'become clear. there is cons iderable over lap between 
these categori in practice. 
At the 1£:rminal1cvcl, wholc.salers ~ the m 51 amuuon 
suppliers, serving phannacies [15-27,33.48-50.,5'1-.54,56 , 
drug shops [26.18,29 ,31-34,48 $0 • .53.54.57 ,5HJ and general 
shops [25-2H .. ~233,50,53.s7 1_ En some setti ngs, different 
t)pes of wholesalers tEnded to s u,ppl)" different t)'pes of 
retail outlets. I n I anzan:i.J. and Kenya, wmLcsaJcrs Who sup-
plied drugs .alongSide other oornmodities served general 
shops [25.28 3 -I, whilst wmlcsalcrs spcciali1lX1 in handling 
drugs usually served pharmacies [25,27) a nd drug -hops 
[2~,32]. 
eta ilers themselves frcquentl}· operated as terminal 
suppliers fOr outlets located in more r"£mote areas [13 , 
although with \ 'ariatio n across countries and retaile r 
t}pes. Pharm.acies frequcnt l}' supplied rural drug shops 
[_6,31,48 .. ';0) and ~eraJ stores [17 0-6,5(1). sometimes in 
a relatively o rganized manner, such as in Nigeria where 
they sent sales 1leams [17]. Drug shops were somewhat 
Less common terminal suppliers, at times servi ng othe r 
drug s hops in . ganda.and anzaru.a [_6,29 and general 
stores in Uganda o nl)-' [26 _ 
Importers were also bcnn inaJ sources when they 
directly served pharmacies [26 .49,50,561. which they 
sometimes owned [ _0.49,50) , a nd also drug shops 
[26,32,5(1 , using sales tcam.s, such as in fanunia [32J. 
Public agencies were tcr rni nal suppliers, either ofB-
cia.lly such 3S in Sri Lanka where the State PharlTLlLccuti.-
cal Corporation supplicd reta il outlets [47) o r 
unof!.ic iaJly in other countries, whc.rc SO~"Crnrne:nt health 
workers sold public sector drugs 1D I' tail shops, such as 
in Uganda and Cameroon for example [18 .19.481. 
Teaninal suppUe rs' characteris t ics were ra rel y' 
explored. Wh cn available, the c\iiden<r shows that in 
Tanzania wholesalers infrequently had any health-
related qualifications. although drug specific wholesalers 
were reported to cmplo),' more qualifitxl staff mainly 
pharmacy and biochemistry g raduates. and to have n 
in apcr atio n for .longcr than general wholesalers [ ] . 
In fonnation on tcnnin.il uppliens' locations show 
that o"eral1, remotel): locatcd drug shops and general 
stores obtained. thei r supplies more loc.aU}· than m rc 
aoocssible retailers. In Zambia, 24 . of outlets located in 
three border districts with DR Congo or anza ni a 
obtained their drugs from district suppliers llnd the 
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Table 2 Overview of the literature 
Reference Distriblaion chain .structure 
Burkina Faso 
I?BM Secretariat 2007 (77) 
Cambodia 
Sowce of 
~ply 
x 
Instit ute of "'Jedicin~ XI04 [48L Shretta and Guimier, 2003 [55} X 
PSl DJ8 (58L Sabot, 2009 [53) X 
Rozmdaal, 2001 r44} x 
Cameroon 
Va n der Geest, 1987 i (19) x 
ItBM Secretariat 2007 154/ x 
Ghana 
Buabeng et a ~ 2008 15~ x 
Kenya 
Marsh et a~ 2004 [57} x 
Ministry of Health of the Go-.emment of the I~public of Kenya, -
2004 [78j 
Myhr, 2000 [61 J 
TiJl/row, 2003 1251 x 
Amin and Snaw, 2005 [27) x 
Mozambique 
Russo, 2007 1: r4~ x 
Nigeria 
Ad ikwu, 1996 i (17) x 
IF<:., 2008 i [52) x 
Senegal 
Instit ute of Medicin~ m4 148L Shretta and Guimier (l003) l55j X 
Kone et aly 2007 162) X 
IFe, 2008 i 152} X 
Sri lanka 
Rajakaruna et aly ~ (47 
Tanzania 
Battersby et a ~ DB 131 
Goodman, 2004I:iDl Chukwujekwu, 2007 [32) 
(linton Foundation, 2008 [3 
GOJernment of the ltepublic of Tanzania and Clinton 
Foundat ion, 2008 12 
Uganda 
Adame et al .. l996 (18 
The Repubfic of Ug'anda, 2004 159) 
MMV, 2007 (26) 
Yadav and Conesa, 2008 lSI} 
1Fe. 2008 1: (52) 
HBM Secretariat 2007 154! 
x 
x 
X 
x 
X 
x 
x 
X 
x 
x 
Number of 
suppliers 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
X 
x 
x 
X 
x 
x 
Suppliers' 
characteristics 
x 
X 
X 
Page 5 d 14 
Anti~m8larial 
products 
Volumes 
sold 
Mark-
ups 
)( 
x 
x x 
x 
)( 
x 
X 
x x 
X 
X 
X X 
X )( 
x 
x 
x 
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Table 2: Overview of the literature (Continued) 
Zambia 
Cl into n Foundat ion, 2008 133. 
Low/Middle income countries 
fa; r, 19:)1 1. r 13 
Yadav and Or"901a, 2007 1. IS3} 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
Page6d 14 
x x 
x x 
x 
x x 
± stud~ on di~tribut ion c:hain for pllarma<ceLtic&1 dtu~ in general (other stud ies art! ~pecjfic to anti mala rials} 
same proportion chose to cross borders to buy from 
Tanzanian or Congolese suppliers [33J. In Tanzania. 
drug shops generally obtained anti-malarials from drug 
specific wholesalers or phannades located in the capital 
city. hundreds of kilometres away {28,29,32J. whilst 
those located more than 1,000 kilometres away from the 
capital city obtained their supplies from more nearby 
locations [29 ]. In Uganda and Kenya. general shops 
usually obtained their supplies from local suppliers 
(25-27J. In Kenya. the location of general shops' supply 
sources varied with outlet size. such that large shops 
where more than one person worked during opening 
hours obtained their supplies from general wholesruers 
located inside or outside the district whilst smaller 
shops where one person worked during opening hours 
bought more frequentl)' from general wholesalers 
located within the district {27]. 
Mobile suppliers, such as sales representatives of drug 
companies or general distributors. served re tailers in 
many settings. although their popularity and the types 
of outlets they served varied. In Kenya. mobile vendors 
commonly supplied both drug and general shops 
[25.2 7,57J. whilst in T anzania mobile vendors only 
served general shops. representing in some district.Ii only 
1 % of supply sources {28], but in others being a more 
common source of supply (31 ]. In Nigeria. sales repre-
sentatives of large national and international drug com-
panies supplied all types of retail outlets 11 7J. By 
contrast. in Uganda and Tanzania. local manufactwers' 
sales teams supplied the more accessible retailers with 
more qualified staff {26,32]. Finally. overseas manufac-
turers directly supplied retailers in Sri Lanka only where 
5% of retailers obtained drugs directly from drug com-
panies in India .[47]. 
At intermediate level. studies provided much less 
information on supply sources. In settin~' where inter-
mediate-level suppliers were identified (26.32.48.52]. 
they were wholesalers who. as in the case of those oper-
ating at terminal level. either handled drugs alongside 
other commodities or specialized in drugs. hence sup-
p lying distinct distribution chains. Information on the 
location of intennediate suppliers was available only for 
Tanzania and Uganda. where they operated in the capI-
tal city {26,32J and at regional (32J or district level (26J. 
In Tanzania. intermediate wholesalers were sometimes 
agents of upstream suppliers at regio nal level [32). 
Regional wholesalers also. at times, used mobile services 
providing door-to-door services to their customers 132J. 
In other settings. there was no information availabl at 
this level or no intermediate suppliers operating in the 
chain serving the studied areas (18,25,27,58J. Finally. as 
at terminal level. information on suppliers' characteris-
tics was prOVided by a Single study reporting that in 
Tanzania generru suppliers had started their business 
more recently than drug specific wholesalers and rarely 
employed staff with health related qualificatioll.Ii {32]. 
At the top of the chain or primary level. suppliers 
were inlporters who were agents of overseas pharma-
ceutical companies. sometimes contracted to act as 
their sole supplier for distributing their products 
locally (26.32.50] or. more rarely. integrated with over-
seas companies as seen in Mozambique (49). The lit-
erature provided little information on the nature of 
this agency relationship. In the case of exclusi e distri-
butorship agreements between overseas companies and 
local importers, the latter frequently exchang d pro-
ducts with other importers for which one or the other 
was the sole supplier (26.31,32.49.50J. creating hori-
zontaltransactions at the top of the chain. This situa-
tion was reported in Zambia where importers tended 
Lo have regular customers who would generally pur-
chase the bulk of their supplies from few importers. As 
importers were generally the sole entry point for a par-
ticular drug. they would often exchange products 
between one another (32,50) rather than send custo-
mers to buy from the relevant importer. As a result. 
no clear differentiation between wholesalers and 
importers existed in many settings. as these roles were 
product dependent (50.59]. As at terminal and Itlter-
mediate levels. suppliers' characteristics wer provided 
only by the study conducted in Tanzania. where drug-
specific suppliers employed more staff with health-
r lated qualifications and had been in operation for 
longer than general suppliers {32]. 
304 
Patou illard et 01. MoJorio JoumoJ 20 10, 9 :50 
http://www.malariajoumal com!contentl9I1/SO 
Finatly, illegal distribution channels were reported in 
everal countries, whereby drugs were smuggled from 
one country to another [19,44,48,56]. For example, 
drugs smuggled from Nigeria were commonly found on 
sale in Cameroon or passi ng through Cameroon to 
reach Gabon or the Central African Republic {l9J. In 
Senegal, smuggling took the form of sea or air ship-
ments diverted from their initial destination or illegal 
imports of donations from European countries {48]. 
\Vl\ilst illegal channels were commonly reported, the lit-
erature offered very limited information on their struc-
ture and actual size {19]. In Zambia, illegal importers 
were found to serve wholesalers and drug shops directly 
148]. 
This section shows that the distribution chain is far 
more complicated than as characterized in our La on-
omy (Figure 1). Figure 2 represe nts what happens in 
reality, ~ reported in the literature. 
Anti-malarial sales volumes and mark-ups 
Sales volume estimates are key data for assessing the 
relative importance of wholesalers with.in the distribu-
tion chain and understanding suppliers' pricing deci-
sions. Data on actual volumes sold across chain levels 
were found in only six references (29,34,48,53,55,60]. 
Anti-malarial sales volumes reported by 21 wholesalers 
operating across six regions of Tanzania ranged from 
Manufacturers 
(local & international) 
Page 7 ci 14 
2,001 and 27,000 doses per month {34]. The rest of the 
literature indicated relatively concentrated wholesale 
markets (compared to retail markets), especially at the 
top of the chain where a few suppliers were responsible 
for most of the volume sold (33,51 ,53]. Only one study 
on the anti-malarial import market in Uganda calculated 
concentration ratios (the proportion of anti-malarial 
sales volumes /value accounted for by the n largest 
firms) and the Hirshman- Herfindahl index (HHI) (the 
sum of squared market shares of each firm in the mar-
ket). The study found that five importers accounted for 
nearly 72% of anti-malarial sales with a HHI of just 
under 1400, indicating moderate market concentration 
(an index under 1,000 is associated with competitive 
markets and above 1,800 with monopoly) (51]. 
More attention has been paid to measuring anti-
malarial price mark-ups, especially on first-line treat-
ments for uncomplicated malaria or the most common 
alternatives at the time of the studies. Methods used 
included regulatory document re\;ews, qualitath inter-
views with key informants including government of 1-
eials, wholesalers and retailers [48,54,61 ], sometimes 
combined with semi-structured or structured interviews 
with wholesalers, retailers andlor consumers (Table 3), 
For the purpose of this review, mark-up data were sum-
marized using a specific taxonomy. Primary mark-ups, 
therefore, refer to the margins that primary suppliers 
Pharmacies Orug shops Genero.l stores 
o f 
Figure 2 Structure of the distribution chain. This figure ~OW'S t re complexity d t ile in-rount ry dist riruton ch in for ant i laria l drugs in 
low and midd le-il'\come cnuntries. as repo in the ii rature. 
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(entry point to the distribution chain) add on top of 
their purchase prices when they sen-e intermediate or 
terminal wholesalers. Terminal mark-ups rclate to mar-
gins added by terminal wholesalers (retailers' direct sup-
ply sources) on top of the price at which they obtained 
the drug, either from primary or intennediate suppliers 
(Table 3). 
Overall, srudies reported mark-ups \\'ithin the distribu-
tion chain sening phannacies orland drug shops, except 
one that also prO\-ided anti-malarial mark ups within the 
chain supplying general stores. 
\,\'ithin the distribution chain, mark-ups varioo across 
levels, ranging from 27% to 99% at primary level, 8% at 
intermediate and 2% to 67% at terminal level (Table 3). 
In some settings, mark ups ,-aried depending on the 
structure of the chain (26], with somewhat higher mark-
ups at a given level observed in a distribution chain 
made of fewer lenls. For example, in Tanzania, when 
suppl)ing regional whok'salers, impOlters addt.'<i between 
27% and 43%. whilst when directly supplying retailers 
they added between 50% and 67% (29]. 
I ~ the retail market. price mark-ups on anti-malarials 
have been relatively more researched. They were some-
times very high and varioo greatly across outlet type and 
location. and anti-malarial type and packaging. There 
were four key findings. First, mark-ups ranged between 
3% and 566% in pharmacies. 29% and 669% in drug 
shops and 100% and 233% in general shops (Table 3). 
Second. mark-ups were somewhat higher in rural outlets 
compared to urban ones. In Zambia. for example. the 
median ACT mark-up in Lundazi, a rural district was 
54% whilst in Kabwe urban district the median was 29% 
(33]. In Choma, a peri urban district. the median ACT 
mark-up wa.<;, howcver, much higher than in rural Lun-
dazi reaching 300% (33]. Third. genericS tended to have 
higher percentage mark-ups, a situation that may not 
have translated into higher absolute margins given that 
generics are generally sold at lower prices than branded 
products. Fourth, mark-ups varied across packaging 
types. with a mark-up of 669% on one loose tablet of 
amodiaquine compared to 270% on a blistered tablet in 
Tanzania (20]. Again. assuming that loose tablet prices 
are lower than packed tablet prices. this may not have 
automatically translated into higher absolute margins. 
In some settings. where ACT subSidy schemes have 
already been i~nplemented, mark ups were \\'ithin the 
range expectcd by the managers of the schemes. In 
Senegal. private pharmacies purchased the subsidi7..ed 
first-line ACT from public sector medical stores and 
added on average 35% to the price of an adult dose. 
which translated into a retail price only 4% higher than 
the recommended retail price (RRP) (60,62]. In two dis-
tricts of Tanzania. a subsidy scheme was piloted in drug 
shops and in one of these two districts, it was combined 
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with a RRP printed on ACT packs. ACT availability 
increased and the subsidy effectively decreased the price 
of ACT below the price paid by consumers in the con-
trol area and below the price of older anti-malarials. 
leading to a large increase in the proportion of anti-
malarial consumers purchasing ACT in the two inter-
vention areas (from 1% to 44.2% one year later) (63J. 
SurpriSingly. ACT prices were higher in the di.<;trict with 
the RRP than in the district \\';thout. suggesting caution 
in future use of this approach for controlling ACT retail 
prices [63]. In Cambodia. a contrasting experience of a 
subsidy scheme was reported. Cambodia is the first 
country to have sy,itched its first-line treaOllent to ACT 
and implemented a social marketing progranune, includ-
ing a subsidy, packs printed with RRP and mass com-
munication campaigns in its endemic pl'Ovinces. Market 
penetration of the subsidized ACT remained relatively 
low and ACT retailed. on average, at a price 70% higher 
than the RRP (60]. 
O,-er.lll. relatively little is kno\\,11 about the factors that 
influence pricing decisions. Only one study was identi-
fied which used multivariate statistical methods to ana-
lyse price determinants, examining prices in drug and 
general retail shops selling anti-malarials in rural Tanza-
nia. The study found that higher retail prices were asso-
ciated \\;th branded and packed products. being sold in 
general shops (which might have rcHeeted higher prices 
charged by t11eir terminal supply sources) and higher 
market concentration [16,20]. The rest of the literature 
providt.'<i descriptive findings. Retail and whok'Sale mar-
gins were reported to be influenced by fixed price or 
margin regulation or, in the absence of regulation. mar-
ket competition and consumer demand. Wnolesale pri-
cing decisions were also reported to be intluenced by 
product characteristics. business practices and costs 
(26.32.54]. In Uganda. markups were reported to be 
lower for anti-malarials with shorter shelf life (26]. In 
Tanzania. drug wholesalers reported giving discounts to 
customers who bought drugs in relatively large quanti-
ties (32J. and general wholesalers to rustomers who pur-
chased drugs alongside other commodities [32J. One 
wholesaler also reported adding 6-7% to cover his 
expen.<;es and 3-4% for profit [32]. 
Discussion 
The existing evidence on the retail sector distribution 
chain for anti-malarial drugs was reviewed by identifying 
32 references across 12 low and middle-income coun-
tries. The distribution chain has a p)T3mid shape and its 
structure varies greatly across countries and within 
countries across outlet types, with chains having more 
levels when serving rural and less formal outlets. There 
wa.<; also some indication of weak competition espt.'Cially 
at primary level, where few wholesalers accounted for 
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Table 3 Mark ups on anti-malarial drugs 
Country Methods (study Generic Product 
reference) name* description, 
(drug type (as provided 
or brand) in the 
literature) 
Burkina Document CQ 1 dose 
rasa review; SP 1 dose 
KIl~ Semi- Aa 1 dose 
structured 
interviews with 
suppliers [54 
Cameroon KlI 154J Aa I dose 
Cambodia Semi- AS 18 tablets 
structured AS+M Child dose 
interviews with (rillalarine·) 
suppliers and 
retailel5 [~5J 
Structured ASI .. M..t Adult dose 
interviews with (Malarine·, 
suppliers (58) 
AS+fI.'l J .. Child dose 
(Malarine·, 
AS+M2 8 tablets 
AS+M3 ' 2 tablets 
~+M4 '7 tablets 
Kenya KI t and AQ(lB) 9 tab lets 
structured survey 
of retailers (78) 
3 tablets 
3 tablets 
Semi-stru ured Chik:l dos~ 
interviews with syrup 
reta ilel5 125' 
AQ Chik:l dost; 
(Amobin·) syrup 
AQ Chik:l dose 
(IiIlalaratab,,) 
$P Chik:l dose 
(Larldax-) 
SP Child dose 
(t-ansida"', 
SP C.hild dose 
(Falcidin·) 
Document Noh; 
review [61 J 
Kit [54) AO 1 pack 
Sene<Jal KI ~ Mystery AS+AQ± Adult dose 
shopper 
technique at 
reta iI level (62) 
Chik:l dose 
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Mark ups across supply chain levels 
Primary Intermediate Intermediate Terminal Retail (location where 
1 2 available) 
Pharmacies Drug General 
sh,ops shops 
100% 
HXIlf, 
3mb l00'}f, 
1410 34% 
2% 3% 
5CR6 3% 
71% "" 
65% · · 
2991) ... 
15% · " 
16% ·" 
4:)% 15% 33% 
29.5% 15% 33% 
15% 203% 
86% 
~2 .91O 
189*. 
151% 
13% 
~890 
19\16 20% 
lCR6 33% 
15% 3-5% 
15% lH2% 
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Table 3: Mark ups on anti-malarial drugs (Continued) 
Semi-stnJ u~ o (IB, BG. , dose 
interviews with (ini ion, 
suppliers and 
reta 'Iers 1551 
O(G 1 dose 
(in; ion, 
Tanzania Semi-stnJctured AO , tablet 
interviews with 
suppliers and 
reta'iers (2q32 
AQ 1 tablet 
Q 1 tablet 
~mi-stnJ u~ SP 3 tablets 
interviews with 
suppliers and 
retailers (31) 
Semi-stnJ ured 5<15 kg dose 
interviews with 
suppliers and 
retailers (29,30 
15<25 kg dose -
25<35 kg dose -
35+ dose 
AL (is) i 5 <15 kg dose 43% 
15 <25 kg dose .34% 
25<35 log dose 31% 
35+ log dose 27-3rn6 
n/a" 
interviews with 
suppliers and 
reta ~ el'> (34; 
AMT(lB 
SP n/a" 
AQ n/a 
Quinine n/a-
Uganda Semi-stnJctured SP (MSQ 3 tablet s 
i nterv iews with 
suppliers and 
retailers (5 
SP (LPG) 3 tablets 27% 
l Semi- AIl AMs n/a 5 . 
structu~ 
interviews with 
reta ilers [541 
Al(Q 1 dose 
(O(G 1 dose 
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1mb 41% 
15% 3)Cj6 
9CJ6 270C*r 
-
669% 
(rural 
8% 
2616 150%-
203% 
(rural) 
13% 100-
233% 
67% •• 100-
200% 
5BJb - 60%-
221% 
52% •• 47CJ6.-
230% 
39CJ6.-
233% 
100-
200% 
60%-
221% 
47%-
230% 
- 39CJ6.-
233% 
21% 54% 
(rural 
1mb 44% 
(rural) 
23% 110% 
(rural} 
41% 96% 
(rural 
3mb % 
6% 41 
501% 
7-8% 
38% 
100% 
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Table 3: Mark upson anti-malarial drugs (Continued) 
Sem ~structured DHA+PP (18) 1 tab let 32% 
interviews with 
suppliers and 
retailers 126J 
DHA+PP (lB 1 tablet 32% 
SP (IS) 1 tablet 57% 
SP (IS) 1 tablet 57% 
SP (G) 1 tablet 
SP (G} 1 tablet 
(Q (Cot) , tablet 
Arremetner 1 ampoLJIe 
(I B) 
A mether 1 ampoule 56% 
(IS) 
SP (G 1 tablet 
CQ(G 1 tablet 
DHA+PP (IS 1 tablet 36% 
Arremether 1 ampoule 
56% 
57% 
1 tab let 
(Q (C,) 1 tab let 
Lambia Structured AG 
interviews with 
suppliers 133) 
SP 
AG 
AG 
ACf 
SP 
SP 
~p 
Sem~structured Selected AM -
interviews with 'II' 
suppliers and 
reta~er:s (4B.55} 
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14)6 29% 
(rural 
:mb 22% (ruraG 
8% 43% 
(rural) 
1610 5~ruraD 
4mb 198% 
(rural) 
13% 271%(rural) 
11m 152*i(rural) 
33% 50% 
(ru~ I 
1 fRO 289t( ru ra I) 
25% 200% 
(rural) 
41% 92% 
(rural) 
11% 059t(urban; 
17% 
1-7% 829t{urban; 
5% a59f:{urban) 
25% 568*. 
(urban) 
24Jb 143% 
(urban. 
609D 
18...~ 
2~ II%-100% {urban; 
67%,13%-100% (peri-urban, 
54Jb, 50-100% (rura 
5~ 15%-327% (urban 
3~ 50%-517% lperl-urmnj 
50%, 15%-500% (rural) 
30% 
• AM anti -malarial$; AMT artemislnln monotheraples; mg milligra'ms; ml millititres; AS Artesunate; M Mefloqtine; AS4M2 combination fa children 
weighing between 16 kgs to 24 kg.s; AS+M3 combination for children weighing between 25 kgs to 3S kg.s; M+M4 mmbllli1tion for adu'lt.s; AQ 
Amodiaquine; 51' S\llphadoxine-l'yrimethamine; Q Quinine; Al Artemether.tumefantl'ine; OHA PP Oihydroarteml$inin+Plperaquine; IB imported 
innovator brand. IG " imported generic., B branded;G 'Ioc.a.lly prod'Ured generic. MSG most sold generic LPG ,lowest pri~d generic. BG branded 
generic I Imported, LP '10Gl11y produced; SC supply dlaln; ± stmidi:md product; .. level oft he dlaln did not l!Jllst or data not available; -Autho(s own 
wwlations; t mean acrou all prodUClS within drug dau.. primal)' supplier is the tenninal sl4>piier, I pr.imary:wppliRr \elis to terminal regional wpplier. V 
,induded NJ (3 tablets •• Artemether (not :statedl, AS {6 tabletsl, CQ (1000 tablet~), OHA ~not stated}, Halofanlrine 16 tablets}, Mef10quine f.3 tablets}. Proguanil (not 
stated., Q (1000 tablets), At IB (6 tablets), 51' (3 tablets). IFe International Rnanee Corpol'ation .. l&rk up data were rounded to the nearest whole number .. ~Kn 
key lriamant inteIViews; Mystery shopper technique ~obtrlJsille observation d shop attendants by researdlers Who pow as dient seeking are ftom it 
prO\lldel who is UM\l\We of their identity. 
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most of the anti-malarial volumes sold Wnolesale mark-
ups were lower than retail mark-ups and these ,'aried 
across dlain levels and anti-malarial drug types. 
O\'erall, there was a lack of representati\'e data on a 
national scale, which made the interpretation of data 
difficult. Studies tended to focus on the distribution 
chain serving a single type of outlet., often the more for-
mal type, such as pharmacies generally operating in 
urbanized settings. Data on the number of wholesalers 
who operate across levels was restricted to registered 
businesses and information on their characteristics was 
generally lacking. Studies were mainly descriptive and 
provided limited ('vidence on the influence of the distri-
bution chain on retail anti-malarial availability and 
prices. Sales ,'olume data across chain levels were non-
existent and mark-up data were concentrated at retail 
and terminal levels. with less information at primary 
and particularly intermediate levels (one study only). 
This situation can be explained by the methods that 
have been used to stud)' key ,'ariables, whidl were often 
limited to document reviews and interviews with key 
informants (central government. industry representa-
tives) or retailers. [vidence on stocking and pricing 
decisions within the distribution chain was therefore 
lading. an important knowledge gap for improving con-
sumers' access to affordable quality malaria treatment. 
High mark-ups and prices are commonly perceived as a 
sign of high profit, often leading to calls for medicine 
price reduction (64]. However. ~ithout infonllation that 
disaggregates mark-ups into profits and costs it is 
unclear if such measures are appropriate. 
A strong interest in working with retailers to improve 
the quality of care they provide has emerged in recent 
years. Goodman and colleagues identified 16 interven-
tions working "'ith medicine sellers to improve malaria 
treatment. all including a mix of activities such as train-
ing and capacity building. demand generation. quality 
assurance and creation of an enabling ern'ironment (281. 
However. only two of the 16 interventions were imple-
mented "'ithin the distribution chain, involving training 
wholesalers and mobile \'endors in Kenya and sales 
representatives in Madagascar. ~'hilst the evidence 
available on the outcomes of these initiati\'es wa .. weak 
and particularly limited in terms of the sustainability 
and equity of benefits. it showl.'CI some improvemenl .. in 
retailers' knowredge and/or perfonnance (28]. 
The Affordable Medicine Facility for malaria (AM:Fm) 
(65] aims to increase coverage of effective treatment and 
delay the development of drug resistance, by subSidizing 
ACT at the top of the distribution chain and imple-
menting supporting int.erverltions such as training. regu-
latory strengthening and consumer education. The 
capacity of AMfm to m('('t its goals has bt.'Cn extell. .. ively 
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debated (66-68]. including how the structure of the dis-
tribution chain and nature of competition at all levels 
will affect final prices. Sceptics are concerned that the 
subSidy will be captured by middle-men "'ithin tlle pri-
vate commercial supply chain and informal unqualified 
profit-maximizing retailers. This re\'icw indicates that 
there is insufficient evidence on anti-malarial distribu-
tion chains to predict "'ith confidence what the outcome 
will be, particularly reflecting inadequate infomlation on 
profit margins and the factors that influence pricing 
decisions. On the one hand. relatively concentrated mar-
kets (few suppliers accounting for large share of sales) 
were documented at the primary supplier level in 
Uganda and Zambia, accompanied by frequent exclusive 
dealership relationships. and within local areas at retail 
level, indicating the potential for exploitation of market 
PO"'"Cr. On the other hand. early experiences of subsidiz-
ing ACT provide valuable lessons, notably the impor-
tance of rigorous distribution chain analYSiS, for 
example to set the RRP at an appropriate le\'el. Redu-
cing the price of ACT will however not suffice and 
accompanying interventions need to be identified and 
tailored to each country context (69]. for example, 
Rapid Diagnostic Test. .. (ROTs) have the potential to 
increase access to accurate diagnosis and appropriate 
treatment. eSp<'cially in remote areas where alternative 
routine microscopy S£'rvices cannot ea .. ily be made avail-
able [70-73]. However, the distribution of affordable 
quality ROTs is also not ",ithout challenges (71,74.75] 
and has been the object of little research to date (76]. 
Conclusions 
Available evidence on the distribution chain for retail 
sector malaria treatment provides some useful descrip-
tive information. but there is a lack of nationally repre-
sentath'c data, and of analysiS of the determinant. .. of 
supplier behaviour. In the advent of the AMfm, a bl.'lter 
understanding of the role of the anti-malarial distribu-
tion chain on retail ou tcomes is urgently needed. Retai-
lers are likely to remain an important source of malaria 
treatment and the knowkxlge gaps idmtified here could 
jeopardize the success of initiatives for improving ACT 
access. Addressing these unL'Crtainties should be a prior-
ity of ongoing and future research. 
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Department Public Health and Policy 
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Any subsequent changes to the application must be submitted to the Committee 
via an E2 amendment form. 
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ACTwatch Combined Supply Chain & Sales Level Surveys 
Information Sheet 
My name is and I work for the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. In 
collaboration with PSI Cambodia and with the approval of the National Ethics Committee for Health 
Research of the Ministry of Health, we are conducting a study called the Supply Chain Study on the 
availability of antimalarial medicines throughout Cambodia. The results of this study will be used to 
improve the availability of malaria treatment. I would like to invite you to participate in this study 
because we believe that your experience in the antimalarial business can contribute much to our 
understanding. 
I would like to ask you a number of questions about: 
• The operation of your business 
• Your suppliers and your customers 
• The range and quantity of antimalarials you stock today. I would also like to ask your 
permission to visit you again in two weeks time to record the quantity of antimalarial medicines 
you will have in stock at that time. 
Finally we would like to record your geographical coordinates using a GPS machine. 
How long will the interview take? 
The interview with you should take approximately 1 to 1.5 hour, depending on how many antimalarial 
medicines you have in stock. When we return in two weeks, the interview is expected to be shorter 
because we will only collect information on the quantities of antimalarials you will stock. 
Are there any disadvantages or advantages involved in taking part? 
There are no individual benefits to taking part in this study, but in answering our questions you will help 
improve our understanding of the antimalarial market, and so potentially benefit all Cambodians. The 
only disadvantage for you is the time to complete the interview. 
Who will have access to the information I give? 
We are not here to inspect your business and no information about this specific outlet will be passed on 
to the regulatory authorities. The information gathered from this study is confidential and will be kept 
private. We will not share individual information about you with anyone beyond our research team. 
Instead, the knowledge gained from this research will be shared in summary form, without revealing 
individuals'identities. 
What will happen if I refuse to participate? 
Participation in this research is completely voluntary. You are free to decide if you want to take part in 
this study. If you do agree, you can still change your mind at any time. You can refuse to answer any 
specific question, or stop the interview at any point. If you chose not to answer a question, stop the 
interview or not participate there will not be any negative implications for you . 
.. 
What if I have any questions? 
If you have any questions, you can ask them now, during the interview or later. If you wish to ask 
questions later, you may contact any of the following members of the study team: 
Dr Kara Hanson, Reader in Health Economics and Policy, Health Policy Unit, London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine, London UK. The email addressisKara.hanson@lshtm.ac.uk 
Long Dianna, Strategic Information Director, Population Services International-Cambodia. The 
telephone number is 016 53 11 35. 
Phok Sochea, Malaria Research Manager, Population Services International-Cambodia. The telephone 
number is' 017562568. 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the Cambodia National Ethics Committee, which is a 
committee whose task is to make sure that research participants are protected from harm 
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Certificate of Informed Consent 
have read the information sheet for the above study to interviewee of 
___________ {business name) in a language he/she understands. 
He/she was given the opportunity to ask questions and seek clarification. 
He/she gives voluntary consent to take part in the study. 
Signature of researcher __________ Date ______ _ 
Print name of researcher __________________ _ 
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District - Business ID: U_I_I-1-LI_I-1 
I. Census & Screening Information 
Interviewer verifies the information below is correct. 
Business 10 District - Business ID: [ 1 1 1 ]-[ 1 1 ] 
C1. Today's date (dd/mm/yy) [ 1 ]-[ 1-1-[ 01-1 
C2. Interviewer's name C2a. Interviewer's code 
[ ] [ 1 1--1 
C3. Province C3a. Province code 
[ ] [ 1 1--1 
C4. District C4a. District code 
[ ] [ 1 1 1--1 
CS. Name of business (if no name, record "no name") CSa. Business code 
[ ] [ 1 1--1 
My name is and I work for the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. 
In collaboration with PSI Cambodia, we are conducting a study called the Supply Chain Study on the 
availability of antimalarial medicines throughout Cambodia. This study is funded by the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation and the results will be used to improve the availability of malaria treatment. We 
are not here to inspect your business and no information about this specific business will be passed on 
to the regulatory authorities. 
SCREENING QUESTIONS 
51. Do you have any antimalarial medicines in stock today? 
1 = Yes go toS3 [-] 2 = No 
9 = Don't know 
52. If no, have you stocked any antimalarials in the past 3 months? 
1 = Yes [-] 
2 = No 
9 = Don't know 
53. Do you have any rapid diagnostic test kits for malaria in stock today? 
1 = Yes obtain consent [-] 
2 = No 
9 = Don't know 
54. If no, have you stocked any RDTs in the last 3 months? 
1 = Yes [-] 
2 = No 
9 = Don't know .. 
IF ANSWERED 'NO' OR 'DON'T KNOW' TO ALL 4 OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONS 
END INTERVIEW OTHERWISE READ INFORMATION SHEET AND OBTAIN CONSENT. 
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District - Business 10: LI_I_I--.J-LI_I--.J 
C6. Number of Visits 
Date 
Result 
C6a. Supply Chain Survey [& Sales Level 
Survey First Interview] 
COMPLETE FOR ALL BUSINESSES 
Visit 1 Visit 2 Visit 3 
[ ] [ ] [ ] 
1 = Completed 
2 = Business closed down 
3 = Eligible respondent not available 
4 = Business not open at the time 
5 = Interview interrupted 
6 = Refused - go to C7 
7 = Other: 
[--------------
C6b.Sales Level Survey Second Interview 
ONL Y FOR BUSINESSES PARTICIPA TlNG IN THE 
SALES LEVEL SURVEY. COMPLETE AT SECOND 
INTERVIEW 
Visit 1 Visit 2 
[ ] [ ] 
1 = Completed 
2 = Business closed down 
3 = Eligible respondent not available 
4 = Business not open at the time 
5 = Interview interrupted 
6 = Refused - go to C7 
7 = Other: [L-___________ ] 
1/ it will be possible to complete the 1/ it will be possible to complete the interview 
interview at another time, note this time at another time, note this time here, and 
here, and return then: return then: 
C7. REFUSAL: 
C7a. If the business refused, why? 
1 = Client load 
2 = Thinks it's an inspection/nervous about license 
3 = Not interested 
4 = Refuses to give reason 
5 = Other (Describe) 
[----------] 
I C8a. Any other comments 
FOR THOSE BUSINESSES PARTICIPA TlNG IN THE 
SALES LEVEL SURVEY & AT SECOND INTERVIEW 
C7b. if the business refuses to participate ill 
second interview of Sales Level Survey, why? 
1 = Client load 
2 = Thinks it's an inspection/nervous about 
license 
3 = Not interested 
4 = Refuses to give reason 
5 = Other (Describe) 
[----------] 
L] 
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District - Business 10: LI_I_I--.J-LI_I--.J 
For businesses that participated in the Sales Level Survey: 
After the first interview of the Sales Level Survey. interviewer to comment on: 
C8b.Tell us about your experience of collecting Quantity sold in the last week 
How did it go? 
What happened? 
Why? 
Were written sales records available? 
Did it help or not? 
C8c. Tell us about your experience of collecting Quantltv In stock 
How was stock taking of packed tablets? Why? 
How was stock taking of loose tablets? Why? 
How was stock taking of ROn Why? 
How was your experiences of collecting tablets and loose tablets compare? Why? 
How was your experience of collecting tablets and injectables compare? Why? 
How was your experience of collecting drugs and ROT compare? Why? 
Were stock cards available? if yes, did it help or not? 
After the second interview of the Sales Level Survey. interviewer to comment on: 
C8d.Tell us about your experience of coliectlnl..Quantity sold since last visit 
How did it go? What happened? Why? Were written sales records available? Did it help or not? 
C8e. Tell us about your experience of collecting Quantity in stock 
How was stock taking of packed tablets? Why? 
How was stock taking of loose tablets? Why? 
How was stock taking of ROT? Why? 
How was your experiences of collecting tablets and loose tablets compare? Why? 
How was your experience of collecting tablets and injectables compare? Why? 
How was your experience of collecting drugs and ROT compare? Why? 
Were stock cards available? if yes, did it help or not? 
C8f. your e~erience of collecting Quantity received since last visit 
How did it go? 
What happened? 
Why? 
Were written sales records available? 
Did it help or not? 
CBg. your experience of collecting Quantity disposed since 'aSt visit 
How did it go? What happened? Why? Were written sales records available? Did it help or not? 
., 
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District - Business 10: LI_I_I---.J-LI_I---.J 
II. Provider Questionnaire 
t. TIme Started 
PI. In what year did these premises open (YWY)? (9999 = Don't know) 
P2. Apart from antimalarials, what other drug categories are in stock? Read list 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
9 = Don't know 
I. Painkillers/anti-pyretics 
II. Anti-helminthics (worms) [_] 
III. Antibiotics [_] 
IV. Oral anti-fungals [_] 
V. Cardiovascular (angina, arrhythmia, hypertension) [_] 
VI. Ointments and creams (anti-fungal, acne) [_] 
VII. Gastro-Intestinal conditions (antacid, anti-emetic, laxatives, diarrheas) [_] 
VIII. Vitamins and tonics [_] 
IX. Cough medicines [_] 
P3. Apart from pharmaceutical products, what other types of products do you sell in 
this business? Read list 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
9 = Don't know 
I. Medical supplies (syringes, IV, gloves) 
II. Reproductive Health products (egg condoms) 
III. Toiletries 
IV. Household goods 
V. Mobile air time 
VI. Cigarettes 
VII. Food 
VIII. Other (specify): [ ___________ --'] 
P4. Who are your customers for antimalarials? Read list 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
I. Retail pharmacies 
II. Wholesale pharmacies 
III. Depots A & B 
IV. Drug Stores 
V. Cabinet (sells drugs, provides treatment; not equipped for treating 
severe cases) 
VI. Sun Quality Health Clinics 
VII. Other private commercial clinics (Clinical pharmacies) 
VIII. NGO/mission clinics 
IX. Grocery/convenience stores/village shops 
X. Mobile vendors 
XI. General wholesalers 
XII. Individuals 
XIII. Referral hospitals 
XIV. Health centres/posts 
[ ] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
~] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
~] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[ ] 
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District - Business I D: LI_LL--1-LI_I---.J 
xv. Village Malaria Workers 
I [-] XVI. Other (specify): [ ] [ ] 
P5. Where do your customers come from? 
I. List of provinces 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
9 = Don't know 
[-] 
1=Banteay Meanchey [-] 
2=Battambang [-] 
3=Kampong Cham [-] 
4=Kampong Chhnang [-] 
5= Kampong Speu [-] 
6=Kampong Thom [-] 
7=Kampot [-] 
8=Kandal [-] 
9=Koh Kong [-] 
10= Kratie [-] 
11=Mondul Kiri [-] 
12=Phnom Penh [-] 
13=Preah Vihear 
-
[-] 
14=Prey Veng [-] 
15=Pursat [-] 
16=Rattanakiri [-] 
17=Siem Reap [-] 
18=Sihanoukville [-] 
19=5tung Treng [-] 
20=Svay Rieng [-] 
21=Takeo [-] 
22= Oddar Meanchey [-] 
23=Kep [-] 
24=Pailin 
II. Other countries (specify): [ ] [-] 
P6. Do you import antimalarials? 
1 = Yes [-] 
2 = No 
9 = Don't know 
.. 
P7. Does the owner of this business own other shops or businesses? 
1 = Yes [-] 
2 = No go to P9 
9 = Don't know go to P9 
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District - Business 10: LI_I_I-1-LI_I-1 
P8. If yes, how many of each the following type of businesses does he/she own? 
Type of Business Number Location 
(write #) 1 = This district 
2 = Other district 
3 = 80th 
4 = Other (specify) 
7 = Not applicable 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
I. Drug Manufacturer [_1_1_] [-] 
II. Drug Importer [_1_1_] [-] 
III. Wholesale pharmacies [_1_1_] [-] 
IV. Retail pharmacies [_1_1_] [-] 
V. Depots A &/or 8 [_1_1_] [-] 
VI. Drug Stores [_1_1_] [-] 
~II. Clinical Pharmacies [_1_1_] [-] 
"III. Sun Quality Health Network clinics (SQHN) [_1_1_] [-] 
IX. Other private clinics [_1_1_] [-] 
X. General importer/ wholesaler [_1_1_] [-] 
XI. Grocery stores or village shops [_1_1_] [-] 
XII. Other (specify): (if they own a cabinet it can be [_1_1_] [-] entered here) 
P9. How are antimalarials transported to your customers? 
1 = You deliver to them [-] 
2 = They collect from you 
3 = 80th 
9 = Don't know 
PlO. In the last three months, have you given credit to any customers who bought 
antimalarials in bulk? [-] 
1 = Yes 
2 = No go to question PI2 
.. 
9 = Don't know go to question PI2 
Pl1. If yes, what are your most common terms of credit for these customers? (Le. 
how many days)? Enter number 0/ days [_1_1_] 
999 = Don't know 
Pl2. Including the owner and yourself, how many people work here (all staff 
employed at these premises)? [_1_1_] 
999 = Don't know 
Pl3. Has anybody working in this business (including the owner) completed secondary 
school? [-] 
1 = Yes go to PIS 
2 = No 
9 = Don't know 
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District - Business 10: U_I_I--.J-LI_I--.l 
P14. If no or don't know, has anybody working in this business (including the owner) 
completed primary school? [_l 
1 = Yes 
2 = No go to question P17 
9 = Don't know go to question P17 
PIS. Does anyone working in this business [including the ownerl have any health 
related qualifications? [_l 
1 = Yes 
2 = No go to question P17 
9 = Don't know go to question P17 
P16. How many people working in this business [including the owner] have the following types of health 
qualifications? Read List 
Type of Health Qualification Number 
I. University-level Pharmacist [_l 
II. Pharmacy Assistant [_l 
III. Medical doctor [-] 
IV. Medical assistant [-] 
V. Laboratory assistant [-] 
VI. Specialist [_l 
VII. Nurse / Midwife [_l 
VIII. Other (Describe): [_l 
P17. In the past 2 years, have the staff that work here participated in any type of in-
service training or workshops? Do not include pre-service training [-] 
1 = Yes 
2 = No go to P19 
9 = Don't know go to P19 
P18. If yes, complete the following table: 
)ubject of training: Run by: Duration: 
1 = Government (in days) 
2= NGO 99=Don't know 
" 
3 = Private commercial 
7 = Not applicable 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
[_l [_I_l·Ll 
[_l [_I_l·Ll 
" 
[_l [_I_l·Ll 
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SOURCES OF ANTIMALARIALS 
P19. In the last 3 months, from how many suppliers have you purchased antimalarials? 
00 = No suppliers in last 3 months go to P37 [_1_] 
88 = Refuses 
99 = Don't know 
P20. In the past 3 months, what was the name of your top supplier of antimalarials? 
1 = Knows name of business (specify): [ ] [-] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P21a.Commune or Sangkat (a/the top supplier) 
1 = Knows commune or Sangkat (specify): [ ] [-] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P21b. District or Khan (a/the top supplier) 
1 = Knows district or khan (specify): [ ] [-] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P21c. Provincial town or Phnom Penh City (0/ the top supplier) [-] 
1 = Knows town (specify): [ ] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P21d. Province (a/the top supplier) 
1 = Knows province (specify): [ ] [-] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P22. Physical address (Location identifiers) (0/ the top supplier) 
1 = Knows address (specify): [ ] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P23. Telephone number (a/the top supplier) 
1 = Knows telephone number (specify): [ ] [-] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P24. Type of supplier. Read list. Single response. 
1. Drug Importer [_1_] 
2. Wholesale pharmacy 
3. General importer 
4. General wholesaler 
5. Retail pharmacy 
6. Drug Store 
7. Grocery/convenience stores/village shops/market stalls 
8. Clinical Pharmacy 
9. Other private commercial clinic (such as SQHN) 
10. NGO/Mission clinic 
11. Public Health Facility 
12. Other (specify): [ ] 
88= Refuses 
99 = Don't know 
P25. How do you receive your antimalarials from your top supplier? Read list. One response only. 
1 = Supplier delivers to you [-] 
2 = You collect from supplier or from port/airport 
3 = Both 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
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P26. Do you buy antimalarials medicines on credit from your top supplier? 
1 = Yes [-] 
2 = No go to question P28 
9 = Don't know go to question P28 
P27. What are the most common terms of credit from your top supplier? Enter number 0/ days 
999 = don't know [ 1 1.-1 
P28. Did you have any other suppliers for antimalarials in the past three months? 
1 = Yes [-] 
2 = No go to question P37 
9 = Don't know go to question P37 
P29. In the last 3 months, what was the name of your second top supplier for antimalarials? 
1 = Knows name of business (specify): [ ] [-] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P30a. Commune or Sangkat (o/the second supplier) 
1 = Knows commune or Sangkat (specify): [ ] [-] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P30b. District or Khan (o/the second supplier) 
1 = Knows district or khan (specify): [ ] [-] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P30c. Provincial town or Phnom Penh City (o/the second supplier) 
1 = Knows town (specify): [ ] [-] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P30d. Province (o/the second supplier) 
1 = Knows province (specify): [ ] [-] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P31. Physical address or location identifiers (o/the second supplier) 
1 = Knows address (specify): [ ] [-] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P32. Telephone number (o/the second supplier) 
1 = Knows telephone number (specify): [ ] [-] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P33. Type of supplier. Read list. Single response. 
1. Drug Importer [_1_] 
2. Wholesale pharmacy 
3. General importer 
4. General wholesaler 
5. Retail pharmacy 
6. Drug Store 
7. Grocery/convenience stores/village shops/market stalls 
8. Clinical Pharmacy 
9. Other private commercial clinic (such as SQHN) 
10. NGO/Mission clinic 
11. Public Health Facility 
12. Other (specify): [ ] 
88= Refuses 
99 = Don't know 
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P34. How do you receive your antimalarials from your second top supplier? Read list. One 
response only. [-] 
1 = Supplier delivers to you 
2 = You collect from supplier or from port/airport 
3 = Both 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P35. Do you buy antimalarials medicines on credit from your second top supplier? 
1 = Yes [-] 
2 = No go to question P37 
9 = Don't know go to question P37 
P36. What are the common credit terms from your second top supplier? Enter number of days 
999 = Don't know [ 1 1--1 
P37. Do you have a license from the Department of Drug & Food (DDF) or the Provincial Health Department 
(PHD)? 
Type of License Has License Observed Valid Until (mm/yy) 
1 = Yes 2 = No 77/77 = N/A 
7 = Not applicable 
8 = Refuses 9 = Don't know 
I. Pharmacy license [ ] [ ] [ 1 ]/[ 1 ] 
II. Depot A license [ ] [ ] [ I ]/[ I ] 
III. Depot B license [ ] [ ] [ I ]/[ I ] 
IV. Import permit [ ] [ ] [ I ]/[ I ] 
V. Manufacturer license [ ] - [ ] [ I ]/[ I ] 
VI. Other (describe): [ ] [ ] [ ] [ I ]/[ I ] 
P38. Do you have a general trading license? 
Type of License Has License Observed Valid until (mm/yy) 
1 = Yes 2 = No 77/77 = N/A 
7 = Not applicable 
8 = Refuses 9 = Don't know 
I. Wholesale trading license [ ] [ ] [ I ]/[ I ] 
II. Retail trading license [ ] [ ] [ I ]/[ I ] 
III. Import license [ ] [ ] [ I ]/[ I ] 
IV. Manufacturer license [ ] [ ] [ I ]/[ I ] 
V. Other (describe): [ ] [ ] [ ] [ I J/[ 1 ] 
P39. Has an inspector from the DDF/ justice police/provincial health office come to visit 
you in the last year? [-] 
1 = Yes 2 = No go to question P41 
9 = Don't know go to question P41 
P40. When did they last come? Enter date (MM/yv) [ I J/LI ] 
P41. Can you please show us the full range of antimalarials that you currently have in stock. Do you currently 
have any of the following: (No responses need to be recorded) 
I. Artemisinin Combinations Therapies III. Non-artemisinin-based malaria drugs 
i. Artesunate+Mefloquine (e.g. Malarine, A+Ml,2,3,4) vii. Sulphadoxine-Pyrimethamine (e.g. Malastop) 
ii.Dihydroartemisinin+Piperaquine (e.g. Artekin, Duo- viii. Quinine 
Cotexcin) ix. Mefloquine 
iii. Artemisinin+Primaquine+Piperaquine (e.g. x. Chloroquine (e.g. Nitaquine) 
Artequick} xi. Tetracycline (e.g. Tetraman) " 
II. Other Artemisinin-based malaria drugs xii. Amodiaquine 
iv. Artesunate (e.g. Arquine, Plasmotrim) xiii.Proguanil 
v. Arternether IV .Syru pst suspensions 
vi.Dihydroartemisinin (e.g. Cotexcin) V.lnjectibles 
VI.Granules/powders 
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P42. Of these products, which is the antimalarial product that you have sold the most doses of (treatment 
courses) in the past month? 
Generic name 
9 = Don't know 
Do not write here 
L-I--1 
Brand name 
6 = No preference 
9 = Don't know 
Do not write here 
L-I 1--1 
Dosage form 
1 = Tablet 
2 = Suppository 
3 = Syrup 
4 = Suspension 
5 = Liquid injectable 
6 = Powder injectable 
7 = Granule 
8 = Other (describe) 
9 = Don't know 
P43. In your opinion for treating uncomplicated malaria in adults, what is the most effective antimalarial 
product of all of those available on the market? Looking for either generic name or brand name. 
Generic name Brand name Dosage form 
9 = Don't know 6 = No preference 1 = Tablet 
Do not write here 
L-1--1 
9 = Don't know 2 = Suppository 
3 = Syrup 
4 = Suspension 
5 = Liquid injectable 
Do not write here 
L-I 1--1 
6 = Powder injectable 
7 = Granule 
8 = Other (describe) 
9 = Don't know 
[ ] 
P44. In your opinion for treating uncomplicated malaria in children under five years of age, what is the most 
effective antimalarial product of all of those available on the market? Looking for either generic name or 
brand name. 
Generic name 
9 = Don't know 
Do not write here 
L-I--1 
Brand name 
6 = No preference 
9 = Don't know 
Do not write here 
L-I 1--1 
Dosage form 
1 = Tablet 
2 = Suppository 
3 = Syrup 
4 = Suspension 
5 = Liquid injectable 
6 = Powder injectable 
7 = Granule 
8 = Other (describe) 
9 = Don't know 
P45. Please name the medicine recommended by the government to treat 
uncomplicated malaria? Do not read list. Only one response aI/owed. [_] 
1 = Artesunate + Mefloquine (A+M and Malarine) 
2 = Dihydroartemisinin + Piperaquine (e.g. Artekin, Duo-Cotexcin) 
3 = Artesunate (e.g. Arquine, Plasmotrim) 
4 = SP (eg Malastop) 
5 = Tetracycline (eg Tetra-Man) 
6 = Chloroquine (eg Nitaquine) 
7 = Dihydroartemisinin (e.g. Cotexcin, Malaratin) 
8 = Other (specify): [ ] 
9 = Don't know 
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1m. Antimalarial Inventory Sheets 
Proceed to the drug inventory. Different Drug Inventory sheets will be used to record the antimalarial 
information based on the dosage form of the medicine. Look at the top of each sheet to record the 
drug information on the appropriate form: 
• If the antimalarial is in the form of tablets or suppositories, use the Tablets & Suppositories 
Drug Inventory Sheet. 
• If the antimalarial is in any form other than tablets or suppositories, use the Non-Tablet Drug 
Inventory Sheet. 
P46. Interviewer: Were any of the antimalarials recorded in the inventory ACTs? 
1 = Yes gather samples of all ACT products currently in stock [-] 
2 = No go to question P49 
P47. In the past 3 months, have you ever been out of stock of all these antimalarials 
(show all gathered ACTs) at the same time? [-] 
1 = Yes 
2 = No go to question P49 
8 = Refuses go to question P49 
9 = Don't know go to question P49 
P48. At the time you were out of stock of all of these antimalarials (show all 
gathered ACTs), did you have any other ACTs in stock? [-] 
1 = Yes, specify [ ] 
2 = No 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
OBSERVATION RECORD 
P49. May I see where you store your antimalarials? 
1 = Yes [-] 
2 = No, not stored on these premises go to P53 
8 = Refuses go to P53 
PSO. Are antimalarials stored in a dry area? 
1 = Yes, stored in a dry area [-] 
2 = No, not stored in a dry area 
PS1. Are antimalarials protected from direct sunlight? 
1 = Yes, protected from direct sunlight [-] 
2 = No, not protected from sunlight 
PS2. Are antimalarials kept on the floor? 
1 = Yes, kept on the floor [-] 
2 = No, not kept on the floor 
SOURCES OF RDTs 
If the business either has RDTs curr:~ntly in stock OR has carried them in the last 3 months, complete 
this section; otherwise, proceed to C9 
PS3. In the last three months, from how many suppliers have you purchased rapid 
diagnostic tests (ROTs) for malaria? [_1_] 
00 = No suppliers in last 3 months go to RDT Inventory Sheet if has 
RDTs in stock; otherwise go to C9 
88 = Refuses 
99 = Don't know 
PS4. In the past three months, what was the name of your top supplier of ROTs? 
1 = Knows name of business (specify): [ ] [-] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
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PSSa. Commune or Sangkat (a/the top supplier) 
1 = Knows commune or Sangkat (specify): [ 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
PSSb. District or Khan (a/the top supplier) 
1 = Knows district or khan (specify): [ 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
PSSc. Provincial town or Phnom Penh City (a/the top supplier) 
1 = Knows town (specify): [ 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
PSSd. Province(o/the top supplier) 
1 = Knows province (specify): [ 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
PS6. Physical address or location identifiers (a/the top supplier) 
1 = Knows address (specify): [ 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
PS7. Telephone number (a/the top supplier) 
1 = Knows telephone number (specify): [ 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
PS8. Type of supplier. Read list. Single response. 
l.Drug Manufacturer 
2. Drug Importer 
3. Wholesale pharmacy 
4. Retail pharmacy 
5. Drug Store 
6. General importer/wholesaler 
7. Grocery/convenience stores/village shops 
8. Clinical Pharmacy 
9. Other private commercial clinic (such as SQHN) 
10. NGO 
11. Public Health Facility 
12. Other (specify): L-[ ____________ ]
88= Refuses 
99 = Don't know 
] 
] 
] 
] 
] 
] 
PS9. How do you receive your ROTs from your top supplier? Read list. One response 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
M~ [_] 
1 = Supplier delivers to you 
2 = You collect from supplier 
3 = Both .. 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P60. Do you buy ROTs medicines on credit from your top supplier? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No go to question P62 
9 = Don't know go to question P62 
P61. What are the common credit terms from your top supplier? Enter number 0/ days 
999 = Don't know 
P62. Did you have any other suppliers for ROTs in the past three months? 
1 = 'Yes 
2 = No go to ROT Inventory Sheet i/ has RDTs in stock; otherwise go to C9 
9 = Don't know go to ROT Inventory Sheet i/ has ROTs in stock; otherwise go to C9 
[-] 
[ I I~ 
[-] 
329 
P63. In the last 3 months, what was the name of your second top supplier for ROTs? 
1 = Knows name of business (specify) [ ] [_] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P64a. Commune or Sangkat (o/the second supplier) 
1 = Knows commune or Sangkat (specify): [, ________ ] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P64b. District or Khan (o/the second supplier) 
1 = Knows district or khan (specify): [ __________ ] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P64c. Provincial town or Phnom Penh City (o/the second supplier) 
1 = Knows town (specify): [, ____________ ] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P64d. Province(o/the second supplier) 
1 = Knows province (specify): [, ___________ ] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P6S. Physical address or location identifiers (o/the second supplier) 
1 = Knows address (specify): [, ___________ ] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P66. Telephone number (o/the second supplier) 
1 = Knows telephone number (specify): [, ________ ] 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P67. Type of supplier Read list. Single response. 
1. Drug Manufacturer 
2. Drug Importer 
3. Wholesale pharmacy 
4. Retail pharmacy 
s. Drug Store 
6. General importer/wholesaler 
7. Grocery/convenience stores/village shops 
8. Clinical Pharmacy 
9. Other private commercial clinic (such as SQHN) 
10. NGO 
11. Public Health Facility 
12. Other (specify): [ [ ] 
88= Refuses 99 = Don't know 
P68. How do you receive your ROTs from your second top supplier? Read list. One 
response only. .. 
1 = Supplier delivers to you 
2 = You collect from supplier 
3 = Both 
8 = Refuses 
9 = Don't know 
P69. Do you buy ROTs medicines on credit from your second top supplier? 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
[-] 
1 = Yes [_'J 
2 = No go to ROT Inventory Sheet i/ has ROTs in stock; otherwise go to C9 
9 = Don't know go to ROT Inventory Sheet if has ROTs in stock; otherwise go to C9 
P70. What are the most common terms of credit from your second top supplier? Enter 
number 0/ days LI_I--1 
999 = Don't know 
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IV. ROT Inventory Sheet 
Proceed to the RDT inventory. Use as many sheets as necessary. 
C9. Physical address of business (not PO box) C9a. Telephone 
GPS: 
C10.South: Lat~ude [_l-LI_I_l- [_l-LI_I_l- [_l-LI_I_l-
[ I I I I 1 [ I I I I 1 [ I I I I 1 [_l-LI_I_l- [_l-LI_I_l- [_l-LI_I_l-
Cl1. East: Longitude [ I I I I 1 [ I I I I 1 [ I I I I 1 
COMPLETED SNOWBALL CENSUS SURVEY? n 
If the business participates in the Sales Level Survey: 
(if not sure, check the list of suppliers you have been given) 
C12. We would like to come back after 2 weeks to ask again about the quantity of antimalarials you 
have in stock, in order so that we can calculate the quantity of antimalarials you have dispensed 
during this period 
Interviewer uses calendar & suggests next appointment date. If not possible to conduct interview at 
suggested date, make alternative arrangement keeping in mind that second interview should take 
place 2 weeks after the first interview. 
C12a. Did they agree to make an appointment? 
l=yes 
2=no Ll 
If no, why not? 
C12b. We expect to come back here again on • write day of the week 
Go to C6b to record the date you have just arranged for conducting the second LI.JLI_][OI91 
interview 
C12c. Please may I know your name? 
[ I I I I I I I I 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1-1 write name 
C12d. When we come back we would also like to know the quantity of drugs you have received 
during this 2-week period. Therefore it would be very helpful if you could keep a record of any 
deliveries, or keep any receipts for drugs during this period. (no answers need recording) 
Thank you very much for your participation. 
IS IT OK FOR SUPERVISOR TO RETURN FOR MORE INDEPTH INTERVIEW? n 
Do you have. any questions or comments for us? 
I T2. Time Completed 
Return to C6a to record final status of interview. If Business participated in Sales Level Survey, go to 
CBb when exiting the premises to record your impressions on completing the interview (and record 
GPS coordinates!!) . 
END INTERVIEW 
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X2. Additional observations by interviewer (if any) 
Al. Total number of Tablet & Suppository Inventory Sheets/Tablet & Suppo 
Inventoried [ I ] 
A2. Total number of Non- Tablet & Suppository Inventory Sheets/Non-Tab & 
Suppo Inventoried [ I ] 
A3. Total number of RDT Inventory Sheets/RDT inventoried [ I ] 
August 2009 
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
24 26 
31 
September 2009 
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
21 22 23 24 
28 29 30 
October 2009 
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
~ "-"-"-'\ ~,"""-" ~","  "-" 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
26 27 28 29 30 31 
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Snowball Census 
We are trying to develop a complete list of all businesses that wholesale antimalarials or malaria diagnostic test kits in this District/Khan 
___________ (name of district or Khan) 
Is the information provided in the table below complete? Do you know of other businesses of this kind in this town and which are not listed? 
If any additional businesses identified, complete in table below: 
Complete at source outlet, and verify when you arrive at new outlet Complete when you arrive at new outlet 
Name of business Physical address or location identifiers Phone number Engages in AM Wholesale? Engages in RDT Wholesale? 
(Y/N) (Y/N) 
N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 
~ N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 
--
Type of business 
(drug / general) 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
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Second Interview Sales Level Survey SLS2 (Only for businesses included in the Sales Level 
Survey) 
Interviewer verifies that the in/ormation below is correct. 
Business 10 District - Business ID: [ 1 1 ]-[ 1 1--1 
C1. Today's date (dd/mm/yy) [ 1 ]-[ 1--1-[01--1 
C2. Interviewer's name C2a. Interviewer's code 
[ ] [ 1 I~ 
C3. Province C3a. Province code 
[ ] [ 1 1----1 
C4. District C4a. District code 
[ ] [ 1 1----1 
CS. Name of business (i/ no name, record "no name") Csa. Business code 
[ ] [ 1 1----1 
Introduce yourself 
Go to C6 to record date & number of visits for conducting the second interview of the Sales Level 
survey (SLS2) 
I T3. Time Started I ] 
If they did not have any malaria drugs or ROT at the time of the first interview, go to P71 
If they had malaria drugs or/and ROT at the time of the first interview, complete Questions 11 to 14 of 
the Inventory Sheet you started filling in 2 weeks ago for the Supply chain Survey and Sales Level 
Survey (SLS1) 
P71. Since my last visit, have you received any other malaria drugs? 
l=yes Go to Inventory Sheets For New Products in stock at second visit SLS2 [-] 
2=no 
9=don't know 
P72. Since my last visit have you received any other ROT? 
l=yes Go to Inventory Sheets For New Products in stock at second visit SLS2 [-] 
2=no 
9=don't know 
Thank you very much for your participation. 
Do you have any questions or comments for us? 
I T4. Time Completed I 
Return to C6 to record /inal status .. 0/ interview. 1/ Business participated in Sales Level Survey, go to 
CBb. when exiting the premises to record your impressions on completing the interview. END 
INTERVIEW. 
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TABLETS I SUPPOSITORIES - SUPPLY CHAIN SURVEY (SCS) 
Complete for all businesses 
Code: District LI_I_I~ Business [_I_I~ Product numl?er [_I_I~ 
1. Generic I 2. Strength 3. Dosage form 
name 
LI_U·Umg 1 = Tablet 
2 = Suppository 
LI_U·Umg LJ 
am IWnmlt:l LI_U·Umg 
8. Wholesale Selling price 
Interviewer asks 
What is the minimum quantity that 
you wholesale (sell at bulk price)? 
8a.LI_I_I_I~ packs 
(as you described in Q6) 
Or 
8b.[_I_I_I_I_l tablets/ 
suppositories 
at a unit price of 
~_....."_~,""",,," ____ + ______ "'" 8c.LI_I_I_I_I~ Riels 
4. Brand S. Country of 6. Package size What is the minimum price you 
LI_I--1 
name manufacture There is a total of charge for bulk purchases? 
a:m:mnmThl tI.llfT. 
LI_I--11 LI_I--1 
LI_'-U tablets/ 
suppositories in each: 
1 =Tin 
2 = Pack 
LJ 
8d.[_I_I_I_I_I~ Riels 
How many packs or tablets/ 
suppositories would your customers 
have to purchase to receive this 
price? 
8e.[_I_I_I_I_l packs 
(as you described in Q6) 
Or 
8f·LI_I_I_I~ 
suppositories 
tablets/ 
SALES LEVEL SURVEY 
FIRST INTERVIEW (SLS1) 
Only for bus'inesses participating in 
SLS. Complete at time of scs 
lO.Quantity in stock 
Interviewer counts stocks 
There are: 
lOa.LI_I_I_I_1 full packs/ tins 
(as you described in Q6 )in stock 
Or 
lab. [_I_I_I_I_I~ tablets 
/suppositories in stock 
&/or if there is a half-full tin 
Height of tin (cm) 
lac. 1_1_1.1_1 cm 
Height oftablets (cm) 
lad. 1_1_1.1_1 cm 
Number of tablets/ suppositories in a 
new full tin 
lOe.I_I_I_I_1 tablets/ 
suppositories 
7. Quantity sold wholesale (in bulk) in last week. 9.Purchase price For all questions (except Q1 to Q6), 
Interviewer asks Interviewer asks other possible answers: 
This business sold 
7a. [_I_I_I_I_I~ packs (as you described in Q6) 
Or 
7b. LI_I_I_I_I_J tablets / suppositories 
For the most recent purchase, 
you bought a total of 
9a. [_I_I_I_I_J packs 
(as you described in Q6) 
Or 
9b.[_I_I_I_I_J 
tablets/suppositories 
at a unit price of 
9c.LI_I_I_I_I~ Riels 
777777= Not applicable 
888888 = Does not vary price 
999999 = Don't know 
666666=Refuses 
SALES LEVEL SURVEY 
SECOND INTERVIEW (SLS2) 
Only for businesses participating in SLS. 
Complete at second interview of SLS. For new products in stock at time of 
second interview (because no inventory sheet exists yet), use Tablet & 
Suppository Drug Inventory Sheet - SLS2 
11. Quantity sold wholesale 13. Quantity disposed since last visit 
since last visit Interviewer asks 
Interviewer asks 13a. LI_I_I_I_I--1 packs /tlns have 
This business sold been disposed/ thrown away /sent back to 
11a.LI_I_I_I_I--1 full supplier/ given to other owned shop since 
packs / tins (as you described in last visit 
Q6) since the last visit. Or 
Or 13b.LI_I_I_I_I--1 tablets 
llb. LI_I_I_I_I--1 /suppositories have been disposed/thrown 
tablets/suppositories since the away since last visit 
last visit 
12. Quantity In stock today I 14. Quantity received since last visit 
Interviewer f2!!!!!! stocks 
There are: 
12a.I_I_I_I_I_1 full 
packs /tins (as you described in 
Q6.) 
Or 
12b·LI_I_I_I_I--1 
tablets /suppositorles 
&/or if there is a half-full tin 
Height of tin (cm) 
12e.I_I_I.I_1 cm 
Height of tablets (em) 
12d. 1_1_1.1_1 cm 
Number of tablets/ 
suppositories in a new full tin 
12e.I_I_I_I_1 tablets/ 
suppositories 
Interviewer asks 
14a.LI_I_I_I_I--1 packsl tins have 
been received (as you described in Q6) 
Or 
14b. LI_I_I_I_I--1 
tablets/suppositories have been received 
since last visit 
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INJECTABLES - SUPPLY CHAIN SURVEY (SCS) 
Complete for 0/1 businesses 
Code: District LI_I_I~ Business LI_I~ Product number [_I_I~ 
1. Generic I 2. Strength 
name 
LI_ I_IJ ·Umg 
LI_lJmL 
L LLIJ·Umg 
LI _lJmL 
LI_ I_IJ ·Umg 
LI _lJmL 
(Note: no mL 
recorded for 
... ____ ... powders or I [!m~W'Il;} I granules) 
3.Dosage form 
3 = Syrup 
4 = Suspension 
5 = Liquid inject 
6 = Powder inject. 
7 = Granule 
L1 
8. Wholesale selling price 
Interviewer asks 
What is the minimum quantity (i.e . 
number of packs) that you wholesale 
(sell at bulk price)? 
8a. ~ packs of bottles/ 
ampoules/sachets 
(as you described in Q6b) 
Or 
8b. ~ bottles/ampoules/sachets 
at a unit price 
8c.~Riels 
What is the minimum price you charge 
LI_I~ for bulk purchases? 
4 B d 5 C 6 U· . 8d. ~ Riels 
. ran . ountry a. n.lt size How many packs or bottles 
name manufacture There IS a total of 
LI 1 I~ mL ampoules/sachets WOUld. your.cust.omer 
( - -f d have to purchase to receive this prrce? or mg or power . t---.---f-~--~.~-II .. ct· d 8e .[~ packs(as you described In Q6b) . :!IDll'Iill ~ i!mli!m~ InJe Ions an 0 granules) in each: r 
1 = Bottle 8f·L1 bottles/ ampoules/sachets 
2 = Ampoule/vial 
LI_I--1 LI_I--1 
SALES LEVEL SURVEY 
FIRST INTERVIEW (SLS1) 
Only for businesses participating in 
SLS. Complete at time of SCS 
lO.Quantity in stock 
Interviewer counts stocks 
There are 
7a. 1_1_1_1_1_1 packs of 
bottles/ ampoules/ vials/sachets l!! 
stock 
(as you described in Q6b) 
Or 
7b. 1_1_1_1_1_1 bottles, 
ampoules/ vials/sachet in stock 
For 0/1 questions (except Q1 to Q6b), 
other possible answers: 
3 = Sachet of granules 
L1 777777= Not applicable 
888888 = Does not vary price 
6b. Package size 
(Fill in number) 
Total of 
LI_I_I~ 
units 
per package/pack 
7. Quantity sold wholesale (in 9. Purchase price 999999 = Don't know 
bulk) in last week. Interviewer asks Interviewer asks. For the most recent 666666=Refuses 
This business sold purchase, you bought a total of 
7a. LI_I_I_I_I~ packs of 9a. [_1_1_1_1_1 packs 
bottle/ampoules/sachets in the last (as you described in Q6b) 
week (as you described in Q6b) Or 
Or 9b·[_I_I_I_I_1 
7b. [_I_I_I_I_I~ bottles/ ampoules/sachets 
ampoules/sachets sold in the last at a unit price of 
week 9c.LI_I_I_I_I~ Riels 
bottles/ 
SALES lEVEL SURVEY 
SECOND INTERVIEW (SLS2) 
Only for businesses participating in SLS. 
Complete at second Interview of SLS. For new products in stock at time of 
second interview (because no inventory sheet exists yet), use Non-Tablet Drug 
Inventory Sheet - SLS2 
11. Quantity sold wholesale 13. Quantity disposed since last visit. 
since last visit. Interviewer asks 
Interviewer asks. 13a.U packs have been disposed/ thrown 
This business sold away / sent back to supplier/ given to other 
11a.L--j packs (as yau own shop since last visit 
described In Q6b)sold since Or 
the last visit, 13b.( --1 bottles/ ampoules/sachets have 
Or been disposed/thrown away since last visit 
11b. Ubottles/ampoules 
/sachets sold since the last 
visit 
12. Quanthy In stock today 
Interviewer counts. There are 
12a. I_I packs (as 
described in Q 6b.) 
Or 
12b. U bottles 
ampoules/sachets 
14. Quantity received since last visit 
Interviewer asks 
14a. L--j packs have been received since 
last vislt(as you described In Q6b) 
Or 
14b. [-1bottles/ ampoules/sachets have 
been received since last visit 
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Information Sheet for Sales Level Survey (Retail) 
My name is and I work for the London School of Hygiene ad Tropical Medicine and 
PSI/Cambodia. With the approval of the National Ethics Committee for Health Research of the Ministry 
of Health, we are conducting a study called the Supply Chain Study on the availability of antimalarial 
medicines throughout Cambodia. The results of this study will be used to improve the availability of 
malaria treatment. I would like to invite you to participate in this study because we believe that your 
experience in the antimalarial business can contribute much to our understanding. 
I would like to ask you permission to collect information on the range and volumes of antimalarial drugs 
& malaria tests (rapid diagnostic tests) that you have in stock today, and to come back in 2 weeks time 
to collect this information again. 
How long will the interview take? 
The interview with you should take between 15 to 60 minutes, depending on how many antimalarial 
medicines you have in stock. 
Are there any disadvantages or advantages involved in taking part? 
There are no individual benefits to taking part, but in answering our questions you will help improve our 
understanding of the antimalarial market, and so potentially benefit all Cambodians. The only 
disadvantage for you is the time to complete the interview. 
Who will have access to the information I give? 
We are not here to inspect your business and no information about this specific outlet will be passed on 
to the regulatory authorities. The information gathered from this study is confidential and will be kept 
private. We will not share individual information about you with anyone beyond our research team. 
Instead, the knowledge gained from this research will be shared in summary form, without revealing 
individuals' identities. 
What will happen if I refuse to participate? 
Participation in this research is completely voluntary. You are free to decide if you want to take part in 
this study. If you do agree, you can still change your mind at any time. You can refuse to answer any 
specific question, or stop the interview at any point. If you chose not to answer a question, stop the 
interview or not participate there will not be any negative implications for you. 
What if I have any questions? 
If you have any questions, you can ask them now, during the interview or later. If you wish to ask 
questions later, you may contact any of the following members of the study team: 
Dr Kara Hanson 
Reader in Health Economics and Policy, Health Policy Unit, London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine, London UK, The email addressisKara.Hanson@lshtm.ac.uk 
Long Dianna 
Strategic Information Director, Population Services International-Cambodia. The telephone number is 
01653 1135. 
Phok Sochea 
Malaria Research Manager, Population Services International-Cambodia. The telephone number is 017 
562568. 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the Cambodia National Ethics Committee, which is a 
committee whose task is to make sure that research participants are protected from harm 
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Certificate of Informed Consent 
have read the information sheet for the above study to interviewee of 
___________ {business name} in a language he/she understands. 
He/she was given the opportunity to ask questions and seek clarification. 
He/she gives voluntary consent to take part in the study. 
Signature of researcher __________ Date ______ _ 
Print name of researcher __________________ _ 
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." Upon your on arrival at the outlet, check that that the information below is correct 
and enter your name and interviewer's name 
Business 10 
District-Sub District- Outlet ID: [_I_I--1-LI_I--1-LI_I--1-LI_I--1 
Province Province code 
[ ] [_1_1..--1 
District District code 
[ ] [_1_1..--1 
Sub-District Sub-District code 
[ ] [_1_1..--1 
Outlet ID Business code 
[ ] [_1_1..--1 
-
Name of outlet 
[ ] 
GPS coordinates 
N 
E 
Interviewer's name Interviewer's code 
[ ] [_1_1..--1 
if different interviewer at second visit, write name, 
code & explain why initial interviewer not present at 
the time of second interview Interviewer's code 
Name: 
[ 1 [_1_1..--1 
.. 
Explain: 
] 
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."When you enter the outlet, read the information sheet and obtain consent 
FIRST INTERVIEW 
"f. 1. Is it possible to do the interview? 
l=yes 2=no 
1.a. If no, why not [_] 
l=closed today 2=closed permanently 
3=refused:why? __________________________________________ __ 
4=other: specifY. __________________________________________ _ 
"f. 2a. Date of Interview [_:_-1/ L_:_l /2009 
(day/month) 
2b. Start Time 
3. I would like to ask about drugs for malaria. Can you please show me the full range of antimalarials 
that you currently have in stock. 
"f. Probe: do you currently have any of the following: (No responses need to be recorded) 
I.' Artemisinin Combinations Therapies 
i. Artesunate+Mefloquine 
(e.g. Malarine, A+Ml,2,3,4) 
ii.Dihydroartemisinin+Piperaquine 
(e.g. Artekin, Duo-Cotexcin) 
iii. Artemisinin+Primaquine+Piperaquine 
(e.g. Artequick) 
II. Other Artemisinin-based malaria drugs 
iv. Artesunate (e.g. Arquine, Plasmotrim) 
v. Artemether 
vi.Dihydroartemisinin (e.g. Cotexcin) 
III. Non-artemisinin-based malaria drugs 
vii. Sulphadoxine-Pyrimethamine (e.g. Malastop) 
viii. Quinine 
xix. Mefloquine 
x. Chloroquine (e.g. Nitaquine) 
xi. Tetracycline (e.g. Tetraman, Tetra-Ms) 
xii. Amodiaquine 
xiii.Proguanil 
IV.Syrups/suspensions 
V.lnjectibles 
VI.Granules/powders 
."If they don't have antimalarials in stock, go to #5 
" 
." If they have antimalarials in stock, go to #4a &/or #4b to fill in Stock Table Questions 
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4a. Stock Table for Tablets and Suppositories 
~If a given drug is available in more than one kind of packaging, fill in a separate line for each kind of packaging. 
~Product description to be filled in at first visit if product in stock at first visit. Product description to be filled in at second visit if in stock at second visit but 
not at first visit . 
Code 
LI_I~ 
District 10 
[_I_I~ 
Business 10 
LI_I~ 
Product No. 
4. Brand name 
Llr •• tIt 
LLJ 
. PRODUCT DESCRIPTION FIRST VISIT SECOND VISIT 
1. Generic name 2. Strength 7. Quantity in stock I 8* . Quantity sold since last visit I 10. Quantity disposed since last I 11. Quantity received since 
[_I_I~ ·[_lmg 
l_I_I~·l_lmg 
LI_I~·l_lmg 
today: 
a. Number of full 
packs/pot/tin in stock 
(as described in Q 6.) 
l--... ~-. --I -~--~ilEilitm-:!!!'-- ----+-1-3-. D-O-S-ag-e-f-o-rm---tII_I_I_I_I_1 
LI-I 1 = T,ablet 
2 = Suppository 
l_l 
5. Country of manufacture I 6. Package size 
(Fill in number) 
There is a total of 
[_I_I_I~ 
tablets/ su ppositories 
in each 
package type): 
1 = Pot/tin 
2 = Pack 
Ll 
(select 
full packs/ pots/ti ns 
or/and if there is a half-
full tin 
b. Height of tin (cm) 
1_1_1.1_1 cm 
c. Height of tablets (cm) 
1_1_1.1_1 cm 
d. Number of tablets in 
a new full tin 
(9999=don't know) 
1_1_1_1_1 
(RECAll) (Record # of packs/ pots/tins 
described in Q6) 
l_I_I_I_I_I~ 
packs / pots / tins were sold since last 
Yl.ill, OR 
l_I_I_I_I_I~ 
tablets/suppositories were sold since last 
visit 
9. Quantity in stock today: 
a. Number of full packs/pot/tin in stock 
(as described in Q 6.) 
1_1_1_1_1_1 packs, pot, tin 
or/and if there is a half-full tin 
b. Height of tin (cm) 
1_1_1·1_1 
c. Height of tablets (cm) 
1_1_1.1_1 
d. Number of tablets in a new full tin 
1_1_1_1_1 
visit 
LI_I_I_I_I~ 
packs / pots / tins 
have been disposed/thrown 
away /sent back to supplier/ 
given to other owned shop, 
confiscated since last visit 
Or 
LI_I_I_I_I~ 
tablets/suppositories have been 
disposed/thrown away since last 
visit 
last visit 
l_I_I_I_I_I~ packs / 
pots / tins have been received 
Or 
[_I_I_I_I_I~ 
tablets/su ppositories have 
been received 
341 
Code 
{_ I_ /~ 
District 
L/_/~ 
Business 
L/_/~ 
4b. Stock Table for Syrup, Suspension. Liquid & Powder In;ectables. Granules 
",If a given drug is available in more than one kind of packaging, fill in a separate line for each kind of packaging . 
.,.Product description to be filled in at first visit if product in stock at first visit. Product description to be filled in at second visit if in stock at second visit 
but not at first visit. 
PRODUCT DESCRIPTION 
1. Generic name 2. Strength- 3. Dosage form 
3 = Syrup 
4 = Suspension 
5 = Liquid inject. 
6 = Powder inject. 
7 = Granule 
FIRST INTERVIEW 
7. Quantity in stock: 
1_1_1_1_1_ 1 
packs of bottles, ampoules, vials, sachet 
(as described in 6b) 
Or 
SECOND INTERVIEW 
8 *. Amount sold since last I 10. Quantity disDosed since 
visit (RECALL QUESTION) (Record 
# PACKS of bottles/ ampoules/ 
vials/ sachets sold in past 
described in Question 6b) 
last visit 
[_I_I_I_I_I~ packs of 
Product No . 
[_ I _I_ I~ ·[~ 
mg/LI_I~mL 
[_I_I_I~·[~ 
mg/[_I_I~mL 
LI_I_I~ ·[~ 
mg/[_I_I~mL 
This business sold 
bottles/ampoules have been 
disposed/thrown away /sent 
back to supplier/given to other 
owned shop, confiscated since 
last visit 
'~rI_'b"'T"b 
LLJ 
(Note ; no mL 
recorded for powders 
or granules) 
Ll 
1_1_1_1_1_1 
bottles, ampoules, 
descri bed in 6a) 
vials, sachet (as 
LI_I_I_I_I~ ~of 
bottles, ampoules, sachets 
Or 
L 1_1_1_1_I~bottles 
/ampoules/sachets 
Or 
[_I_I_I_I_I~bottles/a 
mpoules disposed / thrown 
away/returned to suppliers / 
given to other shop 
/confiscated since last visit 
9. Quantity in stock at second 111. Quantity received since 
interview: last visit (regardless if in stock 
1_1_1_1_1_1 atfirst visit or not) 
packs of bottles, ampoules [_I_I_I_I_I~ packs of 
(as described in 6b) bottles, ampoules (as 
Or described in 6b) 
1_1_1_1_1_1 Or 
bottles, ampoules (as described [_I_I_I_I_I~bottles, 
in 6a) ampoules (as described in 6a) 
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4c. Stock Table for Malaria Diagnostic Tests or Rapid Diagnostic Tests 
.,\If a given drug is available in more than one kind of packaging, fill in a separate line for each kind of packaging. 
",Product description to be filled in at first visit if product in stock at first visit. Product description to be filled in at second visit if in stock at second visit 
but not at first visit. 
PRODUCT DESCRIPTION 
Code 1. Brand Name 2. Manufacturer 
[_I_I~ 
District 
[_I_I~ 
Business 
LI_I~ 
Product No. 
"1!E~'~ _IollITo 
LI--1 LLJ--1 
3. Country of I 4. Package size (Fill in number) 
Manufacture Total of LI_I_I_l tests per package 
1-}olllIo 
LI--1 
FIRST VISIT 
7. Quantity in stock: 
1_1_1_1_1_1 packs oftests 
(as described in 4) 
Or 
1_1_1_1_1_1 tests 
SECOND VISIT 
8 *. Amount sold since last visit (RECAll I 10. Quantity disposed since last visit 
QUESTION) 
This business sold 
LI_I_I_I_I~ packs oftests 
Or 
L I_I_I_I_I~ tests 
9. Quantity in stock today: 
1_1_1_1_1_1 packs of tests 
(as described in 6b) 
Or 
1_1_1_1_1_1 tests 
[_I_I_I_I_I~ packs of tests 
have been disposed/thrown away /sent 
back to supplier/given to other owned 
shop, confiscated si nce last visit 
Or 
LI_I_I_I_I~ tests 
disposed/thrown away/returned to 
suppliers/given to other 
shop/confiscated since last visit 
11. Quantity received since last visit 
(regardless if in stock at first visit or not) 
[_I_I_I_I_I~ packs of tests (as 
described in 6b) 
Or 
[_I_I_I_I_I~tests 
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S. We would like to come back after 2 weeks to ask again about the quantity of antimalarials you have 
in stock, in order so that we can calculate the quantity of antimalarials you have dispensed during this 
period. 
Sa. Did they agree to make an appointment? 
l=yes 
2=no 
[-1 
Sb. If 'no', why not? ______________________ _ 
Sc We expect to come back here again on: 
__________ -J' [_: __ ]/L_:_]/ L2_ :_O-1LO_ :_9_] 
write day of the week (date/month) 
-
Many thanks for your cooperation. When we come back we would also like to know the quantity of 
drugs you have received during this 2-week period. therefore it would be very helpful if you could 
keep a record of any deliveries, or keep any receipts for drugs during this period . 
... End Time [_: __ ] H L_:_] 
-'-Fill in the Business Code Number at the top of each page of the Questionnaire and Stock Table. 
-'-Before moving to the next outlet, take a moment to write down some notes about this interview. 
Discuss these notes with your partners. 
Notes on First Interview 
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SECOND INTERVIEW 
7. Is it possible to do the interview? 
1=yes 2=no 
La. If no, why not 
1=closed today 2=closed permanently 
3=refused:why? ________________________________________ __ 
4=other: specify ________________________________________ _ 
8. Date of Interview [_: __ 1 I L_:_1 I L2_ :_0_1LO_:_ 9...1 
(day/month) 
If they did not have any malaria drugs at the time of the first interview, go to #10 
If they had malaria drugs at the time of the first interview, Fill in Stock Table, Questions 8, 9,10,11 
9. since my last visit, have you received any other malaria drugs? l_l 
l=yes 2=no 9=don't know 
if they did receive any other malaria drugs, list them in Stock Table Product Description (Ql-6), and fill in 
Q8-11 
10. Many thanks for your cooperation. When we come back we would also like to know the quantity 
of drugs you have received during this 2-week period. therefore it would be very helpful if you could 
keep a record of any deliveries, or keep any receipts for drugs during this period . 
.. End Time [_:_...1 H L_:_1 
.. Fill in the Business Code Number at the top of each page of the Questionnaire and Stock Table . 
.. Before moving to the next outlet, take a moment to write down some notes about this interview. 
Discuss these notes with your partners 
Notes on Second Interview 
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Supply Chain Study Semi-structured Interview 
Information Sheet 
My name is Edith Patouillard and I work for LSHTM. With the approval of the Ministry of Health, we are 
conducting a study called the Supply Chain Study on the availability of antimalarial medicines 
throughout Cambodia. We would like to ask you some questions about your antimalarial business. The 
results of this study will be used to improve the availability of malaria treatment. I would like to invite 
you to participate in this study because we believe that your experience in the antimalarial business can 
contribute much to our understanding. 
The questions will cover: 
• Your suppliers and your customers 
• Your decisions about antimalarial stocking and pricing 
• The costs you face 
• The regulatory system 
We will take notes during the interview. 
How long will the interview take? 
The interview with you should take approximately 1 hour. 
Are there any disadvantages or advantages involved in taking part? 
There are no individual benefits to taking part, but in answering our questions you will help improve our 
understanding of the antimalarial market, and so potentially benefit all Cambodians. The only 
disadvantage for you is the time to complete the interview. 
Who will have access to the information I give? 
We are not here to inspect your business and no information about this specific outlet will be passed on 
to the regulatory authorities. The information gathered from this study is confidential and will be kept 
private. We will not share individual information about you with anyone beyond our research team. 
Instead, the knowledge gained from this research will be shared in summary form, without revealing 
individuals'identities. 
What will happen if I refuse to participate? 
Participation in this research is completely voluntary. You are free to decide if you want to take part in 
this study. If you do agree, you can still change your mind at any time. You can refuse to answer any 
specific question, or stop the interview at any point. If you choose not to answer a question, stop the 
interview or not participate there will no be any negative implications for you. 
What if I have any questions? 
If you have any questions, you can ask them now, during the interview or later. If you wish to ask 
questions later, you may contact any of the following members of the study team: 
Dr Kara Hanson 
Reader in Health Economics and Policy, Health Policy Unit, London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine, London UK, The email addressisKara.Hanson@lshtm.ac.uk 
Long Dianna 
Strategic Information Director, Population Services International-Cambodia. The telephone number is 
016531135. 
Phok Sochea 
Malaria Research Manager, Population Services International-Cambodia. The telephone number is 017 
562568. 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the Cambodia National Ethics Committee, which is a 
committee whose task is to make sure that research participants are protected from harm 
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Supply Chain Study Semi-Structured Interview 
Certificate of Consent 
have read the information sheet for the above study to the interviewee of 
______________ (business name) in a language he/she understands. He/she was 
given the opportunity to ask questions and seek clarification. 
I believe that he/she gives voluntary consent to take part in the study. 
Signature of researcher __________ Date ______ _ 
Day/month/year 
Print name of researcher __________________ _ 
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Supply Chain Study Semi-structured Interviews 
Interview Guide 
Interview Details 
Interviewer Name: 
Language in which the interview was conducted (translator name if 
language different than English or French) 
Interview Date (dd/mm/yyyy): 
Start Time (hh:mm): 
Interview Location: 
Information forms provided: yes or no 
Consent obtained yes or no 
End Time (hh:mm): 
1) Introduction 
a) Can you tell me a bit about yourself and your role in this business? 
b) Who are the other key people involved in the business and what are their roles? 
2) Relationships with your suppliers 
a) How many suppliers of AM do you have? (SCS) Can you name them? (Phd) For how much of the 
AM volume that you buy do they account for (Phd)? 
b) How do you decide which suppliers to buy antimalarials from? 
c) Do you ever change suppliers? Why? Why not? 
d) Do you buy direct from manufacturers/importers? If not, what stops you? (trying to get at reasons 
for multiple links in supply chain) 
e) Do you ever have problems with availability of AM supplies? 
f) Do your suppliers have any rules about: 
i) the prices you can then resell the products at? (e.g. Recommended Retail Price (RRP)? Do 
you think RRPs are observed?if not, why not? 
ii) the products you purchase from them (e.g. product tie-in, bundling, exclusive dealing?) 
g) Do your suppliers distribute AMs to you? If yes, how often do they come? Do you pre-order or are 
they van sales? 
h) Do suppliers send sales reps to visit your business? What influence does that have on your 
business? 
i) How do you communicate with them? 
j) Are. any of your staff paid for by suppliers higher up the supply chain (embedded sales force based 
at lower levels of the chain)? 
k) What other ways do your suppliers try to influence the AM products you stock? eg gift, bonuses, 
credit 
3) Products stocked (at retail level, this is asked first) 
a) [Which malaria drugs do you have in stock?{Probe: first-line antimalarial treatment, names of 
banned AM) - start with this question in pilot test, but usually this info available from quantitative 
survey]. 
b) How do you decide which AM to stock? If they don't stock [name of ACT/the first line treatment 
drug], why? do you know where to buy it from? 
c) How often do you receive supplies/procure? 
d) Why don't you stock [name of ACT/first-line treatment drug]? 
e) What would make you stock it? (?follow up different pack sizes, shelf life, max price at which they 
would stock) 
f) how do you deal with expired products? 
g) have you heard about/do you stock the rapid diagnosis test? which one? why? why not? 
h) have you ever received training on RDT? who from? 
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i) do you use RDT? why? why not? if so, how does it influence AM/treatment sold? 
j) do you sell AM without a test? 
k) what do you think about RDT? eg opinion about it i.e. popular, precise etc ... 
4) Setting prices 
a) How do you decide what prices to charge for AM? eg price in other shops, product availability on 
the market, bonuses you have received from your supplier? 
b) Do you vary your price of a given drug? What are the reasons for this? (eg order value, different 
customers?) 
c) What is your average markup? Does it vary by drug class? What is the antimalarial product with 
the highest mark-up? With the lowest mark-up? 
5) Relationships with your customers 
a) Who are your customers for AM Eg individuals, cabinet, retail pharmacies, wholesalers, private 
hospitals/clinics, type of wholesalers, public hospitals/health centres. and who are your customers 
for RDT? 
b) Where are you customers located? Eg which provinces? (at retail level only; for wholesalers these 
data are collected during the SCS) 
c) How do they communicate with you? eg when they order, access to their sales records, manage 
inventory 
d) Distribution: Do you distribute AMs to your customers? Why/why not? If yes, can you describe 
your distribution system? Do you have distribution centres / nodes? (e.g. number and frequency 
of routes, charging practices, logistics) . How do you decide when to distribute eg as soon as order 
or wait to have several customers on same route? why?(eg less costly or more profitable) do you 
distribute above a certain order threshold? 
e) Do you send sales reps to you customers? (why/how often, ... )] 
f) Do you place any types of restrictions (price, products) on your purchasers? 
g) Do you have any other strategies for influencing your own customers' choice of product, or 
providing them with information? eg bonuses, gift for buying specific products 
h) Do you give credit (at retail level)? for how long? why? why not? 
i) Do you do any repackaging / relabeling of AMs? 
6) Competition 
a) Which places do you consider your main competitors for customers for antimalarials (other 
wholesalers, retailers, health facilities, VMW)? What is it about them that makes them your 
competitors? if there are facilities or other shops nearby not mentioned, why are they not 
considered as competitors? 
b) How do you try to attract more customers to your business? eg distribute at no cost, credit, 
bonuses, discount 
c) Why do you think some customers choose other businesses instead of yours? 
d) Are there any ways in which businesses cooperate? e.g. do you borrow products from one 
another? is there a trade associations? (are you a member? What benefit?) Agreements about 
what prices to charge? Ter~!tory/geographic area to focus business on? 
e) Barriers/contestability 
i) do you think other people will set up similar businesses in this area in the near future? if 
no, why not? if yes, do you think they will take away your customers? 
ii) do businesses like this often go out of business? eg bankrupt. Why? 
iii) do you think this could happen to your business? 
iv) are you planning to expand/open new business? why? why not? 
v) do medicines sellers experience any problems in expanding or opening new busines~es? eg 
competition from existing shops, regulation, access to capital 
7) Sources of Information 
a) -How do you get general information about AM/RDT? 
8) Costs involved in wholesaling and retailing AM 
a) We're trying to understand the main costs of running a pharmacy business: Could you please help 
us to complete this table: 
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if does not work, try asking about expenses over the last month 
Expense Riels or $ per month Notes 
Rent 
Electricity 
Gaz 
Stock 
Water 
Phone 
Employees: Salaried 
Employees: Casual/hourly (including salaries to your family 
members who work here) 
Salary to yourself 
Stationery 
Freight 
Transport to pick up drugs 
Transport to deliver drugs to customers 
Clearance charges 
Marketing 
Trade/business license (This may be annual) 
Pharmacy/depot/cabinet license 
-Other PHO fees 
Insurance 
Security 
Taxes - Corporate 
Taxes - Local 
Taxes other 
Other categories 
Total 
b) Are there any important categories that we have missed? 
c) do you keep records of these expenses? could we see these records? 
d) [Check by comparing the total revenue with total cost] So that means that your monthly profit is 
----? 
e) If you were to set up this business again today, what would be the costs of setting up? 
i) Rent a house/premises such as this one? 
ii) Furniture and fittings 
i,ii) Purchase of initial stock 
iv) Equipment 
v) Vehicles 
vi) Loan cost (interest rate) 
f) How do you finance your inventory? Do you have any problems with this? 
9) Sales revenue 
a) What is your gross monthly sales revenue? 
i) at terminal/terminal/intermediate, what is the value of your overall daily sales (before 
paying any expenses? what is the value of your antimalarial/ROT daily or weekly sales? 
ii) at primary level, what is the value of your annual sales for all products? what is the value 
of your annual AM/ROT sales? 
b) 'What share of this is from antimalarial drugs/ROT (if previous questions did not work)? 
c) does this vary during the year/any months during the year for which the quantity of AM you sell 
varies? 
10) Regulations 
a) What are the regulatory requirements for opening this kind of business? 
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(to registered, do you need to pay a fee or do you just to be a pharmacist/the name of a 
pharmacist? if yes, how often do you need to pay this fee/renew the license) 
b) What are your views on the regulatory requirements for this type of business? 
i) Do you think they are reasonable? If not, why not? 
ii) How do they influence the way you run the business? 
c) What are your views on the capacity of the regulators to enforce their regulations? 
i) Do you feel that most people comply? 
ii) Do you feel that sanctions are enforced? 
iii) Have you had any personal experiences of dealing with the regulatory authorities? Can you 
describe them? 
d) Would you like to see changes in the regulatory system? What aspects would you like to see 
changing? 
e) In places we have come from we have heard stories about drugs from health facilities/the public 
sector/public central medical store getting into private shops. Have you ever heard stories such as 
these? 
f) Have you heard stories about AM that may be fake/counterfeit? What do you know about 
markets for counterfeits/fakes? what kind of suppliers (walk, moto, vans, always the same people, 
where do they come from, how often do they come? 
g) What do you know about the operation of a black/parallel market in this country (=unofficial 
imports / exports, smuggling) 
11) Policy Context 
Ask about any policy intervention occurring/that might occur in Cambodia 
a) ban monotherapies - if stocks, what have you done with these products/what are you going to 
sold with these products? (ie continue selling until finish? send back to supplier? throw way? 
what has been the impact on your business? 
b) OTC products - the MOH has issued a new regulation which asks businesses like yours to sell 
some drugs only to customers with a prescription. Have your heard about this? how? (received 
letter from PHD, other businesses told you? what has been/will be the impact on your 
business?) 
c) private sector regulation for selling AM 
12) Suggestions 
a) What is the biggest risk/challenge you face in the AM business? What could be done to address 
this? eg bad debt 
b) Is there anything else that you want to tell me about your experience in dealing with 
antimalarials? 
c) Do you have any questions for us? 
d) For ·future research, we would like your advice on the following survey approaches for identifying 
the # of businesses that wh91esale AM and ROT: 
i) do you keep lists of your customers? what kind of list (credit, distribute to, ... )? does it 
include name and address of each customers? what share of AM buy wholesale? 
ii) another approach we thought of is to conduct interviews with your customers as they exit 
your premises. Interviewers would collect names and addresses of each of your customers 
visiting your business to buy AM and ROT for a period of - 3 days. What do you thin~.of 
such approach? why? why not? how do you think your customers will feel/react to such 
approach? 
13) Record other notes and impressions on the interview. type of structure, range of drug stocked, 
cleanliness, orderliness, business location, interview location 
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Supply Chain Study Key Informant Interview 
Information Sheet 
Greetings from the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine and PSI/Cambodia! 
With the approval of the Ministry of Health, we are conducting a study called the Supply Chain Study on 
the availability of antimalarial medicines throughout Cambodia. The results of this study will be used to 
improve the availability of malaria treatment. I would like to invite you to participate in this study 
because we believe that your experience in the antimalarial business can contribute much to our 
understanding. 
The questions will cover: 
• Your role in the supply chains for antimalarials and RDTs 
• The overall antimalarial and RDT supply chains 
• Price and availability of antimalarials and RDTs 
• The policy and regulatory environment. 
We will take notes during the interview. 
How long will the interview take? 
The interview with you should take approximately 1 hour. 
Are there any disadvantages or advantages involved in taking part? 
There are no individual benefits to taking part, but in answering our questions you will help improve 
our understanding of the antimalarial market, and so potentially benefit all Ugandans. The only 
disadvantage for you is the time to complete the interview. 
Who will have access to the information I give? 
We would like your permission to identify you by name, or other identifying information like the 
organization you work for, your business title, and your occupation. We would also like your 
permission to quote this interview. If you do not wish to be named or quoted, the information gathered 
from this interview is confidential and will be kept private. We will not share individual information 
about you with anyone beyond our research team. Instead, the knowledge gained from this interview 
will be shared in summary form, 
without revealing individuals' identities. Your decision to be named and quoted is voluntary. 
What will happen if I refuse to participate? 
Participation in this research is completely voluntary. You are free to decide if you want to take part in 
this study. If you do agree, you can still change your mind at any time. You can refuse to answer any 
specific question, or stop the interview at any point. If you choose not to answer a question, stop the 
interview or not participate there will not be any negative implications for you. 
What if I have any questions? 
If you have any questions, you can ask them now, during the interview or later. If you wish to ask 
questions later, you may contact ~ny of the following members of the study team: 
Dr Kara Hanson 
Reader in Health Economics and Policy, Health Policy Unit, London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine, London UK, The email addressisKara.Hanson@lshtm.ac.uk 
Long Dianna 
Strategic Information Director, Population Services International-Cambodia. The telephone number is 
01653 1135. .. 
Phok Sochea 
Malaria Research Manager, Population Services International-Cambodia. The telephone number is 017 
562568. 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the Cambodia National Ethics Committee, which is a 
committee whose task is to make sure that research participants are protected from harm 
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Supply Chain Study Key Informant Interview 
Certificate of Consent 
have read the information sheet for the above study to interviewee of 
________________ i,n a language he/she understands. He/she was given the 
opportunity to ask questions and seek clarification. 
He/she gives voluntary consent to take part in the study. 
Signature of researcher Date ______ _ 
Day/month/year 
Print name of researcher __ Edith Patouillard 
-----------------------
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Supply Chain Study Key Informant Interviews 
Interview Guide 
Key Informant Details 
Name: 
Organisation: 
Department/Unit: 
Position: 
Length of time with organization: 
Sector: Public or Private or NGO: 
Type of organization: 
Address: 
Telephone: 
Mobile: 
Email: 
Interview Details 
Interviewer Name: Edith Patouillard 
Language in which the interview was 
conducted (name of translator) 
Interview Date (dd/mm/yyyy): 
Start Time (hh:mm): 
Interview Location: 
Information forms provided: 
Consent obtained 
End Time (hh:mm): 
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The Supply Chain for Antimalarials 
1. Regarding the interviewee's role in the antimalarial supply chain: 
a. Please tell me about your organization and the role it plays in the supply chain for 
antimalarials. 
b. Please tell me about yourself, your position in the organization, and your role. 
2. Regarding the overall antimalarial supply chain: 
a. What are the main levels of the antimalarial supply chain, and what happens at each level? 
b. Who are the main actors at each level of the supply chain (Le. businesses, NGOs, 
procurement agencies, international organizations, and donors)? 
c. What are the roles and main activities of actors at each level of the supply chain? 
d. Roughly how many businesses of each type are there? Where are they located? 
e. At each level of the supply chain, are certain businesses responsible for a major share of 
the market? 
f. 00 lists of importers, wholesalers, distributors and outlets at various levels exist? 
3. Regarding the price and availability of antimalarials: 
a. Please name the main antimalarial medications (both generic and brand names) that are 
available in the country. 
If at the Pharmaceutical Regulatory Authority, do you have a list of all antimalarials 
registered in the country? 
b. As best as you can, please try to estimate the sales volume for each brand, class, 
preparation, therapeutic category etc. of the antimalarials that you mentioned 
c. As best as you can, please try to estimate the retail price for each brand, class, preparation, 
therapeutic category etc. of the antimalarials that you mentioned 
d. To the best of your ability and being as specific as you can, please estimate the price mark-
ups at each level of the supply chain 
e. Please comment on the availability of the antimalarials that you mentioned before. For 
example: 
i. Are some products more readily available compared to others? 
ii. Are there currently or have there recently been problems with the availability of 
antimalarials? 
The Supply Chain for ROTs 
4. Regarding the interviewee's role in the ROT supply chain: 
a. Please tell me your organization and the role it plays in the supply chain for ROTs 
b. Please tell me about your role in the supply chain for ROTs 
5. Regarding the overall ROT supply chain 
a. Is the supply chain for ROTs distinct from the supply chain for antimalarials? 
b. What are the main levels of the supply chain, and what happens at each level? 
c. Who are the main actors at each level of the supply chain (ie. businesses, NGOs, 
procurement agencies, international organizations, and donors)? 
d. What are the roles and main activities of actors at each level of the supply chain? 
e. Roughly how many businesses of each type are there? Where are they located? 
f. At each level of the supply chain, are certain businesses responsible for a major share of 
the market? 
g. 00 lists of importers, wholesalers, distributors and outlets at various levels exist? 
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6. Regarding the price and availability of ROTs. 
a. Please name the main ROTs that are available in the country? 
b. best as you can, please try to estimate the sales volume for each brand, product type, etc. 
of ROT that you mentioned. 
c. As best as you can, please try to estimate the retail prices for each of the ROT products 
that you mentioned 
d. To the best of your ability and being as specific as you can, please estimate the price mark-
ups at each level of the supply chain. 
e. Please comment on the availability of ROTS that you mentioned before. For example: 
i. Are some products more readily available compared to other? 
ii. Are there currently or have there recently been problems with the availability of 
ROTs? 
Policies and Regulations 
7. Issuing of licenses, permits, and registration for importers, wholesalers, distributes, and outlets 
a. Are there different categories of licenses for importers, wholesalers, distributors and 
outlets? 
b. What are the conditions, requirements and processes of licensing/permits/registration? 
What is the fee structure for licenses/permits/registrations? 
c. How many licenses, permits or registrations were granted this year? 
d. In your opinion, how easy or difficult is it for potential new importers, wholesalers or 
distributors to enter the markets? 
e. Is there a probationary period for new entrants? 
f. How often must licenses, permits and registrations be renewed? How much does renewal 
cost? 
g. Please comment on the implementation of these regulations for importers, wholesalers, 
distributors, and outlets. For example, 
8. Regulations 
i. Is it common for businesses to operate without the appropriate license? 
ii. Why do some businesses choose to operate without the appropriate license? 
iii. What would you change about licensing and registration arrangements or 
processes? 
a. What are the main documents regulating the supply chain for antimalarials? 
b. Please describe the main policies and regulations that dictate the activities of actors at 
each level of the supply chain for antimalarials. 
c. Please describe the main policies and regulations that dictate the activities of actors at 
each level of the supply chain for ROTs 
d. Are there any regul<;!tions about how the drugs are kept or dispensed, or the types of 
packaging allowed? 
e. Are there other regulations for businesses related to their operation (ex. staffing, building, 
etc)? 
f. How is compliance with regulations of antimalarial markets enforced and monitored? 
i. What type of inspections are conducted at each level of the supply chain? .. 
ii. How often are inspections conducted? (in theory and in practice ... ) 
g. What are some of the findings from recent inspections? 
h. Please comment on the effectiveness of these regulations. For example: 
i. Is it common to find businesses flouting these regulations? 
ii. Have there ever been problems such as fake drugs, smuggled drugs, or drugs 
leaking from public health facilities? 
iii. What changes to regulations would you like to see? 
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9. Taxes and Tariffs 
a. Please describe the main taxes that must be paid by actors at each level of the supply 
chain for antimalarials 
b. Does the tax status of antimalarials differ from other drugs? How? 
c. Please describe the main taxes that must be paid by actors at each level of the supply 
chain for ROTs. 
d. How are the tax rates set? 
e. How are these taxes paid? 
f. What records of goods bought and/or income must be kept for taxation purposes 
g. What are the costs (official and unofficial) of obtaining clearance for antimalarials? 
h. Please comment on the implementation of taxes and tariffs? 
i. Are there any problems with taxes not being paid? 
ii. What impact do taxes have on the supply chain for antimalarials? 
iii. What would you change about these taxes? 
10. Guidelines for treating malaria 
a. What are the most up-to-date guidelines for the treatment of malaria? 
b. Have the most up-to-date guidelines been implemented? 
c. Do you have any opinions on the current national guidelines for the treatment of malaria 
(either for adults or children, uncomplicated or complicated etc.)? For example: 
i. Can you comment on the relevance of current national guidelines? 
ii. How well are they disseminated amongst provides of treatment? 
iii. Do they impact the prescribing habits or otherwise affect demand for 
antimalarials? 
11. Other key factors affecting antimalarial and ROT availability and price 
a. Please comment on the amount of competition within the antimalarial and ROT market at 
all levels of the supply chain? 
b. Are there any interventions/pilots that could affect the antimalarial or ROT markets? 
c. Are there any other important factors that affect antimalarial and ROT availability and 
price in the country? 
End Time (hh:mm): 
357 
Topic guide for group discussions with data collectors undertaken for the comparative 
analysis of recall and retail audit methods for measuring wholesale and retail sales volumes 
Start with ice-breaking session: funny story from the field? 
Areas of discussion: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
Willingness and availability of respondents to participate in SLS1 and SLS2 
Availability of written sales records at first and second visits of the Dales Level 
SurveySalesLS1 and SLS2 
For the recall method, can you describe your experience in collecting: 
a. Sales volumes data for antimalarials? How did it compare with ROT? 
b. Sales volumes data for antimalarials in tablet form? How did it compare to non-
tablet? 
c. Sales volumes data for packs of antimalarials? How did compare to loose tablets 
or/and tablet in non-original packaging? 
For the retail audit method, can you describe your experience in collecting 
a. Stock data for antimalarials (E.g. was it possible to count the stocks? If not, why? How 
did it compare with ROT? 
b. Stock data for antimalarials in tablet form? How did it compare to non-tablet? 
c. Stock data for packs of antimalarials? How did compare to loose tablets or/and tablet 
in non-original packaging? 
d. Repeat questions a. to c. for data on quantities disposed and quantities received 
e. How was your experience in collecting a-d at SLS2? 
Did you experience any challenge in implementing the recall method? The retail audit 
method? What has been your biggest challenge? 
How would you describe the attitudes of shopkeepers towards each method? 
Do you have any other comments? 
Do you have questions? 
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APPENDIX 5 Calculating antimalarial adult equivalent treatment dose 
Active ingredient Oose(mg) used Active ingredient 
for calculating used for AETO 
1 AETO* calculation in 
combination therapy 
Arteether 1050mg 
Artemether 960mg 
Artemisi ni n-Pi peraquine- 576mg Artemisinin 
Primaquine 
Artesunate 960mg 
Artesu n ate-M efl oq u i ne 600mg Artesunate 
Chloroquine 1500mg 
Dihydroartemisinin 480mg 
Dihydroartemisinin- 360mg Dihydroartemisinin 
Piperaquine 
Mefloquine 1000mg 
Primaquine 45mg 
Quinine 12600mg 
Sulfadoxi fle- 1500mg Sulfadoxine 
Pyrimethamine .. 
AETD is for adult equivalent treatment dose for a 60kg adult 
Source: Adapted from PSI for the ACTwatch project, 2010 
-
Notes and data source 
WHO Use of Antimalarials, 2001 
WHO Use of Antimalarials, 2001 
Tangpukdee, N. et al. 2008. Efficacy 
of Artequick versus ACT artesunate 
and mefloquine in the treatment of 
acute uncomplicated Jalciparum 
malaria in Thailand. The Southeast 
Asian Journal of Tropical Medicine 
and Public Health. 39(1): 1-8 
htt[2:LLimsear.hellis.orgLhandleLi2 
345678903676 
WHO Use of Antimalarials, 2001 
Manufacturer Guidelines 
(Artequin Adult - Mepha) 
WHO Model Formulary, 2008 
Manufacturer Guidelines 
(Cotecxin - Holleypharm; 
MALUether - Euromedi) 
Manufacturer Guidelines (Ouo-
cotecxin - Holleypharm) 
WHO Use of Antimalarials, 2001 
This dose is for the 
gametocytocidal treatment of P. 
Falciparum. WHO Model 
Formulary, 2008 
This dose is for quinine sulphate, a 
salt, as quinine strengths are 
normally reported for salts. The 
total dose for quinine base based 
on 24mg/kg is 10080mg for a 60kg 
adult: 
WHO Model Formulary, 2008 
WHO Model Formulary, 2008 
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APPENDIX 6 Weights used in the analysis of ACTwatch" Outlet Survey data 
District Sub-district Strata Strata Sub- District Total Number Weightfor Weight 
Population District Population PHFs in PHFs 1 PHF for 
Population District visited non-
(Sample PHF 
frame) 
Anlong Anlong MDR SIC 1,463,025 19,883 26,482 2 28 0.50 0.66 
Veaeng Veaeng 
Thpong Anluong MDR SIC 1,463,025 10,217 38,920 4 15 0.34 1.29 
Chrey 
Krakor Ansa MDR SIC 1,463,025 7,115 53,312 6 6 0.25 1.85 
Chambak 
Rovieng Chhnuon MDR SiC 1,463,025 5,355 31,138 4 21 0.42 2.46 
Choam Choam Ksant MDR SIC 1,463,025 11,379 18,674 2 14 0.71 1.16 
Khsant 
Kampot Kampong MDR SIC 1,463,025 17,280 100,245 7 15 0.13 0.76 
Kraeng 
Prasat Kantreang MDR SiC 1,463,025 16,140 42,881 4 4 0.31 0.82 
Bakong 
Chhuk Koh Sia MDR SIC 1,463,025 13,789 25,880 16 25 0.51 0.96 
Sala Krau Psar Prum MDR SIC 1,463,025 6,074 28,269 1 5 0.47 2.17 
Kralanh Saen Sokh MDR SIC 1,463,025 17,472 51,318 5 7 0.26 0.75 
SraeAmbel SraeAmbel MDR SIC 1,463,025 23,009 34,090 2 5 0.39 0.57 
Chum Kiri Srae Chaeng MDR SIC 1,463,025 16,293 46,080 4 34 0.29 0.81 
Smach Mean Stueng MDR SIC 1,463,025 9,449 30,059 3 3 0.44 1.39 
Chey Veaeng 
Svay Chek Svay Chek MDR SIC 1,463,025 12,814 12,814 5 17 1.03 1.03 
Phnum Ta Sah MDR SIC 1,463,025 19,779 58,127 4 19 0.23 0.67 
Kravanh 
Kampong Takavit MDR SIC 1,463,025 13,307 13,307 1 4 0.99 0.99 
Seila 
Tbaeng Mean Tbaeng Mean MDR SIC 1,463,025 23,814 23,814 3 14 0.55 0.55 
chey chey 
Kamrieng Trang MDR SIC 1,463,025 16,973 32,480 3 4 0.41 0.78 
Varin Varin MDR SIC 1,463,025 10,552 10,552 2 23 1.25 1.25 
Memot Choam Triek MDR Free 1,519,546 15,945 123,903 10 12 0.12 0.86 
Sesan Kampun MDR Free 1,519,546 6,906 12,970 11 6 1.18 1.98 
Sameakki Krang Lvea MDR Free 1,519,546 18,571 30,635 4 4 0.50 0.74 
Mean Chey 
Santuk L'ak MDR Free 1,519,546 9,886 17,586 7 6 0.87 1.38 
Sambour Ou Krieng MDR Free 1,519,546 14,463 34,620 26 19 0.44 0.95 
Ou Reang Ou Reang MDR Free 1,519,546 1,826 4,159 6 8 3.68 7.49 
Tboung Roka Po Pram MDR Free 1,519,546 16,629 58,150 15 19 0.26 0.82 
Khmum 
Prasat Sambour MDR Free 1,519,546 12,579 54,810 3 3 0.28 1.09 
Sambour 
Mittakpheap Sangkat MDR Free 1,519,546 32,439 67,775 3 3 0.23 0.42 
Muoy 
Kiri Vong Saom MDR Free 1,519,546 16,692 16,692 9 10 0.92 0.82 
Sameakki Svay Chuk MDR Free 1,519,546 12,064 30,635 4 4 0.50 1.13 
Mean Chey 
Chamkar Leu Ta Prok MDR Free 1,519,546 6,256 38,529 11 11 0.40 2.19 
Thala Barivat Thala MDR Free 1,519,546 12,883 12,883 17 21 1.19 1.06 
Borivath 
Kracheh Thma Kreae MDR Free 1,519,546 12,377 91,031 17 21 0.17 1.11 
Prey Chhor Thma Pun MDR Free 1,519,546 12,479 27,528 12 74 0.56 1.10 
Tram Kak Tram Kak MDR Free 1,519,546 13,642 68,188 13 11 0.22 1.00 
Prey Chhor Trapeang MDR Free 1,519,546 15,049 27,528 12 74 0.56 0.91 
Preah 
Stoung Trea MDR Free 1,519,546 11,146 11,146 9 8 1.37 1.23 
Dambae Tuek Chrov MDR Free 1,519,546 16,021 53,373 3 6 0.29 0.85 
. . PHF IS Public Health FaCIlity. Source. PSI, personal communication. Adapted by the author . 
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APPENDIX 7 Factors for scaling-up monthly sales volumes to the whole year 
Month Number of cases treated in Scale-up factor ± 
2009 in the public sectort 
January 6,000 0.67 
February 4,000 0.44 
March 3,900 0.43 
April 4,200 0.47 
May 7,000 0.78 
June (month of data collection) 9,000 1.00 
July 9,500 1.06 
August 9,400 1.04 
September 9,500 1.06 
October 8,000 0.89 
November 8,000 0.89 
Dec 7,500 0.83 
Total 86,000 
tsource CNM Annual Progress report, 2009 
+ Number of cases treated in a given month in 2009 
- Number of cases treated during the study month Uune 2009) 
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APPENDIX 8 Procurement costs of antimalarials in the public sector 
Active Ingredient Unit Unit AETO Procurement 
Procurement Cose 
Cost 1 
Artesunate and Mefloquine Blister Tablets 600mgZ $3.60 $4.14 
Oihydroartemisinin+Piperaquine Blister Tablets 320mg" $2.10 $2.42 
Artesunate Tablet 50mg $0.10 $2.21 
Artesunate Suppository 50mg $0.34 $7.51 
Artemether Ampoule 80mg $0.30 $6.62 
Mefloquine Tablet 250mg $0.45 $2.07 
Chloroquine Tablet 150mg $0.01 $0.12 
Quinine Tablet 300mg $0.45 $21.74 
1; Unit Procurement costs of ChloroqUine, Mefloqulne, Artesunate and 
Oihydroartemisinin+Piperaquine were collected from the Central Medical Stores records and the 
CNM in September 2009 and 2010; 2 Strength of artemisinin derivative; 3 AETO is for adult 
equivalent treatment dose. The cost of one AETO was calculated using information on number of 
units required for 1 AETO and unit procurement costs, inflated by 15% to account for additional 
costs whilst in-country (e.g. transport and storage). 
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APPENDIX 9 
Chain Study 
Stratum with 
Sample of 20 sub-districts sampled for the ACTwatch Supply 
Stratum without Multi-
suspected/confirmed Multi- drug resistance (MDR) 
drug resistance (MDR) 
Sub-district name Sub district name 
Anlong Chrey L'ak 
Ansa Chambak Svay Chuk 
Chhnuon Saom 
Choam Ksant Ou Krieng 
Psar Prum Trea 
Sen Sok Thala Barivat 
Stueng Veaeng Tram Kak 
Takavit (Kampong Seila) Sambour 
Trang Ta Prok 
Varin Tham Pun 
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APPENDIX 10 Coding scheme for qualitative data analysis 
/ 
MARKET STRUCTURE 
/ 
PROVIDER CONDUCT 
/' 
REGULATION 
MARKET DEFINITION 
IV AR I RATION 
tOR 12 N .L N EGRATION 
D ISTI I U' N AIN STRUCTURE 
BARRIERSTO ENTRY 
EXITING THE MARKET 
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN 
OUTLETS 
PRICE COMPETITION 
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
PUBLIC PRIVATE LINKS 
'\ -aU I ... N ~ ... 
HE, r ·1.41 ~II ".4TIONS 
DR ~. 1:)11 Ii. liON 
..... U 'N~ 
CLAP DOWN ON UNLICENSED BUSINESSES 
B I IAMT 
B I PRI1 AT :. ,-"TOR SALES 
~~~ ~ ,! It II:U PRO-DUCTS 
~~~ ~ 51 ) DRUGS 
DRUG LEAKAGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION CHAIN 
KNOWLEDGE OF DRUG REGULATION 
\.. ~ SUGGI::) IIUN:) I;:::======~ PROVISION OF1NFORMATION INTERVENTIONS TRAINING OF PRIVATE PROVIDERS (NON-REGULATORY) SUGGESTIONS 
[ REFLEXIVITY 
RANGE OF SELLERS & BUYERS 
RANGE OF PRODUCTS 
SIZE OF THE MARKET 
REGULATORY FACTORS 
LACK OF EXPERIENCE 
LACK OF CAPITAL 
'\ CUSTOMER DEMAND/ PREFERENCES 
LOCATION 
DRUG AVAILABILITY 
EXPERTISE & REPUTATION 
PERCEIVED DRUG QUALITY 
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
BLOOD TESTING SERVICES 
PRODUCT PROMOTION 
CREDIT FACILITIES 
./ DELIVERY SERVICES 
VOLUMES 
RECOMMENDED RETAIL PRICE 
PRODUCT BUNDLING 
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APPENDIX 11 HHI on antimalarial sales values and volumes by market 
Commune Name HHI on antimalarial sales 
HHI on antimalarial sales 
Stratum values1 volumes 1 
ANlONG CHREI 1.00 1.00 
BOENG lVEA 0.26 0.27 
CHANG KRANG 0.32 0.30 
DAK DAM 1.00 1.00 
KAMPONG THMA 0.12 0.12 
KAMPUN 1.00 1.00 
KANG CHAM 0.54 0.56 
KAOH SNAENG 0.66 0.38 
KBAl DOMREI 0.19 0.16 
KBAl RO MEAS 1.00 1.00 
KRANG lVEA 0.36 0.21 
KRAYA 0.20 0.28 
OU KRIENG 0.22 0.17 
PEAM 
PHlUK 
ROKAPOPRAM 0.29 0.26 
ROlUOS MEANCHEY 0.54 0.69 
RUNG 1.00 1.00 
SAM KUOY 1.00 1.00 
SAMANG 1.00 1.00 
MDR Free SAMBOK 0.18 0.28 
SAMBOUR 
SANGKAT MUOY 
SAOM 0.62 0.51 
SDOU 
SEN MONOROM 0.64 0.64 
SRAE CHIS 0.63 0.46 
SRAE KOR 
SRAE RUESSEI 1.00 1.00 
SVAY CHUK 0.37 0.37 
TAlAT 
TAPROK 0.68 0.46 
THAlABARIVAT 0.26 0.38 
TMA KRAE 0.29 0.31 
TMA PUN 0.52 0.60 
TRAMKAK 0.32 0.32 
TRAMUNG 0.40 0.43 
TRAPEANG PREAH 
TREA 
TUEK CHROV 0.33 0.43 
ANlONG VEAENG 0.13 0.15 
ANSA CHAMBAK 0.71 0.59 
BAK CHENHCHIEN 0.22 0.19 
BOENG REANG 0.58 0.30 
CHAMKAR LUONG 0.96 0.83 
CHHEAN MUKH 0.69 0.68 
CHI KHA KROAM 0.50 0.50 
MDR Suspected CHI KHA lEU 0.43 0.4~ 
or Confirmed CHOAM KHSANT 0.18 0.21 
DANG PEANG 0.50 0.49 
DANG TONG 1.00 1.00 
KAMPONG KRAENG 0.64 0.54 
KAMPONG SElLA 0.19 0.20 
KANTREANG 1.00 1.00 
KROUNCH KOR 1.00 1.00 
lUMTONG 0.49 0.74 
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HHI on antimalarial sales HHI on antimalarial sales 
Stratum Commune Name 
values 1 volumes1 
LVEA KRANG 0.72 0.62 
MEAKPRANG 
OU BAK ROTEH 0.26 0.29 
OU DA 0.38 0.60 
PAL HAL 0.12 0.24 
PHTEAH RUNG 0.28 0.25 
POU 0.36 0.36 
PRAMBEI MOM 0.32 0.34 
PREAH KHLAENG 0.35 0.40 
PRING THUM 0.50 0.50 
RATHANAK 0.30 0.28 
RIEB ROY 0.48 0.45 
ROLUOS 
RUOSROAN 0.62 0.73 
SAEN SOKH 0.68 0.68 
SNAYANH CHET 1.00 1.00 
SRAE AMBEL 0.30 0.28 
SRAE CHAENG 0.58 0.58 
SRAE KNONG 0.72 0.83 
STEUNG KAEV 0.58 0.60 
STUENG KACH 0.20 0.36 
STUENG VEAENG 
SVAY CHEK 
TA KAEN 0.52 0.56 
TASAEN 0.28 0.25 
THLAT 0.38 0.42 
TRANG 0.29 0.34 
TRAPEANG PLANG 0.26 0.28 
TRAPEANG TAV 
TUEK KRAHAM 0.61 0.49 
VARIN 0.55 0.51 
1 A blank cell refers to the case where the HHI could not be calculated because of total sales volumes dUring the 
week preceding the survey being null in the corresponding market 
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APPENDIX 12 Correlations between predictor variables 
HHI HHI STRATUM ACCESS RISK DOSE OUTLET GENERIC SUPPLIER OUTLET BRAND SALES 
- -
VOL VAL FORM TYPE TYPE DELIVERS LENGTH VOLUMES 
OPERATION 
HHIVOL 1.00 
HHIVAL 0.89* 1.00 
STRATUM 0.13* 0.06 1.00 
ACCESS -0.25* -0.20* 0.11* 1.00 
RISK -0.04 -0.01 0.25* -0.01 1.00 
DOSE FORM -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.06 1.00 
OUTLET TYPE 0.13* 0.12* -0.26* -0.17* -0.12* 0.04 1.00 
GENERIC TYPE -0.05 -0.05 -0.08- -0.01 -0.17* -0.14* 0.14* 1.00 
SUPPLIERS -0.09 -0.09* 0.23* 0.12* 0.25* 0.03 -0.45* -0.18 1.00 
DELIVERS 
OUTLET LENGTH -0.09* -0.05 -0.03 0.13* -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01 1.00 
OPERATION 
BRAND -0.01 -0.03 0.13* 0.04* 0.11* -0.24* -0.13* -0.16 0.08* -0.02 1.00 
SALES VOLUMES -0.07 -0.10* 0.09* 0.04 -0.05 -0.10 -0.15 0.05 0.14* 0.06 -0.03 1.00 
*indicates P~O.05 
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APPENDIX 13 Calculation of interaction coefficients 
Table A.13.1 Effects of strata on retail percent price mark-ups across market accessibility levels 
(All AM, HHI value) 
Effects in MORSe stratum compared to baseline MORF stratum 
Effect of strata across different Coefficient P-value 
strata 
ACCESSI BI LlTY _LOW 0.716 <0.001 
ACCESSI BI LlTY _MODERATE 0.716 <0.001 
ACCESSI BI LlTY _ACCESSI BLE 0.072 0.672 
Table A.13.2 Effect of strata on retail percent price mark-ups across market accessibility levels 
(ASMQ only, HHI volume) 
Effects in MORSe stratum compared to baseline MORF stratum 
Effect of strata across different Coefficient P-value 
accessibility levels 
ACCESSI BI LlTY _LOW -0.535 0.001 
ACCESSI BI LlTY _MODERATE -0.535 0.001 
ACCESSI BI LlTY _ACCESSI BLE 0.258 0.186 
Table A.13.3 Effect of an increase in market concentration on retail percent mark-ups across 
market accessibility levels (ASMQ, HHI volume) 
Effect of ~ change in HHI across Coefficient P-value 
different strata .. 
ACCESSI BI LlTY _LOW -0.980 0.002 
ACCESSI BI LlTY _MODERATE 1.765 <0.001 
ACCESSI BI LlTY _ACCESSI BLE -0.057 0.900 
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Table A.13.4 Effect of strata on retail percent price mark-ups across market accessibility levels 
(ASMQ only, HHI value) 
Effects in MORSe stratum compared to baseline MORF stratum 
Effect of accessibility across Coefficient P-value 
different strata 
ACCESSI BI LlTY _LOW -0.723 <0.001 
ACCESSI BI LlTY _MODERATE -0.723 <0.001 
ACCESSI BI LlTY _ACCESSI BLE 0.246 0.197 
Points 1) to 5) describe the model with interactions and calculations of coefficients. 
1) How are retail mark-ups affected by market concentration in markets at different levels of 
accessibility? 
• The model is: 
Yi=BO+B1 *HHI+B2*HHI*ACCESS_MODERATE+B3*HHI*ACCESSIBILlTY_HIGH+ 
B4*ACCESSIBILlY_MODERATE+B5*ACCESSIBILlTY_HIGH 
• The coefficients representing the predicted retail mark-ups Vi are: 
HHI 
ACCESSIBILITY_lOW (omitted) BO+B1 
ACCESSIBILITY_MODERATE BO+B1+B2+B4 
ACCESSIBILITY _H IGH BO+B1+B3+B5 
~ The effect of an increase in HHI on Yi in moderately accessible markets compared to 
remote markets is BO+B1 +B2+B4-BO-B1=B2+B4 
.. 
~ The effect of an increase in HHI on Vi in accessible markets compared to remote markets 
is BO+B1 +B3+B5-BO-B1=B3+B5 
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2) How are retail mark-ups affected by accessibility across strata? 
• The model is: 
Vi=BO+B1 ACCESSIBILlTY_MODERATE+B2 ACCESSIBILlTY_HIGH+ B3 Stratum MDRSC+B4 
ACCESSI BI LlTY _MODERATE* STRATU M_M DRSC+BS ACCESSI BI LlTY _H IG H * STRATU M_M DRSC 
• The coefficients representing the predicted retail mark-ups Vi are: 
Stratum MDRF Stratum MDRSC 
(omitted) 
ACCESSIBILITY _LOW (omitted) 80 80+83 
ACCESSIBILITY_MODERATE 80+81 80+83+81+84 
ACCESSIBILITY_HIGH 80+82 80+83+82+85 
~ In the MDRF stratum, compared to remote markets (baseline), the effect of being sold in 
moderately accessible markets on retail mark-ups is BO+B1-BO=B1 
-
~ In the MDRF stratum, compared to remote markets (baseline), the effect of being sold in 
an accessible market is BO+B2-BO=B2 
~ In the MDRSC stratum, compared to remote markets (baseline), the effect of being sold in 
moderately accessible markets on retail mark-ups is BO+B3+B1+B4- BO-B3=B1+B4 
~ In the MDRSC stratum, compared to remote markets (baseline), the effect of being sold in 
moderately accessible markets on retail mark-ups is BO+B3+B2+BS-BO-B3=B2+BS 
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3) How are retail mark-ups affected by strata across markets at different levels of 
accessibility? As for 2) above, 
• The model is: 
Yi=BO+ B1 ACCESSIBILlTY_MODERATE+B2 ACCESSIBILlTY_HIGH+ B3 Stratum MORSC+B4 
ACCESSIBILlTY_MOOERATE*STRATUM_MORSC+B5 ACCESSIBILlTY_HIGH* STRATUM_MORSC 
• The coefficients representing the predicted retail mark-ups Vi are: 
Stratum MDRF Stratum MDRSC 
(omitted) 
ACCESSIBILITY_LOW (omitted) BO BO+B3 
ACCESSIBILITY_MODERATE BO+B1 BO+B3+B1+B4 
ACCESSIBILITY _H IGH BO+B2 BO+B3+B2+B5 
y In remote markets, the effect of being sold in MORSC stratum compared to MORF is 
BO+B3-BO=B3 
y In moderately accessible markets, the effect of being sold in MORSC stratum compared to 
MORF is BO+B3+B1+B4-BO-B1=B3+B4 
4) How are retail mark-ups affected by accessibility across markets at different levels of 
malaria transmission risks? 
• The model is: 
Vi = BO + B1 moderate access + B2 high access + B3 moderate risk + B4 low risk + B5 moderate risk 
*moderate access + B6 moderate risk * high access + B7 low risk * moderate access + B8 low risk 
* high access. 
• The coefficients representing the predicted retail mark-ups Vi are: 
ACCESSIBILITY _ ACCESSIBILITY _ ACCESSIBILITY _HIG 
LOW (omitted) MODERATE H 
RISK_HIGH (omitted) BO BO+ B1 BO+ B2 
RISK_MODERATE BO+ B3 BO + B1 +B3 + B5 BO + B2 + B3 + B6 
RISK_LOW BO+ B4 BO + B 1 + B4 + B 7 BO + B2 + B4 + B8 
y In market at high risk of malaria transmission, the effect of being sold in a moderately 
'accessible market rather than in a remote market is BO+B1-BO=B1 
y In market at high risk of malaria transmission, the effect of being sold in an accessible 
market rather than in a remote market is BO+B2-BO=B2 
371 
~ In markets at moderate risk of malaria transmission, the effect of being sold in a 
moderately accessible market rather than in a remote market is BO+B1 +B3+B5-BO-
B3=B1+B5 
~ In markets at moderate risk of malaria transmission, the effect of being sold in an 
accessible market rather than in a remote market is BO + B2 + B3 + B6- BO - B3=B2+B6 
~ In markets at low risk of malaria transmission, the effect of being sold in a moderately 
accessible market rather than in a remote market is BO + B1 + B4 + B7 - BO + B4=B1+B7 
~ In markets at low risk of malaria transmission, the effect of being sold in an accessible 
market rather than in a remote market is BO+B2+B4+B8-BO-B4=B2+B8 
5) How are mark-ups affected by malaria transmission risk across markets at different levels 
of accessibility? 
As for 4) above, 
• The model is: 
Yi = BO + B1 moderate access + B2 high access + B3 moderate risk + B4 low risk + B5 moderate risk 
*moderate access + B6 moderate risk * high access + B7 low risk * moderate access + B8 low 
risk * high access. 
• The coefficients representing the predicted retail mark-ups Yi are: 
ACCESSIBILITY _ ACCESSIBILITY _ ACCESSIBILITY _ 
lOW (omitted) MODERATE HIGH 
RISK HIGH (omitted) BO BO+ B1 BO + B2 
RISK MODERATE BO+ B3 BO + B1 +B3 + B5 BO + B2 + B3 + B6 
RISK lOW BO+ B4 BO + B1 + B4 + B7 BO + B2 + B4 + B8 
~ In remote markets, the effect of being sold in a market at moderate risk compared to 
market at high risk is BO+B3-BO=B3 
~ In remote markets, ~,he effect of being sold in a market at low risk compared to 
market at high risk is BO+B4-BO=B4 
~ In moderately accessible markets, the effect of being sold in a market at moderate 
risk compared to market at high risk isBO + B1 +B3 + B5- BO - B1=B3+B5 
~ In moderately accessible markets, the effect of being sold in a market at low risk 
compared to market at high risk is BO + B1 + B4 + B7 - BO - B1=B4+B7 
~ In accessible markets, the effect of being sold in a market at moderate risk compared 
to market at high risk is BO + B2 + B3 + B6- BO - B2=B3+B6 
~ In accessible markets, the effect of being sold in a market at low risk compared to 
market at high risk is BO + B2 + B4 + B8-BO-B2=B4+B8 
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APPENDIX 14 
methods 
Identifying antimalarial wholesalers through two different 
Methods Bottom up Snowball census 
Provinces Number of antimalarial Number of additional antimalarial 
-district wholesalers identified wholesalers identified 
Phnom Penh 
-Chamkar Morn 5 n/ez 
Kampong Cham 
-Chamkar Leu 3 n/a3 
-Prey Chhor 1 n/a 
Kratie 
-Kraeheh Khan 7 1 
-Sambo 3 8 
-Smaeh Meanehey 1 3 
Battambang 
- Battambang 4 n/e 
-Kamrieng 3 n/e 
Pailin 
-Pailin 6 n/e 
Steung Treng 
-Thalabarivat 1 2 
-Steung Treng 6 2 
Siem Reap 
-Siem Reap 3 0 
-Varin 2 2 
-Puok 1 1 
-Kralanh, 1 2 
-Angkor Chum 1 2 
Pursat 
-Sampov Meas 1 n/e 
Takeo 
-Tramkak 2 1 
Bantey Meanchey 
-Serey Sophorn 4 n/e 
Kampong Thorn 
-Stoung 2 4 
-Baray 1 1 
-Sambo 3 0 
-Stung Sen 9 0 
Preah Vi hear 
-Tbaeng Meanehey 3 0 
-Rovieng 3 2 
-Choam Ksant .. 6 2 
Kampong Speu 
-Phnum Sroueh 1 6 
-Oudong 2 3 
-Cbar Morn 2 3 
Kampot 
-Chhuk 1 4 
-Angkor Chey 1 1 
Kampong Chhnang 
-Sameakki Meanehey 1 0 
-Kampong Tralaeh 1 0 
1 .. . ~ collected from the Ministry of Health provincial department, nlc for districts In which snowball census was refused by 
wholesalers; 3 nla for districts in which the snowball census was not conducted because of logistic difficulties during fieldwork. 
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APPENDIX 15 Performance ranking of four methods for identifying and 
sampling antimalarial wholesalers 
Methods Dimensions Score Rationale for score 
Official lists Shape of the AM chain 1 No information. 
Total AM WS in the chain serving 1 No information on outlet that WS nor on outlet stocking AM 
the study areas 
Number of AM WS operating in a 1 No information on antimalarial wholesalers. Some 
particular area information about drug outlets, but likely to be inaccurate. 
AM WS Level of operation 2 Possible to deduct rough estimates on number of 
wholesalers importing antimalarials. 
AM WS name & location 2 Location and name available for drug outlet in general only 
and lists likely to be outdated. 
Informal AM WS 1 Rarely captures informal providers. 
Affordability 4 Cheap. 
Speed 4 Quick. Best approach. 
Key Shape of the AM chain 2 Some information on overall shape but simplistic 
Informant representation. 
Interviews Total AM WS in the chain serving 1 No information. 
the study areas 
Number of AM WS operating in a 1 No information. 
particular area 
AM WS Level of operation 1 No information. 
AM WS name & location 1 No information. 
Informal AM WS 1 Unlikely for authorities to openly identify informal providers. 
Affordability 4 Cheap. May be combined with collection of official lists. Best 
approach. 
Speed 3 Quick, although requires more time than just collecting lists. 
Bottom-up Shape of the AM chain 4 Detailed information. Best approach. 
Approach Total AM WS in the chain serving 4 Provided providers use no more than 2 supply sources. 
the study areas 
Number of AM WS operating in a 1 No information. 
particular area 
AM WS Level of operation 4 Best approach. Identifies wholesalers operating at more 
than one level. 
AM WS name & location 3 Some identified, but not all. 
Informal AM WS 4 Providers willingly disclosed their antimalarial supply 
sources. 
Affordability 1 Expensive: training, pilot, fieldwork. Requires structured or 
recently updated list of antimalarial wholesalers. 
Speed 2 Time consuming if antimalarial wholesalers are located far 
apart. 
Snowball Shape of the AM chain 1 No information. 
Census Total AM WS in the chain serving 1 No information. 
the study areas 
Number of AM WS operating in a 3 Best approach but prone to refusals. 
particular area 
AM WS Level of operation 1 No information. 
AM WS name & location 4 Detailed information. Best approach. 
Informal AM WS 3 Less good than bottom up as perceived as denunciation and 
prone to refusals. 
Affordability 2 Expensive: training, pilot, fieldwork (census-like), but small 
incremental cost when combined with bottom-up method. 
Speed 1 Time consuming if undertaken as standalone (census-like) 
AM is for antimalarial, WS IS for wholesaler 
374 
APPENDIX 16 Sample of antimalarial wholesalers for comparing two different 
methods for measuring sales volumes 
Provinces District Number of antimalarial 
wholesale outlets sampled 
Kampong Thom Baray 8 
Prasat Sambo 4 
Santuk 1 
Steung Sen 12 
Stoung 3 
Preah Vihear Rovieng 4 
Tbaeng Mean Chey 5 
Choam Ksant 4 
Siem Reap Siem Reap 1 
Kralanh 2 
Angkor Chum 1 
Puok 1 
Varin 3 
Banteay Mean Chey Serey Sophorn 4 
Battambang Battambang 5 
Kamrieng 3 
Kampong Cham Chamkar Leu 1 
Pailin Pailin 5 
Pursat Pursat 1 
All areas 68 
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APPENDIX 17 Sample of antimalarial retailers for comparing two different 
methods for measuring sales volumes 
Provinces Sub-district Number of antimalarial retail 
outlets sampled 
Kampot Kaoh Sia 18 
Srae Chaeng 9 
Kampong Kraeng 12 
Koh Kong Stueng Veaeng 6 
Srae Ambel 35 
Kampong Seila 27 
All areas 107 
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